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Abstract
Financial Change and European Society
The selected works deal with the nature of the financial changes taking place in
Europe over recent years and with their social consequences. The approach is
critical of many of the financial developments which have taken place, in terms
of the dangers they pose to employment relations, to both individual economic
security and social security and to economic and employment stability. At the
same time, however, it has been argued that many of the most important finan-
cial changes have been functionally necessary supports for ongoing developments
in the world economy. It is not denied that there are special financial interests
which have limited the effective performance of these functions and distorted
patterns of economic development; nevertheless it is argued that it is necessary
to regard finance primarily as a function and only secondarily as a group of
interests. Otherwise the increased power and influence of the financial sector
itself becomes hard to understand. Three particular arguments illustrate this
general position. Firstly, it is argued that critical and mainstream economists
have both failed to understand the relationship between the vast volume of fi-
nancial transactions today and structural changes in the financial system —
misunderstandings which have led to the notion of a “casino economy.” In par-
ticular, it is incorrect to treat most foreign exchange transactions as speculative.
Secondly, it is argued that the very positive assessments that are often made of
West European financial systems are out of date, that these systems as histor-
ically developed were not well adapted to the emergence of a global economy.
Thirdly, and in consequence of the first two assertions, a relatively positive view
is taken of the EU’s financial integration strategy, a central component of the
Lisbon agenda, which is regarded as a necessary response to the emergence of
a global financial system centred on the US. On the other hand, a simplistic
drive to minimise transactions costs led to the neglect of public goods of great
importance to the European social models.
The work so described, like most work related to the financial sector, has to be
reassessed in the context of the enormous crisis in global finance which broke
out in 2007. Many specific assertions will no doubt have to be revised. Nev-
ertheless, the general view adopted seems confirmed in two basic respects: the
iv
functionality of a globally integrated financial system has not been called into
question in either the academic or the policy responses to the crisis; but the
social costs — in terms of instability, inequality and inefficiency — arising from
its domination by narrow interest groups have been brutally revealed.
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Financial Change and
European Society:
Context Statement
The submitted work consists of eighteen papers, published between 2000 and
2009, which address the issue of financial changes in Europe, the origins and
logic of these changes, their social consequences and some of the policy ques-
tions which arise. The economic arguments put forward are broadly heterodox,
drawing on post-Keynesian and neo-Marxist themes, but distinguished from
much other work in the same traditions by an insistence on the necessary eco-
nomic functions of finance as well as on the interest groups involved. The social
consequences are seen as often, in practice, adverse – from the point of view
of employees, retail investors and others – but it is suggested that in a better
policy framework, these consequences could be avoided.
The papers are divided into four groups covering: important intellectual
influences; financial globalisation; financial integration in the EU; and the im-
plications for employment relations. This context statement deals with each
group in turn.
It is recognised that many of the positions taken are open to debate and
that some of them are obsolete, especially in the light of the unprecedented
crisis which broke out in 2007-8. Even when this is the case, however, the
papers might be seen as useful contributions in a complex debate.
I Influences
This first group of papers, all book reviews, illustrate some of the main influences
on the following work.
Item 1: ”Money as Sovereignty: the economics of Michel
Aglietta”, New Political Economy, 5, 2, 2000
This piece relates to what is the most important influence on these studies
– the writings of the French re´gulation school and, in particular, the work of
ix
Michel Aglietta on money and finance. The original interest of the school’s work
was perhaps that it reintroduced dynamic processes into a theoretical context
rendered immobile by a preoccupation with structuralism. The emphasis of
the school was on structural change and its notions of accumulation regime
and mode of regulation were used to support an histoire raisonne´e of capitalist
development. After the seventies the work of the school became somewhat
formulaic: on the one hand it focused increasingly on comparative problems
which tended to weaken its grasp of the general features of current capitalist
development; on the other the repetitive use of a standardised set of “structural
forms” – employment relations; monetary constraint; inter-firm relations and so
on – tended to hypostasise these concepts.
Aglietta meanwhile continued to discuss the general evolution of capitalism
and made the very correct decision to centre his analysis on monetary and finan-
cial issues. His views around 1980, just when the turn to counter-inflationary
monetary policy was taking place, were put forward in a celebrated work with
Andre´ Orle´an, La violence de la monnaie. The terminology speaks mostly of
money rather than of finance but the conceptual structure implicitly includes
financial claims because it postulates a hierarchical system of monetary claims
in which claims on the lower levels – those most distant from the socially des-
ignated money form, such as gold or the money issued by a strong state – can
be regarded as financial instruments.
A difficulty many readers had with this work is its use of the French-
American writer Rene´ Girard. Girard has made fascinating interventions across
a wide range of subjects – ancient and modern literature, biblical exegesis,
anthropology, psychology and others. But there is a totalizing aspect to his
thought which seems to require that a single set of concepts – mimesis, sacri-
fice, the scapegoat – be recognized as universally valid. Further, their universal
validity would have religious implications – Girard advances a specific version
of Christianity, although one which does not seem to make major supernatural
claims, at least not explicitly. These characteristics could raise suspicions among
the typical audience for a re´gulationniste text. The question was avoided in the
article reproduced here simply by treating Aglietta and Orle´an’s use of the Gi-
rardian apparatus as figurative. Thus there is seen to be an analogy between
two types of monetary crisis – inflationary and deflationary – on the one hand,
and two types of religious crisis – excess of immanence, excess of transcendence
– on the other.1
Another strategy might have been possible: Girard treats human desires as
essentially inauthentic; one desires (analogously, regards as money) mimetically
1Less grandiose sources might be used; anyone looking for a graphic and detailed account
of a mimetic crisis could profitably consult the Dr Seuss story, The Star-bellied Sneeches.
Girard’s oeuvre has recently been superbly debunked by Rene´ Pommier (Pommier, 2010).
It was impossible to resist the following treatment of Girard’s often portentous paradoxes:
“Quand on choisit de dire n’importe quoi, il est essentiel de le dire avec le plus d’autorite´
possible. Malheur a` l’aˆnerie apeure´e, a` la sottise craintive, a` la sornette timore´e, a` la faribole
effarouche´e, a` la baliverne circonspecte, a` la calembredaine pre´cautionneuse. L’aˆnerie se doit
d’eˆtre assure´e, la sottise suffisante, la sornette re´solue, la faribole arrogante, la baliverne
intre´pide, la calembredaine cate´gorique.”
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that which is desired by other people. One could establish a relation between
this view of human wants and the notion of alienated individuals who lack
authentic social references to help formulate their goals and ambitions.
However, the important point is that Aglietta and Orle´an use Girardian
notions to establish a qualitative account of monetary/financial crises. The
germ of their accounts is the emergence of tensions between suppliers and users
of funds at a low hierarchical level. If the problem cannot be resolved at that
level it is referred upwards. The basic decision is binary: to refinance or not
the deficit unit which is in trouble. Refinance favours the debtor and is –
potentially – inflationary. Its refusal implies pressure for a transfer of property
rights to creditors. Either strategy can succeed; either can fail; if it fails the
problem is again referred upwards where again a binary decision is possible.
Eventually critical tensions work up through financial markets and commercial
banks to reach the central bank, which stands before the same dilemma. These
processes are all characterised by imitative behaviour – thus, for example, one
refusal to refinance provokes similar decisions by others. If action at all levels –
including that of the central bank, only aggravates the tensions then the entire
monetary order is imperiled and the search begins for a new monetary object.
The authors used this simple structure to explore the background to the most
important monetary event of the present era, the Volcker shock – just beginning
as they wrote. They saw the US authorities as threatened with just such a crisis:
no one wanted to lend dollars, only to borrow them, and all agents were looking
for alternative stores of value.
Thus Aglietta and Orle´an used this simple model of financial tensions to
build complex and detailed accounts of monetary and financial problems. Both
have continued to work in the field, Orle´an concentrating on imitative behaviour
and related economic phenomena such as asset price bubbles (for example,
Orle´an, 2009), Aglietta more on monetary theory and policy. They have also
worked together again on the origins of money and on the relationship between
money and political sovereignty. A recent work by Aglietta, covering the period
leading up to the credit crisis of 2008, is discussed in Grahl, 2009b.
The value of this source for the research presented in this context statement
is that is made possible a qualitative account of financial processes which was
useful in exploring the social impact of financial change. Mainstream accounts
of inflation and deflation, because they often postulate a given economic equi-
librium independent of monetary factors, minimise the contrast between the
restructuring processes associated with each - the contrast between restructur-
ing by refinanced debtors and restructuring by creditors after the property of
failed debtors has been transferred. Yet this difference in restructuring patterns
is important in interpreting the longer run consequences, and particularly the
social consequences, of macroeconomic developments.
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Item 2: Review of J. Huffschmid, Politische O¨konomie
der Finanzma¨rkte, International Review of Applied Eco-
nomics, 14, 3, 2000
The influence represented by this review is a different kind. The candidate
worked closely with Jo¨rg Huffschmid, founder of the EuroMemorandum group,
between 1995 and Jo¨rg’s death in 2009 (for an obituary, Grahl, 2010). They
collaborated on some 12 issues of the EuroMemo – an annual critique of EU
economic policies from a left-wing position (for the work of the EuroMemo
group see www.euromemo.eu) – and in the context of two thematic networks
sponsored by the European Commission: the first, on EU economic policies in
general, coordinated by Huffschmid; the second, on the economic and social
implications of financial integration, by the candidate.
These collaborations were based on broad agreement concerning both anal-
ysis and policy proposals. However, as this review of Huffschmid’s Politische
O¨konomie der Finanzma¨rkte indicates there were also points of disagreement
which enlivened their work together (a second edition followed, see Huffschmid,
2002).
The convergence of views on analysis relates to a broad agreement on the
use of an eclectic range of postkeynesian and neo-Marxist sources; on the ad-
verse consequences of current financial developments; and on the necessity for
social control. The differences, as the last page of this item suggests, centre on
the degree of interdependence already established in the international financial
system and therefore on the appropriate strategies to establish social control.
Huffschmid suggested that many aspects of liberalization could be reversed; the
review suggests that new control systems were needed at the international level.
Behind these differences lies perhaps a difference of opinion on the functionality
of the emerging global system.
It has to be acknowledged that following remark in the review, which was
written towards the end of the high-tech boom, was hardly prescient: “these two
spheres [production and finance] may not be as completely ‘uncoupled’ as Huff-
schmid suggests (his treatment of current US conditions, where a deregulated
financial system is pouring resources into high-risk enterprises, leaves something
to be desired).” The point was made to indicate that deregulated finance did
not necessarily lead to stagnation but investors who lost their shirts on that one
might be more appreciative of Huffschmid than of his reviewer.
Item 4: Review of Dume´nil and Le´vy, Crises et Sortie de
Crises, New Left Review, 2001
This work was actually reviewed both in the original French (in New Left Re-
view) and in a revised English translation (in the Political Quarterly ; see Grahl,
2005). The first review has been chosen because it was longer and more consid-
ered. It can represent the view taken of the broad current of heterodox literature
on current economic developments. Most of the work is accepted but with one
or two disagreements and changes in emphasis.
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Dume´nil and Le´vy develop their argument from a relatively orthodox Marx-
ist crisis theory: an established pattern of accumulation reaches its limits in an
overaccumulation and profitability crisis; this triggers restructuring linked to
the devalorisation of existing capital; a new pattern of accumulation eventually
results. Finance becomes more important in the restructuring phase because
capital in monetary form confers flexibility. The authors find a precedent for
the profitability crisis of the 1970s not in the Great Depression of the 1930s
but in that of 1873-95. That too resulted in radical changes in the financial
system, leading to the formation of the giant trusts. In this new context pro-
ductivity could be raised through Taylorism and Fordism. The crash of 1929
on the other hand, resulted from the very success of the previous crisis resolu-
tion. Demand failed to keep pace with production and when it faltered a large
number of smaller enterprises went to the wall. (Dume´nil and Le´vy anticipated
very correctly similar problems of success in overcoming the crisis of the 1970s
but point out, also correctly, that massive state intervention would be used to
prevent a repetition of 1930s slump.)
The applied economics in Crises et Sortie de Crises is of a very high or-
der. The objections raised to their work in the review are to do with their
over-simplified account of agency. An undifferentiated force, finance, adopts a
similarly undifferentiated strategy, neoliberalism. Sometimes this kind of com-
pression might be simply a form of shorthand but it leads to the neglect of
important differences and distinctions. The most extreme example is probably
the description of the Volcker shock as a “neoliberal coup.” Volcker was no ne-
oliberal; he was desperately trying to stabilise the dollar in the face of a reckless
refusal by the Bundesbank to intervene in the FX market. The hike in interest
rates certainly made neoliberal measures more feasible and the continuation of
Keynesian intervention extremely difficult (as events, for instance in France,
were to show.) But it was not designed to produce these effects and Volcker
himself had expressed his preference for a more organized response to inflation.
(See the account in Grahl, 1988).
Such distinctions may be of both practical and theoretical importance. An-
other more general reservation to such work as that of Dume´nil and Le´vy can
be advanced. It is now some thirty years since the turning point marked by the
Volcker shock. Yet analysis based on Marxian crisis theory still tends to make
the profitability crisis of the 1970s its starting point. All subsequent events are
interpreted in the light of that crisis, as either expressing its continuing effects
or as potential elements in its resolution. This may tend, quite unintentionally,
to give a backward-looking bias to the theories concerned.
Influences: conclusion
It is hoped that these three reviews indicate the positive but critical view that
was taken of the main currents in the heterodox economic analysis of financial
change. Aglietta and Orle´an offer one of the most developed theoretical ap-
proach to finance, and one which establishes connections with theories of the
state; Huffschmid gives a critique of the then recent functioning of the finan-
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cial system up to the East Asian crises of 1998; Dume´nil and Le´vy integrate
their account of finance into a periodised account of capitalist development as
a whole.
All these accounts are accepted2 but with the insistence that recent financial
developments (“financialisation” - see Toporowski, 2012, for a critique of this no-
tion) have also to be seen as functional. If the major financial crisis of 2007-2009
certainly exhibits the dysfunctions of the financial system, it also, paradoxically
reveals its functionality in the high priority given to its preservation by nearly
all agents concerned. The suspicion behind much of the submitted work is that
globalisation represents, among other things, a new phase in the socialisation of
production and that it calls for deep transformations of finance. The same point
of view makes for certain reservations about the notion of neoliberalism. There
are many economic developments, expressed through markets, which cannot
plausibly be attributed to the political strategy or the ideology of neoliberalism.
II Global Finance and the Issue of Scale
This group of papers is concerned with the nature of global finance. The position
adopted, shown best in the first paper, has two main distinguishing features:
firstly, financial globalisation is seen as a basically functional development, im-
pelled primarily by economic logic rather than by political strategy; secondly,
the character of the emergent financial system is interpreted to a large extent
in terms of scale, of its immense size. The fact that emergent global financial
structures and practices tend to resemble those of the US suggests that scale
may be a key determinant of financial change - the size of the US economy, its
continent-wide extent and the number of enterprises and households involved
in its financial system may help to explain why the US system became a model
for financial relations in the global economy.
Item 5: “Sand in the Wheels or Spanner in the Works?
The Tobin Tax and Global Finance”, Cambridge Journal
of Economics, vol. 27, no 4, July 2003
This piece, jointly written with Photis Lysandrou of London Metropolitan Uni-
versity, relates to the argument of this context statement in several ways. It
was inspired by a certain dissatisfaction with, and suspicion of, the prevailing
interpretation of foreign exchange (FX) trading among heterodox economists.
This was the view that the enormous scale of FX markets was to be seen as
essentially speculative, that this market was an enormous casino. This judge-
ment was based on the fact that the volume of FX trading was far in excess
of what might be required to support international trade or even international
2In spite of the importance of these heterodox accounts, especially for an exploration of the
social consequences of financial change, it is also necessary to draw on mainstream accounts
both to understand the details of many financial instruments and procedures and to derive a
view of the functioning of the financial system as a whole.
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portfolio investment (for example, Arestis and Sawyer, 1997). It amounted to
the assertion that one of the most striking aspects of global finance was to be
regarded as completely dysfunctional. Lysandrou and the present researcher,
on the other hand, because they took a more positive view of global finance,
wondered whether a different interpretation of FX trading might be found.
The actual argument of the piece hinges on the nature of a particular fi-
nancial instrument, the FX swap, which accounts for approximately 50% of FX
turnover. The FX swap combines the spot sale of a currency with a forward
purchase of the same amount and with the same counter-party. It is important
that neither party to the transaction has any exposure to variations in the ex-
change rate3 – thus it is difficult (although not absolutely impossible) to see
the swap as a speculation. Since, on the other hand, the structure of the FX
swap is analogous to that of a repo, it can be interpreted directly as a form of
inter-bank credit, where foreign currency (usually dollars) is used as collateral,
rather than the treasury securities which are used in a repo. To the extent that
FX transactions are looked at in this way, their scale ceases to be paradoxical
because of the corresponding scale of the inter-bank money markets.
The authors related their discussion of FX to the policy debate around the
Tobin tax, but the most important implication for them concerned the globalisa-
tion process. With the emergence of the FX swap, money markets had become
globalised in that dollar liquidity could be used to support euro-denominated
transactions. This is a very different view from that which sees the same trans-
actions as purely speculative; it points to a deep transformation of financial
systems and one which in certain respects must improve their functioning: in
particular, the possibility of transferring liquidity from the US banking system
to the eurozone was presumably of significant benefit to the latter.
Before the limitations of the piece are discussed, two very different method-
ological points can be made. The first is that the interpretation of the FX swap
which was advanced could only be news to academics and other commentators.
Because the change in practice was recent, standard works on the money mar-
ket did not mention the FX swap, or only mentioned it without a clear account
of its function. Two different accounts of the lacuna in academic discussions
are suggested in the piece. The over-simplifications in heterodox discussion are
explained by commentators jumping to conclusions – financial practices were
condemned before they had been examined in detail. It is possible that similar
errors have been made elsewhere in the heterodox discussion of “financialisa-
tion” and related phenomena.
Why did mainstream economists not put forward a clear interpretation of
developments in the FX market? One factor is that mainstream finance experts
are usually much more interested in asset prices than in trading turnover –
3Such an exposure could emerge in the event of a default by the counter-party; but since
the main actors are the very largest banks in the world this is extremely rare and in any case
the exposure would usually be very small because the collateral currency is only held for a
day or two. To give rise to a loss on an FX swap the counterparty would have to default and,
at the same time, the collateral currency depreciate. It is possible that such risks became
non-trivial during the credit crisis of 2008, but that was the only occasion when they did so.
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indeed it is quite possible to find books on the FX market which concentrate
completely on the determination of exchange rates and fail to discuss turnover
at all. It is also possible that the “monetary theory of the balance of payments”
was an obstacle to a clear understanding. Any explanatory power that this
doctrine possessed has today surely been lost – in this it shares the fate of other
aspects of the quantity theory of money.
A quite different methodological point concerns an apparently trivial ob-
servation which strongly reinforced the authors’ confidence in their argument.
Looking at the most recent treatise he could find on the money market, Lysan-
drou came across a note to the effect that, in the big banks involved, the FX
swap dealers did not sit on the FX desk but on the money market desk. This
makes perfect sense – there is no reason why someone arranging an FX swap
should be particularly concerned with the exchange rate. If the interpretation
put forward in the piece had been wrong, however, the same simple remark
would have been inexplicable. Many types of evidence may prove to be relevant
to an inquiry and it is hard to predict such relevance. The present writer had a
long discussion with an FX dealer which proved not to be of much help for the
research. This was only seen as logical in retrospect – the dealer was focused
on spot transactions and hence on exchange rate movements.
A limitation of this article is that, in a sense, it only moves the problem of
financial trading back one stage. One can convincingly explain much FX trad-
ing by relating it to the money markets – but how do we explain the scale of
money market transactions? The only plausible explanation must be in terms of
security trading – the big banks which make most active use of the money mar-
kets are either trading securities themselves or providing transactions balances
to those who are. But the central phenomenon – the immense scale of security
trading itself, which is such a prominent feature of recent financial change – still
requires explanation. Some further remarks are made on this below.
Nevertheless, this piece made a contribution by arguing for a more complex
view of current financial developments and by illustrating – with the example
of increasingly internationalized money markets – the global structures which
are emerging.
Item 12: “Capital Market Trading Volume: an overview
and some preliminary conclusions”, Cambridge Journal of
Economics, 2006
This piece, again jointly written with Photis Lysandrou, can be seen as a sequel
to item 5, but a sequel which is much less successful. A central problem of the
position developed by the present author and Lysandrou is that the emergence
of a global financial system is to be interpreted as a logical economic develop-
ment. For Lysandrou the logic concerned commodification (see, for example,
Lysandrou, 2005); for the present writer it was more a question of a functional
development within a new phase of the socialisation of production.
A difficulty with the latter approach is to give some kind of functional eco-
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nomic account of the staggering growth in financial transactions, since the switch
from bank credit to security-based finance is a central feature of financial glob-
alisation. Now if the very large volume of trading on security markets has no
economic rationale – if indeed that trading is largely dysfunctional – then the
economic logic of the whole process becomes very questionable.
Thus the search for an account of security trading volumes is an important
element of the argument. Some preliminary progress, as regards both FX trans-
actions and money market transactions, is made in item 5: FX turnover can be
linked to turnover in the money markets. But money market turnover is itself to
be explained in terms of security trading – the big banks must either be trading
securities themselves or providing transactions balances to the traders. Here the
account of FX markets in item 5 leads to a certain clarification – international
money market flows do not just support international security trades. They
support security trading in general. There is no reason why the purchase of
eurozone securities by a eurozone resident should not be financed from a dollar
holding.4
It remains to explain the trading of securities themselves. The puzzle is
on the demand side – it is easy to see how technical change reduces the costs
of transactions – the puzzle is why increased supply meets such enormous de-
mand. Item 12 reviews some of the literature and reaches some very tentative
conclusions.
One preliminary point is that there is no clear association between trad-
ing turnover and volatility. Normally, the most traded assets display the least
volatility, and the same is true for markets – those with the highest aggregate
turnover exhibit the most stable prices. Item 12 concentrates on the trading
activities of institutional investors. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the period in
which the institutional investors became the dominant players on the security
markets roughly coincides with the immense acceleration of trading activity.
Secondly, their holdings are much larger than those of any other actors. How-
ever, the trading necessary to implement a passive, index-tracking investment
strategy might be rather limited; in principle, a portfolio which replicates the
whole market is self-balancing.
The paper looks at the actual strategies followed by fund managers and
perhaps succeeds in showing that their strategies - within a “core-satellite”
framework – are some distance away from a 100% passive holding of all the
stocks in a given index and that portfolio rebalancing operations might account
for a substantial fraction of security transactions.
However, the piece does not go much further. Today, it can certainly be seen
as obsolete because, somewhat belatedly, the mainstream finance literature is
starting to address the question of trading volume. As the representative agent
approach becomes somewhat less dominant, a range of heterogeneities among
agents can be taken into account which help to explain security trading.
Portfolio adjustment by institutional investors, in one form at least, can be
4Strictly speaking the dollars would be used as collateral for a euro credit but it comes
down essentially to the transfer of liquidity across currency zones.
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seen as a necessary component of any full explanation of security trading. Nagel
(2005) models the trading associated with rule-bound portfolios where the rules
relate to such equity characteristics as firm size, value and momentum. He finds
that investors following such rules must trade on a substantial scale. Of course,
this only drives the problem one stage back. Nagel writes, “one key to explaining
trading activity is to understand the forces that make investors specialize into
diverse style categories and lead them to follow heterogeneous trading rules. At
present neither the agency and industrial organization issues that might drive
the specialization into styles, nor the notion of fixed trading rules as heuristics
in investment decisions have a natural place in theoretical models of trading
volume” (pp 19-20). But his work does indicate that the regular rebalancing
operations of institutional investors contribute to the enormous trading volumes
observed in security markets today.
Of course, there was never any intention to deny that a great deal of such
trading is dysfunctional – purely speculative, or a matter of churning portfolios
to swell transactions charges against the interests of retail investors. On the
contrary, the goal was a highly critical account of current financial practice.
However, it was intended to suggest that the new structures of global finance,
including the shift from classical bank intermediation to marketable claims, are
not only a reflection of economic decadence or the triumph of special interest
groups – that there is also a functional core to the new structures.5
Although it is too early to say that this view is justified it is also too early
to say that it is wrong.6 A recent study by Alexander et al. (2010), discussing
the issue in the context of transactions taxes, leaves it open:
Academic opinion, however, is strongly divided over what utility fi-
nancial transaction taxes have in curbing excessive risk-taking and
generating sustainable sources of revenue. Proponents of financial
transaction taxes have based their views on certain assumptions
about trading and pricing in asset markets: that modern financial
markets are characterised by excessive trading activity and short-
term speculation, and that such speculation generates volatility not
only in short-term asset prices, but also in long-term asset prices
marked by persistent and dramatic departures from equilibrium.
Keynes observed that this led to the ‘predominance of speculation
over enterprise’ and led to reduced long-term investment and growth.
Accordingly, a tax on transactions in securities and other financial
instruments would increase the cost of speculative trading, especially
for trades with shorter durations, and this would have a stabilising
effect on asset prices. Moreover, the tax would generate revenue
5The approach adopted also seems to be in the spirit of Marxist theory. Marxism is about
what people have to do, rather than what they choose to do. Proletarians have to seek work;
capitalists have to accumulate. Modernity does not equal freedom. Similarly, asset managers
have to trade.
6A recent paper with Lysandrou continues this discussion in the context of the European
Commission’s proposal for a financial transaction tax (Grahl and Lysandrou, 2014). This
piece also gives a fuller survey of theories of security trading.
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needed to assist governments with fiscal consolidation, especially
during times of crisis. Opponents of transaction taxes generally
share the view that the case is flawed because it ignores the fact
that a high number of transactions – both short and long-term - are
necessary for the price discovery process to work and for the effi-
cient distribution of risk. More transactions lead to a smoothing in
asset price movements towards equilibrium, and short-term trading
is necessary to allow effective hedging and should not therefore be
limited. Any increase in transaction costs (ie., a tax) would limit
parties ability to hedge risk, thus reducing liquidity and increasing
short-term volatility of asset prices (pp31-32).
Item 8: “Financial Markets and Globalisation”, Soundings
2005
Item 8 is an expository piece, published in a non-academic journal. This context
permitted a wider, but undocumented, account of the issues involved in global
finance. Its main weaknesses are that it does not pay sufficient attention to the
issue of stability and that it fails to anticipate the massive instabilities from
2007 onwards. However, it brings together most of the elements of the position
that was worked out.
Thus the essential nature of finance is derived from disequilibrium Keyne-
sianism: since markets fail to clear, surpluses and deficits are distributed across
the market economy; only the recycling of financial resources enables market
relations to continue. Adjustment processes in market economies are best seen
as resulting from financial pressures, rather than as responses to price signals.7
The stylized view of financial history, drawing to some extent on Hicks’
(1989) A Market Theory of Money, is that early forms of finance tend not to
be intermediated and tend to take the form of trade credit. The emergence
of a distinct financial sphere is then seen as a consequence of the functional
differentiation with structural integration which typifies the modern era as a
whole. It is important that finance is interpreted in the first instance as a
function and only secondarily as an interest group. (This is by no means to
deny that finance is also an interest group, one characterised by extreme forms
of predatory and parasitic behaviour.)
From a similar point of view, global finance is seen, not as a structure brought
into being by political forces, but as a functionally necessary complement of the
global economy. This is a difficult issue because virtually all economic develop-
ments today require some form of political ratification: legislative or regulatory
reform, changes in the nature of property rights, reshaping or redirection of
7To avoid misunderstanding, it may be useful to point out that the view here is that,
although savings follows expenditure, finance necessarily precedes it. As Minsky says some-
where, “that which cannot be financed will not occur.” The exact source of this quotation
has not yet been traced; it occurs in a piece on one of the OPEC oil price hikes. Minsky
argued that the right response in the west would be to increase the tax on petrol; if people
just couldn’t afford it the price hike would soon be reversed.
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public sector agencies. However, it is still possible to see these political moves
as secondary – as driven by economic developments. Thus, one can tell the
story of financial internationalization as a sequence of political decisions and
interpret that sequence as the expression of a basically political project. This
is broadly the position adopted by Gowan, 1999, for example.
The problem with positions such as Gowan’s is that they downplay the
economic forces at work. The contrasting position taken by the present writer
is that the basic political decisions giving rise to the global financial system were
determined – not in every detail but in their general direction – by the changing
economic context. Thus emphasis would be placed on the link between the
activities of US multinationals in Europe and the emergence of the Eurodollar
system. Again, in discussing the break-up of Bretton Woods, it would be the
preceding growth of international capital flows which would be underlined.
Item 9: “Scale and the Political Economy of Financial
Change” in Jens Ho¨lscher and Horst Tomann (eds) Glob-
alization of Capital Markets and Monetary Policy, Pal-
grave, London, 2005
This piece, published in a Festschrift for the distinguished German monetary
theorist Hajo Riese, returns to this issue of scale and sums up both findings (the
money-market nature of much FX trading) and hypotheses (security trading as
perhaps a necessary aspect of global finance) before going on to consider financial
transformation in Europe, which is discussed below.
The importance of this issue can be brought out by considering current
proposals for banking reform. The validity of key proposals would seem to
depend on the view one takes of security trading. The largest banks either
trade intensively themselves, through their investment banking arms, or provide
transactions balances to other traders. The two activities, security trading, and
the provision of balances with which to do so, seem to be so closely related in
functional terms that it is unclear how meaningful it is to insist on their legal
separation. The large banks will be big holders of securities in either case –
either through their proprietary trading or as collateral against their loans to the
traders. On the other hand, if one took the view that a drastic reduction in such
trading was necessary and desirable, then the formal separation of commercial
and investment banking could be accompanied by a substantive separation with
no great disadvantage.
Similar considerations seem to apply to the notion of banks which are “too
big to fail.” If the provision of finance for security trading is an essential activity
then firstly there may be economies of scale in such provision and secondly
a reduction in banking concentration may lead, pari passu, to an increase in
interconnectedness as the inter-bank credit market takes the strain.8
8Charles Goodhart refers ironically to these two positions on structural change as the “two
mantras.” The first is: if it’s too big to fail it’s too big; the second is: commercial banks
typically combine a public utility with a casino and the two should be separated. (Oral
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The status of that market itself is also an important issue in the drive for
banking reform. Inter-bank credits make it possible to finance vast amounts of
security trading with an astonishing economy of monetary resources. If that
trading is much reduced so also will be the intensity of inter-bank credit oper-
ations (and the flows through wholesale payment systems which reflect them).
But monetary policy today works through this market so that its attenuation
could raise problems for policy implementation (of which there was a precursor
during the recent credit crisis).
The issue is now beginning to attract more attention from finance specialists
who admit that it has been neglected in the past. Choridia et al., 2008 write:
The literature on financial markets has traditionally focused on ex-
plaining asset prices, while trading activity has attracted only pe-
ripheral attention. Indeed, Rubinstein (1975), Hakannsson, Kunkel
and Ohlsen (1982), and Milgrom and Stokey (1982) suggest that
there will be no trading in a market consisting of rational agents
with identical priors. Empirical investigations of well-known asset
pricing models such as the CAPM have also centered only on the
determinants of expected returns. Yet trading activity is an inalien-
able feature of financial markets and, thus, warrants separate exam-
ination. Indeed, trading volumes are large in financial markets. For
example, the NYSE website indicates that the annual share turnover
rate in 2003 on the NYSE was about 99%, amounting to a total vol-
ume of about 350 billion shares. Assuming a per share value of $20
and a 50 basis point round-trip cost of transacting, this amounts to
a transaction cost of several billion dollars that the investing public
paid in 2003 (p3).
The CAPM paradigm tended to suggest that trading would be limited and
that buy-and-hold strategies would be widely adopted. A recent theoretical
study (O’Hara, 2003) argues to the contrary that a strategy of “holding the
market” would involve an impossible amount of trading:
A simple example can illustrate the problem. Suppose your goal is
simply to “hold the market” and you do so by holding shares in the
Russell 1000.9 How much of a portfolio-weighting problem do you
really face? Consider the 2002 Russell Reconstitution. The weights
of and companies in the index are reconstituted every July 1. On
July 1, 2002, 160 companies were added to the Russell 1000 and 113
were deleted. So at a minimum, 273 of the Russell 1000 companies
remarks of Goodhart.) It is necessary to have a clear view of the future balance between
security trading and classical bank intermediation to obtain a more useful view of structural
reform in the banking sector.
9O’Hara herself explains: “The Russell 1000 index measures the performance of the 1,000
largest companies representing approximately 92% of total market capitalization (see www.
russell.com for index details).” The web-site states that the number, 1000, is itself an
approximation, which is why more companies could come in than go out.
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changed weights from positive to zero and conversely. Another ap-
proximately 840 companies had their relative weights change. Is it
really the case that holding the market is straightforward? Even an
equal-weighted strategy of trying to hold one share in every company
misses the mark substantially; pursuing a value-weighted strategy is
a task worthy of Sisyphus (p130).
Global Finance: Conclusion
The issue of security trading volume is still, at present, open. However, enough
has perhaps been said to show that the scale of security trading is an incom-
pletely understood phenomenon, important for monetary policy and banking
regulation and that a better understanding is necessary for an accurate char-
acterization of what heterodox economists call “financialisation.” The contri-
butions under review have the merit of pointing out the importance of the
question within an account of global finance which, unlike many other hetero-
dox accounts, stressed the economic logic and the functionality of many of these
developments. Many radical proposals for financial reform seem to be based on
the expectation that a lot of genies can be coaxed, or forced, back into their
bottles – international capital mobility, the proliferation of derivative instru-
ments, competition between different financial sectors and so on. To the extent
that recent developments are functional, such expectations appear somewhat
implausible.
III Financial Integration and the Lisbon Agenda
The item just considered ends with reference to the European situation and
the rest of the pieces submitted concern European developments. At the end
of the 20th century the European Commission formulated an ambitious plan
for financial integration, the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP, comple-
mented by the Venture Capital Action Plan, VCAP). The FSAP soon became
a key component of the Lisbon Agenda, a comprehensive strategy for the first
decade of the present century which won unanimous support from member state
governments.
Item 11: “Financial Integration in the EU: Policy Issues
and Proposals”, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 17,
2006
Although this piece is dated 2006, it was written before the other articles on the
FSAP. It sketches out the main issues as they were perceived at the beginning
of the research; these did not change in terms of broad outline, but, as will be
seen, each of them was characterised more accurately and in more detail as the
research proceeded. The view taken was that financial integration was a rational
and indeed indispensable policy in the EU but that it ought to be combined
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with flanking policies to secure certain public goods. The reason integration
was perceived as necessary relates to the discussion above of security markets:
it was thought that the process of globalisation would confirm and intensify
the switch from classical bank intermediation to security market based finance.
If this were the case then the EU could be disadvantaged. As the point was
put more than once in the selected articles, if the EU did not build big, liquid,
capital markets, it would simply drive every investor and issuer on the planet
into the North American ones. However the dangers of uncontrolled integration
were also pointed out. The key issues here remained the same throughout the
discussion:
• The impact of the change on corporate strategy and possibly on employ-
ment relations within the enterprise. Initially this possibility was under-
stood in a somewhat simplistic way, which identified such consequences
of financial change with the shareholder-value model of the enterprise.10
Today, it seems more accurate to discuss the economic pressures on the en-
terprise in terms of financial market capitalism because, while shareholder
interests as such do not seem to play a determining role in corporate strat-
egy, nevertheless capital markets impose more constraints on corporations
than in the past. It is also necessary to interpret some aspects of the
drive for shareholder value more in ideological than in economic terms
(see especially item 10, discussed below).
• Interactions between financial change and social security reform. The cen-
tral issue here is the transfer of pension provision from the state to the
institutional investors and the security markets, although there are pres-
sures for such change also in other fields, such as care for the elderly.
Nearly all EU member states have reformed their pension systems in this
direction in recent years and were strongly urged by the Commission to do
so. There are at least two obvious problems: the risks involved in depen-
dence on the security markets; and the distributional effects of the shift
which seems bound to increase inequalities because it will gear pensions
to savings rather than to income.
• An obvious issue is that of economic stability. Security markets had dis-
played considerable instability even in the years before this piece was writ-
ten and therefore there was a case for regulatory and supervisory measures
to limit instability.
• A final issue concerns consumer protection. This gradually came to seem
increasingly important over the decade since the FSAP was launched. It
concerns not so much the performance of the wholesale markets them-
selves as that of the institutional investors (often including the big banks)
which give households access to diversified portfolios. The Commission
10The candidate, together with Paul Teague, had contributed to a symposium on share-
holder value published in Economy and Society in 2000, but their own paper (Grahl and
Teague, 2000) did not deal specifically with financial issues.
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adopted a relaxed attitude towards such issues. This raised at least two
concerns. Firstly, the Commission seemed to treat the retail finance scene
in Britain as a model for the EU as a whole. Now a whole series of reports
and enquiries, often by insiders, have demonstrated that retail finance
serves British households very badly. Secondly, the Commission took a
very different position on regulation in this sphere than elsewhere. In
labour market and employment regulation, in environmental protection,
in issues of consumer safety it has always been possible for individual
member states to adopt higher standards than those promulgated by the
EU. The Commission, however, vigorously combated what it now called
“gold-plating” in the field of retail finance.
As is shown below, these themes would be further developed, but item 11 was
the first of the listed items to raise them. It has to be acknowledged, however,
that the key issue of mortgage finance was not addressed until late in the day.
The deregulatory moves of the Commission were certainly criticised11, but the
massive implications for stability were not perceived. Many scholars concerned
with employment relations shared this blind spot – the interest in corporate
finance, which seemed to have more direct implications for employment relations
led to neglect of real estate finance although the latter is very much larger and
therefore has much greater potential effects on stability
Item 7: “Problems of Financial Integration in the EU”,
Journal of European Public Policy, December, 2005
This piece, jointly written with Paul Teague, makes several points about the
financial integration strategy which are also made in some of the other sub-
mitted publications. One factor stressed here is the impressive political unity
with which the FSAP (Financial Services Action Plan) was adopted. It was
unanimously endorsed by both EU level bodies and by member states and this
gave unusual impetus to the programme. Even so, the programme ran into
trouble in that the early legislation did not bring about much integration on the
ground. However, the reaction to these problems once again demonstrated the
high priority which all parties attached to the strategy. Alexandre Lamfalussy
was brought in to chair a committee of “wise men” charged with reorganising
the FSAP. They proposed a very streamlined legislative process, which was in
fact agreed and which successfully relaunched the integration drive.
In retrospect, of course, the political unity surrounding the FSAP and other
aspects of the Lisbon agenda seems suspect, in that it reflected a common
misperception of the US economy and of US financial practices. The paper
in question already raises the issues of social policy and of the reconsideration
made necessary by the bursting of the high-tech bubble. It is noteworthy that
Lamfalussy himself expressed reservations on the issue of stability as early as
2003. The episode is reported in Toporowski’s (2009) chapter on financial crises
11The candidate did so at a meeting of the European Economic and Social Committee in
the Spring of 2007.
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in the volume edited by the candidate. The Lamfalussy committee had argued
that:
“. . . greater efficiency does not necessarily go hand in hand with en-
hanced stability . . . Increased integration of securities markets entails
more interconnection between financial intermediaries on a cross-
border basis, increasing their exposure to common shocks . . . there
is an urgent need to strengthen cooperation at the European level
between financial market regulators and the institutions in charge of
micro and macro prudential regulation” (cited in Lamfalussy, 2003).
This is not what D.-G. Internal Market (“the hooligans” as the Dutch Labour
Party MEP, Jan Cremers, has called them) wanted to hear:
“it was politely but firmly suggested that we drop the subject” (Lam-
falussy, 2003).
Item 15: “Lisbon, Finance and the European Social Model”
in J. Grahl (ed) Global Finance and Social Europe, Edward
Elgar, 2009
This piece provides an overview of the Lisbon Agenda and of the place of the
FSAP therein. The view taken of the Lisbon Agenda was always critical but
gradually became more so as it became clear that there was no prospect of
meeting its central employment targets and that the macroeconomic regime
which accompanied it was simply inconsistent with those targets. (Some of the
material in this piece was used for an even more critical account of the Lisbon
Agenda and the way in which the FSAP was implemented. See Grahl, 2011).
This was also the era when neoliberal extremism, or hooliganism in Cremers’
terms, particularly in the case of the Bolkestein directive (see Grahl, 2007),
seemed to gain almost complete control over policy formulation in the EU.
Firstly, the climate in which the agenda was adopted was little short of a
moral panic. There was a complete misreading of the US growth performance
at the time of the high-tech bubble. It was seen as imperative to imitate some
features of the US economic system – although these did not include its strong
preference for expansionary macro policies. Secondly, the social dimension of
the EU was completely instrumentalised in the strategy; labour market policies
were given a supporting role in promoting the “competitiveness and dynamism”
of the “knowledge-based economy.”
Within the financial sphere itself, the Lisbon Strategy put almost exclusive
emphasis on lowering transactions costs, on making Europe, in the notorious
words used by the Commisson in its report to the Stockholm Council, “the
cheapest and easiest place to do business in the world.” Only subsequently was
it realised that cheap business is not always good business. The consequence
was a neglect of essential public goods linked to finance. The most important of
these is certainly economic stability; however, in the research project concerned
(see Grahl, 2009a), this was addressed by other scholars: Jo¨rg Huffschmid, Jan
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Toporowski and Dominique Plihon. Thus the following five pieces concentrate
on other public goods menaced or impaired by a financial integration: well-
ordered employment relations; consumer protection; and social protection. The
exclusive focus on transactions costs necessarily led to this neglect of public
goods. It can also now be seen as a contributory factor in the financial debacle
of 2007-8 and the heavy involvement of EU banks in the collapse.
Item 17: “Finance and the Household” in J. Grahl (ed)
Global Finance and Social Europe, Edward Elgar, 2009
This piece returns to the issue of retail finance. It draws for the most part on
British documents because the British scene was most known to the author.
This procedure seems justified, however, because market-based finance plays a
much bigger role for households in Britain than in other EU member states12
and it is clear that the Commission was aiming at an expansion of market-based
provision throughout the Union. Before the events of 2007 it also adopted a
markedly deregulatory approach.
It is extremely easy to document serious malfunctions in British retail fi-
nance, using reports from the Treasury (for example, Myners, 2001) and from
the Treasury Select Committee of the House of Commons (for example, Trea-
sury Select Committee, 2004). (These are quantitative failings – products and
services which do not give value for money. In terms of the form and man-
ner in which services are provided, the lamentable way banks and institutional
investors often treat their customers can be seen by glancing at the personal
finance columns of any British newspaper.)
In preparing, with two colleagues, a report on financial change for the GUE
group in the EP, Grahl et al., 2002, some conclusions had already been reached.
Huffschmid summed these up as: caveat venditor – the seller is responsible.
Regulatory authorities in Britain had already been forced into such a position in
some notorious cases of “mis-selling.” In our view this should become a general
principle in retail finance and is the only effective way in which the asymmetries
in both knowledge and power between financial firms and individuals can be
addressed: corporate providers of financial services should be required to consult
very seriously the interests of their customers; if they fail to do so they should
bear most or all of the resulting losses.13
The issue relates to broader discussions of financial reform. These usually
12The Netherlands is a possible exception, since it also relies on the accumulation of securi-
ties to fund its pensions. By most accounts the Dutch pension system outperforms the British
one, with a lower charges by the fund managers and a certain pooling of risks among scheme
members.
13As this context statement is revised for submission yet another example arises in the
conduct of Lloyds Bank – after the crisis and in spite of a substantial public share in its
ownership. Lloyds employees were offered the carrot of substantial bonuses and threatened
with the stick of demotion or dismissal to encourage them to sell unwanted risky investment
products to the bank’s customers. The Finncial Conduct Authority imposed a fine of 28 million
(Financial Times: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/567a23a0-6247-11e3-99d1-00144feabdc0.
html#axzz2nZnpljq8)
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refer to operations at wholesale level, but one method of reducing the size of
the financial sector and lowering the costs of intermediation would be to lower
the fees and charges paid by retail customers.
Thinking on how this might be done seems might point to a need for stan-
dardisation. Retail finance, especially in Britain, is characterised by extreme
forms of product differentiation, with the usual consequences of a failure to
achieve scale economies and high marketing costs. Until recently, arguments for
product standardisation (as opposed to standardised selling practices) were met
with the claim that this would inhibit innovation. Today, a less sanguine view
is taken of financial innovation – in reality, most innovations in retail finance
involve either spurious product differentiation or scams – and a more effective
system of consumer protection may become possible (although one also observes
the fierce resistance of established financial interests, for instance in the struggle
to reform financial advice in Britain).
Item 17 makes clear that the Commission, until very late in the day, pushed
for rapid market-led integration of retail finance even when this menaced con-
sumer protection. The most striking example is the drive by D.-G. internal
market (aka “the hooligans”) to integrate EU mortgage markets. Since, at the
time, there was sufficient integration of wholesale finance to roughly equalise
mortgage interest rates across member states, it was impossible to base this
policy on the prospect of cost reductions. Instead it was based on the promise
of greater consumer “choice.” This story is recounted in more detail in Grahl,
2011 where it is shown clearly that the Commission was aiming at the intro-
duction of a sub-prime mortgage market in the EU, a project only abandoned
when the corresponding US market collapsed.
The candidate and a colleague who had also participated in the FISC project,
in evidence published by the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee,
drew some conclusions about the Commission’s current attempt to assume con-
trol of financial regulation. Nothing in the Commission’s past record, which is
one of reckless integration at the expense of effective control, justifies such a
pretension (Frangakis and Grahl, 2009).
Item 14: “The Official Case for Financial Integration” in
J. Grahl (ed) Global Finance and Social Europe, Edward
Elgar, 2009
This piece, also a product of the FISC research network, addresses another as-
pect of EU policy-making in general and of the Lisbon strategy in particular.
It was jointly written with the young German econometrician, Thorsten Block.
Block was primarily responsible for a detailed examination of several technical
papers published by the Commission which predicted very great gains from the
FSAP. Block’s findings were that these studies combined state-of-the-art econo-
metric modeling with heroic assumptions and that their optimistic conclusions
depended crucially on the latter. The candidate put Block’s assessment into a
wider examination of the official case for financial integration and referred to
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a previous case of similarly optimistic forecasts in the studies around the 1992
single market programme. The overall conclusion was:
The European Commission frequently resorts to the purchase of
technically sophisticated but basically tendentious studies from com-
mercial research organisations who seem to know very well what
their paymaster wants to hear. Over time, this practice can only
serve to further undermine public confidence in, and public respect
for, the European project (p148).
The case of sub-prime mortgages for the EU, referred to above, provides
another sorry illustration of the same practice: Grahl, 2011 documents the
massive study commissioned from one of the (most) usual suspects, London
Economics (2005), to justify this ill-considered policy.
Item 16: “Financial Markets and Social Security” in J.
Grahl (ed) Global Finance and Social Europe, Edward El-
gar, 2009
As suggested above, the financial integration policies built into the Lisbon
agenda tended to downplay all the public goods which might be affected by
the market creation process. This piece deals briefly with another example of
such public goods, namely social protection. Only old age pensions are discussed
although it is suggested that similar forces are at work in the provision of health
care. On pensions, the very influential World Bank (1994) Report, Averting the
Old Age Crisis, crystallised the view that more intense pressures on pension
systems resulting from population ageing (or asserted to do so) would be best
met by a qualitative change in the nature of these systems. The “first pillar”
of provision, state pensions financed on a PAYGO basis, should play a smaller
role, focused on minimum standards. The second and third pillars, funded pro-
vision on an occupational basis organised by employers and on an individual
basis by fund managers, should expand to fill the gap. The switch was justified
by the need to strengthen public finances, and, in several countries, to increase
the savings rate. Other motives might be a desire to replace public by private
provision and to expand the role of the security markets.
In practice a very big obstacle to this kind of reform in countries with sig-
nificant PAYGO systems is the potential cost of transition which would require
one generation to pay both for its parents’ pensions and for its own. This might
be one reason why reforms in the suggested direction, although they took place
throughout the EU, went furthest in the CEECs. The Commission strongly
supported this direction of reform although competence for pensions systems
remains largely with the member states. However, it is possible to detect an
inflection in Commission policy after the stock market crash of 2000/2001 and
subsequent scandals in corporate finance. It was still insisted that coming pres-
sures on public finance necessitated deep reforms but now a kind of self-financed
funding by governments was also recommended. These should move quickly to
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large budget surpluses in order to cover the deficits which would be needed when
the bill for population ageing fell due.
The piece in question here has no conceptual originality but records some of
the most important factors in the EU’s pension policies. It rehearses, with ref-
erence to European developments, some of the strongest arguments against the
World Bank position. The dimensions of the ageing crisis may be exaggerated,
and, in any case, the pressures involved may relate more to a shortage of em-
ployment than to an excess of older citizens. An alternative to a changed ratio
among the three pillars might be parametric change in state provision (in prac-
tice, this has probably been the most important type of reform). The second
pillar has been weakened by the degradation of many employer-based systems
(by now a virtually universal shift from defined benefit to defined contribution
provision among big US and UK companies) while the third depends on both
the questionable practices and performance of the fund management industry
and the vagaries of the securities markets. There are also major distributional
problems with reform in the recommended direction. Funding of pensions on
an individual basis through the accumulation of financial assets would tie pen-
sions very closely to wealth rather than to income and this would make pension
provision much more unequal.
All these points remain valid but two further considerations can be added.
On the one hand, on the basis of the very strong expansion of the fund manage-
ment sector over recent decades it does seem likely that their role will increase.
However, it would be best if this expansion took place without the very large
and inequitable tax breaks which the sector currently enjoys and if the main
task undertaken was to provide, without subsidies, for individuals with higher
incomes who are not satisfied with a state-run system which should become
more redistributive and only pay pensions up to the level of average, or perhaps
median, pension incomes.
Secondly, a sceptical note can be sounded on projects for transformational
pension funds (for instance Blackburn, 2002) which, drawing on the original
objectives of the Meidner proposals in Sweden, see the accumulation of equity
stakes by workers’ funds as a way to change the balance of power between em-
ployers and employees. This is a revolution which would depend on a prior
restoration. Before equity stakes could be used in this way, it would be neces-
sary to transform the actual relation between top management and shareholders
to put the latter back in the saddle. Surely the multiple corporate and financial
crises of the last decade have confirmed the dominance of control over owner-
ship. The classic account – amply reaffirmed across the years – of the modern
corporation by Berle and Means (1932) describes the Faustian pact by which
dispersed shareholders abandoned their putative control rights in exchange for
liquidity – for the right to exit quickly from their investments via the organ-
ised markets. The weakness of current movements for “activist” shareholding
indicate that today’s fund managers make the same fundamental choice: they
want the companies they invest in to be transparent but will resist any close
involvement in corporate decision-making since that would impair their ability
to trade on what is now an enormous scale (Aglietta and Re´be´rioux, 2005).
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Item 3: “Globalised Finance and the Challenge to the
Euro”, New Left Review, March/April, 2001
This piece, revised from a professorial lecture, is the earliest attempt to ar-
ticulate the general argument running through all the papers submitted. The
occasion was a substantial depreciation of the euro against the dollar shortly
after its introduction. This is attributed to capital flows to the US, a judgement
which still seems valid. However, the main thrust of the paper is elsewhere;
it attempts to challenge certain views, widespread in heterodox theory, about
finance. One way this is done is by suggesting that there are limits to Granovet-
ter’s (1985) famous argument on the social embedding of economic relations. It
is certainly true that economic transactions may be facilitated by the existence
of social affinities between the transacting parties – it might be easier to deal
with your brother-in-law than with a complete stranger. However, the rule of
US finance (“arms-length” finance, as it is characterised by Rajan and Zingales,
2003) that anyone can play, also has advantages. An arms-length system
can expand into the most varied social contexts without difficulty. In contrast
the “embedded” systems of Western Europe – based on national or regional
identities or on political or confessional allegiancies – may not be able to ex-
pand easily beyond the social milieux in which they originated. The various
Western European systems were described here as a “cluster of particularisms.”
No doubt this was somewhat exaggerated – the remark was made to emphasise
the possibility of an alternative to the usual view of embeddedness.
Financial Integration and the Lisbon Agenda: Conclusion
The publications discussed here cover the weaknesses of the Lisbon agenda re-
lating to its financial dimension. The discussion is like a performance of Hamlet
without the Prince of Denmark in that the most important and central weak-
ness, the neglect of financial stability, is not dealt with. This is because, as
pointed out above, in the context of the FISC project, that issue was dealt with
by others. However, enough has been said to suggest that the FSAP and other
financial integration policies were pursued to the neglect of other important
public goods: consumer protection and social protection (a third example, the
impact of financial integration on employment relations systems, is discussed in
the next section).
This neglect can be plausibly attributed to the ideology prevalent in the
Commission (and most member state governments) in the first decade of the
new century which saw market-based policies as the solution to every problem
and radically underestimated the role of regulation, intervention and public
institutions. In the financial sphere itself one result can be seen in the extremely
high leverage ratios of EU banks prior to 2008 and their massive exposure to
the sub-prime debacle. Thus the current banking crisis in the eurozone was, at
least to significant extent, made in Brussels.
The same extremism marked other aspects of the Lisbon agenda, especially
in the Bolkestein proposals for service sector integration (Grahl, 2007). How
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comprehensively the Lisbon strategy failed is perhaps not yet fully appreciated.
Consider the central targets for employment growth. Between 2000 and 2007
three quarters of the employment growth achieved in the eurozone was concen-
trated in five countries – Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal – all of it
dependent on unsustainable capital flows and more than all of it subsequently
lost. Thus the apparent, very transient and partial, success of the strategy was
due not to the good functioning of the monetary union, but to its defects, to
the massive misallocation of capital which it engendered.
Since the EU’s “2020” strategy for the second decade of the new century
quite closely resembles the Lisbon agenda – at least as regards employment
– it is difficult to be confident about its prospects of success. At the same
time the present discussion might indicate that there is no easy solution in a
backward direction. Monetary integration in the EU has accelerated financial
integration which, however badly it has been managed, still corresponds to a
functional necessity in a global financial system where interdependence has been
intensified, not attenuated, by the crisis.
IV Financial Integration and European Employ-
ment Relations
The papers grouped here deal, in particular, with the potential impact of fi-
nancial change on EU employment relations. This is generally seen as negative
but it is suggested that this need not necessarily be the case – that the nega-
tive impacts relate more to simplistic accompanying measures by the European
Commission and member state governments than to financial integration as
such. All of this debate, including the candidate’s own contributions, focused
on corporate finance and neglected the huge imbalances building in real estate.
Item 6: “The Eurozone and Financial Integration: the in-
dustrial relations issues”, Industrial Relations Journal, 34,
5, December 2003
This piece, jointly written with Paul Teague, is only partly centred on financial
integration. The first half discusses what was at the time a better-known issue,
namely the consequences of monetary union as such, and the consequent loss
of macroeconomic instruments at member state level, for wage bargaining and
employment relations. One judgement in this section, that there would be no
strong move towards international coordination of bargaining, seems to be borne
out by subsequent developments, while a second, that monetary union would
not fragment and “Americanise” employment relations, proved valid up to the
eurozone crisis and the drastic reshaping of labour markets in the worst affected
countries.
It is only the second part of this item (published in 2003) which addresses
the issue of financial change. The treatment is schematic and, in at least one
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respect, simplistic. It is correctly asserted that the FSAP and the drive for
financial integration was at the same time a drive for financial transformation
and that this transformation involved a decline in the use of classic bank cred-
its by big corporations and their increasing reliance on the security markets.
However, the identification of this shift with “shareholder capitalism” certainly
needs to be qualified. It is probably more accurate to speak of “financial market
capitalism.” The increased role of the security markets in corporate finance, and
the consequent change in the character of the financial constraints on corpora-
tions, are not in doubt. On the other hand, the claim that in the transformed
system the interests of shareholders are paramount seems in retrospect to have
more to do with corporate publicity than corporate reality. Many things are
justified by the need to serve the interests of shareholders, but repeated stock
market crashes and a host of “principal-agent problems” in the linkages from
the ultimate suppliers of capital to the managements of the corporations which
deploy it call into question the actual primacy of shareholder interests.
Nevertheless the piece does point to some indicators of new pressures on em-
ployment relations. One of these concerns corporate structure: when finance is
supplied through organised security markets the investors tend to put a higher
weight on the transparency of corporations closely focused on their central activ-
ities and a lower weight on the risk reductions linked to conglomerate form, since
effective risk-spreading can be achieved by portfolio diversification. A related
pressure concerns employee relations – market-based finance does not abolish
stakeholder coalitions, but it tends to narrow them, excluding those employees
who have no critical influence on profitability.
This was an early consideration of the theme. The next two items make the
account of financial change more concrete and specific.
Item 10: “Financial Change and European Employment
Relations”, in James, P. and Wood, G. (eds) Institutions,
Production and Working Life, OUP, December, 2006
This piece, a chapter in a very loosely integrated book of essays, covers a lot of
ground and many of its main themes are addressed in the publications discussed
above – this is the case for example with the issue of scale in security markets.
Here the discussion of trading volumes is dealt with as part of a critical exami-
nation of the notion of financialisation, which is perhaps invoked too frequently
to account for various current socio-economic developments. Likewise, there
is an attempt to limit the notion of neoliberalism, and to argue that not all
market-driven developments can be attributed to neoliberal political strategies.
Although the piece continues to refer to “shareholder capitalism” the ac-
count given of financial changes is more precise than in the candidate’s earlier
work. A critical reading of the work of Michael Jensen had made it clear that
certain aspects of corporate finance were linked to specific conjunctures in the
US economy. As US corporations in the 1970s and 1980s faced strong challenges
from Japanese and German rivals, an increased role for the capital markets was
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advanced as a restructuring strategy for US industry14. Jensen’s earliest for-
mulations did not in fact advocate an active role for dispersed shareholders –
he was very much the guru of the leveraged buy-out, by which corporate own-
ership could be reunited with corporate control in order to eliminate the waste
and inefficiency resulting from irresponsible management (seen as a “principal-
agent” problem). Only when the drive for unrestricted LBOs reached certain
limits (crisis in the junk-bond market, scandals associated with some corporate
raiders, reintroduction of legal constraints on takeovers) did Jensen’s emphasis
fall increasingly on governance issues: dispersed ownership might remain but
changes in governance could perhaps reduce conflicts of interest between man-
agements and shareholders. Maximisation of the value of companies (and thus
of returns to shareholders) was seen as the key to efficient use of resources.
By the end of the 1990s, and in the wake of the dot-com bubble, this position
also became obsolete. A key issue now was the overvaluation of companies on the
stock markets. When this happens, the capital markets can no longer be seen as
limiting and disciplining corporate leaderships. On the contrary, the ability to
issue equity at unrealistically elevated prices eliminates such external discipline
and permits all kinds of malfunction and excess. Jensen now became concerned
with the quality and authenticity of communication between the corporations
and the capital markets. One of his later articles has the title, “Just say no to
Wall Street” (Fuller and Jensen, 2002).
Item 10 looks at the response of EU leaders to the evolution of US and
global finance. It attempts to distinguish a rational core in EU policy – pursuit
of financial integration, recognition of a wider role for securities markets – from
the completely uncritical acceptance of any and every US precedent. The mood
at the moment when the Lisbon strategy was formulated is described as one of
“moral panic.” A perceived gap in productivity growth between the EU and
the US called every aspect of the European models into question15. Breakneck
Americanisation, especially of financial processes, was the actual content of the
push for the “knowledge-based economy.”
As regards employment relations, an important case was the Commission’s
position on takeovers. D.-G. internal market once again proved worthy of Jan
Cremers’ epithet as they proposed a complete liberalisation, ignoring the signif-
icant problems that had arisen with liberalisation in the US. One Commission
document included the staggering sentence: “The disposal of securities concerns
only the owner of those securities.” This was in the context of corporate re-
structuring where the purchase of a controlling equity stake can radically affect
all the stakeholders in the enterprise involved. By a tied vote the EP rejected
the Commission’s draft and the legislation actually passed did not make big
changes to the status quo.16
14There are interesting and ironic parallels with some Marxist accounts of capital restruc-
turing presented at roughly the same time.
15In retrospect it seems that US productivity performance was greatly exaggerated (Cowen,
2011).
16The Commission deplored this decision in the EP. In the Netherlands in 2007 the candidate
heard a speaker from D.-G. internal market assert that corporate governance was a matter for
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On the basis of the distinction made above, between the rational core of
financial integration and the sometimes unbalanced and simplistic way in which
it has been pursued, the piece argues that “more ambitious European strategies
are possible which would combine the construction of an integrated financial
system with effective measures for its social control.” This hope remains but
recent developments have done nothing to justify it.
Another aspect of this piece is that it makes explicit something which is
implicit in most of the publications submitted: a critique of the “varieties of
capitalism” position. A general suspicion that this approach exaggerates the
importance of differences among advanced economies and, correspondingly, un-
derplays the general forces at work across all of them has been reinforced by
the observation of rapid financial change in many cases. The “varieties” ap-
proach evokes path-dependence and institutional complementarities to suggest
that distinct socio-economic models can coexist over long periods. The rapid
transformation of the German financial system in the first years of the present
century calls both notions into question. If institutions are complementary to
the extent that change in a single sphere would lead to serious problems else-
where, how was it possible to transform the German financial system virtually
overnight, and without provoking obvious malfunctions elsewhere? Likewise, if
the shape of institutions is narrowly constrained by their history, how could so
much financial history be rapidly written off? It seems that most important
players – institutional investors, corporations and banks – were agreed on the
need to move to a much more market-oriented financial system. (For a detailed
assessment of the move see Streeck and Ho¨pner, 2003.) A key reform to enable
them to do so was the abolition of capital gains tax on the cross-holdings of
equity among banks and big industrial companies.
If advanced capitalist systems do not preserve their institutional identities
in the way sometimes suggested in the “varieties” literature, then the notion of
hybridity referred to in this item becomes indispensable in comparative studies,
as does the recognition of strong general tendencies across systems. It is natural,
when general trends seem politically and socially adverse, to search all the harder
for exceptions. But exceptions are not necessarily solutions.
Item 18: “The Impact of Financial Change on European
Employment Relations” in J. Grahl (ed) Global Finance
and Social Europe, Edward Elgar, 2009
This item is a slightly later examination of the same theme as in the previous
one. The notion of shareholder value is now presented as threefold: new di-
rect financial constraints on the enterprise, arising from the enhanced role of
security markets; a corporate ideology, disguising the persistence of managerial
capitalism in the assertion that corporate power is exercised in the interests of
member states “provided minority shareholders were protected.” The qualification makes the
main clause vacuous since minority shareholders are almost bound to profit from unrestricted
takeovers. There is no logical basis for such solicitude – minority shareholders presumably
know what they are doing when they buy into a closely held company.
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proprietors; and, deriving from both of these, standards of conduct and rules of
governance.
Once again, a distinction is made between the broad economic pressures for
financial change in Europe and the policy response of the Commission, with the
takeover directive again the main example of the latter.
The impact of financial change on employment relations is schematic but
locates the most negative aspects more to shareholder doctrines than to actual
market constraints. The only empirical material referred to relates to the single,
but very important, case of Germany. Major changes in share ownership had
occurred very recently, with a dissolution of cross-holdings and the entry of
foreign investors. However, it was difficult to separate out the effects of these
changes from other adverse pressures on employment relations, notably those of
the Hartz reforms.
The outbreak of massive financial crisis in 2008, after all the texts above
had been drafted, revealed many blind spots. In particular, scholars concerned
with employment relations were led to focus on corporate finance, rather than
other aspects of financial change simply because corporations, as employers,
were central actors on the labour markets and in employment relations. This
focus in practice led to the neglect of the theme which was stressed in some of
the earlier submitted publications – that of scale. According to Federal Reserve
data, at end 2007, on the eve of the crisis, outstanding mortgages in the US
totalled $14.46 trillion. This compares with $3.73 trillion in corporate bonds
and $5.01 trillion in Treasury securities (Federal Reserve, 2013, Table L2).
North American real estate is the largest financial market in the world. Its
scale explains firstly why it could absorb so much speculative capital before
the bubble burst (high-tech enterprises could not absorb a fraction of the same
sum even with internet entrepreneurs working day and night to organise IPOs).
Its scale likewise explains the dimensions of the consequent crisis, of which the
impact on employment and employment systems dwarfs any of the direct effects
of specifically corporate finance discussed above.
Item 13: “Global Finance after the Credit Crisis” Journal
der Entwicklungspolitik (Vienna), 2009
This is a slight piece and at one point it was thought better to drop it from the
submitted work. It was retained because it is the only submitted text written
after the financial collapse of 2008 and because it deals, admittedly in a very
simplistic way, with a key conditioning factor in any consideration of financial
change: the cost of capital. As Michael Jensen himself now recognises, economic
restructuring via capital market pressure depends on capital scarcity. In the
1980s investors could pressure enterprises to either declare very high profits or
to return capital because the very high interest rates obtainable on government
debt gave them an obvious alternative. This is no longer the case.
In principle a decline in interest rates might be expected to reduce the hurdle
rates of return required from productive investments and thus to increase the
demand for labour. Established norms and conventions within the financial
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sector may have delayed such an adjustment (Plihon, 2002, explores the possible
role of such conventions in the high-tech crash of 2000-01).
The reasons for the present abundance of capital are clearly of enormous
importance, as is the question of whether such conditions can be expected to
continue. There are considerable disagreements, even as to the role of real forces
as against monetary ones in the present situation. One view is that a major
factor has been Chinese savings and that, as China moves to a more autocentric
path of development, capital costs will again rise (McKinsey, 2010).
The issue perhaps indicates the limits of the whole discussion above. Finan-
cial structures and mechanisms have their importance, but financial conditions
depend more on interest rates and asset prices than on particular structures
of intermediation. On the other hand, there are no signs that the process of
financial globalisation will be reversed nor that the enhanced role of security
markets will be called into question.17
Financial Integration and European Employment Relations:
Conclusion
The survey here of the impact of financial change on European employment
relations does not reach strong conclusions. It is relatively easy to specify some
pressures on corporate strategy, such as the preference of investors for out-
sourcing. It is much more difficult to assess the weight of such pressures in
overall changes in employment relations since the latter are over-determined by
a host of other factors, notably transformations in the international division of
labour, public policy and macroeconomic fluctuations. It is also necessary to
take specific national factors into account. The criticism here of the notion of
strongly identified varieties of capitalism and the emphasis on general trends
in advanced economies certainly does not imply uniform developments across
countries – rather it sugests that comparative work explore various forms of
hybridity in institutional change.
Overall Conclusion
Financial change has become an important factor in overall socio-economic
change in recent decades. The papers grouped here have attempted both to
interpret financial change and to make that change more widely understood.
The basic view taken was that finance has to be interpreted both as an inter-
est group, or a set of interest groups, and, especially, as a function. Thus the
functional aspects of financial globalisation were stressed, with one consequence
admittedly being that dysfunctional aspects, although they were repeatedly dis-
cussed, were underestimated. On the other hand it could be argued, even after
the massive crisis of recent years, that heterodox writers, especially those in
17Indeed, it seems likely that higher capital requirements and other constraints on the banks
will encourage further securitisation (oral remarks of Charles Goodhart).
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the Marxist tradition, are sometimes too ready to privilege the crisis in epis-
temological terms. Crises are supposed, no doubt correctly, to reveal flaws,
inconsistencies and antagonisms concealed by economic upswings. However, it
is hard to make full use of the lessons of the crisis unless one is also ready to
learn from trends and developments in more “normal”, more stable, periods.
To call into question the epistemological privilege attached to crises might be
one value of the work presented here.
The empirical context of most of the contributions is the European Union
and here it was argued that integration was a basically rational strategy, in spite
of the many criticisms of the way in which integration was pursued. Today, this
central position is open to question. Once again, however, the contrarian view
adopted here might not be without value. At present there is a widespread
condemnation of the monetary union as illogical in its very foundations. One
implication of the arguments summarised above might be that monetary in-
tegration and the financial integration it necessarily implies were and remain
basically rational strategies, in spite of the debacle resulting from their actual
implementation.
Whether or not these judgements are valid, it is hoped that the papers, taken
together, can be seen as a useful and in some aspects original contribution to a
very necessary debate.
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REVIEW ESSAY
Money as Sovereignty: The Economics
of Michel Aglietta
JOHN GRAHL
In 1982, in a work then considered baf ingly unorthodox, Michel Aglietta and
Andre´ Orle´an attempted to use the anthropologica l speculations of Rene´ Girard
as a basis for monetary theory (La violence de la monnaie, hereafter VM).
Sixteen years later they have returned to the scene of the crime in a new attempt
to establish such anthropologica l foundations (La monnaie souveraine, hereafter
MS).1 Meanwhile, both authors, but especially Aglietta, have drawn on the
original theoretical structure to inform a wide range of monetary studies: on the
role and origins of the central bank, on European monetary integration, on
instabilitie s in international  nance, on international monetary regimes. This
literature can be seen as contributing to a radical Keynesian account of monetary
phenomena:  rstly, because it adds, to the central Keynesian insight of uncer-
tainty as the determinant of liquidity preference, a corresponding theory of the
determination of the monetary object itself, that is, of the birth and death of
monetary systems; secondly, because it explores the extra-economic conditions
which in uence the stability of monetary orders. Largely because much of this
material remains untranslated, it is not well known outside France.2
This review essay undertakes a critical examination of this body of work. It
is organised as follows. There is  rst a discussion of the origins of Aglietta and
Orle´an’s  rst theoretical synthesis, which is followed by an examination of their
 rst major work (VM). Then a series of short sections explore the impact of this
general orientation on several substantive and methodological questions. Finally,
an examination of their most recent joint work (MS) leads into an overall
assessment of their approach.
Re´gulation theory
Although most readers in Britain and the USA know little of Aglietta’s monetary
studies, he is, of course, very well known as one of the founders of (the
best-known variant of) the re´gulation approach to capitalist economic systems,
his book, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, being a seminal source for this
literature.3 Although the re´gulation approach is a general theory of contemporary
John Grahl, The Business School, University of North London, Stapleton House, 277–281 Holloway
Road, London N7 8HN, UK.
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capitalism, it does contain some monetary theory, money being seen as one of
the canonical institutiona l or structural forms, through which particular growth
models are interpreted (the others are the employment relation, the pattern of
enterprise competition and price formation, the structure of state intervention and
the international regime). As Aglietta was contributing to the foundation of the
regulation school in the 1970s, the key monetary problem was in ation. In
general, it is probably valid to see the school’s view of in ation as a form of
cost-push theory, but certain features distinguish it from other versions of
cost-push. In particular, an interesting attempt was made to embrace the problem
of capital devalorisation . The destruction of capital values, associated with
restructuring of the productive system, is traditionally an aspect of Marxian
theories of economic crisis, but devalorisation was classically seen as a function
of general de ationary processes. Aglietta suggested that in ation could contain
devalorisation processes: if oligopolisti c price formation prevented sudden re-
ductions in price following the introduction of new technology, then  rms left
with obsolete capital equipment could withdraw it gradually from production; if
this happened on a widespread basis it would tend to increase in ationary
pressure to the extent that the restructuring projects of the laggard enterprises did
not turn out, in the event, to be fully successful; in this event, the elimination of
obsolete capital would have taken place but have been accompanied by a certain
socialisation of losses to all the holders of nominal assets through a rise in the
general price level; clearly an accommodating monetary policy was a necessary
support of the price formation process which was postulated.4 This interesting
conception contrasted with more orthodox Marxist approaches which tended to
see in in ation merely the deferral of an inevitable de ationary crisis and not a
process which could be in some ways a functional equivalent to the latter.
Subsequent work by Aglietta was increasingly specialised on monetary ques-
tions.5
The use of Girard
The appeal to the anthropology of Rene´ Girard which was made by Aglietta and
Orle´an in VM met widespread hostility, partly no doubt because Girard’s
doctrines of the sacred appeared to be a celebration of irrationality .6 No attempt
will be made here to assess these doctrines.7 All that will be done is to pick out
a few key notions used by Aglietta and Orle´an. Human beings are seen as having
no intrinsic or naturally authentic desires; their lack of such authentic being
impels them to imitate others in the attempt to  ll this void; this imitative
process, however, if not controlled by institutions , will be reciprocated by the
other person chosen as model, who thus becomes a rival, and tends to generate
violence between them. The social institutions—at least in early societies,
religious institutions—which could control this violence emerge from violence
itself as it spreads contagiously just through the originally assumed process of
mimesis or imitation.8 This is because, at its paroxysm, violence tends to become
focused on a single victim who is destroyed or exiled. The sacralisation of the
excluded victim can bring a precarious peace as there now exists a transcendent
model of desire removed from everyday life so that the latter can be reoriented
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to the pursuit of profane objects without triggering immediate and dangerous
rivalries. Rites and rituals endeavour to repeat this sacri cial crisis in a benign
form, for instance by using surrogate victims or symbolic representations whose
ef cacy depends on their being misunderstood by the participants; but the sacred
is a fragile institution and can fail either through the desacralisation of the
chosen/excluded victim, who thus no longer serves as a model, or through too
intense a commitment to rites and rituals which cease to be symbolic represen-
tations of the original crisis and become bloody repetitions.
Now some of the shock value of VM arose from the solemnity with which the
writers assured us that their use of this colourful narrative was not  gurative.
(The preface to the second edition of VM, however, establishes a certain
distance from the Girardian world-view.) It is more practical for present
purposes to side-step this perhaps embarrassing claim and to see what features
of the Girardian story attracted Aglietta and Orle´an as metaphors for monetary
processes. One can brie y recapitulate the speculative historical schema, inspired
by Attali,9 which leads from ritual to money. Attali’s narrative has a Hegelian
triadic pattern. Aglietta and Orle´an use it as follows. In primitive society,
institutionalise d by ritual and sacri ce, there is no real money because desires for
being are focused not on things but directly on other persons and their conduct.
In a second era, the monarch or sovereign emerges as a more stable institution -
alised representative of the sacred excluded/elected victim: here money has a
secondary status as re ecting the monarch and his sacred prerogatives. Finally,
in mercantile society, with the kind of long-distance exchange relations explored
by Braudel, money escapes the control of the sovereign and becomes in itself the
primary embodiment of wealth.10
In Aglietta and Orle´an’s use of the Girardian image there are clear analogies
with Hobbesian politics: sovereignty (a recognised monetary system) emerges to
regulate the unlimited struggle to seize wealth (accaparement) which would
otherwise prevail in modern society. By diverting the keenest desires for wealth
on to a special object excluded from everyday production and consumption, the
monetary order permits these activities to embrace a host of lesser, profane,
objects shielded from the most acute rivalries. The key difference with Hobbes,
however, is that the sovereign’s peace does not arise from a covenant; the myth
of a social covenant is seen from a Girardian point of view as a typical
obfuscation of the true, that is, violent, origins of social order; rather do peace
and stability emerge from the bellum omnium contra omnes itself—through the
coalescence of all the feuds and enmities in society into a unanimous attack on
an excluded and subsequently sacralised victim. The analogy is clear: specu-
lation, as uncontrolled imitative rivalry in the search for authentic wealth, is the
violence which menaces modern economies; but it is this speculation itself, when
it becomes the unanimous pursuit of a single asset, which gives rise to the
monetary order; the latter may then be able to cool speculative passions and
divert them into the production of profane, non-monetary goods. This duality
might be represented as contagion/convention : conventions control and subdue
violent speculative contagions, but the origins of convention (misrecognised by
those who follow it) are to be found in exactly the same kind of imitative
behaviour which produces contagion.11 The resulting view of the economy is
293
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
idd
les
ex
 U
niv
ers
ity
], 
[Jo
hn
 G
rah
l] 
at 
03
:31
 16
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
3 
John Grahl
radically monetary and in this way connects with other theories inspired by
Keynes: there are no intrinsic use-values naturally given to the human conscious-
ness; in an inversion of traditional doctrines of a real economy, other goods are
regarded as wealth because they represent money, the supreme but socially
de ned object of desire.
In the genesis of the monetary order it is, contrary to standard theory, the unit
of account function which is primary—that is, the  rst step is to de ne what the
sacred, excluded/elected, object is to be. Then comes the store of value function
because acquisition of money is now the socially recognised path to wealth; this
determines the production of goods for monetary exchange so that the standard
derivation of functions is turned on its head.
Monetary orders conjure destructive speculation but never eliminate it, so that
fundamental crises are always conceivable. These can take two forms. To use the
analogy with religion again the god of money can fail either through an excess
of immanence (money becomes a banal, omnipresent, object easily obtained and
loses its special status—in ationary breakdown) or through an excess of tran-
scendence (money becomes unobtainable , completely removed from concrete
economic activity—de ationary crisis). Although these breakdowns have com-
pletely opposed forms, they are nevertheless fundamentally uni ed, alternative
expressions of the same inability of the monetary system to absorb changes in
the production and distribution of monetary wealth.
Centralised and fractionated systems
The logic of the Girardian analogy having been summarised, it is possible to lay
out in more concrete terms the view of monetary systems which is developed by
Aglietta and Orle´an in VM. The simplest form would be a homogeneous system
within which money consists entirely of claims on a central authority (a useful
analogy is perhaps 100 per cent reserve banking).12 This would be the most
direct embodiment of money as an institution—a special asset, excluded from
routine production and consumption activities. The form is, however, too pure
because it overstabilises the capitalist economy by obstructing the transfer of
property. Private debt is absent so that the monetary constraint faced by de cit
units is connected directly to the issue of central money which is managed by
the central instance. However, when de cits and surpluses swell surplus agents
have no immediate claim on the assets of debtors, only a growing holding of
central liabilities which may come to seem a simple appropriation if transfers of
property are blocked. In this structure the primary form of monetary constraint
is the ability of de cit units to settle their balances in central money. The
time-horizon over which this constraint must be met is centrally managed.
Money here is a pure public good.
At the other extreme, we can consider the fractionated system (syste`me
fractionne´). Here, although a unique central money still exists, it does not play
an active role in  nance where there are a host of competing private issues (the
corresponding analogy might be free banking). In this system, private means of
exchange appear in the course of the bilateral transactions among decentralised
agents and are thus purely endogenous. Monetary constraints take the form of
294
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
idd
les
ex
 U
niv
ers
ity
], 
[Jo
hn
 G
rah
l] 
at 
03
:31
 16
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
3 
Money as Sovereignty
the liquidity of private credits—their convertibility into central money—but the
time horizon over which this constraint operates is determined by the creditors
themselves. It is intrinsically unstable because of the imitative tendencies of the
latter and can become impossibly short in times of panic, preventing debtors
from clearing their positions with commodity outputs and forcing them either to
settle in central money or to cede property. Money here is essentially the basis
for private property transfer.
Viable systems, respecting the ambivalence of money as public good and
private asset, must be heterogeneous. In the hierarchical system (syste`me
hierarchise´) we see the coexistence of centralised relations ( nance of de cit
positions by the issue of central money) and private credits. The two are related
through a set of secondary moneys in the strati ed form of a pyramid. The
convertibility of these into central money guarantees their acceptability within
their particular spheres of circulation, where they set the monetary constraint
(balance between  nancing and adjustment of de cits) for agents at a lower
level. It is the differentiation of the system which gives scope to private
initiatives while its centralised instance, product of, but distinct from, private
interests, uni es the space of commodity exchange. Because central money does
not enter into all credit relations it is shielded from the mistrust which would
otherwise arise whenever a particular de cit position becomes untenable.
The dialectic of homogeneous, fractionated and hierarchical systems seems a
well-developed framework in which to approach such questions as the endogene-
ity of money or the relations between central and commercial banks. It forms the
basis of a discussion by Aglietta and Orle´an of monetary crises.
In ation and de ation
It is an aspect of the monetary concepts elaborated in VM that monetary
disorders, whatever their technical complexity, have an inescapable social and
political content. Money is a sovereignty, a political structure which constitutes
the market system. ‘The monetary question is a fully political question.’13 At
stake in the transformation of such systems are the reallocation of property and
the nature of restructuring processes.
The text of VM examines,  rstly, pure forms of crisis, those in which
adaptations fail to restore stability and in consequence lead through cumulative
processes to a complete breakdown of the monetary order. It is not, however,
suggested that such pure forms are typical of monetary history; more usual are
situations where instability is limited and controlled. The difference hinges on
whether restructuring initiatives by creditors or debtors succeed in isolating
disturbance or whether in contrast the de ationary or in ationary impulses return
to their initiators in an aggravated form, beginning a vicious cycle which leads
to spreading instability. The mark of in ationary crisis is centralisation:
re nance,  rst by powerful intermediaries but  nally by the central bank, shields
embarrassed debtors from property transfers to creditors and extends the horizon
over which they may attempt to restructure their positions. It is centralising
because it protects the economy as a whole from the brutal severance of
established exchange relations. The success of such debtor-led restructuring can
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lead back to stability and a gradual reorganisation of stable credit relations. Its
failure on the other hand will multiply the initial pressures on intermediaries. A
study of the hyperin ation in Weimar Germany is used to illustrate this logic:
contrary to quantitativis t interpretations, the crisis is seen as running through
distinct phases with differing macroeconomic characteristics: the functions of the
Reichsmark are impaired in a speci c sequence as it ceases  rstly to be a unit
of account, then a store of value and only at the very end a means of exchange.
It is at the second stage, for instance, that the exchange rate begins to drive the
in ationary process much more rapidly than any consideration of money
quantities would render plausible. The culmination of the process is a unanimous
 ight towards hard currency as an alternative form of monetary wealth; through-
out the process the division between debtors and creditors forms the basis of an
underlying social con ict; the refusal of big industrial debtor interests to bear
any large share of the public debt accumulated through the First World War
conditions the inability of the authorities to establish a coherent stabilisation
project.
The decentralising and de ationary character of creditor-driven restructuring
is examined in less detail in VM because it had already received de nitive
treatment in the works of Keynes and the Keynesian school. In this case the
hierarchical structure tends to collapse into the fractionated, rather than the
homogeneous, system. Debtors are here exposed to drastic transfers of property
under pressure from creditors: correspondingly , investment time horizons are
drastically curtailed towards the imperative of immediate settlement. Although
pure cases, leading to the breakdown of the monetary order, are rare, a canonical
example is offered by the demonetisation of gold as international money during
the Great Depression. It is important to note that the two types of crisis are not
simple opposites. This is because both centralisation and decentralisation of
credit relations are possible responses to the same types of tension between
borrowers and lenders. Also, in both cases the cumulative exacerbation of the
initial disturbance leads ultimately to the demonetisation of the previously
established central money and the de nition of a new monetary object through
the working out of the crisis itself. In both cases the gradual loss of differen-
tiation among economic agents and the spread of their imitative behaviour as
they seek for secure forms of wealth, culminating in the unanimous  xation on
a new elected/excluded asset, drives the crisis from one phase to the next.
Money and socialisation
A somewhat later text, uncluttered with Girardian imagery, gives a clear view of
the implications of the VM analysis for the socialisation of agents in a
commodity economy.14 Three approaches are contrasted (and represented
conveniently in  gures). The Walrasian system (see Figure 1), with its well-
known requirements, such as the complete transparence of exchange relations,
has to suppose that the desires of economic subjects are already given. This
naturalist option implies what Aglietta calls the postulate of nomenclature.15
Here ‘nomenclature’ designates a complete list of commodities, something
like an idealised industrial classi cation, which speci es in advance all the
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Figure 1. The naturalist option: subjects are elements of an objective nature. They do not enter into
intersubjective relationships.
qualities of commodities entering the exchange process, so that only the
quantities endowed and exchanged remain to be determined. Thus the very  rst
move in standard General Equilibrium (GE) theory, that is, to write down a
vector of goods which is supposed to be known to every agent, already
represents a conceptual error from the point of view of monetary theory. To
escape from this a priori structure and to introduce the problem of intersubjec-
tive relations, ‘it is necessary to put exchange at the origin: in the beginning
there are no subjects already furnished with objective preferences; in the
beginning is exchange. Desire is not the desire to overcome the obstacle of
natural scarcity; it is the desire to exchange, that is to acquire a subjective
economic identity by entering into direct relations with someone else’.16
On the other hand, the simple confrontation of two individuals (see Figure 2)
does not resolve the problem of socialisation . Con ict (this text no longer says
‘violence’) is inherent in such a situation because successful exchange depends
on the conjectures formed by each agent vis-a`-vis the other. Since it is
illegitimate to presuppose that the nature and intensity of individual desires is
given as common knowledge, this unmediated exchange leads to an in nite
regress, a game of mirrors where each party has to anticipate reactions which
themselves depend on the anticipation of his own anticipations. Merely multiply-
ing the number of such parties does not represent a solution unless one returns
to the naturalist axioms of GE theory. The historical solution to the problem of
socialisation in individualis t societies is represented by money as a social
institution which breaks the symmetry of the exchange process. ‘An agent
proposing an object for exchange now only enters into relation with a possessor
of money, that is, not a double [model and rival, JG], but an individual who
represents for the seller a social reference. For the buyer has in his hands money,
the homogeneous mediator of any and all exchanges.’17 This confrontation
admits of a quantitative adjustment between the price assigned by the seller and
that accepted by the buyer (see Figure 3).
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Figure 2. Failure of socialisation: individuals, exposed to the ‘game of mirrors’ of their
intersubjectivity, are unable to form a social linkage.
Now  nancial tension is inscribed in this structure because nothing guarantees
that the sums realised in monetary exchange will equilibrate the accounts of the
participants. Rather, the emergence at any speci ed time of de cit and surplus
units is inevitable. ‘Far from being an appendix of the real economy,  nance is
the nervous system of the economy as a whole.’18 Consideration of the recycling
problem which emerges then leads to the dialectic of homogeneous, fractionated
and hierarchical systems described above. The last of these is the only viable
Figure 3. The monetary option: through the mediation of the monetary institution (the collective
instance) individuals are able to give social expression to their subjective evaluations and to enter
into direct relations by payment (exchange of every economic object against money).
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system over time. On the one hand, there must exist collective rules to determine
the issue and destruction of money; on the other, these rules are better defended
if the central issuing instance is not directly involved in the  nance of (or refusal
of  nance to) individuals in de cit.19 Thus the decentralised exchange economy
becomes possible through the existence of a vertical, monetary, relation
alongside horizontal exchange. The con dence in the monetary object which this
requires is assured by its symbolic representation of the social totality (although
it should be noted that this later text seems to recognise a variety of possible
forms for such symbolism, which is no longer traced to sacri cial ritual).
Applied studies
Following the appearance of VM, a large number of applied studies of monetary
questions illustrated how its basic conceptual structure might help to elucidate
concrete issues in monetary economics. It should be noted, however, that these
studies never simply repeated the original analysis and that they were in uenced
by the contributions of other writers, especially those in the Keynesian tradi-
tions.20 As responses to emerging questions of monetary policy through the
1980s and 1990s they are also conditioned by particular conjunctures. Neverthe-
less, it may be useful to examine brie y some of the themes addressed with a
view to their relationship with the vision of monetary processes presented in
VM.
The Volcker shock
One can begin by addressing a key monetary phenomenon which in uences
Aglietta’s response to most contemporary monetary problems; the dramatic
swing in US policy in the autumn of 1979 which is associated with the tenure
of Paul Volcker as chair of the Federal Reserve System. US policy is discussed
in considerable detail in VM itself and, although this text was too early to
incorporate the actual virage brought about by Volcker, it gives prescient
indications of the issues at stake. The discussion develops through a critique of
monetarist doctrine to a heterodox interpretation of the in ationary pressures
which precipitated the revolution in central bank doctrine and practice. The
in ationary conjuncture of the late 1970s in the USA is presented as the triumph
of debtor interests over the formulation of monetary policy.
As debtor-based restructuring failed to restore the bases of the postwar growth
model, centralising policies became increasingly in ationary. Differentiation
among  nancial agents and instruments was eroded so that the partially con-
trolled disintermediation by which monetary restriction had been able to slow
in ation in the 1960s became an ineffective weapon.21 The loss of differentiation
was also expressed by the increasingly universal indexation of credit instruments
on short-run money market interest rates, so that the authorities could no longer
use distortions in the spectrum of rates to limit credit expansion and were left
only with the crude weapon of a drastic increase in rates as a whole.
However the Volcker shock is evaluated, it took place in a conjuncture where
the impairment of the dollar’s role as a store of value was tending to produce
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uncontrollable waves of speculation in surrogate ‘moneys’—real estate, oil
reserves, gold and, above all, foreign exchange. Aglietta’s analysis of the
destruction of con dence con rms the view expressed by Hicks: it is a misun-
derstanding of Keynesian theory to believe that one can lock agents into
productive investments by depriving them of a liquid asset; what rather results
is a  ight from both real productive assets and from  nancial assets denominated
in terms of the unit of account; a search, increasingly imitative and unanimous,
for an alternative money.22
The turning of 1979, later characterised by Aglietta as a ‘revolt of the
creditors’, represents a break in postwar monetary and economic history even
more signi cant than the break-up of Bretton Woods in 1971.23 Governments
and private agents are still coming to terms with the regime of high interest rates
and creditor-controlled or creditor-sanctioned restructuring which it inaugurated,
but the origins and nature of the Volcker shock are still insuf ciently explored.
It is indicative of the prescience of much of Aglietta’s work that he identi ed so
early the scale and signi cance of this discontinuity .24
Internationa l monetary regimes
The title of Aglietta’s short book, La  n des devises cle´s (The End of Key
Currencies), refers,  rst, to the decline of sterling and dollar hegemonies in
monetary history and, second, to the possible disappearance of all such hege-
monic structures from the international monetary scene in the future. Inter-
national monetary systems can be regarded as a privileged  eld in which to
examine the analysis of VM because the absence of a world government means
that the monetary object cannot simply be designated; it must rest on the
(imitative) interactions of agents. When the monetary object is not given from
outside, liquidity depends on con dence in the sense of a relation of individual
agents to the totality of the exchange economy: ‘as with every collective
phenomenon which is the result of public opinion, con dence in a particular
form of liquidity is extremely changeable if it is not anchored in commonly
accepted rules and guaranteed by credible authorities’.25 ‘Con dence in money
means postulating that it will be accepted inde nitely and that in consequence
it will guarantee the continuous and potentially unlimited realisation of com-
modity relations … Con dence in money is con dence in the perpetuity of the
commodity order beyond the horizons over which individuals calculate.’26
The analysis of the sterling-centred international gold standard and of Bretton
Woods as dollar hegemony corresponds to most accounts in seeing the former
as a system of capital mobility, eventually undermined by monetary nationalism,
the latter as a system of national monetary autonomy, destabilised by capital
mobility.27 It is suggested, however, that there is one basic similarity in the crisis
of the two hegemonies: ‘the key currency only has organising capacity to
develop the pattern of international division of labour within which it acquired
its hegemonic status, only to diffuse the growth model of the country which
issues it, to the extent that this country possesses technical and social conditions
of production more advanced than elsewhere’.28 This historical limitation,
however, is not seen as a real ‘fundamental’ which determines monetary
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developments so much as a source of rivalries which can release the destabilis-
ing forces latent in international systems, where the primacy of common rules
over competitive arbitrage is always fragile.
Aglietta argues that the reference to gold during the period of sterling
hegemony did not involve any calculated assessment of the stability of its
purchasing power so much as an unshakeable faith in its intrinsic value, what he
calls a religion of money. Thus the long secular price swings of the 19th century
were not re ected in variations in long-term interest rates as would be expected
if agents were calculating in terms of purchasing power rather than simply
accepting the validity of nominal magnitudes. The strength of the monetary order
does not result from its capacity to answer every possible challenge of specula-
tive attack but from a con dence, often based on mistaken interpretations, which
puts the monetary object beyond question.
As opposed to this religion of the 19th century, monetary nationalism,
associated with the assertion of social priorities against the commodity economy,
represented a certain desacralisation of money.29 Convertibility under Bretton
Woods became an instrument of macroeconomic policy rather than a respectful
tribute to the nominal value of private contracts. However, as with the break-
down of the convertibility rules of the gold standard, market interactions cannot
build a new monetary organisation. ‘The institution of a new principle of
convertibility , on which new rules and new structures arise, is not an economic
process. It is an act of sovereignty. ’30
While the collapse of the gold standard was a classical decentralising crisis,
the aftermath of dollar hegemony is characterised as an international debt
economy, in which no rules limit the externalities emerging from uncoordinated
national policies and in which  nancial functions and the trade-off of yield and
risk are distorted by the absence of a clearly de ned international monetary
asset. ‘When the monetary is reduced to the  nancial, disorganisation prevails.’31
The brief restoration of US hegemony in the early 1980s, when for a few
years the US balance of payments again became the main source of international
reserves, having failed, the way forward is considered. Aglietta cites Keynes on
the desirability of a supranational system, but regards this as only a solution in
the very long term. His view is that in the near future a system of institution-
alised cooperation among the major economic groupings is both possible and
desirable.32 A more recent paper ampli es this argument.33 Neoliberal interpreta-
tions of international monetary phenomena are considered inadequate because
they rely on the a priori assumption of controlling, ‘real’, fundamentals and
misapply the model of perfect competition to interactions among currencies.
‘Imitative behaviour can dominate the in uence of any exogenous factors.’34 In
contrast an attempt is made to apply network theory to the pattern of inter-
national payments; infrastructural economies of scale can lead to a strong
concentration on a single currency, but information structures may tend to a
certain regionalisation of payments functions. As in standard theory, each
country has to trade off monetary autonomy, exchange rate stability and freedom
of capital movements. But it is argued that viable international monetary regimes
must display a certain convergence of these national choices in order to reduce
the systemic risks (see below) to which decentralised structures are exposed.
301
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
idd
les
ex
 U
niv
ers
ity
], 
[Jo
hn
 G
rah
l] 
at 
03
:31
 16
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
3 
John Grahl
Viable regimes must establish rules which are compatible with the national
social compromises lying behind the policies of individual countries and lead to
predictable, rule-governed, exchange-rate structures. While predictability for
individual agents militates in favour of relatively  xed rates, substantial
 exibility is needed to allow countries to respond to disturbances. On the other
hand, to give complete priority to adjustments at national level would make for
an unpredictable overall structure and promote self-ful lling, destabilising
speculation. The most credible international regime would be based on the
co-responsibilit y of leading currency blocs. Cooperation should be more am-
bitious and wider-ranging than the ad hoc agreements of the 1980s and should
involve interest rates as well as exchange rates. Some codi cation of mutual
obligations is seen as giving institutiona l expression to this principle of co-re-
sponsibility.
European monetary integration and the parallel currency
Aglietta has returned frequently to the issue of European monetary integration.
As the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) process became increasingly
speci ed by the Maastricht Treaty and the convergence process which followed,
some of his earlier work became obsolete in policy terms, but it is still
interesting to consider his contribution to the French argument for a parallel
currency road to monetary union because this illustrates how the abstract
analysis of VM could guide more concrete discussions.35
French advocacy of the parallel currency strategy re ected the two enduring
interests of France in EMU: to challenge both the global hegemony of the USA
and the more local hegemony of Germany over European responses to that
global environment. The development of the external role of the ECU could
become a preferred path towards closer European integration because it would
tend to preserve degrees of freedom in the internal policy of EU member
countries while transforming the nature of the external monetary constraint. The
general notion was that member states would hold reserves in the form of ECUs
issued by a central agency which would be able to de ne a common policy on
the ECU/dollar exchange rate and manage the amount and distribution of ECU
reserves. Integration would proceed from outside in, since the  rst goal would
be to articulate a united strategy vis-a`-vis non-members and then only gradually
to harmonise domestic monetary policies.
Aglietta’s speci c contribution to this debate concerned the line of evolution
needed to develop the actual ECU (as of the mid 1980s) into such a reserve
asset. It conforms closely to the logic of VM in that it focuses on the interactions
between money and  nance. In general, the  nancial function—allocation of
capital—requires monetary stability because in the absence of a clearly de ned
monetary asset as the highest form of liquidity it becomes impossible to de ne
clearly the risk/yield trade-offs necessary to allocate capital resources. This
consideration led to the view that the key weakness of the ECU was the
separation of its public and private circuits; there existed both a growing market
for ECU issues and a distribution of ECU-denominated reserves to member-state
central banks in the context of the European Monetary System (EMS), but there
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was no connection of the former to the latter. ECU reserves were necessarily
decomposed into national currencies prior to use in forex interventions. Thus no
mechanism existed through which an evolving common external monetary
policy could impact on intra-European  nancial  ows. Aglietta attempts to
de ne reforms that could overcome this design fault while leaving a measure of
autonomy to member states as regards their internal policies. The method
envisaged was to promote the private use of the ECU to make payments and the
emergence of a spot exchange market for ECUs. The latter would allow a
common monetary strategy (on the general level of interest rates and on the
average value of European currencies vis-a`-vis the dollar) to impact on and
orient the decisions of private  nancial agents. Any such reform would be
complicated by the absence of strong institutions (the European Monetary Fund,
originally seen as a complement to the exchange rate mechanism within the
EMS, had not been introduced), but an attempt was made to de ne a possible
approach. Subsequently , of course, the complete dismantling of European forex
controls made such proposals obsolete, because the margins for, even merely
internal, monetary autonomy in member countries were narrowed drastically; but
the reasoning does illustrate the understanding of monetary systems as hierarchi-
cal systems which had been laid out in VM.
It can be added that the judgement of the early phase of the EMS to be found
in this text is much more severe than the usual conclusion that forex and credit
markets were stabilised. This reduction in volatility is recognised, but is seen as
relatively super cial; behind it lies the failure of European countries to de ne a
collective response to the Volcker shock and the dramatic appreciation of the
dollar; this failure intensi ed the European recession of the early 1980s.36
The independent central bank
An essay appearing in Annales considers the origin of central banks and the
notion of their independence.37 The evolution of a dominant private bank to an
essentially public role is clearest in England but can also be seen in the USA of
the 19th century, where regional banking clubs concentrated reserves and started
to take responsibilit y for both prudential supervision and emergency re nance in
times of crisis. The US pattern of development, however, is truncated, since the
decisive step of abstracting the emergent central bank from the usual rules of
competition was not taken before legislation established the Federal Reserve
System. Aglietta relates his historical account to a theorised move from ‘free
banking’ to the modern two-tier structure—which re ects the dialectic of
fractionated and hierarchical systems in VM. Although similar readings of this
evolution can be found elsewhere,38 Aglietta insists on the political nature of the
completed process, most apparent in the central bank’s role as lender of last
resort. ‘This is an operation outside the scope of the rules of competition. There
is a violation of the market since private engagements are not respected; but the
sanction for this is suspended for an indeterminate period by a sovereign
decision, not delayed by contractual means.’39
These historical re ections lead into a discussion of the meaning of central
bank independence today. The disappearance of the ‘sacred’ reference to gold
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does, it is suggested, introduce the need for a nominal anchor as the basis for
con dence in the monetary unit, although it is not claimed that securing this
anchoring must be the only, or even the predominant, objective of monetary
policy. ‘The principle of price stability, which legitimises the independence of
central banks, is a reference framework for decision-making , not a rule which is
substituted for decisions. This reference expresses a representation of the
monetary constraint which is commonly accepted in contemporary economies
and which is institutionalised. ’40 Protection of  nance and credit against systemic
risk, and hence the functions of prudential supervision and lender of last resort,
thus remain central to the role of the central bank. It follows that two types of
discretionary action have to be possible—on the one hand, a strategic change in
the nominal anchor deployed (for example, the adoption or abandonment of an
exchange rate peg); on the other, the scope and duration of tactical departures
from the rules of emission implied by a given anchor. Independence, in
Aglietta’s account, is not an institutiona l separation of the central bank from the
executive but rather a guarantee that these indispensabl e discretionary powers
will be exercised in the general interest and not in that of particular debtor or
creditor groups. He contrasts the form of this guarantee in Germany, where the
wide contact of the Bundesbank with regional  nancial and economic develop-
ments and with savers’ associations and regional authorities makes for a certain
control over public opinion, and in Britain, where the basis of independence
(prior to the recent reforms, it must be noted) was the permanent interrogation
of central bank policy by both parliament and the press. Both structures are seen
as compatible with democracy, but the suggestion remains that con dence in the
monetary unit escapes, to some extent, from rational analysis:
The central bank furnishes a guarantee against the arbitrary nature
of the monetary sign, a rampart against nominalism. This guaran-
tee must be an intimate belief of private agents, while, however,
modern economic culture forbids us to give this guarantee the
symbolic form of a ‘natural’ reality. It is nevertheless sure that a
unanimous belief, if it is to be solid and persistent in those crisis
situations where the central bank is led to adopt policies very far
from its habitual behaviour, can only function in the manner of a
myth. From this stems its symbolic character. It is not an
exchange with individuals but a pact with society. Con dence is
not established by a contract but enacted through a ritual. The
myth consists in the belief that the institution is outside the
con icts which run through society; which gives to it the status of
an impartial mediator.41
This insistence on a certain necessary misrecognition of monetary phenomena is
a central dif culty of Aglietta’s thought and is discussed again in the concluding
section.
Systemic risk and  nancial globalisatio n
In recent years a growing number of Aglietta’s concrete studies have concerned
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the process of  nancial globalisation . These include, for example, detailed
studies of Russia and Japan which it is impossible to review here.42 But one can
characterise brie y a more abstract account of the problem of systemic risk in
globalised  nance.43 The initial discussion of systemic risk in general, with its
heavy emphasis on imitative behaviour, recapitulates some of the analysis
discussed above. The position coincides most closely with the line of post-Key-
nesian theory developed by Minsky, including the latter’s account of an
endogenous tendency towards increasing  nancial fragility. However, use is also
made of several more formal accounts of  nancial disturbance, such as ‘rational
bubbles’, the ‘peso problem’ and ‘sunspot cycles’. These models are seen as
offering particular ‘patterns’ of imitative–speculative behaviour ( gures de la
spe´cularite´); their use requires a reference to a more fundamental level of theory
which makes the unreadability of macroeconomic constraints by individual
agents the basis of an account of cumulative, imitative, destabilisation . The
derivation of central bank responsibilities—regulation, prudential supervision,
emergency re nance—from this instability follows both in theory and in evol-
utionary practice.
However, it is argued that, in industrialised countries today, ‘the violence of
 nancial crises has been attenuated to give place to “systemic risk” … if all the
elementary sources of past crises—imitative/speculative behaviour, blindness to
system-wide disasters, contagious loss of con dence—continue to be omnipres-
ent in our economies, their working has not led, for a period of now several
decades, to the appearance of chain reactions with consequences comparable to
those observed only half a century ago … systemic risk is the form taken by
 nancial catastrophe when some control over it is successfully maintained’.44
These risks, nevertheless, are seen as increasing both because of more intense
 nancial relations as such and because of growing interconnections among
 nancial systems. In this context, Aglietta, writing here with Anton Brender,
develops a typology of systemic risks.
First, breakdowns (pannes) are system failures intrinsic to the  nancial system
as such, arising as a consequence of failures in the functioning of the payments
system or of important market-makers, both of which are limited in capacity and
procedures. Both payments and market-making mechanisms can come under
increasing pressure from the volume of transactions effected by institutiona l
investors and from a phase of intense competition among markets and  nancial
centres. Some of the phenomena of the 1987 stock-market crash—programme
trading, ‘triple-witching hours’—are offered as examples.
Accidents, on the other hand, are seen as the consequences of localised
(sectoral, regional) economic failures for a  nancial system which has not
succeeded in adequate diversi cation (there is, as is pointed out, an unavoidable
tension between such diversi cation and the specialisation of intermediaries
needed for local ef ciency). On a limited scale, widespread bank failures in
agricultural states of the USA in the 1980s illustrate this kind of accident; but
the crisis of Latin American debt, following the rise of US interest rates in 1979
and the recessions of 1980–82, is also placed in this category. The previous
credit expansion towards these same countries is also seen as having involved
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speculative imitation: ‘a reading of available testimony shows indeed that in
numerous, or even in most, cases, banks extended their loans to the South, not
because they had analysed the growth prospects of each of these countries, but
because they had the idea that their predecessors in this lending had done so and
had concluded that these were promising markets’.45 The possibility that these
 rst lenders were mistaken was ruled out, even though the downturn in the
international cycle showed how delicate a matter such country risk could be;
similarly, those joining the rush into sovereign debt ruled out the possibility that
such imitation would itself subvert the premises on which earlier loans had been
made.
Finally, a drift (de´rive) is not a crisis within the  nancial system, but a
persistent failure of the latter to regulate the real economy. Examples are the
distortions which can be produced by a rapid growth of consumer credit or in
the credit available for take-overs, even if the banks and credit markets which
supply these borrowers with funds are never put at risk. A more structural
example of a drift arises from the impact of the portfolio preferences of
institutiona l investors on the relative prices of assets. In the context of globalisa-
tion, such drifts had a clearly in ationary tendency in the 1970s, but today they
seem more likely to slow down the supply of bank credits to private agents.
The general conclusion of Aglietta and Brender is that the ‘cognitive re-
sources’ of the  nancial system depend almost exclusively on the analysis of
past regularities, but that these regularities are impossible without the action of
a centralised agency which can assess the macroeconomic impact of  nancial
developments and supply necessary guidelines to  nancial agents. In present
circumstances, such an agency would have to operate on an international scale.
The scene of the crime
La monnaie souveraine (MS), published in 1998, can properly be regarded as a
collective and not merely a collected work. It is the fruit of a long interdisci-
plinary inquiry, bringing together economists, anthropologists , historians and
psychologists over several years. It rests on the elaboration of a common set of
concepts and their deployment in order to account for the monetary phenom-
enon.46
Such an interdisciplinary approach is necessitated by the basic logic of a
monetary theory of markets and by the rejection of the standard attempt to derive
money from the exchange process. If money lies at the origin of the commodity-
producing economy as a distinct sphere, then, from the point of view of
economic theory itself, money must be presupposed and only a widening of the
inquiry to other social sciences can account for its emergence. As Aglietta and
Cartelier put it, ‘money is logically prior to market relations’ and ‘money is a
social tie more fundamental than the market’.47
At the same time, MS seeks to provide more secure anthropologica l founda-
tions than those of VM. In this respect the later work involves an attempt to
substitute a solid, empirically grounded anthropology for the speculative anthro-
pology of Girard.48 Thus the discussion of monetary phenomena in pre-modern
societies is extremely detailed and recognises a very wide variety of both social
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practice and symbolic interpretation. Nevertheless, a uni ed account does
emerge. The starting point is the notion of debt, understood as a debt of the
individual to the social totality. This totality is not to be seen simply as a power
structure but, in essence, as de ned by a hierarchy of shared values. These
values may well sanction a marked differentiation of social positions, but, since
they are values, their acceptance is a matter of authority , not of power. Since the
perception of such a debt is commonly an aspect of a religious world-view, there
is a link to Durkheim’s anthropology .
Money in general, then, becomes the means, the speci c rules and practices,
by which the obligations stemming from this social debt are discharged. Only a
few illustrative points will be taken to indicate the kind of interpretation to
which this leads. The study of a Melanesian society by Daniel de Coppet reveals
a complex monetary system of considerable sophistication .49 Flows and coun-
ter ows of money (beads made from shells) are subject to precise laws: at times,
for example, during funerary rites, there is a centralisation of money; at others,
a wide dispersion. What differs most clearly from modern societies is the
signi cance of the monetary phenomenon which is here essentially ritualistic—
monetary concentrations enact the cult of ancestors while dispersions then link
the other spheres of social life, such as cultivation, to the rites which are seen
as the highest form of existence. Charles Malamoud examines the use of money
in the sacri cial rituals of Vedic India.50 This Indo–European example perhaps
comes closest to the sacri cial structures postulated by Girard since there is a
clear substitution of monetary payments for more primitive and bloody offerings.
The census of ancient Rome, analysed by Jean Andreau, moves us much closer
to modernity since one can now detect the emergence of distinct political and
even economic spheres in society, not tied essentially to the ‘domain of the
sacred’.51 Here again, however, the claims of the social whole remain primary:
monetary assessments are part of a more general process which assigns to each
citizen his place in the polity, including his military rank; in the monetary aspect
of the census  scal obligations have primacy over any market-based evaluation
of social status.
Finally, Jean-Michel Servet discusses the transformation of monetary pro-
cesses brought about by Western colonisation in Equatorial and West Africa.52
His analysis includes an interesting account of the myth of barter in European
thought which he sees as a blindness towards the forms of social organisation
dislocated or even suppressed by the colonialists:
The barter by which African exchange systems have often been
characterised is not, as is generally claimed, a primitive, pre-mon-
etary stage revealed by the presence of the West. This expansion
of barter exchanges is a consequence of the demonetisation of the
previous systems by the colonial states and the result of the
monetary development of colonised societies subject to con-
straints or beginning with the speci c dynamic of ‘commoditised’
activities.53
No attempt is made in MS to construct an overarching or universal social theory.
The social whole to which reference is made is, in every case, de ned by a
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speci c hierarchy of values. But there is a kind of second order universalism in
that, within each society, money is seen as having a general relation to the social
totality. Contributions by Jean-Marie Thiveaud and Mark Rogin Ansprach
attempt to elaborate these general relations and to prepare the way for the
analysis of modern monetary systems.54 The  rst insists on the primacy of the
 nancial over the monetary in the sense that the discharge of obligations to
society as a whole is the basic datum; the evolution of monetary practices is then
a means by which these obligations can be codi ed and organised. At the same
time, money, like the development of writing or of science generally, does
represent a certain secularisation and rationalisation of social organisation. ‘The
use of struck coins, in the distant eras of antiquity, represents one of those phases
of human evolution when knowledge and technique advance together.’55
Ansprach insists on the element of continuity between pre-modern and
modern monetary systems. This is the vertical relationship of human beings to
the sovereign social totality:
Even if we have lost sight of the sacri cial stake, the vertical axis
remains. It is still the relation to the community as a whole which
is expressed by money. But, instead of being displayed in broad
daylight, like the bead curtains [of the Melanesians] … this
relation is henceforth hidden as by a veil. The monetary veil is
interposed between exchangers and allows them to act as isolated
individuals, outside any traditional social ties. Nevertheless, it is
only by virtue of this very particular relation to the community as
a totality that individuals can behave as though the relation to the
totality did not exist.56
How are we to see modern monetary relations in the light of this revised
anthropologica l model? The task is undertaken in the introduction to MS and
three of its chapters. Firstly, the vertical relation, the debt to society, is
profoundly modi ed. Financial obligations are now broken into a multiplicity of
debts to other individual agents, even though honouring these debts remains a
social rule and one that can only be expressed through the social institution of
money. Meanwhile, the directly vertical relation between the whole and the parts
is inverted. Political structures, especially welfare states, become the debtors of
individual citizens.57 Now if these two changes were complete, then monetary
relations would indeed have become purely instrumental, tools in the hands of
autonomous individuals for whom society is merely the sum of their interactions.
The values involved, both individual liberty and equality, are individualistic .
What, however, distinguishe s our analyses from the views which
predominate in economic theory, is the recognition that it is
impossible to complete these two developments. We consider, in
effect, that this impossibilit y expresses the fundamental con-
straints which every human collectivity must respect. In other
words, the growing autonomy of the economic sphere, the instru-
mentalisation of collective institutions and the primacy of power
relations over relations of authority do not delineate a coherent
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social model. On the contrary, the latter presupposes the subordi-
nation of power relations to a principle of authority.58
In consequence, money does not arise as, but only becomes, an economic object
and this transformation is never completed; a social authority (not merely a
power centre) is required to establish and maintain its economic status. At this
point the economists make their contribution to the work as a whole.
The argument of Orle´an is essentially critical.59 He chooses the overlapping
generations (OG) model of money as encapsulating the attempt to account for
monetary phenomena on the basis of purely individualis t behaviour. In the OG
model, intrinsically useless monetary units are accepted simply because they are
accepted; this is described as a purely self-referring (autore´ferentielle) expla-
nation. ‘No form of symbolic guarantee is required. Agents perceive each other
as rational subjects moved only by the search for maximum pro ts.’60 Orle´an’s
argument, both theoretical and empirical, is that this reasoning is a reductio ad
absurdum of its individualis t premises—because of the fragility and instability
of the equilibrium which has to be assumed.
Aglietta himself, in a joint paper with Jean Cartelier, attempts a positive
characterisation of the modern monetary system, starting from the view that
money, socially given, is historically and logically prior to market relations.61
The basic task is the classical one of reconciling the decentralisation of market
economies with the economy-wide interdependence which is necessary for their
coherence. Abstracting completely from the ‘real’ commodities and assets which
enter into exchange,62 the writers seek this reconciliation in the monetary sphere,
speci cally in the workings of the payments system. Their stylised account of
payments systems is laid out in three steps.
First, the speci cation of a common unit of account; Keynes’ Treatise on
Money is cited in defence of the primacy of this concept. ‘It is through it that
relations among individuals can take a quantitative form.’63 This in turn requires
both a sovereign instance to de ne the unit and a nominal anchor to secure its
permanence. Second, the process of primary monetary issue (monnayage); it is
access to means of payment which gives, to those agents who enjoy it, their
economic autonomy. Although we can envisage this process as the coining of
specie in an idealised metallic system, in contemporary systems such access is
a question of capital. ‘In a credit system, it is the amount of capital and its
liquidity which will determine the capacity for action which individuals have in
the market.’64 Nevertheless, we  nd here also a vertical dimension: the means of
payment reveals ‘a super-individua l element, or if one prefers, a vertical relation
of individuals to an organising principle’, embodied in a clearing house or
central bank.65 Third, a viable payments system requires a principle of settle-
ment: just as was indicated above in the discussion of socialisation ,  nancial
tensions are implicit in a monetary economy since there is no reason why the
closing balances at the end of any period should correspond to its initial
monetary issues. The principle of equivalence is violated by these non-zero
balances. Their settlement, or the general acceptance of their being carried
forward, thus becomes the third component of the payments system and the only
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actual means by which the ‘sanction of the markets’ and the rule of equivalence
is enforced. Since the question is one of reabsorbing tensions in the payments
system or matrix, here again vertical relations are involved.66
Although MS, unlike its Girardian predecessor VM, does not develop an
elaborate theory of monetary processes themselves, the indications are that it
leads to a very similar account of monetary instability and of centralising and
decentralising crises—now denoted, in more orthodox terms, as a loss of
nominal anchorage on the one hand and systemic risk on the other. What is
attempted is an account of the general condition of con dence which holds
critical factors at bay. Con dence is seen as having three key forms.67 Hierarchi-
cal con dence is the most familiar of these since it can be identi ed with
con dence in the central bank as a sovereign authority, in its competence and
reliability. Methodical con dence applies to the level of market agents them-
selves and derives largely from the routine and repetitive nature of transactions.
It can perhaps be related to the notion of trust among economic agents. The term
‘methodical’ is used because this trust rests on ‘suspicion, scepticism, mistrust,
in nite procedures of assurance and reassurance, the work of inquiry and
supervision’68—thus counterparties are trusted because methodical procedures
hold them to their undertakings. Once again, breakdowns in con dence can
propagate rapidly through imitative processes, just as imitation spreads
con dence and tends to promote it from the individual to the collective plane.
Finally, ethical con dence results from the perceived conformity of monetary
institutions to the (individualist) ethic which prevails in market societies; it
corresponds to the belief that the authority of the central bank will be used to
reinforce and not to threaten the continuity of contracts through time.
The independence of central banks is seen, by Aglietta and Cartelier, as
closely linked to globalisation . The sets of agents linked by payments systems
correspond less and less with the populations of states: ‘the independence of
central banks is the institutiona l form of a monetary legitimacy which transcends
the national framework’.69 The dangers of such developments are well expressed
in the introduction to MS:
These [national] principles of economic organisation express the
higher values by which European societies sought to establish
their unity at a certain period of their history: a constitutiona l
order protecting the mission of the central bank in Germany, the
general interest incarnated by the state in France. These forms of
sovereign authority have been subjected to the test of the inter-
national expansion of the markets. While the constraints of
economic integration unbalanced national governance systems,
economic liberalism destroyed the policy doctrines by which the
same systems were legitimised. The hour had come of the only
correct thinking. Indeed, the globalisation of  nance has given
decisive force to transnational  nancial opinion so that national
economic policies are no longer judged according to the hier-
archies of value which used to legitimise them. Con icts between
national principles of economic governance and the vagaries of
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 nancial opinion have, for more than  fteen years, punctuated the
alternations of con dence and mistrust in national economic
policies.70
Whether the advent of the euro can do anything to resolve such problems is, very
wisely, left as an open question.71
Conclusion
This essay serves its purpose if it suggests the interest and contemporary
relevance of a neglected body of monetary theory. To conclude, a few remarks
will be made on Aglietta’s work as,  rst, a research agenda and, second, a set
of substantive propositions .
At least since the contribution of Patinkin,72 the monetary research programme
of mainstream economics has been to reconcile, within formal models, the
theory of money with the Walrasian, general equilibrium, version of the theory
of value. This programme is surely degenerate. It has given rise to some
plausible accounts of speci c monetary effects, but these invariably rest on a
petitio principii (money as an argument of preference functions, or a ‘cash-in-ad-
vance’ rule to exclude barter). Where any degree of generality is attempted,
de nite results are impossible to obtain; one simply gets the result that anything
can happen.73 Although some ‘new Keynesian’ writers have tried to advance the
same research agenda by emphasising certain aspects of Keynesian theory, it is
hard to say that they have been rewarded with any greater degree of success.
Where interesting results are obtained they rest on some form of untheorised
assumption, such as the non-clearing prices postulated by Benassy, for exam-
ple.74
Aglietta, together with Cartelier and Orle´an, invites us to draw the logical
conclusion of this failure. Monetary theory and value theory are alternatives, not
complements.75 To develop the  rst, one should begin with the radical rejection
of the second. Certainly, much of the work of the post-Keynesian school tends
in this direction, but rarely with the decisiveness and clarity of these French
writers. Some results of this alternative programme have already been displayed.
Two examples discussed above are a reconsideration of the signi cance of
money as a unit of account and the need, once one has adopted the position that
markets rest on money and not the reverse, to conduct an interdisciplinary
investigation of the origins and social supports of monetary relations. Of course,
this radicalism (some may see it as nihilism) presents its own dif culties. In
some way one must reintegrate, even in a subordinate place, notions of resource
constraints, preferences and so on. Some of Aglietta’s writings give hints as to
how this might be done. The notion of a relatively stable growth path indicates
the circumstances which best reconcile a developing division of labour with
con dence in the monetary order. But now this reconciliation has a different
meaning: it is not a question of a pre-given ‘real’ equilibrium, still less of social
optimality, but rather of a condition of existence, a constraint, on the primary
monetary phenomenon.
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When one moves from this metatheoretical level back down to the more
prosaic plane of substantive analysis, the work of Aglietta is more heteroge-
neous, but it always illuminates the speci c topic under examination and can
frequently lay claim to conceptual originality . If a few interesting aspects of this,
by now voluminous, body of work are to be emphasised the list might include,
 rst, the incorporation of the notion of liquidity into a wider notion of
con dence—agents are concerned not only with the convertibility of their assets
into money, but with the reliability of the monetary unit itself and the perpetu-
ation of the exchange economy as a whole. All of these are seen as social
constructs. Second, this is related to the key issue of imitation, which can
certainly be explored by orthodox game theoretical methods but which takes on
its full signi cance when one avoids the over-strong postulates which game
theory makes about both motivation and interactions. Third, Aglietta’s work has
important implications for the debate on the endogeneity or exogeneity of money
in both theory and practice and proposes a complex synthesis of the con icting
positions involved.
Finally, one can return to the argument, somewhat surprisingly repeated in La
monnaie souveraine, that economic agents fail to understand the monetary
system in which they act, that they are necessarily victims of a misunderstanding
(me´connaissance) with respect to this central and determinant institution . In the
Girardian phase this cognitive failure was the direct consequence of a metaphys-
ical ontology, a lack of authenticity in all human beings. If this metaphysics is
discarded, why is it still claimed76 that there is ‘an irreducible opacity of the
social totality for the individuals who act according to the fundamental rules of
money’? In the premodern cases this is simply the result of the sacralisation of
society as a whole. But why do the agents of the market economy, having
desacralised all relations and accustomed to interrogate every institution from an
instrumental point of view, continue to depend on such myths as that of the
independent central bank?
The answer appears to lie in the hierarchy of values which governs the
economic relations of modernity. In different ways both egalitarian and liberal
ethics accord absolute primacy to the development of the individual . It is an
ethical myopia which blinds us to the social constitution of the individual and
perpetuates the claims of an unrecognised community in the form of the
‘malignant power of money’.
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2. The only accounts known to the present writer are Michel De Vroey, ‘A Non-monetarist Monetary Theory
of In ation’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1984), pp. 381–99, which lays out a similar
view of in ation to that of Aglietta, but which is focused on this single analytical issue; and Robert
Guttmann, How Credit-money Shapes the Economy: The United States in a Global System (M.E. Sharpe,
1994). See also John Grahl, ‘Economies Out of Control’, New Left Review, No. 185 (1991), pp. 170–83,
which attempted to apply some of these monetary concepts to the existing conjuncture .
3. Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience (New Left Books, 1979). For
a recent reappraisal, see the postface to the new edition of A Theory of Capitalist Regulation (Verso,
2000) which appeared in shortened form as Michel Aglietta, ‘Capitalism at the Turn of the
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Century: Regulation Theory and the Challenge of Social Change’, New Left Review, No. 232 (1998), pp.
41–90.
4. Compare Michel Aglietta, ‘Monnaie et in ation: quelques lec¸ons de l’expe´rience ame´ricaine des dix
dernie`res anne´es’, Economie et Statistique, No. 77 (1976), pp. 49–71.
5. This essay will not explore Aglietta’s precursors in any detail. They include what are known as the ‘circuit
theorists’, such as Bernard Schmitt, who in turn in uenced the work of Cartelier (see note 62, below). A
comprehensive survey of ‘non-conformity ’ in French economics can be found in Jean Weiler & Bruno
Carrier, L’E´conomie non-conformist e en France au XXe sie`cle (PUF, 1994) which includes references to
publications, frequently in English, by many of the most prominent  gures.
6. See especially Rene´ Girard, La violence et le sacre´ (Grasset, 1972).
7. For an anthology of positive and negative reactions, see Paul Dumouchel , Violence and Truth: On the
Work of Rene´ Girard (Athlone, 1987); for a sympathetic but rigorous critique, which measures Girardian
hypotheses against a wide range of evidence, see Paisley Livingston, Models of Desire: Rene´ Girard and
the Psychology of Mimesis (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).
8. Classically, the term mimesis refers to artistic representations and thus to the imitation of nature. The
Girardian term refers rather to imitation of some other person, taken as a model. There is an overlap,
however, in the art of Greek tragedy which Girard interprets as a partially secularised ritual. The rest of
the present essay simply uses the term ‘imitation’.
9. The work of Attali cited by Aglietta & Orle´an, La violence de la monnaie, is Jacques Attali, Les trois
mondes (Fayard, 1981).
10. See, for example, Fernand Braudel, E´conomie et capitalisme, Vol. 2: Civilisation mate´rielle (Colin, 1979).
11. In this context a contrasting in uence in VM to that of Girard can be mentioned—Prigogine’s attack on
reductionism in the natural sciences (for example, Ilya Prigogine, From Being to Becoming: Time and
Complexity in the Physical Sciences (W. H. Freeman, 1980)). Reductionism (of all sciences to physics) can
be refuted by the demonstration of self-organising processes which, on the basis of given physical laws,
themselves can lead to new, higher-order systems. This becomes an analogy, in VM, for the emergence
of more or less stable conventions out of chaotic imitative behaviour .
12. The critique of Friedmanite doctrines in VM associates them with the a priori assumption of a
homogeneous monetary system. This seems to correspond well with the oral tradition in Chicago,
associated with the name of Henry Simons, which had indeed been tempted by the notion of 100 per cent
reserve banking in the wake of the 1930s depression.
13. Aglietta & Orle´an, La violence de la monnaie, ch. 1.
14. Michel Aglietta, ‘L’ambivalence de l’argent’, Revue Franc¸aise d’Economie, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1988), pp.
87–133.
15. In this he follows Jean Cartelier; see, for example, Jean Cartelier, ‘The´orie de la valeur ou he´terodoxie
mone´taire: les termes d’un choix’, Economie Applique´e, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1985), pp. 63–82.
16. Aglietta, ‘L’ambivalence de l’argent’, p. 95.
17. Ibid., p. 97.
18. Ibid., p. 113.
19. The relation between this derivation of money as a form of socialisation and the famous Marxist derivation
of money in the  rst chapter of Capital may be of interest. In fact, there is an attempt, in VM, to establish
a close relation between the two, but this is hardly convincing because it is reasonably clear that Marx
regards barter as representing an incomplete or undeveloped form of value rather than an impossible
structure leading inevitably to con ict. A recent contribution by Jean Cartelier, ‘Marx’s Theory of Value,
Exchange and Surplus Value: A Suggested Reformulation’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 15,
No. 3 (1992), pp. 257–69, calls into question the internal consistency of the Marxist dialectic of value
forms. Another leading member of the regulation school has tried to integrate monetary and  nancial
processes into the theory while remaining closer to classical Marxism. This essentially involves a
restatement of the theory of commodity and money fetishism; see Alain Lipietz, The Enchanted World:
In ation, Credit and the World Crisis (Verso, 1985).
20. In terms of analytical tools, perhaps the most important in uence on Aglietta’s subsequent work has been
the application of asymmetric information models to credit relations. See, for example, Joseph Stiglitz &
Andrew Weiss, ‘Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information’, American Economic Review,
Vol. 71 (1981), pp. 393–410.
21. Compare, for example, Hyman Minsky, Stabilising an Unstable Economy (Yale University Press, 1986)
on credit crunches.
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22. John Hicks, The Crisis in Keynesian Economics (Blackwell, 1974). On the necessity of a liquid asset,
Hicks writes: ‘once one accepts that one form of investment is not as good as another, it follows that it
is socially productive that the form of investment should be wisely chosen. It cannot be wisely chosen if
it is too much hurried. The social function of liquidity is that it gives time to think’ (p. 57, emphasis added).
23. Michel Aglietta, La  n des devises cle´s (La De´couverte, 1986), p. 85.
24. Michel Aglietta, ‘World Capitalism in the Eighties’, New Left Review, No. 136 (1982), pp. 5–41, gives a
re´gulationniste interpretation of the conjuncture of the early 1980s. Readers are warned that the
expression, in ation rampante (creeping in ation), is horrifyingly mistranslated as ‘rampant in ation’
throughout this text. The article draws on a more technical paper: M. Aglietta, P. Ewenczyk & G. Oudiz,
‘L’Europe dans l’affrontement international des anne´es 80’, Ministe`re du Plan/CEPPII working paper,
presented to the conference, Western Europe in the 1980s, Cambridge, May 1982.
25. Aglietta, La  n des devises cle´s, p. 21.
26. Ibid., p. 35.
27. Compare, for example, Barry Eichengreen, Globalising Capital: A History of the International Monetary
System (Princeton University Press, 1996).
28. Aglietta, La  n des devises cle´s, p. 44.
29. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon Press,
1944), although not mentioned in this particular text, can be seen as the theorist of this social revolt and
of the transformation of capitalist systems which it brought about.
30. Aglietta, La  n des devises cle´s, p. 66.
31. Ibid., p. 33.
32. Compare the short text, in English, Michel Aglietta, ‘The creation of international liquidity’, in: Loukas
Tsoukalis (Ed.), The Political Economy of International Money (Sage/RIIA, 1985), ch. 6, pp. 171–202.
‘The world economy needs an of cial monetary control compatible with the degree of  nancial
interdependence which it has attained’ (p. 199). In more recent discussion, Aglietta indicates that, in
practice, a concert of independen t central banks may be the closest feasible approach to this requirement.
33. M. Aglietta & P. Deusy-Fournier , ‘Internationalisation des monnaies et organisation du syste`me mone´-
taire’, Economie Internationale, No. 59 (1994), pp 71–106.
34. Ibid., p. 77.
35. Michel Aglietta (Ed.), L’ecu et la vieille dame: un levier pour l’Europe (Economica, 1986).
36. Many subsequent texts return to European monetary integration. In particular, one can mention the clear
warning given about the coming crisis of the ERM: Michel Aglietta, ‘Stabilite´ dynamique et transforma-
tions des re´gimes mone´taires internationales’, in: Robert Boyer, Bernard Chavance & Olivier Godard
(Eds), Les  gures de l’irre´versibilite´ en e´conomie (Editions de l’E´cole des Hautes E´tudes en Sciences
Sociales, 1991), pp. 311–34. See, for details, John Grahl, After Maastricht: A Guide to European Monetary
Union (Lawrence & Wishart, 1997), pp. 105–6.
37. Michel Aglietta, ‘Gene`se des banques centrales et le´gitimite´ de la monnaie’, Annales: E´conomies, Socie´te´s,
Civilisations, No. 3 (1992), pp. 675–98.
38. See, especially, Charles Goodhart, The Evolution of Central Banks (MIT Press, 1988).
39. Aglietta, ‘Gene`se des banques centrales’, p. 686.
40. Ibid., p. 695.
41. Ibid., p. 696; emphasis added.
42. On Russia, see Michel Aglietta & Philippe Moutot, ‘Rede´ployer les re´formes’, E´conomie Internationale
(1993), pp. 67–103; on Japan, see Michel Aglietta, ‘Les de´rapages de la  nance japonaise’, E´conomie
Prospective Internationale (1992), pp. 9–29.
43. Michel Aglietta & Anton Brender, ‘Globalisation  nancie`re et risque de syste`me’, Cahiers E´conomiques
et Mone´taires (Banque de France), No. 37 (1990), pp. 37–81; this is based on ch. 5 of a longer study:
Michel Aglietta, Anton Brender & Virginie Coudert, Globalisation  nancie`re: l’aventure oblige´e (Eco-
nomica, 1990), pp. 223–70. Much of the analysis discussed here is summarised in Michel Aglietta,
Macroe´conomie  nancie`re (La De´couverte, 1998). Although this is designed as a pedagogi c text it does
contain much original material, notably on the stability of national banking systems.
44. Aglietta & Brender, ‘Globalisation  nancie`re et risque de syste`me’, p. 54.
45. Ibid., p. 63.
46. An earlier group of studies from the same project appeared as Michel Aglietta & Andre´ Orle´an (Eds),
Souveraint e´, le´gitimite´ de la monnaie (Association d’e´conomie  nancie`re, 1995).
47. Aglietta & Orle´an, La monnaie souveraine, p 131.
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48. The repudiation of Girard is too total and too silent. Although the index to MS contains 26 references to
‘sacri ce’, 29 to ‘the sacred’ and 20 to ‘violence’, there is not a single mention of Girard’s name, passim
in VM. It seems that the theoretician of the bouc e´missaire has himself become a scapegoat , sacri cial
victim of an unacknowledged exclusion. The totalising, even imperialist, nature of Girard’s thought
certainly makes it dif cult to combine his insights with those drawn from other theorists. Nevertheless, it
may be going too far to abandon completely the notion of a hidden or suppressed violence behind the
world of free exchange.
49. Aglietta & Orle´an, La monnaie souveraine, pp 159–211.
50. Ibid., pp. 35–52.
51. Ibid., pp. 213–50, 249.
52. Ibid., pp. 289–324.
53. Ibid., p. 294.
54. Ibid., pp. 85–126, 53–83.
55. Ibid., p. 109.
56. Ibid., p. 83.
57. It is stressed by Bruno The´ret (MS, pp. 253–87) that money in contemporary society serves not only to
unify the economic sphere of commodity exchange , but also to unite the political and economic spheres
through taxation and public spending.
58. Aglietta & Orle´an, La monnaie souveraine, p. 11.
59. Ibid., pp. 359–86.
60. Ibid., p. 380.
61. Ibid., pp. 129–56.
62. This daring strategy can be traced back to the earlier work of Cartelier, in particular, Carlo Benetti & Jean
Cartelier, Marchands, salariat et capitalistes (Maspero, 1980). The original motivation of this work was
perhaps its critique of the Marxist theory of social classes: for the authors the asymmetry between
proletarians and the bourgeoisi e is essentially a matter of their differential access to monetised credit,
rather than to the means of production as such. Although it is dif cult at present to attach a great deal of
importance to this point, Benetti and Cartelier can also be seen as developing a critique of general
equilibrium theory as in their identi cation, mentioned above, of the ‘postulate of nomenclature’.
63. Aglietta & Orle´an, La monnaie souveraine, p. 135.
64. Ibid., p. 136.
65. Ibid., p. 137.
66. A serious problem arises with this tripartite account of monetary systems. On the basis of the
distinction between primary monetary allocations and rules of settlement Aglietta and Cartelier problema-
tise the Keynesian concept of liquidity (MS, p. 140). They wish to distinguish the marketability of
assets (liquidity) from their ability to act as the basis of primary issue or monnayage . To the present writer
this seems to be a distinction without a difference; as soon as one makes capital valuations the basis of
access to the means of payment this access becomes a market process. Here the simplicity of conceptual
structure is bought at too high a price in terms of descriptive accuracy. The anthropologica l foundations
of MS are no doubt much more solid than those of VM but the promotion of the concept of debt over
that of money weakens its economics. Credit requires collateral; if we apply Cartelier’s own logical
fork, assets can act as collateral either through their ‘real’ properties (utility, productivity) or by virtue of
their monetary values. If one makes the second choice one is surely back in a completely Keynesian
world.
67. In an extension of the interdisciplinary approach of MS, Jacques Birouste develops (pp. 323–56) a
psychological account of con dence. In this context one can report the repeated references of both Aglietta
and Orle´an to the work of Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, trans. by Tom Bottomore & David
Frisby (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978) [ rst German edition 1907], whom they regard as providing the
most developed account of the impact of modern monetary relations on the perceptions and motivations
of the individual. The essay by Frederic Jameson, ‘The brick and the balloon: architecture, idealism and
land speculation’, in: The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Post-modern 1983–1998 (Verso, 1998)
pp. 162–89 brings out well the nature of Simmel’s contribution:
Any discussion of money as a mediation needs to confront the work of Georg Simmel,
whose massive Philosophy of Money pioneered what we would today call a phenomeno-
logical analysis of this peculiar reality (p. 165).
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To illustrate the pertinence of Simmel’s analysis, we can cite a passage suggesting how money can lower
the con ict intrinsic to exchange:
Money transactions erect a barrier between persons, in that only one of the two parties to
the transaction receives what he actually wants … In this way an inner barrier develops
between people, a barrier, however that is indispensable for the modern form of life. For
the jostling crowdedness and the motley disorder of metropolitan communication would be
simply unbearable without such psychologica l distance (The Philosophy of Money, p. 477).
Orle´an has made frequent reference to this work; see, for example, Andre´ Orle´an, ‘La monnaie comme
lien social; e´tude de Philosophie de l’Argent de Georg Simmel’, Gene`ses (June 1992), pp. 86–107.
68. Aglietta & Orle´an, La monnaie souveraine, p. 26.
69. Ibid., p. 157.
70. Ibid., p. 30. The expression, ‘la pense´e unique’, is currently used by heterodox economists in France to
stigmatise the closed intolerance of neoliberal orthodoxy.
71. Two brief papers by Aglietta and Christian de Boissieu have recently discussed the starting position of the
European Central Bank (ECB): Michel Aglietta & Christian de Boissieu, ‘La responsabilite´ de la future
Banque centrale europe´enne’ and ‘Proble`mes prudentiels’, both in Conseil d’Analyse E´conomique,
Coordination europe´enne des politiques e´conomiques (Documentation Franc¸aise, 1998), pp. 49–59, 63–70.
One aspect of this discussion is the pertinence of the US model of central banking, as opposed to the
Bundesbank model which was actually used as a blueprint for the ECB.
72. Don Patinkin, Money, Interest and Prices (Harper & Row, 1956) [2nd edn 1965].
73. This argument is made in more detail in Grahl, After Maastricht, ch. 1, which uses, as a summary of the
current state of play within the mainstream, Benjamin Friedman & Frank Hahn (Eds), Handbook of
Monetary Economics, 2 Vols (North-Holland, 1990). Compare the position repeatedly adopted by
Cartelier, for instance in his recent popular essay: Jean Cartelier, La monnaie (Flammarion, 1996).
74. Jean-Pascal Benassy, Macroeconomics : An Introduction to the Non-Walrasian Approach (Academic Press,
1986).
75. This assertion is made most strikingly in Cartelier, ‘The´orie de la valeur ou he´terodoxie mone´taire’.
76. Aglietta & Orle´an, La monnaie souveraine, p. 147.
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Among the Vultures
JOHN GRAHL*
J Èorg Huffschmid (1999)
Politische ÈOkonomie der Finanzm Èarkte
(Hamburg, VSA-Verlag)
246pp, ISB N 3 ± 87975 ± 736 ± 4
The primary aims of this book are to develop an analysis of globalised finance and
to arrive at policy measures that could reassert social control over the financial
sphere. However, it is also designed as a tool for teaching and as an introduction to
the study of financial relations. It is a partisan work: its actual, dry and descriptive,
title (The Political Economy of the Financial Markets ) was insisted on by the
publishers, who rejected Huffschmid’s more colourful suggestion, Among the
Vultures.
The first chapter presents the explosive growth of international financial
transactions. There is a paradox here, in that the needs of enterprises for external
finance have fallen as a consequence of higher levels of profitability and slower rates
of investment; governmental requirements for credit have also been falling as public
sector deficits have narrowed in many industrialised countries. The result is that
transactions have grown much faster than the volume of outstanding financial
claims. It is, in addition, only a very limited spectrum of assets that are traded on an
international scale: some bond issues, some of the shares quoted on a handful of
stock exchanges, above all currencies Ð together with derivative claims on these
same assets. (Thus, a second, closely related, paradox is that most countries
continue to meet most of their financial needs from domestic resources.)
Huffschmid interprets the continuously accelerated volume of international
transactions in this limited range of liquid assets as a response of financial agents to
the lack of profitable investment opportunities in real economic activities. This
acceleration and increased liquidity of financial placements, together with their
abstraction from the productive economy, have become the basis for huge waves of
speculation.
Huffschmid then examines the actors behind the financial markets Ð the big
banks, insurance companies and institutional investors. In this sector, increased
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
idd
les
ex
 U
niv
ers
ity
], 
[Jo
hn
 G
rah
l] 
at 
03
:36
 16
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
3 
404 J. Grahl
competitive pressures have led to drastic rationalisation and concentration and he
takes this as consistent with his view that there is a superfluity of financial resources.
At the same time, these big players have altered the nature of their business towards
investment banking and dealing on the financial markets Ð a reorientation
encouraged by the privatisations of the 1980s and by the rapid growth of public
sector debt at that time. The increased influence of financial companies, however,
does not rest on a massive internationalisation of their balance sheets, which are still
dominated by domestic assets: their threat to move capital abroad, without their
actually doing so, is enough to reinforce their power over national developments.
The next chapter examines the historical background to financial globalisation.
Tight regulation of finance with controls on international capital mobility was an
essential element of the reformed capitalism of the era after World War II, and of the
long upswing that followed. The exhaustion of this phase of accumulation posed the
alternative of further democratic reforms or the rollback of previous ones. The move
to floating exchange rates was an essential precondition for the victory of the
neoliberal counter-reform agenda. The US authorities, no longer able to assert their
hegemony within the Bretton Woods system, opted for currency competition rather
than a new, multilateral regime for world money and finance. However, currency
competition did not permit the formulation of expansion-oriented national
economic policies. Rather, it instituted an international competition among
countries to reinforce the stability and the yields of the financial assets that they
issued. This pressure was a key lever of the wave of internal counter-reforms
(privatisations, labour market deregulation, public spending reductions, and so on)
which followed. The Bundesbank is heavily criticised for its role in this process: it
promoted capital mobility in Europe as a way of putting additional pressure on the
economic policies of neighbouring countries.
The next chapter traces the economic and social consequences of the neoliberal
turn in economic policies as the new exit-options available to financial capital were
used to help push disinflation to the top of the agenda. These consequences are
different in the different regions of advanced capitalism: in the US, despite a drastic
increase in social inequalities, and despite a whole array of financial crises and
malfunctions, the new financial regime has been compatible with rapid economic
growth and rising employment. There is a stark contrast with developments in
Japan, where financial liberalisation led first to an unchecked speculative stock
market and real estate boom, and then to a disastrous crash. The persistent
stagnation of the Japanese economy through the 1990s is characterised by
Huffschmid as a liquidity trap: even unprecedentedly low interest rates have not
been able to relaunch investment. In Europe, the unfolding of the neoliberal agenda
was dominated by the `stability’  policies of the Bundesbank, which determined a
restrictive monetary and fiscal path towards monetary union. The US, Japan and
Europe, however, are all marked by increasing inequalities and by a growth of
insecurity. The international conjuncture resulting from these asymmetric develop-
ments in the main industrial regions is unstable Ð huge US balance of payments
deficits as against Japanese and European surpluses Ð and there exists the danger of
a general deflation.
Huffschmid now turns to the theoretical analysis of financial crises. In
examining the course of financial crisis, he draws on the writings of Minsky and the
notion of an endogenous tendency towards fragility in financial structures.
However, Minsky’s theory is worked out for an economy in which real production
and investment are growing without basic problems. To account for the origins of
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contemporary crises, Huffschmid prefers to use the analysis of the French
economist, François Chesnais, who invokes the obstacles to real economic
development to explain a superfluity of funds in the hands of creditors and their
search for safe, short-run, returns. The pattern of crisis in East Asia is interpreted in
these terms as the result of overliquid, under-regulated international finance: `First
come the bankers with their credits or the investment funds with their placement
strategy and star t to raise the temperature. Then come the speculators and if the
situation becomes risky the bankers draw back and the speculators finally wreck the
markets.’
The last and longest chapter deals with policies to re-establish social control
over financial processes. Huffschmid notes that the brief official readiness to
contemplate a new global financial ` architecture’  that followed the crises of 1997 has
now subsided into a mere call for more transparency in debtor ± creditor relations
and a tendency to blame the victim countries and exculpate the international
lenders. His proposals for crisis-management are relatively conventional, being
focused on a rapid response of national and international authorities to brake the
self-reinforcing process of currency depreciation, falling asset prices and defaults. In
this context, however, it is a cause for concern that the European Central Bank does
not dispose of a full range of instruments with which to intervene in conditions of
crisis.
Going beyond the immediate response to crises, Huffschmid’s proposals for
medium-term reform are radical, based on constraining, slowing down and
stabilising financial processes and on reintroducing institutional barriers between
the different components of the financial system. He argues for a whole range of
controls Ð fiscal, supervisory, administrative Ð to be operated at every level Ð
national, regional (for example within the EU), and international. Controls over
international capital movements are given a prominent place in this set of proposals;
they are seen as making possible a move back to relatively fixed exchange rates.
Although, in principle, a new global financial order is desirable, it is not seen as
politically realistic at the present time because of US commitment to continuing
liberalisation. This makes regional monetary cooperation all the more important.
With capital controls, regional systems of fixed but adaptable exchange rates can be
constructed. Huffschmid believes that the EMS, despite its dislocation in 1992 ± 93
(which he attributes largely to the ` perversion’  of the system by German policy), can
act as a model for these. He suggests that the EU can become the core of a sheltered
financial space that could not only reconnect the productive and financial spheres
within Europe, but also demonstrate, worldwide, the advantages of regulated
finance. In the long run, the subordination of finance to social priorities requires
differentiated credit policies and a new segmentation of the financial sector, so that,
for example, a bank specialised in housing finance would concentrate on that
function and not be dragged into competition with every other financial
intermediary. It is admitted that such a reform programme may seem `very
authoritarian and restrictive’ . Huffschmid, however, argues that the necessity for
very strict measures against speculation would be transitional because, over time,
the reforms would work to encourage real investment and to eliminate the actual
surplus of financial resources.
The book as a whole is an extremely lucid and comprehensive account of
financial globalisation and it presents a persuasive version of the left-wing case for
radical reform. The reviewer sees some problems with the latter, but will begin with
a certain difficulty in Huffschmid’s historical argument. It seems to be quite correct
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to trace the introduction of the neoliberal counter-reforms to the exhaustion of the
postwar phase of accumulation and to the tendency, released at that point, to divert
investible resources into liquid financial assets. This drive into the financial sphere
then became, as Huffschmid argues, a key weapon in the assault on the postwar
compromise.
However, even at the start of the 1980s, it may have been too late to meet these
developments with a national economic programme. Huffschmid (citing two left-
wing French sources) suggests that the Mitterrand experiment of 1981± 83 was half-
hearted and that it retreated in fear before a confrontation with German policy. This
may be too simple: the left-w ing coalition, which came to power in June 1981 had,
by January 1982, carried out a nationalisation programme of unprecedented scale Ð
which included, significantly, the entire financial sector. It is true that macro-
economic conditions elsewhere Ð in Germany and the US Ð were not propitious for
the attempted expansion, but the expansion was not the only thing that went wrong.
By 1983, the big industrial groups, nationalised with a view to a wider presence of
France in leading sectors, were all haemorrhaging red ink. The political tasks
assigned to them were beyond their capacities and their future development
required more complete internationalisation.
Several points follow: as long as two decades ago, national Keynesian strategies
were problematic Ð even in the world’s fourth industrial power; the inter-
dependencies which constrain national strategies pertain to production as well as to
finance; and these two spheres may not be as completely ` uncoupled’  as Huffschmid
suggests (his treatment of current US conditions, where a deregulated financial
system is pouring resources into high-risk enterprises, leaves something to be
desired).
Turning to the policy recommendations, no objections will be made to much
closer and more detailed supervision of financial markets and agents, to
international agencies which attempt to preserve stability rather than to drive
forward the free market agenda in new industrial countries and to `bail in’  rather
than bail out the creditors responsible for speculative boom and bust in emerging
economies. Nor will the right of these countries (or, in extremis, any country) to tax
and control both capital inflows and outflows be called into question. Similarly,
there is no objection here to the democratisation of such bodies as the IMF or to
closer and more effective policy coordination among the leading powers to replace
the present free-for-all.
However, the battery of measures that Huffschmid proposes to delay, obstruct
and segment financial processes seem to the reviewer to be fundamentally
misconceived. On Huffschmid’s own analysis, it is a key task of contemporary
economic development to transform the potential investment resources, which now
flow ceaselessly from one liquid placement to another, into genuine productive
investment. We are faced with the paradox of superabundant capital together with
exceptionally high profit rates and an ongoing movement (`shareholder value’ ) to
drive these profit rates even higher.
In such a situation, it is hardly useful to erect a host of barriers to financial
transactions. These barriers will lead to as many points of tension in credit relations
and as many targets for liquid capital in search of arbitrage profits. The rapidity and
fluidity of financial transactions today make possible (in the contemporary US, even
actual) an unprecedented diversification of risks, turning innovative projects, by
aggregation, into secure assets; it is important to harness this potential rather than
destroy it.
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The crisis-ridden process of financial globalisation can only be fought with its
own weapons: scale, comprehensiveness, standardisation. The best choice for
Europe, if it wishes to establish some influence over global finance, is to accelerate
the integration of the European financial space, to enforce rigorous rules of
competition and accountability, and to protect both savers and borrowers from the
market power of intermediaries by a thoroughgoing standardisation of financial
products.
It should be added that Huffschmid’s book, besides its merits as an analysis, is
an excellent working tool. Financial institutions, agents and markets are carefully
explained; up-to-date data are marshalled to support every stage of the argument;
there is complete documentation, including the web addresses of important
institutions. This material will be useful even to students with an imperfect
knowledge of the German language. In spite of the objections raised above, it is,
perhaps, the most complete and rigorous exposition of the case for fundamental
reform. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
idd
les
ex
 U
niv
ers
ity
], 
[Jo
hn
 G
rah
l] 
at 
03
:36
 16
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
3 
Chapter 3
Globalized Finance - The
Challenge to the Euro
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john grahl
GLOBALIZED FINANCE
The European project is widely seen to be fl oundering, politically and economically, in the face of US global dom-inance.1 While the long depreciation of the euro—from its initial $1.16 in January 1999 to a record low of 82 
cents in October 2000—may now have been checked, the underlying 
market scepticism about European economic prospects that accom-
panied its fall has not disappeared. The euro’s decline was not, after 
all, a commercial phenomenon—Euroland was posting big current 
account surpluses at the start of EMU—but a fi nancial one, the con-
sequence of big capital outfl ows. Since December 2000, the euro 
has benefi ted to a certain extent from investors fl eeing the troubled 
American economy; but whether this rising tide can fl oat such a leaky 
ship remains to be seen.
The present conjuncture has highlighted two key weaknesses in the 
design of Europe’s monetary institutions. There is, fi rstly, the weakness 
of their external policy: the Council of Ministers has some responsi-
bility but no real power in this sphere. Given the present imbalances 
in the world economy, this carries the risk that a serious slowdown 
in the US will not be compensated for by a decisive relaxation of 
Euroland’s macro stance. Secondly, there is the problem of the ‘policy-
mix’—the balance between the monetary and budgetary components 
of the macro economic stance.2 Fiscal policy is both fragmented and 
uncoordinated. In a situation (undervalued currency, sluggish internal 
economy) where (now standard) Mundell-Fleming theory would call for 
a less restrictive fi scal stance, there is no clear mechanism for effective 
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budgetary coordination; nor is it clear how such a relaxation could avoid 
destabilizing long-run interest rates in the weaker countries.
In this context, the European Central Bank’s sole response to the fall-
ing euro—repeatedly raising interest rates towards US levels, while 
the contradictory statements of Bank offi cials, EU Commissioners and 
national political leaders betrayed their growing anxiety—risked being 
both damaging and self-defeating: damaging, because unemployment is 
still very high in the core Euroland economies and the recovery fragile; 
self-defeating, because a slowdown in Western Europe might provoke 
further capital outfl ows towards other more rapidly developing econo-
mies. The weakness of the euro does not result from infl ation—lower in 
Euroland than in the US—nor is it a mere function of interest-rate differ-
entials, since much of the capital outfl ow is through FDI and not simply 
placements in the US banking system.3 Rather, it was fast economic 
development in the US that gave rise to (real or perceived) investment 
opportunities, and thus attracted European fi nancial resources.
It might be said that Europe is producing plenty of exports but not 
enough assets: its capital markets are fragmented and illiquid, com-
pared to their US counterparts. And though Europe’s security markets 
are now starting to expand and integrate, this involves a long, con-
fl ictual move away from its traditional fi nancial institutions, based 
on various forms of ‘relational’ banking within specifi c countries 
and regions. Thus to address the weakness of the euro by simple 
monetary restriction runs the risk of exacerbating Europe’s fi nancial 
1 This article draws heavily on discussions with two colleagues at the University 
of North London Business School, Stuart Archbold (now at the University of 
Kingston) and Photis Lysandrou.
2 For a full analysis, see Robert Boyer, Le Gouvernement économique de la zone euro, 
CGP, Documentation Française, 1999. 
3 Martin Feldman observes: ‘In the past year . . . [v]irtually all of the net equity 
capital that came to the United States was in the form of FDI, including mergers 
and acquisitions as well as new investments and outright purchases of existing 
businesses’ (‘Aspects of Global Economic Integration’, NBER working paper 7899, 
September 2000). The point is important because it suggests that euro weakness is 
the result of the extent to which European companies, both industrial and fi nancial, 
were participating in the US expansion. This participation was itself facilitated by 
the sophistication of US fi nancial mechanisms—both as regards securities (portfo-
lio capital) and mergers and acquisitions (FDI). 
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weaknesses—the underdevelopment of its fi nancial markets, and the 
survival of obsolete fi nancial structures—which, together, subordinate 
the European economy to US practices and priorities. 
There is still a great deal of scepticism about the extent and the impli-
cations of globalized fi nance for European economic development. A 
strong statement would be:
So long as governments continue to target their current accounts, retain 
some sovereignty within their borders (so that at least the threat of gov-
ernment intervention in cross-border capital movements remains) and 
differentially regulate their fi nancial systems, investors cannot think about 
domestic and foreign assets in the same way. Different national fi nancial 
systems are made up of different institutions and arrangements, with dif-
ferent conceptions of the future and assessments of past experience, and 
thus operate with different modalities of calculation. All these features 
factor into a continued diversity of expectations and outlooks which cannot 
all be reduced to a single global marketplace or logic.4
Two arguments, in particular, are advanced to back the sceptics’ case. 
Firstly, it is often suggested that today’s high levels of fi nancial inter-
action are not unprecedented—that something very comparable can be 
found in la belle époque, with the monetary nationalism that broke up 
the mechanisms of the Atlantic economy and the gold standard being 
seen as inseparably linked to the revolt of the masses and the assertion 
of democratic controls over the free market.5 The second objection rests 
on the prevalence of self-fi nance: any account of globalized fi nance as a 
dominant force in today’s economic life must confront the fact that the 
majority of investment is fi nanced domestically. 
A standard way of representing this is to show that, across countries, 
the ratio of savings to output is highly correlated with the ratio of invest-
ment to output. Countries fi nance nearly all their investment from their 
own savings—investment processes do not generally draw on external 
sources of capital. Why do they self-fi nance? Part of the answer must be 
that virtually all agents in capitalist economies rely heavily on this form. 
4 Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question, Cambridge 1999. 
5 Of course, the classic account of this process is that of Karl Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation, Boston 1957 (1st edition 1944). 
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Corporations, to take the most important case for the present argument, 
draw predominantly on internal funds when they undertake investment 
(see Fig. 1).
Figure 1 Sources of corporate fi nance (percentages)
 Retained Earnings Equities Debt Bank Credit
 1975–80 1991–95 1975–80 1991–95 1975–80 1991–95 1975–80 1991–95
US 63.5 81.1 4.4 1.1 13.2 10.4 6.6 -1.3
Japan 35.2 54.5 4.9 4.6 2.3 4.3 33.6 39.8
Germany 58.8 64.7 2.2 2.0 -0.1 0.7 25.3 23.2
France 42.6 71.5 4.0 18.3 0.0 0.2 12.6 12.2
6 For an English language review, see John Grahl, ‘Among the Vultures’, 
International Review of Applied Economics, vol. 14, no. 3, 2000, pp. 403–7. An exami-
nation of current account fi gures, it must be noted, reveals a single exception to the 
rule that countries self-fi nance: the US. Since this country is usually seen as lying 
at the centre of global fi nancial networks, the exception is extremely important. 
Note the following characteristics: self-fi nance predominates; it is becom-
ing more, not less, important in a quantitative sense; US corporations 
make more, not less, use of self-fi nance than those of Japan or Western 
Europe; the latter rely signifi cantly more on bank credit and less on 
marketable credit instruments (commercial paper/corporate bonds); in 
general, equity makes a nugatory net contribution to business invest-
ment. This kind of evidence has been used to suggest that Japanese or 
German fi nancial mechanisms—privileging ‘insiders’, such as house-
banks—outperform those of the US—based on ‘outsider’ fi nance traded 
by anonymous creditors on organized capital markets; and that, in any 
case, accumulation processes must be relatively independent. These 
conclusions may be obsolete. 
There are many detailed hypotheses about national self-fi nance. But 
it would follow from the use of self-fi nance by most corporations and 
Source: Jörg Huffschmid, Die politische Ökonomie der Finantzmärkte, Hamburg 1999.6
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other economic agents that international capital fl ows would be small 
relative to the total of global investment activity. If we want to argue 
that globalized fi nance is important—is dominant—then we have to 
assert that the tail of external fi nance can wag the dog of internally gen-
erated funds. In what follows, there is an attempt to suggest that this is 
indeed the case.
Information asymmetries and the problem of agency
The standard account of debtor–creditor relations draws on ideas of a 
structural information asymmetry between borrower and lender, fi rst 
developed in the context of the used-car market.7 The seller may have 
a better idea than the buyer about the quality of the car on offer, while 
the buyer may not be able to distinguish a good car from a ‘lemon’. 
The problem is that markets can break down in such circumstances: if 
the buyer simply lowers the price to take into account the existence of 
‘lemons’ on the supply-side, the owners of the best cars may withdraw 
(known as ‘adverse selection’). The same considerations apply to credit. 
Borrowers differ with respect to their reliability and effi ciency, yet it is 
the borrower who has the most concrete idea of how borrowed funds 
will be deployed. A simple increase in interest rates may not be an effec-
tive way of dealing with this problem: borrowers with sound investment 
projects may be deterred, leaving the credit market to those with risky 
prospects, or even those who simply intend to default. The widespread 
phenomenon of credit-rationing (limiting credit supply without raising 
interest rates) fl ows from this.
The ‘principal–agent’ problem has a very similar structure. In this case, 
information asymmetries obstruct relations between an employer and 
an employee or—more directly relevant here—between the proprietor 
of an enterprise and its management: bad prospects will be represented 
as good. Thus both equity and debt fi nance are sources of potential 
confl ict and market breakdown. Hence the key slogan of transparency: 
creditors and shareholders want the procedures and motives of com-
pany managements to be visible to them. We do not have to take such 
(essentially neoclassical) models too literally. What is important is that 
they testify to the inherent diffi culties in debtor–creditor relations, a 
7 George Akerlof, ‘The Market for Lemons’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 89, 
1970.
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key explanation for the prevalence of self-fi nance throughout capitalist 
systems. With self-fi nance the difference between principal and agent 
vanishes, as does the information asymmetry between creditor and 
debtor. The problem is that the capital market disappears at the same 
time: in a world of universal self-fi nance, there are no mechanisms for 
the re allocation of investible resources. And not only the capital market: 
since virtually all monetary exchange results in surpluses on the one 
hand and defi cits on the other, a world without fi nance would be a world 
without markets as such.8 It is the recycling of monetary resources—
that is to say, fi nance—which permits the continuity of market relations 
by accommodating debtors; at the same time, the fi nancial pressure 
to which debtors are subjected is a central component in bringing 
about market adjustment. Dimensions of the latter—intervals between 
assessments, thresholds triggering policy change, required speed of 
adjustment, balance between rationalization and expansion—all obvi-
ously have a fi nancial aspect.9
Voice versus exit
Now, if the inadequacy of generalized self-fi nance is recognized, then 
there are a variety of institutions which might structure debtor–creditor 
relations and thus make it possible for accumulation to be compatible 
with economy-wide restructuring and with the reallocation of capital. 
In extremely stylized terms two types of institution can be envisaged: 
following Hirschman’s classic text, we can distinguish between the 
voice-based and the exit-based approach.10 The former establishes close, 
long-term relations between particular counterparties who will gain, 
over time, specifi c and accurate knowledge of each other’s motives and 
capa cities. They may even come to develop ‘loyalty’—a certain iden-
tifi cation of their interests, so that the coalition concerned actually 
works to mitigate the initial confl icts between them. This is closely 
connected to the notion of a ‘stakeholding’ enterprise, knitted to its 
creditors, its employees, its suppliers and customers, to the local com-
munity and so on. As this happens, interactions within the coalition 
8 See the work of Jean Cartelier, for instance La Monnaie, Paris 1996.
9 The view that fi nance is a kind of superstructure on the base of ‘production’ or 
‘industry’ is responsible for many errors in critical political economy.
10 Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: responses to decline in fi rms, organiza-
tions and states, Cambridge, MA 1970.
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become smoother and less costly. Frequently, this kind of structure will 
be socially embedded, in Granovetter’s sense—economic relations will 
coincide with social relationships, based on kinship or other affi nities.11 
In the case of credit-relations, lenders are reassured by their close, indi-
vidual knowledge of borrowers.
Voice-based structures depart in two key ways from the logic of com-
petitive credit markets. Firstly, they are particularist—they privilege 
insiders, those interests belonging to the coalition, against outsiders; 
secondly—and as a consequence—they may be extremely opaque to 
outside scrutiny. Comparativists, of course, will insist that voice-based 
systems are different in different places: the German use of house-
banks and interlocking directorships is not the same as the Japanese 
keiretsu, while the Korean chaebol are different again; systems vary across 
continental Europe, and so on. This variation is nevertheless a general 
feature of voice-based fi nancial systems: they are all particularist struc-
tures, often embedded in specifi c social relations. Being different is what 
makes them the same.
The exit-based approach, on the other hand, controls economic relations 
by the threat of departure—which depends on the existence of alterna-
tives provided by the market. In the case of credit relations, exit means 
that one can sell one’s claim on a debtor. Thus, exit-based structures 
want to make competitive markets more effi cient, to impose sharper 
and more immediate sanctions on poorly performing debtors, to render 
the activities of corporate borrowers more transparent and to reform 
incentive systems in ways that align agents with the interests of princi-
pals. And because exit, in this case, depends on the ability to sell one’s 
holding or credit instrument, it becomes easier as the corresponding 
asset-markets become deeper and more liquid.
All this is extremely stylized: few, if any, relations between creditors and 
debtors are pure representations of either approach. Even within the 
most highly organized competitive asset-markets, one will always fi nd 
networks of dealers linked by voice, even exhibiting loyalty. Similarly, 
there are no completely closed stakeholding structures—however par-
ticularist these may be, the conditions of outside credit markets will 
11 Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structures: The Problem of 
Embeddedness’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 91, no. 3, 1985.
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always impact on their decisions. Nevertheless, it seems legitimate to 
interpret some of the most important current fi nancial developments as 
a transition from voice-based to exit-based disciplines. The shift is his-
torical: everywhere corporate managements are more subject to fi nancial 
market pressures. It is also hegemonic: the actual process of fi nancial 
restructuring has taken the form of the deregulation and international-
ization of dollar fi nance. 
It seems to be the case that, for all their fl uidity and sophistication, 
voice-based structures have one fatal fl aw—their particularism. However 
crude the market-based mechanisms of dollar-based global fi nance, they 
have the decisive advantage of being reproducible. These techniques, 
taught in business schools all over the world, can be generalized through 
the extension of US fi nancial markets and practices. The fi nancial 
regimes to which they give rise can expand without limit to obtain a truly 
staggering scale. This, in turn, is based on the imposition of universal 
standards. However effi cient, on a local basis, the voice-based structures 
of Germany (or in the days of encadrement de crédit, those of France) may 
have been, they remain imprisoned in their specifi c social environments 
and are unable to extend their operations to the international level. 
While aspects of Japanese industrial practice—lean production, total 
quality, fl at hierarchies and so on—have been enthusiastically adopted 
by Western corporations, these have been completely divorced from the 
ethic and sense of community which may, arguably, have given them 
a certain social value; lifetime employment, of course, stayed at home. 
What could not be exported (as is now clear from the debacle in East 
Asia) was Japan’s opaque, ‘relational’ system of corporate fi nance.
A key battleground for this confrontation between voice and exit has 
been corporate governance. It seems to this writer that the battle is 
already lost and won. The precise ways in which fl ows of external 
fi nance—still the smaller part of investment—can profoundly reshape 
corporate behaviour will be examined through the workings of three, 
more or less fully globalized structures: foreign exchange markets, gov-
ernment bonds and independent central banks.
Foreign exchange
The astonishing growth of foreign exchange transactions over the last 
two decades (see Fig. 2) has often been noted, but its interpretation 
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has sometimes been misconceived. Because there is clearly no rela-
tionship between foreign-exchange trading and either international 
trade or international investment-fl ow, these transactions are some-
times characterized as dysfunctional or purely speculative. If, however, 
we adopt a global rather than an international perspective, what we 
observe is simply the imbrication of national banking systems, almost 
the emergence of a unifi ed payments system. The vast bulk of foreign-
exchange transactions are completely analogous to displacements of 
liquidity within national payments systems—they simply recycle mon-
etary resources, only now on a global basis. Fluctuations in exchange 
rates are not the occasion of this recycling but, on the contrary, an obsta-
cle to it: when they are eliminated, the volume of cross-border monetary 
fl ows increases. (This can be seen in the rapid growth of cross-border 
payments within the EU’s TARGET system. Although the total volume 
and value of inter-bank payments recorded by TARGET are stagnant, 
cross-border payments are expanding rapidly at the expense of domestic 
ones, as monetary and banking integration within Euroland proceed.)12
12 ECB data shows that total daily payments through TARGET were 1,042 bn euros 
in January 1999 and 1,035 bn in October 2000; within this total, cross-border pay-
ments, that is, new fl ows induced by integration, rose from 355 bn to 429 bn.
Figure 2 Daily Foreign Exchange Transactions
Source: BIS, cited by Huffschmid
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Money doesn’t actually cost anything. There are, nevertheless, good rea-
sons why it should be scarce. In a market economy, the allocation of 
these artifi cial symbols of wealth must be subject to the same logic 
as that of ‘real’ resources, otherwise the equivalence of money and 
commodities would be impossible. In every industrialized country the 
creation of money today is strictly limited. The reverse side of this is 
the astonishing acceleration of monetary transfers—an integral part 
of the emergence of global capital markets. Large banks draw short-
term credit from any other point in the world system and, similarly, 
place any surpluses where they please. In consequence, one of the 
basic conditions of bank functioning—the ability of a bank to fi nance 
imbalances in its position—is determined not by national but by global 
circumstances, and on terms which are increasingly homogeneous. 
This can hardly fail to have repercussions on the strategies of any com-
mercial bank embedded in these circuits. At the very least, any agent 
seeking short-term accommodation from such a bank must match the 
terms which prevail on the (global) inter-bank market. And longer-
term credit is affected by short-run terms, since the two are always to 
some extent substitutes.
In the previously vaunted stakeholder systems of Germany and Japan, it 
should be remembered, ‘relational’ banking played a pivotal role. What 
has been said here by no means implies that banks will immediately 
abandon their long-term, stakeholding relationships with important cor-
porate clients. But such relationships are being reassessed in a quite 
different context, and by quite different criteria.
Government bonds 
Deposits with large banks are not very risky placements: this transpar-
ency and liquidity is what permits the rapid penetration of globalized 
relations in this sector. The same applies to the liabilities issued by 
the stable governments of wealthy countries. Bonds are backed, as the 
American expression has it, by the ‘full faith and credit’ of the national 
government, and default would imply an immense disruption of politi-
cal life. That is to say, agency and information problems are minimal. 
It is clear that, with regard to the bond market, the standardization of 
terms and prices does not always require immense cross-border fl ows. 
This is still, nevertheless, a unifi ed market. It would be crudely empiri-
cist to insist on actual phenomena as a measure of globalization; virtual 
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movements are equally important—the possibility of a switch out of one 
government’s debt and a fl ight to ‘quality’ in that of another, held to be 
more reliable, or more respectful of the rules of the game.
Governments cannot be expected to trumpet the loss of their sover-
eignty. There are, however, two closely related reasons why they will 
do a lot to maintain the presence of their liabilities within globalized 
markets. Firstly, the relegation of their bonds to secondary status would 
impose immense costs in terms of the risk premium that would have 
to be paid to their creditors. To put things the other way round: the 
Italian government faces greatly relaxed budget constraints—to the tune 
of 3.5 per cent of GDP—now that the Maastricht agenda and EMU 
have promoted its bonds to international class. Secondly, government 
bonds occupy a key position in national fi nancial systems. Since they 
are, conventionally, risk-free (perhaps, more accurately, minimum-risk) 
instruments—which would fail to perform only after a massive upheaval 
had already called other obligations into question—they act as bench-
marks for the issue of debt by all other agents in the economy, according 
to relatively well-defi ned (and globally scrutinized) trade-offs between 
risk and yield.13 Public credit remains the basis of private credit. Even 
non-standardized, non-classifi ed junk bonds are marketable only accord-
ing to a comparison with the more reliable forms of debt. Equity fi nance 
is also—although in a somewhat looser way—tied to bond yields: any 
dramatic rise in the latter is highly likely to knock the equity market 
for six. On the other hand, even a major stock-market collapse may be 
managed into a ‘soft landing’ if the bond market holds fi rm, as this 
will avoid any complete break in the fl ow of monetary resources to the 
largest borrowers. 
Thus the relegation of a country’s government debt from a globally 
enforced standard to the status of a high-risk instrument threatens the 
economy as a whole with fi nancial disruption. People do what they 
have to do—even in free countries. The Maastricht process explicitly 
made the convergence of bond yields a condition of participation in 
EMU. The standard rationale for this is that bond yields embody expec-
tations of infl ation—which is completely true, but the expectations, the 
judgement, involved are external, as is the sanction. The Maastricht 
13 The increasingly globalized role of US credit-rating agencies is of importance in 
this regard.
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convergence process did immense damage to European employment 
and to the European social models. But if one wants to assert that the 
policy choices made in this context were the wrong ones, one must also 
recognize the pressures bearing on these choices. 
If the world status of its bonds is an important consideration for any 
government, it is also true that the globalized bond-market is a sword of 
Damocles suspended over domestic policy-makers’ heads. If any domes-
tic development—monetary or fi scal, political or industrial—is read as 
threatening the solidity of a country’s fi nancial structure, globalized 
markets will exercise an immediate sanction. The demotion of a coun-
try’s bonds, the emergence of a signifi cant risk premium vis-à-vis the 
obligations of other states, will result in an immediate defl ation of the 
economy concerned as bond yields rise, and with them the required 
rate of return on all medium-to-long-term credit instruments. Thus the 
monetary authorities of advanced capitalist states are not, as in the past, 
choosing between more or less expansionary or contractionary policy 
stances. Frequently, they are trying to forestall a spontaneous, market-led 
defl ation of the domestic economy through a bond sell-off. This leads us 
into the new role of the central bank.
Independent central banks
A question:
Let me now raise a curmudgeonly thought. When you think deeply about 
the reasons for removing monetary-policy decisions from the ‘political 
thicket’, you realise that the reasons apply just as well to many other aspects 
of economic policy—and indeed to non-economic policy as well. Consider 
tax policy for example . . . Yet, while many democratic societies have inde-
pendent central banks, every one leaves tax policy in the hands of elected 
politicians. Why?14
And an answer:
The independence of central banks is the institutional form of a monetary 
legitimacy which transcends the national framework.15
14 Alan Blinder, Central Banking in Theory and Practice, Cambridge, MA 1998, p. 59.
15 Michel Aglietta and Jean Cartelier, ‘Ordre monétaire des économies de marché’ 
in Aglietta and André Orléan, eds, La Monnaie Souveraine, Paris 1998. 
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A transformation of monetary policy has taken place—on a truly global 
scale—over the last ten years. This cannot be examined in detail here. 
But one can offer, as a token of an argument to be developed at greater 
length on another occasion, a brief characterization of the situation of 
national monetary authorities in industrial countries.
One can read through virtually the entire literature on central bank 
independence without coming across a single reference to external eco-
nomic relations. There are plenty of international comparisons—on the 
one hand good, independent, credible central banks and on the other 
weak, politically vulnerable, infl ation-prone central banks—but these are 
simply contestants in a beauty competition, not elements in a single 
system. Why then do we observe a huge wave of reform in nearly all 
industrial countries, always in the same direction? There is, of course, 
the pervasive infl uence of ideology; independent central banks emerge 
as a tribute to such eminent economists as Lucas, Barro and Grossman, 
Rogoff. No objections will be made here to the logic of their accounts 
(although some objections are certainly possible). Rather it can simply 
be pointed out that these accounts are abstract because, in portraying 
monetary policy as a game between politicians, central bank and pri-
vate sector, they neglect the possibly important distinction between 
external and domestic agents. For example, the concern with infl ation: 
domestic players might be worried by infl ation as such—by the rise 
in consumer prices, for instance; external agents are more likely to be 
preoccupied by the risk of currency depreciation. In the most abstract 
accounts of market systems the distinction does not matter because the 
two variables—the internal and the external value of a particular cur-
rency—move in parallel. In practice, things are a little more complex. 
Exchange rates do refl ect price differentials, but they do not do so imme-
diately or exactly: in this context, the price of assets is as important as 
that of consumer goods.
The situation of the central bank places it between the globalized mar-
kets for money and for bonds. As regards the fi rst, central bankers 
can still—just—control the price of monetary accommodation in the 
currencies they issue, but they do so in a world where the terms of 
accommodation, and the elasticity of its supply, are set on the foreign-
exchange market. The sterilization exercises that once divorced these 
two constraints seem to have become a thing of the past, at least for 
small countries—and possibly even for the ECB itself. (Standard theory 
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suggests that sterilization becomes less feasible as the degree of inter-
national capital mobility increases.) The price of money is thus set by a 
trade-off between short-term interest rates and foreign-exchange rates, 
to which central banks respond—but which, in itself, is beyond the 
authorities’ control.
The globalization of bond markets constrains every deliberation of the 
Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee or of the ECB Council. It 
is no longer a question of making a judgement between an expansion-
ary or contractionary stance: as we have seen, a sell-off of government 
bonds is a permanent contractionary threat which central banks must 
attempt to forestall. An effective monetary policy is increasingly seen as 
one without major implications for bond yields; the central bank thus 
operates not on the cost of capital as such, but on the term structure of 
interest rates, trying to accelerate or decelerate immediate expenditures 
without compromising the value of fi nancial assets or the investment 
programmes linked to them. To assess the actions of the central bank 
as if this were not the case—as if comprehensive control over domestic 
credit conditions were still possible—is only another example of the 
anachronism that can be seen in many current debates.16
Effects on corporate fi nance
Thus far, we have seen three key components of the credit system 
in a global context. Banks draw and place funds within an essentially 
globalized payments system, and the terms on which they do so are 
externally determined. Central banks certainly have some infl uence on 
the day-to-day price of these funds, but this infl uence is tightly con-
strained and has to be exercised in a way that does not threaten the 
stability of bond yields. Bonds are not only globally traded but also glo-
16 The position of the US central bank is exceptional in that the global dominance of 
dollar-based fi nance reduces the impact of external constraints on its policies. The 
constitution and functioning of the Fed are relatively unaffected by the monetary 
reforms of the last two decades; specifi cally, the Fed’s broad mandate allows it to 
give considerable weight to the stabilization of output and employment as against 
the suppression of infl ation. A growth-oriented macroeconomic stance can thus 
remain a key component of the US social contract. People have to live and die in 
the marketplace but they do at least insist that markets function, and the electorate 
still sanctions governments that accept lengthy recessions. 
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bally priced, and bond yields establish a key reference point, for all 
marketed credit instruments. Where does this leave the corporation?
It was pointed out at the start that external fi nance still provides only 
a relatively small fraction of corporate investment resources. Can the 
tail wag the dog? This depends on whether external fi nance is merely 
a residual element of an essentially internal process, or whether the 
terms on which it is available have started to defi ne opportunity costs 
for both lenders and borrowers. Once industrial borrowers begin to take 
the external cost of capital as the key hurdle for investment projects, 
and their customary creditors start to regard yields on organized asset 
markets as a base-line rate of return, then market terms and costs will 
inevitably start to be internalized—even if insider fi nance continues to 
prevail in a quantitative sense. Increasingly, to the extent that external 
fi nance is determined on the market, these terms and costs will be a 
matter of global forces.17
It seems that market-determined fi nance does have decisive advantages 
over the voice-based mechanisms of relatively closed industrial groups. 
Firstly, it is able to diversify risks over a vast number of companies 
and investment projects. Secondly, market-based disciplines can reduce 
agency and information costs, by no means completely but, on aggre-
gate, more effectively than the more precise but isolated inspection and 
monitoring procedures used in stakeholding models. The globalization 
of equity markets has therefore tended to reduce the cost of capital to 
borrowers in ways which raise returns to lenders.18 Much of the evi-
dence adduced to the contrary ignores the costs of cross-subsidy within 
stakeholder models: the weaker fi rms in a Japanese ‘convoy’ certainly 
have access to cheap fi nance but only at the expense of the stronger 
fi rms, or of the ‘relational’ banker. Nor are microeconomic data conclu-
17 To put the same point in more general terms: in the global market, the volume of 
trade in fi nancial commodities (claims on income streams) now predominates over 
the volume of trade in real commodities (goods and services). See Photis Lysandrou, 
‘Globalization as Commodifi cation’, University of North London Business School 
Discussion Paper, forthcoming. 
18 René M. Stulz, ‘Globalization of Equity Markets and the Costs of Capital’, NBER 
Working Paper 7021, March 1999. Stulz fi nds a signifi cant reduction of capital 
costs, but not as great as he expected; he may have underestimated the effi cacy of 
the voice-based mechanisms being displaced.
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sive here: a German enterprise may be better managed, physically more 
productive, committed to higher standards of design and so on than 
its US counterpart; but if the enterprise as such represents a misdirec-
tion of capital resources, then it becomes a weakness in the competition 
between national economies.
Shareholder value
Beyond these pressures, there is now a drive in equity markets towards 
challenging, at the limit even eliminating, the very notion of a distinc-
tion between external and internal fi nance, through the demands of 
shareholder value. Legally, the shareholders of an enterprise are not its 
creditors but its owners. By the logic of fi nancial markets, however, the 
main sanction they possess is not a proprietorial but a purely market 
act—to sell; to exit. Companies care about their share price: it deter-
mines the cost they pay for risk-bearing capital. Managements may 
also fear that too low a share-price will lead to their own dismissal. In 
this context, the fact that stock markets do not provide signifi cant net 
amounts of industrial fi nance is irrelevant.19 The role of equity is not 
simply to supply fi nance for companies, but to exercise control over 
the totality of corporate fi nance—including the use that is made of 
retained earnings.
It is not necessary to idealize here the so-called ‘market in corporate 
control’—in fact, there is every reason to question this supposedly effi -
cient Darwinian mechanism for the natural selection of managements. 
Takeovers and mergers may as often be an expression of agency prob-
lems as their solution, refl ecting the opportunism and empire-building 
of acquiring managements. The point is that this does not, in general, 
absolve the management of the acquired enterprise of the sanction of 
a devalued share price.20 Then there is the capacity of relatively pow-
erful shareholders, such as fund-managers, to intervene in corporate 
governance. Beyond the consequences that fl ow simply from fl otation 
on the largest stock markets—accounting procedures and reporting 
conventions—shareholders may seek to impose incentive systems on 
19 Gross fl ows, which include funds extracted from quoted companies, are a differ-
ent matter.
20 Stuart Archbold, ‘An Examination of Managerial Strategies and Motives in UK 
Mergers and Acquisitions’, British Academy of Management Conference, 2000. 
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management, tying them into maximization of profi ts and share appre-
ciation through equity or stock options.
To summarize the shareholder-value agenda, one can look at matters 
from the point of view of the capital market itself—that is, in terms 
of the reallocation of capital resources. This market would see, on the 
one hand, over-capitalized enterprises situated in slow-growth sectors, 
perhaps with high earnings streams but with relatively limited possi-
bilities of accumulation. To the extent that they escape pressure from 
shareholders as principals, these ‘cash-cows’ may have acquired com-
plex networks of insider coalition partners, representing stakeholder 
interests. To such a company, the shareholder-value agenda is all too 
familiar: pressures for productive reorganization will involve downsiz-
ing, disposal of peripheral or under-performing divisions, stripping-out 
of cushioned, managerial layers and so forth. Financial reorganization 
will include higher distribution ratios, equity buy-backs and increased 
gearing through the bond fi nance of assets that provide adequate col-
lateral. In effect, the shareholders are saying: ‘There is no such thing 
as internal resources; everything is ours.’ Companies on which this pro-
gramme has been imposed will provide higher returns on a possibly 
diminished equity base. This will correspond to higher risks for equity 
holders, but today’s fund managers are confi dent that they can diversify 
those risks. They certainly do not want the companies themselves under-
taking asset diversifi cation if this lowers their rate of return. On the 
other hand, shareholders would look for undercapitalized, high-growth 
enterprises. Capital liberated from the cash-cows will be poured into a 
wide range of start-up, innovative, hi-tech projects. The realization of 
profi ts in this case may lie far in an uncertain future, but the potential 
gains are immediately capitalized into equity prices.21
Aspects of the shareholder-value agenda are common to both growing 
and established enterprises. Operational decisions are not supervised; 
instead, there is an imposition of standardized reporting and account-
ing procedures (compare the capitulation of Metallgesellschaft to the 
21 Thus it is by no means accurate to identify the advantages of US fi nancial mecha-
nisms only with phases of rationalization and disinvestment; they display a clear 
superiority in growth sectors such as biotech, where the capitalization of US enter-
prises at $320 bn is some ten times greater than that of their EU counterparts. 
Financial Times, 27 September 2000, p. 29. 
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requirements of the NYSE); incentive structures are introduced to elimi-
nate, in principle, any confl ict of interests between shareholders and 
management.22 The premise of this kind of development is an enhanced 
capacity (real or perceived) on the part of proprietors to diversify 
risks across wide portfolios—a development closely associated with the 
increasing weight of collective fund managers among equity-holders. 
Of course, the idea that this pattern of accumulation is moving us towards 
a world free from agent–principal confl icts is absurd. Managements 
threatened with this kind of colonization are fi ghting back every day—by 
diversifying, for example, perhaps in blatant contradiction of share-
holder logic, into the promised land of the new hi-tech paradigm, or 
by anticipating the called-for restructurings, or by loading themselves 
with so much debt that even the most gung ho acquirers will think twice 
before launching a bid. But many of these defensive moves simply accel-
erate the reordering of productive relations and investment programmes 
promoted by the shareholder-value drive. The high degree of instability 
inherent in such developments goes without saying: the press is full of 
dire warnings about a coming decline in the yield of equity capital, a 
decline which in itself must imply big falls in equity prices. Most of what 
these Cassandras predict must be right; but part of the needed correc-
tion has already happened, and even a big stock-market decline could 
be absorbed by the US corporate sector, provided that other channels of 
fi nance—bonds, above all—can be kept open. 
It remains the case that shareholder-value is not—or not only—an ide-
ology, but a real consequence of fi nancial globalization. It represents a 
22 Standard measures of fi nancial fl ows neglect this pattern. Thus the data cited 
from Huffschmid above suggest that German corporations have more access to 
outside funds than do their US counterparts. This neglects, fi rstly, the extent to 
which US corporations have been made to fi nance each other through such stock-
market mechanisms as equity buy-backs and, secondly, the fact that the German 
and Japanese fl ows often represent what are in fact internal resources—internal, 
that is, to an industrial-fi nancial grouping—and not funds drawn from the capital 
market. Nor are simple comparisons of investment volumes always pertinent: it is 
important to know how effectively these investment resources are deployed. Michel 
Aglietta presents data indicating that the productivity of corporate investment in 
the US (that is, the ability of this investment to raise output) has increased by 40 
per cent over the period 1982–97. The corresponding fi gure for Germany is 12.7 
per cent, for France, 6.8 per cent (‘Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance: 
some tricky questions’, Economy and Society, vol. 29, no. 1, February 2000).
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new balance of forces between proprietors and managers, very much in 
favour of the former. And it is driven not only by the as yet very limited 
cross-border market in equities, but also by the global transformation 
of currency and debt markets in ways which universalize these pres-
sures, even in economies where equity itself is traded predominantly 
among domestic agents. The visible effect is to reinforce, in the most 
powerful way, the familiar drive towards more complete and immediate 
market disciplines in other areas, in labour and output markets. Trade 
liberalization or labour market ‘fl exibilization’ alone would only sharpen 
pressures on some product markets, some categories of labour and so on. 
The shareholder-value drive, in contrast, tends to eliminate the notion of 
a sheltered sector by imposing the same norms of cost, price and profi t 
as prevail elsewhere.
Defensive measures
What are the implications of this for voice-based systems? From the 
point of view of the competitive capital market, stakeholder systems 
are not a solution to the problem of agency but rather the same prob-
lem writ large. Not only has a management established some autonomy 
from proprietorial interests; that management is embedded in a dis-
tributional coalition where a host of other interests can enforce their 
own priorities. For market-oriented shareholders in general (though 
not necessarily for privileged groups of insiders), opacity reigns. 
Particular, non-standard relations govern all transactions. In a confron-
tation between the two types of arrangement, general considerations 
would suggest that voice-based systems have three possible lines of 
defence. All of them are visibly failing in the context of an ongoing 
fi nancial revolution.
The fi rst line of defence might be to erect regulatory or other barriers, 
rendering exit options diffi cult, costly or even impossible, with the voice-
based structures of ‘Rhenish capitalism’ or classical European social 
democracy being an imposed alternative to free capital markets. But the 
increasing interdependence of economies (in general) and fi nancial lib-
eralization (in particular) have been eliminating these restrictions for 
a generation. As early as the 1960s, to give one signifi cant example, 
big German companies realized that they had an escape from the pos-
sibly irksome discipline of housebanks as suppliers of credit: they could 
simply go to the Eurocurrency markets. Exit options have never ceased 
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to multiply in the intervening years (although to different extents, of 
course, for different agents). If voice-based systems are to prevail, it 
must, increasingly, be through successful competition with the market-
oriented forms.
A second line of defence might be to outperform the market-oriented 
approach, by reduced transactions costs, longer time-horizons, lower 
levels of confl ict and so on. The effi ciency of the particular, voice-based 
arrangements may overcome the general conditions of the market. 
This is always to some extent the case: no economic interactions will 
ever be purely contractual. But for the viability of a given voice-based 
system this effi ciency condition (itself increasingly diffi cult to meet as 
market alternatives expand and develop) is necessary without being suf-
fi cient. There is also a distributional condition: the effi ciency premium 
must make every member of a given coalition better off. Otherwise, 
that party may defect, and return to the market. The history of West 
European economies over the last two decades is littered with such 
defections at every level: skilled workers opting for individualized con-
tracts with their employers; the severance of customary ties between 
suppliers and purchasers; giant enterprises delocalizing vast productive 
systems or abandoning their customary sources of fi nance for quotation 
on international stock markets. The pressure on all agents to do likewise 
goes on increasing.
Thirdly, as Hirschman argues, a voice-based system may mobilize the 
loyalty of its agents: an allegiance that rejects purely individual percep-
tions of interest. Of course this is an invaluable resource, and only the 
deep-rootedness of such loyalties can account for the resistance so far 
of many European social structures. But it is hardly necessary to point 
out the pressures. ‘Those who deplore the cynicism of the men and 
women of our time’, writes Pierre Bourdieu, ‘should not omit to relate 
it to the economic and social conditions which favour or demand it and 
which reward it.’23
New developments
The question of effi ciency, however, is not a neutral criterion in judg-
ing between the two systems. As fi nancial market disciplines become 
23 Acts of Resistance: Against the New Myths of our Time, Cambridge 1998, p. 84.
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more intense, different metrics are applied to company performance. 
The scope of such an assessment, moreover, is a function of the 
approach adopted—individual enterprises are more likely to fail under 
a shareholder-value regime, but the economy as a whole may produce 
higher returns. The outcome of the competition between the two 
approaches may also depend on the type of economic development 
that is taking place. Colin Mayer, formerly an infl uential proponent of 
‘insider’ fi nance, now writes:
Outsider systems may . . . be particularly well placed to respond to the com-
mercial opportunities created by the emergence of new technologies and 
new international markets. These require rapid adaptation which may be 
impeded by the complex webs of inter-relations between fi rms and other 
stakeholders which exist in insider systems.24
Finally, one has to take into account the sheer scale of the fi nancial 
resources now being deployed to crack open the insider systems of 
Germany or Japan, made possible by the (practically) integrated world-
payments system. The pace of this change varies: fast in France; slow, 
until very recently, in Germany. But this is a wheel that only turns one 
way: already the complex, interlocking shareholder patterns of Federal 
Germany are being dissolved as the big universal banks transform their 
equity holdings, from supports for reciprocal relations with industrial 
companies into asset-managing funds à l’américaine. In every sphere 
of European fi nance, agents are transforming markets, procedures and 
mechanisms to bring them into line with US practice. Only a few years 
ago, many transactions with derivatives ran foul of German gambling 
laws; today the German Terminbörs is a leading European market for 
derivatives. Whatever the balance of factors in the rivalry, the established 
European systems are losing. The cause is their fi nancial weakness: 
their inability to mobilize and deploy capital resources rapidly, effi ciently 
24 ‘Corporate Governance, Competition and Performance’, in Simon Deakin and 
Alan Hughes, eds, Enterprise and Community: new directions in corporate governance, 
Oxford 1997, p. 171. See also Colin Mayer, ‘The City and Corporate Performance: 
condemned or exonerated?’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 21, no. 2, 1997. 
Mayer fails, in particular, to fi nd evidence that insider systems lower the cost of 
capital: ‘it is diffi cult to believe that the international integration of the past two dec-
ades has not brought costs of capital closely into line, at least for large companies 
which are able to raise funds in markets around the world.’ He now argues only 
for a permissive policy: fi rms should be permitted to have concentrated, insider, 
ownership if they wish. 
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and on a large scale. It is a weakness which may yet begin to compro-
mise the EMU project itself.
Models of resistance?
The argument so far has been that globalized fi nance, based on the 
deregulation and internationalization of the US fi nancial system, is nei-
ther a myth nor even an alarming tendency, but a reality. A recent article 
by Ronald Dore calls into question the triumph of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ capital-
ism; most of the evidence Dore presents, however, is quite compatible 
with the position expressed above.25 The stubborn resistance of Japanese 
society to the shareholder-value agenda is itself evidence of the immense 
external pressures on inherited patterns of economic organization. Dore, 
like many of those attracted to ‘stakeholder’ forms of enterprise, seems 
to regard fi nance as a superstructure—subject, in the last instance, to 
determination by the ‘base’ of Japan’s industrial system. Yet his own 
account of the long Japanese stagnation through the 1990s shows how 
potent fi nancial factors have been. The banking crisis, seen as a major 
cause of retardation, was ‘more or less’ resolved by 1996. Since that 
date, pressures on public fi nance are recognized as having played a neg-
ative role. Thus indebtedness, private and public, has put the recovery 
of Japanese industry into disarray for a full decade—this in the world’s 
largest creditor country, awash with unmobilizable assets.26
If Dore downplays the impact of fi nancial forces, he may, by the same 
token, exaggerate that of ideologies. He records elsewhere a conver-
25 ‘Will Global Capitalism be Anglo-Saxon Capitalism?’, NLR 6, November–
December 2000. See also his Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism. Japan 
and Germany versus the Anglo-Saxons, London 2000.
26 Similarly, Taggart Murphy (‘Japan’s Economic Crisis’, NLR 1, January–February 
2000) gives a graphic account of the painstaking political negotiations that are 
slowly untangling the web of bad and dubious debts in the Japanese banking sys-
tem—but Murphy writes as if this process were of little importance, a secondary 
phenomenon. Compare, to take a notorious counterexample, the rescue of LTCM, 
whose insolvency is widely seen as displaying the instability, even the irrationality, 
of trade in fi nancial derivatives. Its recapitalization (strictly, a ‘bail-in’ rather than 
a bail-out since the resources came from its own creditors, not from the Fed) 
was complete within days. For a more developed version of this point see Photis 
Lysandrou, ‘Globalization and the Euro: lessons and policy implications of the 
Asian crisis’, University of North London Business School Discussion Paper 28, 
October 2000.
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sation with a Japanese manager who thought that ‘a global company 
should have global ownership’, as though to imply a surrender to the 
fashionable managerial nostrums of the hour.27 But banking insolvency, 
a narrow, illiquid securities market, the opacity of interlocking indus-
trial groups where one cannot be sure who owns or owes what, have 
become quite tangible constraints on the reorientation of Japanese pro-
duction, and the manager’s viewpoint—one more decision to exit—may 
be more logical than he would like. As for the German stakeholder 
model, Dore’s pessimistic assessment hardly differs from the view pre-
sented here. Over decades, large companies and banks have built up 
huge cross-holdings in each other’s equity, supporting dense networks 
of reciprocity and cooperation, both fi nancial and industrial. A key com-
ponent of last summer’s tax reform was the removal of fi scal barriers to 
the dissolution of this structure. With capital gains tax on the disposal 
of these holdings simply eliminated, they can be transferred painlessly to 
fund-holding institutions (often yesterday’s ‘relational’ bankers) who 
will henceforth manage them not as the supports of insider fi nance, 
but as so many items in their portfolios. The consequence, accepted 
by both borrowers and lenders in Germany, if not yet by the European 
Parliament, is to put a trillion dollars of corporate assets into play.28 Only 
a few years ago it was generally taken for granted that one could not buy 
a German company. That was then. 
A crash will make no difference
There are many commentators who assert that the dollar-based fi nan-
cial system is riding for a fall. They have some telling arguments on 
their side. Even on the most optimistic assumptions of ‘new paradigm’ 
economics, it is hard to envisage a surge of profi ts that could justify 
27 ‘Asian Crisis and the Future of the Japanese Model’, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, vol. 22, no. 6, November 1998.
28 Peter Gowan has suggested that this transformation of German fi nance was a 
quid pro quo for the participation of German companies in the US economy (per-
sonal communication). This is surely correct, but the desire to attract US FDI into 
Germany was also an important motive. More generally, Gowan’s insistence on the 
political force used to extend what he calls the ‘Wall Street-dollar system’ across the 
globe can be accepted without denying that the resulting economic structure has 
an intrinsic logic of development or believing that the economic changes involved 
are reversible. See Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for 
World Dominance, London 1999. 
46     nlr 8
current equity prices, if equities are to maintain anything like their his-
toric yields. If, on the other hand, these yields are due to be lower in 
future—itself an implication of the fi nancial revolution—then prices are 
already too high.29 It is clear that this concern is shared by the guardians 
of the dollar-fi nancial system itself, including Greenspan. Other major 
disequilibria characterize the present situation: the huge commercial 
defi cit of the US and the related shortage of savings, with American con-
sumers relying heavily on asset-market appreciation to maintain their 
wealth. We already have bitter experience of the instability of asset-based 
growth in the outcome of the worldwide property boom of 1987–90. 
The writer shares the Schadenfreude which accompanies every disrup-
tion of the dominant, dollar-based fi nancial mechanism. But the days 
are gone when any real reversal of present trends could be expected 
from conjunctural developments. As an examination of the pattern of 
cyclical development over the past thirty years will show, globalized 
fi nance is driven forward not by any particular phase but by the cyclical 
mechanism itself (see Fig. 3). Crises, buffered and absorbed in the huge 
dollarized economy essentially through adjustments of US macro-policy 
instruments, have provoked massive regime shifts in Western Europe.30 
Of course, one key factor in this has been the lack of unity among the 
European states—their inability to defi ne a common response. But, in 
this respect, are things really very different today?
A slowdown in the US would involve the immediate devalorization of 
US assets held in other countries; a turn-round of US current account 
and deterioration of European/Japanese competitiveness; pressure on 
Europe to expand by the most inappropriate means—big tax cuts, the 
sacrifi ce of fi nancial stability; and, to the extent that the US bond market 
was implicated, equal pressure on long interest rates in Europe.
29 For an attempt to calibrate the overvaluation of US equities, see Sushil Wadhwani, 
‘The US Stock Market and the Global Economic Crisis’, National Institute Economic 
Review, 167, January 1999, pp. 86–105. Also, Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance, 
Princeton 2000 (reviewed by Andrew Glyn in NLR 5, September–October 2000).
30 Robert Brenner (‘The Boom and the Bubble’, NLR 6, November–December 
2000) may understate the ability of the US to manage a stock market crash, with 
its threat of a ‘hard landing’. He considers the constraints on monetary policy but 
does not discuss the vigorous fi scal expansion which will certainly meet any signifi -
cant downturn. US public fi nance is healthy enough to permit this response, which 
would work to limit dollar depreciation.
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The weakness and subordinate status of the EMU project can be read 
in the increasingly alarmed and disunited statements of the ECB lead-
ership. They seem to feel less and less able to deploy the classic US 
response to such diffi culties: ‘benign neglect.’ There are serious dan-
gers here. Specifi cally, to defend the euro or the price of euro bonds, 
monetary conditions might be tightened, and this in a context where 
the forced march of member-state governments towards fi scal balance 
continues, or even accelerates. Here, then, there exists the possibility 
of a vicious cycle, with stagnation and weak profi tability further under-
mining the strength and organization of euro fi nance, exposing all 
the European systems to continued external pressure. The institutional 
mechanisms which could block such a process are weak: the concerta-
tion of national budgetary policies—to the extent that it exists—remains 
focused on the goals of the Stability Pact, and there is no fi scal policy 
of overall macroeconomic signifi cance at Union level. The truth is that 
Europe is not generating enough assets, either ‘real’ or ‘fi nancial’. The 
deep-rooted preoccupation with les grands équilibres has held back devel-
opment for twenty years (relative to a perpetually disequilibrated US 
economy). What is needed, on both economic and social grounds, is 
a relaunch of economic development, supported by a huge fi nancial 
mechanism; but one which functions with different standards to those 
of globalized US fi nance.
Figure 3 Some crises
 Crisis US response Consequence
1971–73 US balance of Dollar devaluation, Monetary policy
 payments break-up of Bretton becomes key macro 
  Woods instrument in   
   European countries
1979–82 US infl ation Volcker shock: Huge and persistent rise
  drastic rise in US in unemployment in   
  interest rates European countries; fi scal
   crisis of the welfare state
1987–90 US stock market Turn to monetary  Worldwide property 
 crash, recession expansion in US in boom and bust; tensions
  climate of capital in EMS; end of full 
  liberalization employment in Sweden
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How are we to understand the new phase of capitalism that has emerged, over 
the last half-decade or so, from the long downturn that followed the postwar 
boom? A decisive resolution, at last, of a twenty-year period of crisis, with the 
deep restructuring that took place from the mid-seventies to the mid-nineties 
now clearing the way for sustained capital accumulation? Or as a more troubled 
exit into a new stage marked by further financial instability? Crise et sortie de crise 
reminds us that this is not the first time that modern capitalism has transformed 
itself in the course of a profound structural crisis. In this view from Paris, the 
emergence of the neoliberal order is set in a century-long perspective: what can 
the solutions of the Great Depression that beset the final decades of the nine-
teenth century tell us about the trajectories of today?
 Duménil and Lévy begin with an analysis of the slowdown of the seventies, 
following les trente glorieuses—the 30 glorious postwar years. The rate of profit 
is taken as the key variable here, in a quite classical sense. They postulate 
a ‘Marxian trajectory’ in which, at a certain point, the established pattern of 
economic advance was no longer able to deliver rapid gains in labour produc-
tivity without the cost of fixed-capital investment soaring. On both sides of the 
Atlantic, the attempt to restore conditions for profitable expansion by using 
Keynesian methods to maintain activity failed, yielding only a brief stay of exe-
cution for the postwar model. It was at this stage, they argue, that finance 
capital began a decisive intervention to reassert—for the first time since the early 
thirties—its own hegemonic control. 
 It was this finance-led turn to neoliberal policies at the beginning of the eight-
ies that released all the classic mechanisms of crisis. Recession and monetary 
grahl:  Duménil/Lévy     149
review
s
restriction forced reorganization of the productive system, while unemployment 
restored labour-market discipline. In fact, argue Duménil and Lévy, the claims 
of labour soon ceased to be the main barrier to profitable investment. Instead, 
the instability and the relatively poor growth-rates of Western economies over 
the following decades are traced to policies imposed by finance capital which, 
in practice, prolonged the crisis. The leap in interest rates after 1979 inhibited 
productive investment, despite the recovery in gross rates of profit. Deregulation 
of capital flows on a world scale resulted in sharper and more frequent fluctua-
tions of the business cycle—‘disorders’ of neoliberalism triggering devastating 
disruptions in the developing world, from the debt crisis in Mexico at the begin-
ning of the period to the East Asian crises at its close. As income was steadily 
transferred from producers to shareholders, capitalism’s inherent tendency to 
‘reproduce and exacerbate inequalities and injustice’ intensified.
 Duménil and Lévy situate financial globalization within the context of 
American hegemony, but they see developments on both sides of the Atlantic 
as broadly similar. In an analysis darkened, perhaps, by the spectre of three mil-
lion out of work in France—and in contrast to much Anglo-Saxon writing—the 
role of mass unemployment during the long downturn is a central theme of 
Crise et sortie de crise. Mainstream accounts of Europe’s supposed labour-market 
rigidities are dismissed, and the greater persistence of European unemployment 
explained by a somewhat less advantageous balance between expansion and 
rationalization—giving rise to slightly faster growth of labour productivity, at the 
cost of job-creation.
 This weakness, in turn, is traced to macroeconomic policies in the EU, which 
Duménil and Lévy view as excessively restrictive, even when the new financial 
constraints on governments are taken into account. Had economic growth been 
only 0.2 per cent per annum higher, growth of labour productivity only 0.2 per 
cent slower and the effective work week reduced by 0.1 per cent a year, unem-
ployment rates could have been contained. ‘It was not a miracle that was needed 
but a little improvement (un petit mieux) or slightly less of a deterioration.’ They 
fail to add that lack of effective, Europe-wide coordination of macroeconomic 
policies also contributed to stubbornly high levels of unemployment. The severe 
monetary contractions of the early eighties, and again at the beginning of the 
nineties, were both marked by unusual disarray among EU states.
 Crise et sortie de crise draws some striking comparisons between the last quar-
ter of the twentieth century and the Great Depression of 1875–93. Duménil and 
Lévy read the Victorian downturn, too, as the outcome of a ‘Marxian trajectory’—
that is, a major structural crisis precipitated by a failure to build enough 
innovations into established investment patterns. A fundamental restructuring 
of productive relations and financial mechanisms—the rise of the massive corpo-
rations and investment banks supporting them, above all in the US—eventually 
restored the yield on new investments, through the breakthrough in labour pro-
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s ductivity associated with the assembly line and scientific management. This 
is a precedent that suggests a new phase of sustained economic dynamism is 
a real possibility today. But the rise of big business also made for dangerous 
imbalances in the turn-of-the-century productive system. The giant firms existed 
alongside very large numbers of smaller and less efficient enterprises, often in 
the same sectors; only very buoyant market conditions made it possible, for a 
time, to run old and new orders in parallel. Another source of instability lay 
in the extreme fragility of the financial structures—dominated by investment 
banking—that had promoted the rise of the big companies. Duménil and Lévy 
thus define the crash of 1929 and the worldwide depression that followed it as 
‘the crisis stemming from the resolution of the crisis of the late nineteenth cen-
tury’. The collapse expressed a failure by the dominant economic groups to move 
beyond orthodox prescriptions and to adapt institutional frameworks and poli-
cies to new conditions.
 The authors make no apocalyptic predictions. The very fact that 1929 took 
place, they argue, makes it unlikely to happen again: any disturbance serious 
enough to trouble the centre will immediately meet with statist intervention. 
The lessons of fin-de-siècle restructuring yield a more sober verdict: the techni-
cal and economic conditions for a new expansionary phase of capitalist growth 
do indeed exist, but may be undermined by serious imbalances in rates of devel-
opment and unstable systems of financial control. Finance capital may wish to 
move to a new, more centralized stage of neoliberalism; but, the authors point 
out, it is not the only actor here. 
 Two readings of capitalism’s future trajectory are presented in conclusion. In 
part, these are complementary; in part, they widely diverge. Firstly, a ‘Keynesian’ 
chapter traces the economic dysfunctions resulting from the liberalization and 
worldwide penetration of dollar-based finance: chronic imbalances in interna-
tional payments, repeated foreign-exchange disturbances and banking crises, 
especially in the developing countries. Reforms aimed at stabilizing the current 
order would call for strong global institutions to regulate the world economy, 
both taming and sustaining potentially dangerous capital markets.
 The second reading—characterized as ‘Marxist’, but a Marxism combining 
‘fundamentalism and revisionism’—attempts to look beyond these limits. It 
detects, in the emergence of globalized economic relations, a new and higher 
stage in the socialization of production. The giant fund-managing companies 
which dominate private insurance and pension provision open the way to a fur-
ther ‘mutation of property relations’, the latest evolution of the process that saw, 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, the birth of the giant corporations 
financed by share capital. If the authors do not see in such developments any 
clear path to social control over economic life they still feel able to claim that, 
‘sooner or later private ownership of the means of production will belong to the 
past, whatever the steps of this dissolution may be’.
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 Crise et sortie de crise is a clear-minded and trenchant work, which we must 
hope will find an English-language edition soon. What is its originality within 
the literature of a radical political economy today? Duménil and Lévy share the 
underlying idea of an overaccumulation of capital with a good many econo-
mists in the Marxist tradition. But they differ in significant ways from other 
bodies of theory in the field. Criticizing their compatriots in the Regulation 
School, for example, Duménil and Lévy argue persuasively that the regulation-
ists mistake some of the consequences of the long postwar boom—regularly 
rising wages, the prominence of organized collective bargaining—for its pre-
conditions. The ‘institutional forms’ of the fifties and sixties, on which writers 
like Michel Aglietta have insisted, were not as important as the regulationists 
have claimed. The distinctive emphasis of Duménil and Lévy falls, by contrast, 
on the central role they attribute to finance in the history of capital over the 
past three decades.
 Here Crise et sortie de crise adopts a highly intentionalist position. For 
Duménil and Lévy, the term ‘finance’ designates a class fraction capable of 
acting with collective determination in pursuit of clear-cut objectives. Since the 
seventies, its success in securing these has—according to their account—been 
so great that we can speak of the ‘autonomization’ of finance, in determining 
policy outcomes over this period. The increased salience of capital markets, the 
higher costs of credit, not to speak of changes in the pattern of public expendi-
ture, are all interpreted as expressions of the triumph of this class fraction over 
productive sectors of capital and labour alike. Likewise, the dynamic of financial 
globalization is viewed as the result of energetic initiatives by a well-defined set 
of economic interests. 
 This vision of the workings of latter-day capitalism is too voluntaristic. 
Finance is not so much a fraction of capital with a collective subjectivity, as 
an objective function for the reallocation of liquidity in any market economy. 
Temporarily, there do exist conjunctures in which the growth of financial wealth 
may become dissociated from production: the recent stock-market bubble in the 
United States is a case in point. But, as Duménil and Lévy themselves point 
out, any continuing income stream from financial assets must be a deduction 
from profits or wages. Moreover, it is always necessary to distinguish interme-
diaries from holders of financial assets; although the two roles can be played 
by the same agents, this is the exception rather than the rule. The liberalization 
of capital markets is treated by Duménil and Lévy as if it simply reflected the 
interests of intermediaries and creditors, whom they assimilate. But some debt-
ors, particularly but not only in the US, have been major beneficiaries of the 
process as well.
 Thus the detailed record of the downturn does not bear out the kind of 
decisional model on which Duménil and Lévy rely. The most important single 
turning-point in the move away from Keynesian crisis-management was the 
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s drastic tightening of US monetary policy in 1979—the so-called Volcker shock. 
Can this policy shift be traced back to an organized group of private-sector 
agents? Hardly. Some commentators have spoken of it as a ‘revolt of the lend-
ers’, and so far as it goes, this is not incorrect. But the monetary malfunctions 
of that time were so severe that the very distinction between borrowers and lend-
ers was breaking down; everyone wanted to borrow, leaving the Federal Reserve 
itself as the only continuing lender. The American middle classes can move a lot 
of money. The kind of pressure-cooker Keynesianism that attempts to eliminate 
the rentier by eroding the value of monetary assets is fundamentally incompat-
ible with capitalism (which is why this reviewer and others were proponents of 
it at the time). The rule of capitalism is, ‘thou shalt sell’. The rule of financial 
repression is, ‘thou shalt buy’. But if output and labour markets are increasingly 
dominated by suppliers, most of the mechanisms of a decentralized market 
economy cease to function and mechanisms of allocation that are more central-
ized and politicized become unavoidable.
 Duménil and Lévy describe the Federal Reserve’s action in 1979 as an 
‘American decision’. But both terms require qualification. Confronted by a dra-
matic flight from the dollar provoked by inflation and negative real interest rates, 
Volcker sought the assistance of the Bundesbank to stabilize the exchange rate, 
as there was a headlong rush into any and every alternative store of value—gold, 
real estate, oil reserves, Swiss Francs, Deutschmarks. The Bundesbank refused 
and invited Volcker to get the US money supply under control. So the ‘decision’ 
to squeeze credit was tightly constrained. Compare, to take the most obvious 
counter-example, the monetary contraction in Germany from the late eighties 
onwards—a ‘European decision’. The Bundesbank squeezed longer and harder 
against an inflation rate below 4 per cent than Volcker had against inflation of 14 
per cent and rising. So the move was much less constrained than its US coun-
terpart, but of equal or greater consequence for European labour markets. 
 In general, Crise et sortie de crise ascribes too much unity and coherence to the 
calculations and strategies of ruling groups, and underestimates the importance 
of purely market developments in undermining the postwar model. Consistent 
with their treatment of finance, Duménil and Lévy tend to block together what 
they take to be the effects of its victory under the rubric of neoliberalism. In 
their usage, the term comprehends: the ideological and political assaults that 
shattered the postwar settlement and its institutions; the economic processes 
by which new regimes of accumulation were installed on a world scale; and the 
workings of the new globalized system of trade and investment that has issued 
from them. Duménil and Lévy acknowledge imprecisions in the term, but write 
that ‘at the level of analysis at which we place ourselves, the degree of subjec-
tivity or objectivity is a secondary issue. It is only the outcome which matters 
and this is unambiguous’. But while it is true that direct ideological challenge 
to the Keynesian consensus of the postwar era—the moment of Thatcher and 
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Reagan—was essential to the emergence of today’s globalized capitalism, the 
pragmatists who manage the system today, from Greenspan downwards, are 
quite capable of acting in quasi-Keynesian fashion to shore it up. In this respect, 
the history Duménil and Lévy offer of the period is too streamlined. But this bold 
reconstruction of the time is a challenge to those disposed to a more objectivist 
reading of it to produce a better account of systemic response to the breakdown 
of the postwar settlement. 
John Grahl teaches economics at the University of North London. Author of 
After Maastricht: a Guide to European Monetary Union (1997).
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This section is designed for the discussion and debate of current economic problems. Contributions which
raise new issues or comment on issues already raised are welcome.
Sand in the wheels or spanner in the
works? The Tobin tax and global finance
John Grahl and Photis Lysandrou*
This paper presents a radical critique of the Tobin tax—a tax on currency trans-
actions—by undercutting certain assumptions about the size and character of the
world’s foreign exchange markets which furnish the tax with its basic rationale.
While it is acknowledged that only a fraction of the massive volumes of FX trans-
actions relate directly to trade in goods and services or to cross border investments, it
is denied that all the residual transactions are motivated purely by exchange rate
considerations (speculative or hedging activities). Rather, the argument is that a
significant proportion of FX trades have money market characteristics and that these
trades, together with domestic money market transactions, play an important role in
the day to day operation of the global financial system. This perspective is used to
show that the imposition of a Tobin tax would cause extensive material damage to the
system, with consequences that may run counter to the expectations of supporters of
the tax.
Key words: foreign exchange, Tobin tax, global finance
JEL classifications: F02, F31
1. Introduction
Taxes tend to be unpopular with the public at large, but James Tobin’s proposal for a tax
on foreign exchange transactions1 is proving to be an exception to the rule, as support for
it continues to grow among many constituencies.2 The reasons for the popularity of the
Tobin tax, more than thirty years after it was first proposed, are not difficult to fathom.
The post-Bretton Woods era has been marked by an exceptional degree of currency
Manuscript received 14 June 2002; final version received 21 October 2002.
Address for correspondence:
*London Metropolitan University; our thanks to Philip Arestis, Mike Pokorny, John Sedgwick and two
anonymous referees for comments on an earlier draft.
1Tobin (1974,1978,1995,1996).
2 Expressions of support have not only come from parliaments (motions in favour of the tax have been
passed, for example, in the Canadian parliament in March 1999, and in the French parliament in December
2001) and political parties (particularly left-wing and Green parties) but also from various development and
aid agencies.
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volatility which on occasion has had a catastrophic effect on real economic activity. The
fact that this volatility has been accompanied by a huge daily turnover in the foreign
exchange (FX) markets and the fact that the bulk of currency trades are extremely short
term with no direct connection to trade in either goods and services or in securities have
served to strengthen the general conviction that the root cause of currency volatility is
currency speculation.1 This position explains why a simple ad valorem tax on currency
transactions is widely held to be an appropriate and efficient corrective measure for, if set
at a modest level, it would apparently have no deterrent effect on long-horizon trans-
actions undertaken for purposes of trade or cross-border investment while penalising
short-term round trips.2 Since even a minute tax would, given the massive volumes of
currency transactions, generate substantial revenues3 which could be dedicated to a host
of multilateral causes, one can understand why the Tobin tax has become firmly lodged in
popular opinion as a ‘good’ tax.4
If to date there has been no sustained effort to implement the Tobin tax on an inter-
national basis, this is not merely because of the strenuous opposition from those institutions
whose interests would suffer by it. A more plausible reason is that the proposal contains
flaws that have been readily exploited by opponents. A number of critics, for example,
have attacked the simplistic identification of FX trades and speculation, some arguing
that a significant proportion of the latter is accounted for by currency arbitrage,5 and
others arguing that much of what appears to be excessive trading volumes are simply risk
spreading and position balancing trades undertaken by dealers.6 In both cases, the
position is that the imposition of the tax could undermine the efficiency of the currency
markets and possibly enhance, rather than diminish, exchange rate volatility.7 A further
problem is that, even if the Tobin tax were considered desirable, it is by no means clear
that it would be effective. Tobin tax supporters appear to take it as read that most specu-
lative currency transactions are not only driven by short-term profit opportunities but also
executed through successive short-term round trips. However, recent experience indicates
that major speculative attacks on particular national currencies have been driven by the
1 This conviction is shared by expert and popular opinion alike. In fact, it is surprising how many
economists reach this view on the most casual observations of FX trading volumes. Harcourt (1995), among
many others, assumes that as FX transactions can only divide into three categories, i.e., to finance trade,
foreign direct investment and speculation, and as the first two categories only account for a small fraction of
the massive growth in daily turnover, speculation must be the cause of volatility. Similarly with Arestis and
Sawyer (1997) who, before evaluating the ‘thesis that a transactions tax can reduce the excessive volume of
speculative transactions’ simply take it as read that non-trade-related FX transactions must be ‘excessive’ and
therefore ‘speculative’ by virtue of being 60 times ‘greater than the volume required to finance trade’.
2 Tobin has suggested tax rates of 1%, 0·5% and 0·2%; but the figure now typically discussed is 0·1%,
although one commentator (Spahn, 2002) has recently suggested a rate as low as one half of one basis point or
0·005%.
3Felix and Sau (1996) give some estimates of the sums that might be raised.
4 Michalos (1997). Tobin himself has always insisted that the revenue raising potential of a currency
transactions tax is a ‘by-product’. Its central objectives are to give back to governments some scope for
macroeconomic policy autonomy and to reduce exchange rate volatility. It is clear, however, that not all
Tobin tax supporters agree with Tobin’s own particular ordering of priorities or, indeed, even with his stated
range of objectives of the tax. Thus where some protagonists can also see the Tobin tax as a sin tax that
penalises socially undesirable behaviour (Felix,1995) or as a surrogate tax on capital income(Spahn,1996;
Wachtel, 2000), others see it as part of a wider programme for contesting the neo-liberal agenda (Jetin and De
Brunhoff, 2000) and for democratising the globalisation process (Patomaki, 2001). The publications of
ATTAC, a French pressure group campaigning for the Tobin tax, give some idea of the range and variety of
reasons behind the support for it.
5Davidson (1997).
6Frankel (1996).
7Shome and Stotsky (1995), Folkerts-Landau and Ito (1995), Stotsky (1996) and Spahn (2002)
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expectation of a substantive re-alignment in exchange rates and that the determining
factor has been the scale of short-selling rather than its frequency. Clearly, in such cases,
the existence of a small currency tax would have had little if any deterrent effect.1 Finally,
there is the issue of feasibility. While Tobin tax supporters recognise that there are impedi-
ments standing in the way of legislating for, and enforcing, such a tax, they believe these to
be surmountable.2 Critics disagree and argue that the level of agreement and coordination
required to prevent evasion/avoidance of the tax by the use of different financial centres or
different instruments are such as to make operation of the tax infeasible.3
While it may seem that every possible argument for or against a Tobin tax has been
exhaustively discussed, we believe that there is something more to be said on the subject.
Although the dispute over the tax has been intense and wide ranging, it has taken place 
on the basis of an assumption that is accorded axiomatic status, namely, that all non-
goods/securities-related FX transactions are driven by exchange rate considerations (the
distinction drawn by disputants is merely between those motivated by a desire to profit
from exchange rate movements across time—or from exchange anomalies across space—
or to hedge against the risk arising out of such movements). This assumption sustains a
view of the world’s currency markets in which exchange rate volatility and FX volumes
can appear to be locked together in dynamic reciprocity: expectations of volatility generate
mounting volumes of currency transactions which then react back on exchange rates,
causing more volatility. This explains why the Tobin tax is taken so seriously even by
sceptics, and why every financial crisis reawakens debate around it.
This paper challenges the rationale behind the Tobin tax proposal, not by returning to
the much debated issues of desirability, effectiveness or feasibility, but by undercutting
the basic premise that sustains the whole debate. We deny that all non-goods/securities-
related FX trades are exchange rate motivated. Rather, a growing part of FX turnover is
determined by liquidity and interest rate considerations, in other words, by those same
concerns and priorities that lie at the heart of domestic money-market transactions.4
Emphasising the increasing importance of FX swaps, we suggest that FX turnover plays
an essential role in the day to day operation of the global financial system. From this
perspective, it follows that a tax on currency transactions, assuming it to be feasible,
would have a profoundly damaging impact on the world system—it would be less like
sand in the wheels than a spanner in the works.
The more ‘gung-ho’ proponents of the tax might well consider this to be an acceptable
outcome provided that it reined in financial activities so that they were once again
subordinate to the demands of industry, but we argue that this would not happen. On the
contrary, we stress the uneven manner in which the Tobin tax would impact on the
1 The similarities and differences between Grieve-Smith (1997) and Davidson (1997) are instructive here.
Both authors believe that speculation in the world’s financial markets is a major problem that needs tackling
through a more ambitious reform plan than is represented by the Tobin tax proposal: ‘boulders’ rather than
‘sand’. But where Grieve-Smith believes that there is still need for a Tobin tax ‘as a means of reducing run-of-
the-mill speculative transactions’, Davidson does not because he sees most run of the mill trades as arbitrage
activity.
2Haq et al. (1996), Griffith-Jones (1996) and Schmidt (2000).
3 Garber and Taylor (1995) see the implementation of the tax as infeasible on technical grounds, while
Kenen (1996) cites political reasons for his scepticism. Eichengreen seems to have shifted his position from
one of believing the tax to be both politically and technically feasible (see, for example, Eichengeen and
Wyplosz,1996) to one of seeing it as essentially infeasible on technical grounds (Eichengreen, 1999).
4 It can be noted that if FX swaps tend to be traded in the major markets like London, this is precisely
because their depth and liquidity are such as to enable these transactions to be executed without exerting any
discernible influence on exchange rates. London currently accounts for approximately 32% of all world forex
trades, but approximately 50% of FX swaps.
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different national financial markets. Our view is that the US markets, given that they are
already the world’s biggest in terms of breadth, depth and liquidity, would be likely to
expand even further. By inadvertently contributing to the expansion of the US markets, a
Tobin tax would only enhance their supremacy. In this event, the impact of the tax is
likely to be directly opposite to that which is intended.
The paper divides as follows. In Section 2, we look closely at changes in the compo-
sition of daily FX transactions over the last decade and show that FX swaps represent an
important adjunct of money market transactions. In Section 3, we explain the general
contribution of the money market to the operation of the global financial system before
moving on to discuss the contribution of FX swaps in particular. In Section 4, we draw on
capital market data to give weight to our claim that the imposition of a Tobin tax would
strengthen, rather than undermine, dollar hegemony. Section 5 concludes.
2. FX trading as ‘speculation’
The aims of this section are, first, to call into question the view that FX trading is driven
primarily by exchange rate speculation, second, to suggest that other accounts of FX
transactions which focus on exchange rate movements are also flawed and, finally, to
argue that an increasing share of FX transactions arise from money market operations and
have nothing to do with exchange rate fluctuations.
Since much of the present confusion over the size and character of the FX markets
stems from a failure to pay close attention to the different types of FX transactions, we
begin with a brief discussion of these. There are basically three types of FX transactions,
spots, outright forwards and foreign exchange swaps. Spot transactions involve an exchange
of currencies at the current rate for settlement within two days. Outright forward trans-
actions involve the purchase and sale of currencies at a specified future date at a rate
agreed now. They are priced, as is well established, in terms of the spot rate, adjusted for
the interest rate differential between the two currencies involved. Forward markets are 
in general less liquid than spot markets, and exhibit higher bid–ask spreads than the 
latter.
A foreign exchange swap combines a spot transaction with a forward transaction in a
single contract; that is, a sum of currency is bought spot from, and is simultaneously sold
forward to, the same counter-party.1 Textbook treatments of the FX swap have often
considered it as a variant of the outright forward, a tendency reflected by the fact that up
until 1992 central bank surveys conflated the two. It is in reality a very different trans-
action to the outright forward, as is indicated by the following characterisations from the
last four Bank of England surveys of the London foreign exchange market:
1992: ‘Most recorded forward transactions are swaps, which in themselves involve neither party
assuming foreign exchange risk and are closely akin to money-market transactions.’
1995: ‘The more widespread use of swaps suggests that investors are becoming increasingly sophis-
ticated in their management of liquidity and currency risk. It also provides further evidence of the
increasing integration of global currency and money markets, and, by extension, asset markets.’
1998: ‘Foreign exchange swaps . . . are closely linked to money-market deals (most are short-dated)
and are often used to hedge currency risk and manage liquidity.’2
1 Note that swap transactions take place on the spot market and that, therefore, the market for swaps is
more liquid than that for outright forwards.
2 This expression ‘to hedge currency risk’ is, as will be seen, misleading and, in a strict interpretation,
illogical.
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2001: ‘FX swaps are often used as tools to manage interest rate risk; they are effectively linked to
interest rates of two different currencies, with their value determined by movements in those interest
rates.’1
Two key points emerge from these excerpts. The first is that, although classified as FX
instruments, FX swaps are more like money market instruments: since neither party to 
an FX swap assumes any currency risk, it follows that interest rate and liquidity con-
siderations, not possible exchange rate movements, are always the immediate motives
behind the swap.2 The second point is that FX swaps, viewed from a functional perspective,
fall into two distinct categories: those related to hedging and speculation strategies (the Bank
of England should certainly have mentioned the speculative use of swaps) and those used
purely to manage liquidity and interest rate risk. The first category of swaps, exchange rate-
related swaps, can be distinguished by the fact that they are matched with spots and with
outright forwards (as is the case in hedging strategies) or simply with spots (as in the case
of speculation). Table 1 illustrates the standard case for hedging.
When requested by a corporate customer to supply a currency forward, say euros in 30
days’ time, a bank will usually react by undertaking two additional transactions: to this
outright forward deal with its customer (transaction one) will be added a spot inter-bank
trade (transaction two) and a foreign exchange swap (transaction three).3 The purpose of
the spot transaction is to eliminate the bank’s exchange rate risk resulting from the
forward; the purpose of the swap is to provide the dealing bank with a currency (often its
domestic currency) which can be placed more advantageously than the currency in which
it has acquired a forward liability. Since the forward leg of the FX swap is priced in accor-
dance with interest rates on the offshore inter-bank market, where spreads are lowest, this
means that the bank expects to achieve a return on its holding of the swapped currency
1 Bank of England (1992, 1995, 1998, 2001A). Within money markets, one can distinguish a basic
recycling function from the hedging and speculation on interest rates which arise from this function. FX swap
transactions relate to both. They are priced on the basis of interest rate differentials and thus can be used to
take a position on one of the interest rates to the extent that its movement is mirrored by changes in the
differential. Emphasis here, however, is on the broad difference between exchange rate motives and money
market motives for an FX transaction.
2 Choudry (2001, p. 517) makes the very significant observation that, in most major banks, the FX swap
trader sits on the money market desk and not the FX desk.
3 Table 1 also illustrates and confirms an argument made by Davidson (1997, p. 678). In the same article
(footnote 12, pp. 678–9) this author sugested that the ‘growth in swap and forward transactions vis-à-vis spot
transactions is consistent with the view that more hedging per transactions [is] occurring compared to the
past’. Davidson refers to Jan Kregel in this context.
Table 1. Covering an outright forward position (adapted from Burnham 1991)
Future settlement date
Transaction 0–2 days 30 days
1. Outright forward—corporate customer Sell euros
Buy dollars
2. Spot interbank Buy euros
Sell dollars
3. Swap Sell euros Buy euros
Buy dollars Sell dollars
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superior to that prevailing for offshore deposits. Thus, within the hedging strategy, the
motive of the swap itself concerns liquidity and interest rates, not possible FX move-
ments. The swap is a money-market operation, not in itself a hedge.1
Similarly, a swap, or indeed a series of swaps, can be used to hold open either a long or a
short speculative position, although it introduces money market considerations into such
strategies. For example, a US agent with a long position in euros (transaction 1 in Table
2) might swap them for dollars (transaction 2) if a more advantageous return could be
obtained from a dollar placement (or from clearing a dollar loan) than was available on
euro deposits in the inter-bank market. When the swap is completed by exchanging
dollars for euros, it could be repeated, to roll the open position over, or profits/losses could
be taken immediately via a spot sale of euros (transaction 3). A short position, financed by
borrowing euros and selling them spot for dollars, might also be swapped. This could
reduce the cost of the position by clearing the euro debt. When the swap is completed,
dollars might be swapped again for euros to hold the position open as before, or profits 
or losses could be taken by a spot purchase of euros. Here once again, the speculative
position as such is not established by the swap but by a previous spot sale or purchase. The
swap is motivated by money market considerations: it provides either a more advanta-
geous interest rate, or a better adapted pool of liquidity, than simply holding the specu-
lative position.
The second category of swaps, pure money market swaps, is completely unrelated 
to exchange rate positions, whether hedging or speculative. The motive now is solely liquid-
ity and interest rate management. These swaps can be identified by the fact that they arise
on a stand-alone basis and not in connection with either spot or outright forward trans-
actions (see Table 3, where there is only one FX transaction, between two credit operations).
The Bank of England does not make this particular point explicit in its general
characterisation of swaps. For that matter, nor does anyone else, as far as we are aware.
Yet it is absolutely essential to the interpretation of activity in the FX markets. The logic is
straightforward. If the volume of swap transactions were seen to lag behind or broadly
correlate with the volumes of spots and outright forwards, one could safely interpret 
1 This does not mean that spot transactions themselves cannot have a certain money-market aspect. Until
very recently, the term ‘spot’ has been something of a misnomer in that delivery and settlement were not
simultaneous and therefore an extension of credit (for up to two days) could be involved. The new CLS
settlement system moves these transactions much closer to a simultaneous exchange of currencies. If our view
is correct, this will lead to a further decline in the observed ratio of spot to swap trades, because the credit
functions of the former will be absorbed by the latter (CLS, 2001).
Table 2. Funding a long speculative position
Future settlement date
Transaction 0–2 days 2–4 days
1. Spot purchase Sell dollars
Buy euros
2. Swap Sell euros Buy euros
Buy dollars Sell dollars
3. Spot sale Sell euros
Buy dollars
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FX activity from an exchange rate perspective. If, on the other hand, swap transaction
volumes are seen to dominate those for spots and outright forwards, an alternative
perspective on FX activity which foregrounds money market concerns becomes more
convincing. What does the evidence tell us?
Comprehensive statistical surveys of the world’s major foreign exchange markets,
undertaken by central banks and coordinated by the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS), have taken place on a triennial basis since 1986. In Table 4, we present BIS data for
average daily FX turnover since 1992, the year that FX swaps began to be classified and
measured separately from outright forward transactions.
2.1 Speculation
Table 4 shows that average daily FX turnover hovered around $1·2 trillion over the past
decade, a sum that is more than fifty times the daily trade in goods and services and
approximately ten times the daily trade in securities. This has led many commentators,
subscribing to the view that the only legitimate FX trades are those accompanying either
trade in goods or services or foreign investments, to characterise these FX volumes as
‘excessive’ and to see them as proof that the currency markets are dominated by specu-
lation. The immediate objection to this view is intuitive. In principle, speculation is a zero-
sum game: one agent’s gains from currency appreciation must exactly match another
agent’s losses as soon as positions are closed. As Table 4 shows, and as the proponents of
the Tobin tax themselves emphasise, positions in FX markets are extremely short run,
closed out within days or even hours. How can this huge market persist over decades if it
does not generate net gains for its participants?
But the main objection is empirical. Table 4 shows that approximately one half of total
trading volume is now accounted for by FX swaps.1 As we have seen, these cannot in
themselves be speculative in nature because neither counter-party assumes foreign
exchange risk. One can only speculate on foreign exchange (or any other asset) by taking
an open position in it; neither counter-party to an FX swap takes such a position. If one
still wished to maintain the ‘speculation’ account of FX volumes, in spite of the rapid
decline in spot trades and the rising proportion of FX swaps, one could do so by arguing
that speculative positions were being held open for longer periods of time and that short-
dated swaps were being used to roll over these positions in the manner above in Table 2.
But the evidence is against this. First, BIS data show that maturity breakdowns in the FX
market are stable. Second, as regards the foreign exchange exposure of international
1 There are still commentators who fail to make the indispensable distinctions between spot, forward and
swap trades (see, for example, Hau et al., 2002, and the critical remarks of Portes which follow their article).
Table 3. A pure money market FX swap
Future settlement date
Transaction 0–2 days 2–4 days
Credit operation I Borrow dollars
FX swap Sell dollars Buy dollars
Buy euros Sell euros
Credit operation II Repay dollars
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1 See Bank of England, International Banking Statistics, Table D, ‘Banks Operating in the UK, External
Liabilities and Claims by Currency and Sector’. At the end of the third quarter of 2001, dollar liabilities were
$1,034 billion against assets of $917 billion. Euro liabilities were $611 billion against assets of $717 billion.
The net open position between these two currencies was thus less than $100 billion. Frequently, the
imbalance is even smaller: at the end of the first quarter of 1999, net open positions in dollars were less than
$7 billion, in euros less than $2 billion.
banks, there is no new evidence to disturb Goodhart’s (1988) conclusion that they avoid
carrying open FX positions. Bank of England data, for example, indicate that the currency
breakdown of liabilities and assets of London-based international banks is extremely stable.1
Technically speaking, exchange rate speculation can be conducted in the traditional
market for outright forwards, but in practice this is not likely to take place to any signifi-
cant degree because of the costs involved. Rather, professional traders are likely to take
positions in the spot market, where the ability to cover an open position quickly is far
greater and where the bid–ask spreads are substantially narrower than in forward markets.
Confirmation that most outright forwards are in fact undertaken for currency risk hedging
purposes would also seem to be given by the relatively high proportion of trades in 
this category accounted for by non-bank financial intermediaries and by non-financial
institutions.
Table 4. Reported foreign exchange market turnover by instrument, counterparty and
maturity
Daily averages in April, in US$bn
Instrument/counterparty 1992 1995 1998 2001
Spot 394 494 568 387
With reporting dealers 282 325 348 218
With other financial institutions 47 94 121 111
With non-financial customers 62 75 99 58
Outright forwards 58 97 128 131
With reporting dealers 21 33 49 52
With other financial institutions 10 28 34 41
With non-financial customers 28 36 44 37
Up to 7 days – 50 66 51
Over 7 days and up to 1 year – 44 59 76
Over 1 year – 2 5 4
Foreign exchange swaps 324 546 734 656
With reporting dealers 238 370 512 419
With other financial institutions 39 108 124 177
With non-financial customers 47 68 98 60
Up to 7 days – 382 529 450
Over 7 days and up to 1 year – 155 192 197
Over 1 year – 7 10 8
Total 776 1,137 1,430 1,173
With reporting dealers 541 728 909 689
With other financial institutions 96 230 279 329
With non-financial institutions 137 179 241 156
Local 316 526 658 499
Cross-border 391 613 772 674
Source: BIS (2001).
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To repeat, the speculation thesis cannot apply directly to swap transactions, which are
rising and now constitute well over half of the FX market, and is most unlikely to apply to
outright forwards. The upshot is that, if speculative activities can dominate a market for
any one type of instrument, it must be that for spot trades. The key problem for the
speculation thesis in this respect is that spot trades, as is manifest in Table 4, represent a
rapidly declining part of total FX volumes.1 Thus, to the extent that the speculation thesis
was ever plausible, it is becoming rapidly less so.2
2.2 Hedging
Other explanations, although more valid than the speculation notion, also err in empha-
sising exchange rate fluctuations as the basis of FX activity. Consider hedging. There is no
doubt that this explanation, unlike the speculation thesis, is consistent with the continuity
of the market and that it must be, to some extent, valid. Again, this account cannot apply
directly to swap transactions. Swaps cannot be used to hedge exchange rate risk any more
than to speculate on exchange rate movements, and for the same reason: they are closed
positions. To hedge an open position in a currency, one would necessarily have to take out
a second open position with the opposite exposure—it is impossible to use an FX swap for
this purpose. Swaps, as explained, form part of a hedging strategy when used in conjunc-
tion with spots and outright forwards; but given the wide disparity between the amounts
of outright forward transactions and swaps in Table 4, it would seem that only a small
fraction of swaps are embedded in forward hedging operations.
Hedging by FX dealers themselves, which is very short run, normally makes use of
opposite spot exposures to eliminate risk. It is an alternative to the use of outright forwards,
which is the preferred strategy of non-financial agents, working over longer horizons.
Several commentators argue that ‘fundamental’ FX trades, arising from trade in current
output or securities, are multiplied several times by this kind of inter-dealer hedging. This
game of ‘hot potato’ can easily be mistaken for speculation but, in fact, represents its exact
opposite. To quote Burnham (1991): ‘Some commentators observe that the bulk of
foreign exchange activity (over 85%) is between banks and conclude that vast amounts of
speculation are taking place. But rather than being speculative, part of this activity is
actually the means by which speculative positions are avoided.’3 One account (Portes and
Rey,1998) even suggests that the multiplier involved may be as high as 10—an inter-
national security trade of $1m, for example, might give rise to $9m-worth of inter-dealer
activity. Our view is that it is implausible to make such a large volume of secondary, inter-
bank, transactions rest on such a small base of ‘fundamentals’, dealer–customer trades.
High ratios between primary and induced trades are certainly typical of organised asset
markets in general, but such a ratio as one to ten would be a very extreme value. Some
commentators attribute this very high ratio to the supposed ‘inefficiencies’ of the FX
market, where there is a network of dealers and brokers rather than a centralised market,
but this decentralisation can be exaggerated: there are not very many players and their
communications are extremely rapid.
1The full extent of this decline can be better appreciated by going back to the very first central bank surveys
of the FX markets. To take the London market as an example, spots accounted for 73% of the total volumes
traded here in 1986 but by 2001 the ratio had fallen to 30%.
2 We certainly do not deny that trading in the currencies of some developing countries is often driven by
pure exchange rate speculation. But such currencies are a vanishingly small fraction of the world FX market.
3This view is reiterated by Flood (1994): ‘the large volume of inter-bank trading is not primarily speculative
in nature, but rather represents the tedious task of passing undesired positions along until they happen upon a
marketmaker whose inventory discrepancy they neutralise’.
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2.3 Arbitrage
A few writers suggest that a large volume of FX transactions might be a question of
arbitrage. Two objections can be advanced. First, the speed with which prices are commu-
nicated on FX markets makes it implausible to suggest that the bulk of transactions are
driven by inter-dealer price differences, as would have to be the case for the arbitrage thesis
to be valid.1 Second, this explanation would seem to apply only to spot trades—since the
cost of a swap transaction depends only on the interest rate differential which is applied to
the forward price relative to a single spot price (the well-established theory of covered
interest-rate arbitrage), a swap cannot be used to exploit differences between different spot
prices. Technological factors may reinforce this view of arbitrage. Increasingly, deals
between brokers are mediated by electronic brokerage systems rather than separate market
operators, and this suggests that price discovery is becoming easier and more rapid.2
Similar considerations apply to ‘micro-structure’ theories of FX volumes.3 Originally
developed to fill in the gaps in ‘macro’ explanations of short-run exchange rate volatility,
this approach to exchange rates explains the high volumes of intra-day spot trades in terms
of inventory management and risk sharing: given the decentralised, non-transparent
nature of FX markets where bilateral dealer–customer orders are not observable by
others, dealers, seeking to avoid exposure to open positions incurred in trades on behalf of
customers, pass on their inventory imbalances to other dealers who in turn pass these 
on. As this takes place, dealers alter their prices, and so more price exploration becomes
necessary. This seems to us to be essentially a combination of the hot potato hedging and
arbitrage theories and to be open, therefore, to the same objections.
To summarise, if the speculation interpretation of FX volumes held by proponents of
the Tobin tax had some credibility in the days when transactions were dominated by spot
trades, it is completely implausible today, when swaps represent the dominant instru-
ment. In fact, the domination of the FX markets by swap transactions means that no
account of FX volumes that is centred on exchange rate movements can be satisfactory.
Recall that the precondition for this is that swap transactions at most broadly correlate
with spot and outright forward transactions. Yet the global data presented in Table 4
make clear that there are now more swaps than can be accounted for by hedging and
speculative activities. What is particularly striking in Table 4 is that, in the period between
1998 and 2001, spot volumes fell in absolute, not just relative, terms. In addition to the
influence of electronic brokering and the decline in the number of banks as a result of
bank mergers a further important reason for the drop in FX spot volumes was the replace-
ment of 11 European currencies by the euro. The corresponding impact on FX swap
volumes, which appeared to stagnate between 1998 and 2001, can be partly explained by
the fact that, with the introduction of the euro, it was no longer necessary to hedge legacy
currency movements using the dollar as a vehicle currency.4 Nevertheless, the decline in
FX swap turnover was not nearly as pronounced as the decline in spot trades, a fact which
1 As we say, the ‘decentralisation’ of the FX market—as opposed to a situation where one market-maker
might centralise all trades in a single security—has been much over-emphasised. The network of dealers
active in each time-zone is small (the key agents being the 70 world banks linked to the US-offshore payments
system, CHIPS) and their communications are extremely efficient.
2 In its latest survey of the London FX market (November 2001) the Bank of England reported that more
than two thirds of inter-dealer activity is now conducted using electronic brokers, compared with around 30%
in 1998.
3See Frankel (1995) and Lyons (1997; 1998).
4 A further explanatory factor for FX volumes is the impact of the dollar as a ‘vehicle’ currency. Although
broad and deep, the foreign exchange market for currencies cannot provide depth and liquidity in every
currency pair. Consequently, dealers taking on cross-currency transactions on behalf of customers usually do
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confirms that ‘stand-alone’ swaps constitute an increasing proportion of the total, necessi-
tating, therefore, a money-market rather than an exchange rate explanation of FX activity.
Although to date there is no clear theoretical account of FX swaps from a money market
perspective, an interesting parallel is provided by the analysis (Fabozzi and Modigliani,
1992) of an analogous long-term instrument—the currency swap. The latter essentially
concerns bond markets and involves the exchange of the principal sums raised by issues 
in different currencies together with both the stream of coupon payments and final
redemption payments. The motive is clear: to exploit an advantageous opportunity to
borrow in one currency in order to finance expenditures in another. This interest-rate
arbitrage generates gains shared between the advantaged borrower and another agent
requiring the first currency but able to borrow only on ‘standard’ terms in either market.
In our view, the FX swap, although a much shorter-term instrument, can be explained by
essentially the same logic—it arises as advantageous opportunities to borrow (or surplus
liquidities) in one currency are matched against lending opportunities (or acute liquidity
needs) in another.
There is, however, one important difference between the markets for long-run currency
swaps and FX swaps. The former have become much less common with the convergence
of bond markets in terms of both pricing and procedure; the increasingly globalised role 
of the same credit-rating agencies has tended to eliminate advantageous spreads in an
issuer’s borrowing power across currency zones. In contrast, given the continuous emer-
gence of new liquidity needs within short-run credit systems and their vast scale, these
recycling opportunities remain a continuing feature of money markets, even though they
have been rapidly reduced by standardisation and international credit ratings in the markets
for bonds. This argument is expanded further in the next section, which explores recent
developments in money markets.
3. FX transactions and the money market
This section looks at FX transactions in the context of increasing money market inte-
gration across currency zones. First, the recent rapid growth of money market activity is
explained in terms of widespread changes in the financial system: in particular, disinter-
mediation (see Figures 1 and 2). Second, parallels are drawn between money market and
FX activity in respect of scale, rhythm and the major players involved. Finally, these
parallels are interpreted in a way which suggests that cross-border monetary flows have
become a key factor of flexibility in domestic money markets.
Figure 1 shows that the growth in world financial stock over the past two decades 
has outstripped that of world GDP, so that from being roughly equal in size in 1980, the
financial stock stood at twice the level of annual real output in 1992 and at three times that
level by 2000. Figure 2 shows that the major impetus for financial growth has come from
the securities markets, particularly the market for government bonds. While nominal
stocks of tradable securities grew at an average rate of 10% over the past two decades, or 
at approximately 5% in real terms, the money supply, largely comprising bank deposit
money, grew at a nominal rate of 7%, or approximately 2% in real terms, a rate similar to
that of OECD GDP growth and growth in fixed capital formation.
so by undertaking two deals, home currency/dollar, dollar/foreign currency. Once again, however, this factor
is of limited significance. This is because a large number of economic and financial interactions must involve
the US economy in any case and because, even when two other countries are involved, the use of a vehicle
currency will normally only double the number of transactions required to effect a given trade.
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The sharp fall in the share of the world financial stock accounted for by bank deposit
money is, in the first instance, a reflection of the continuing process of bank disinter-
mediation, as large corporations increasingly fund their borrowing needs through the
bond markets, and of changes in the structure of public finance, as governments increas-
ingly fill the gap between income and expenditure with bond issues. At a more funda-
mental level, the constraints on the growth of bank deposit money represent an essential
pre-condition for the continued increase in the stock of debt securities outstanding. In
order to ensure that domestic and international bond markets continued to absorb
government bonds, governments have made inflation targeting their overriding economic
Fig. 1. Stock of financial assets 1992–2000. Source: Bryan and Farrell (1996), FIBV, BIS.
Fig. 2. Distribution of financial stock outstanding, 1980–2000. Source: Bryan and Farrell (1996),
BIS, FIBV.
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priority and this, as a result of the restrictive policies pursued, has kept the growth of
money stocks well below that of other financial assets. We can also note that, in addition
to government-imposed constraints on the rate of bank deposit money creation, banks face
similar pressures to keep down this rate both in the bond markets (where banks’ credit
ratings depend on tight balance sheet management) and in the equity markets (where return
on equity requirements demand that banks make efficient use of capital and thus must
adhere to strict lending criteria).
It follows that disintermediation of financial systems, as a well-established trend in
advanced economies, together with the move to more restrictive monetary policies asso-
ciated with the general reassignment of macro instruments taking place in the 1980s, have
led to an acute contradiction: on the one hand, money is less and less held as an asset; on
the other, the huge increase in securities transactions makes for an increased demand for
money as an exchange medium. This paradox of disintermediation is resolved by a very
rapid growth of the money markets, because it is here that monetary resources are
recycled from surplus to deficit units on an immense scale, at great speed and at low cost.
A recent Bank of England report on the sterling wholesale money market gives a striking
picture of the size and speed of flows in this market (see Tables 5 and 6).
Table 5 shows that, over the previous decade, stocks of sterling denominated securities
grew at a faster pace than British GDP, so that, where they stood at one and a half times
the level of annual output in 1990, they stood at roughly three times the level of output 
in 2000. The left-hand column of Table 5 shows that the expansion in the total stocks 
of money market instruments outstanding has similarly outstripped GDP growth. Com-
pared with an average growth rate in nominal GDP of approximately 8% during the
1990s, the 17% growth rate in money market instruments may appear ‘excessive’. It can
Table 5. Size of sterling markets. Amounts outstanding: £bn
Non-gilt Multiple
Money sterling of annual
Year market Gilts bonds Equities Swaps Total GDP
1990 183 125 60 486 167 1,021 1·8
1995 195 233 117 849 541 1,935 2·7
1998 434 301 203 1,334 1,979 4,251 5·0
1999 475 294 255 1,893 2,194 5,111 6·0
2000 504 294 314 1,715 2,533 5,360 5·9
Source: Bank of England (2001B).
Table 6. Sterling money markets. Amounts outstanding: £bn
Other
Year Interbank CD Gilt repo instruments Total
1990 89 53 n.a. 42 183
1995 93 66 n.a. 37 195
1999 155 135 99 85 475
2000 159 125 127 93 504
Source: Bank of England (2001B).
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be noted, however, that, although the overall growth in the stocks of money market instru-
ments over the previous decade has exceeded annual GDP growth, it broadly corresponds
to that for stocks of government and corporate securities (these grew at a nominal rate of
19%). We take this correspondence to be evidence that money market transactions are an
essential support for active trading in the securities markets under circumstances where
these markets require ever expanding financial transaction balances but at the same time
constrain the supply of the deposits to which these balances correspond. In other words, it
is not financial speculation that is the driving force behind money market transactions so
much as cash conservation and liquidity management.
Although we do not have full, up-to-date, information on the scale of some of the other
major money markets, a reasonable proxy for the growth of these flows is provided by
statistics for inter-bank payments systems; these must be dominated by short-run credit
operations because there is simply no other way of explaining the scale of flows involved.
US payments data throw some light on money market activity for, as one would expect,
the scale of payments flows here is immense, large enough, according to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York to circulate annual US GDP in less than three days.1 The two
main systems, Fedwire ($1·35 trillion per day) and CHIPS ($1·19 trillion), are specialised
in domestic and international transactions respectively, and recent reforms have been
introduced to strengthen the linkages between the two systems.2 Although the data do not
allow us to break down money market activity by maturity or instrument, the fact that they
pertain to an intense degree of cash recycling activity is indicated by Choudry’s (2001)
report that transactions on just one sector of the US money market—repos—are above a
trillion dollars a day.3
In this respect, data for the Eurozone’s TARGET system are particularly interesting
because they allow us to distinguish intra-country from trans-frontier payments in the
zone. The latter begin, at the launch of the euro in January 1999, at some 300 billion euros
per day. By October 2001, they were in excess of 500 billion a day, around 8% of the
zone’s annual GDP. Since one can hardly invoke FX speculation to account for this
growth, given that the flows take place within the same currency zone, it must follow that
they concern essentially short-run credit activities. This interpretation is confirmed by the
fact that the abolition of internal FX rates has not reduced but accelerated these activities.
Apart from the magnitude of flows, an equally striking feature of money markets is the
concentration of lending activity towards the short end of the maturity spectrum—levels
of activity increase as maturities shorten, with the shortest loans, especially overnight 
on the inter-bank market, accounting for the highest turnovers. Market-clearing and
equilibrium theories of financial markets tend to obscure this feature of short-run credit.
However, its rationale becomes clear if one thinks of markets failing to clear, leaving
dealers in securities with surpluses and deficits which are often impossible to predict. The
very continuity of the market economy then depends on a vast recycling process, driven
rather by quantitative mismatches than by price arbitrage.4
1Federal Reserve Bank of New York (n.d.).
2The contrast between the nature of the systems is also relevant. Fedwire is a Gross Real-Time system: this
gives greater security against payments failure. CHIPS uses multilateral net clearing, which enhances
liquidity and lowers transactions costs. It seems therefore that counter-party risk is lower in the international
sector, presumably because the banks involved are smaller in number and larger in size.
3 Data collected by Cook and Laroche (1993) suggest that just three sectors of the US money market—T-
Bills, Repos and Federal Funds—had a total daily turnover of $1·3 trillion in 1992. Payment systems data
suggests that daily activity must have grown by some 40% since that date.
4Cartelier (1996).
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Each longer-term transaction seems to lead to escalating volumes of activity at shorter
maturities. For example, a bond issuer who has just successfully raised capital for a ten
year project has immediately to relend most of the funds thus raised at shorter maturities.
The borrowers who accept these placements then have an analogous problem at shorter
maturities—no agent in the contemporary economy will hold much idle cash. The flows
cascade down the maturity spectrum, ending with an enormous concentration of overnight
trades (overnight inter-bank transactions in the sterling market, for example, averaged £12
billion in 2000, a figure that dwarfs an average daily flow of output of £2–2·5 billion). But
in this overnight market, of course, the central bank stands ready to make up any long or
short position which emerges.1
A further striking feature of money market activity is the extent to which this is
dominated by the banks (see Table 6 for the case of sterling), with the largest banks being
the main players. (Smaller or local banks are essentially in the position of customers to the
larger ones which have offshore subsidiaries, above all in London, able to borrow, lend
and trade the major currencies at the keenest margins.) Faced with increasing short-term
borrowing demands, especially those related to primary and secondary security markets,
but at the same time constrained by government monetary policy and by regulatory rules
and return on equity ratios from creating deposits above certain limits, banks resolve the
dilemma by continually passing around any spare liquidity among themselves.2 Thus
while the top-heavy volume of inter-bank transactions may make it seem that much 
of these are unconnected to underlying fundamentals, the opposite is true: rather than
divert resources away from underlying trades in real goods and services or in financial
securities, inter-bank credit operations in fact constitute an essential mechanism to
facilitate these trades.3
It is clear by this point that there are several strong parallels between the money markets
and the FX market. In both cases, trading volumes appear excessive when set against
GDP data; in both cases, trading activity is heavily skewed towards the very short end 
of the maturity spectrum; and in both cases inter-bank transactions easily outweigh
dealer–customer relations. Correspondence in scale; correspondence in rhythm; correspondence
of actors—these all provide strong, if indirect, motives to relate FX turnover to the money
markets. If the direction of structural change within contemporary financial systems—
where ever-growing values of securities have to be circulated by relatively scarce and
always costly monetary resources—is such as to place an increasing burden on domestic
money markets, it is also the case that part of the burden is carried by the FX market.
Nowhere is this burden sharing more explicit than in the eurozone money markets. A
recent ECB study of these markets demonstrates directly the role played by external
liquidity in the functioning of the internal credit mechanism (see Figure 3).
Figure 3a shows that, just as in the sterling money markets, so also in the euro zone
markets, flows cascade down the maturity spectrum, with a heavy concentration of trades
in the overnight market. Figure 3b shows that although unsecured trades dominate 
1This maturity structure confirms the intuition of ‘hot potato’ theories of FX markets—but it is not foreign
exchange which drives trading so much as excess liquidity as such.
2 We note that, while the largest banks are able to participate in both the unsecured and secured loans
markets, many of the smaller institutions tend to concentrate their activity in the overnight market where
settlement costs are low and credit risk considerations are negligible.
3It is from this same standpoint that we take issue with Arestis and Sawyer’s (1997) argument that the high
daily volume of FX transactions is not only ‘excessive’ but also that this ‘volume clearly absorbs resources to
effect the transactions’. As will be shown below, FX transactions do not so much absorb resources as
constitute an important source of liquidity for domestic credit markets.
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the overnight market where credit risk is negligible, the preference at longer maturities is
for collateralised transactions which, because they minimise credit risk, lower the cost 
of obtaining liquidity. However, of particular interest here is the fact that while the pre-
dominant instrument in the secured inter-bank market is the repo—that is, the collateral
takes the form of euro-denominated government securities—some 15% of the total market
is against foreign currency (almost certainly dollar) collateral. In other words, some 33%
of the secured market makes use of the FX swap to transfer liquidity within the eurozone
banking system. This is straightforward and, in our view, decisive evidence that the FX
market serves to link money markets across currency zones.1
1Although the study does not break down the market into national and cross-frontier operations, it is surely
to be expected that dollars play a larger role in the second because within individual member states there must
be better knowledge of counterparties and of collateral assets than exists in the eurozone at large.
Fig. 3. (a) Euro money market by maturity. (b) Euro money market, breakdown by collateral.
Source: European Central Bank (2001).
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All that is needed to bring about such a linkage is the readiness of a commercial bank to
create a deposit in domestic currency against funds originally borrowed in a foreign one.
This will often be done by the offshore branches of domestic banks which can borrow FX
at the keenest rates and which are subject to the least onerous regulatory and reserve
requirements. In accounting terms, we may well be looking at two distinct monetary
movements: a deposit in the lender’s currency moving from onshore to offshore; a deposit
in the borrower’s currency moving from offshore into the domestic banking system. But if
the basis of the whole operation is a dollar loan from a US to a eurozone agent, which can
then be used exactly like a repo to obtain liquidity in euros, then in economic terms this is
essentially a monetary movement across currency zones. Of course, one can if one likes
view this as a kind of financial cabotage—as a loan, let us say, from a eurozone bank to a
eurozone customer which is merely facilitated by the possession of dollars. But this is
surely an extremely artificial way to look at the question: if a foreign currency deposit can
be easily and routinely used to collateralise the creation of a domestic deposit then, when
the foreign currency is borrowed, there is an effective recycling from a surplus unit in one
zone to a deficit unit in another. Within domestic banking systems monetary surpluses are
recycled on a routine basis to agents with deficits—no exchange of real output or long-run
securities is needed to ‘justify’ such transactions. Exactly the same is true today for short-
run lending across currency zones.
Available data on international bank relations also support this interpretation of the role
and contribution of FX transactions. The BIS puts the stock of international bank lending
at some $8·5 trillion, of which over $6 trillion is inter-bank.1 The relationship between
such lending and FX transactions is complex—not all such loans need involve FX
transactions although some will involve several. However, we have here a form of activity
which, unlike trade in current output or international securities, can be put into a meaning-
ful relation to the size of the FX market. If, to give some purely illustrative figures,
international loans are turned over once a week and involve on average one FX trans-
action each, then we have over-explained the scale of the FX market. The size of the FX
market only becomes a puzzle when ‘fundamentals’ are, quite unjustifiably, restricted to
trade in current output and long-run securities. As soon as money markets are admitted as
an explanatory factor, the problem of scale disappears.
If the preoccupation with exchange rate movements and hedging or speculative strate-
gies is one reason why the liquidity management function of FX swaps and short-term
international bank lending tends to be overlooked, another reason may have to do with the
influence of monetarist thinking. Although there are few commentators today who
maintain the quantitative aspects of monetarist doctrines, the unexamined legacy of these
doctrines continues to distort thinking about international questions. According to the
‘monetary approach’ to the balance of payments, the supply of any given currency is fixed
(under the control of the relevant central bank) as indeed is the value of transactions which
that stock of currency can support. If the world were like this then the cross-currency
transfer of monetary resources would be impossible: one could effectively transfer real
resources across currency zones, by selling either goods or securities to non-residents, but
euros could not replace dollars, say, in supporting domestic US transactions.
To the extent that such a view ever had any validity, it is surely obsolete today given the
extremely high degree of interpenetration of monetary systems among the advanced
1 BIS (2002) Table 1. This is not the same as FX exposure which is several orders of magnitude smaller—
hardly any of this lending involves open positions.
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industrial countries. The supply of, say, dollar deposits has to be regarded in this context,
as in others, as extremely elastic and responsive to the needs of borrowers, with the central
bank having some influence over the price of accommodation but, when the lending
concerned is secured, essentially none over its volume. In this situation external monetary
assets are perfectly good security, in a collateralised loan exactly analogous to a repo.
However, behind the persistent neglect of trans-frontier monetary movements in the
examination of FX markets, there perhaps lies a deeper error. A clear and distinct separa-
tion of monetary spaces is almost a necessary condition for the definition of national
economies; it is only on the assumption that such spaces are well defined that one can hold
to an international, rather than a global interpretation of contemporary financial develop-
ments, and, ultimately, it is only on the basis of such an interpretation that one can
overlook the money market nature of FX swaps and the contribution they make to the
operation of monetary systems.
To sum up, the characterisation of the FX market which we are putting forward is that
it serves as a central factor of flexibility in the operation of internal money markets. This
role is necessary because both the process of disintermediation and the assignment of
monetary policy to the target of price stability lead to immense tensions: the first increases
the demand for financial transactions balances at the same time as it reduces the relative
supply of the deposits to which those balances correspond; restrictive monetary policy
raises the rate of interest at which these liquidity needs can be met. International bank
lending, together with the FX swaps which now dominate the FX market, helps to reduce
the frictions and imbalances arising within currency zone financial systems. What is starting
to emerge, in other words, is a globalised money market accompanied by a globalised pay-
ments system. It follows that accounts of FX transactions in terms of exchange rate specula-
tion, or indeed in terms of exchange rate hedging, are increasingly obsolete and therefore
form a poor basis for thinking about policy. We turn to policy issues in the next section.
4. The effects of the Tobin tax
This section argues that the main impact of a Tobin tax would be on the liquidity of
money markets rather than on the stability of exchange rates. It is also stressed that the
impact on money markets would be asymmetric, with the US economy likely to be the least
affected. We assume throughout that the manifold technical difficulties to the imple-
mentation of the tax could be overcome.
There are three main motives for the Tobin tax; that it would reduce volatility, that it
would enhance national monetary autonomy and that it would raise valuable revenues.
The first of these is not proven: there is no clear causal link between transaction volumes
and exchange rate volatility. Although a tax might reduce destabilising speculation, it
could also, by reducing liquidity in the FX market, amplify the price disturbances arising
from a smaller volume of trading. Certainly the decline in spot trading—the trading
necessarily linked to speculation—between 1998 and 2001 has not led to any perceptible
reduction in exchange rate variability. A study of transactions taxes (stamp duty) in the
London Stock Exchange finds no detectable impact on volatility.1
1 See Saporta and Kan (1997). In general, the sources of volatility in FX markets are not well understood
(the same, of course, is true for many asset markets). Standard ‘over-shooting’ models under-explain FX
volatility by several orders of magnitude and some leading theorists have even resorted to chaos theory to
account for it (De Grauwe and van Santen, 1991). We have little sympathy for approaches which attempt to
maintain strong assumptions as to market efficiency and investor rationality. Nor do we exclude the role of
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Tobin’s original motive for his proposal—the defence of national monetary policy
autonomy—dates from a different world, and it is doubtful whether, in most countries,
much autonomy remains to be defended. The reassignment of monetary policy to the goal
of price stability, and the almost universal move to ‘independent’ central banks which
followed, in fact testify to a considerable loss of autonomy.1 Nevertheless, the original
logic of the proposal still appears to hold in that a Tobin tax would make it more costly to
sell a currency short, and this might create a little more scope for variations in domestic
interest rates.2 Three factors qualify this view. First, as is today widely acknowledged, the
tax would do little to discourage attacks on a currency where a significant devaluation or
depreciation was seen as very likely, because the costs of the tax would then be dwarfed by
the potential gains from a short position.3 Second, the day-to day operation of monetary
policy might be made more difficult or more uncertain if the tax led, as is suggested below,
to narrower or less liquid money markets, since it is through these markets that monetary
policy is implemented. Finally, it is necessary to consider the role of alternative instru-
ments.
Proponents of the Tobin tax have given a lot of thought to the possibility of avoidance/
evasion through the use of alternative financial centres and/or alternative instruments to
currency itself. But there has been little examination of the possible use of bonds4 and
other fixed interest securities, which could be traded to give open positions in a currency
without the need to hold bank deposits. Thus, under circumstances where the tax was
effective in limiting exchange rate speculation, there might be a certain destabilisation of
bond yields. There are few central banks, if any, which would regard such a development
as increasing their room for manoeuvre.5 Indeed, current monetary policies are better
seen as directed at the term structure than at the level of interest rates: a successful policy
move is one which impacts on short rates while leaving long rates steady; if, for example, a
tightening of policy is followed by a rise in long-date bond yields, this would usually be
seen as a sign of lack of credibility of central bank policy.
We have no arguments against raising large amounts of tax on an international base and
directing the receipts to the needs of, in particular, the less developed countries. On the
contrary. Our doubts concern only the specific nature of the tax which is proposed.6 As
regards taxing currency transactions, there are major uncertainties surrounding the key
parameters which would determine the tax yield. The rate of imposition is put at anything
speculation. It may be that different factors need to be invoked to account for different historical episodes:
thus the huge swings in the dollar exchange rate in the 1980s may be related to uncertainties about interest
rates and macroeconomic policies; the more recent gyrations of the dollar-euro rate seem to be more
connected to fluctuations in equity markets. Our aim in the present article is to analyse transactions volumes
rather than price fluctuations and to stress that there is no connection between exchange rate volatility and the
growing volume of FX swaps.
1As Aglietta and Cartelier (1998) argue, it is above all non-resident users of a country’s currency who need
a political guarantee of its stability.
2The relation between autonomy and volatility is unclear; we believe that existing levels of volatility actually
work to sustain a certain measure of interest rate autonomy.
3Davidson (1997) gave the first algebraic demonstration of this result.
4 The stability of differentials among bond yields for the main traded currencies suggests that they are not,
at present, used to take speculative positions on exchange rate movements.
5Compare Haldane and Read (1999): ‘The effects of greater monetary policy credibility (for example, belief
in the inflation target) are likely to show up in smaller movements in longer-maturity interest rates. Credibility
dampens yield-curve volatility at the long end’ (p. 173).
6 Many of the obvious alternatives, such as an international wealth tax, raise serious political difficulties.
But in our view, this may be an advantage. It is better to confront these difficulties directly than to hide from
them in the technical thicket of the FX market.
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between 1% and 0·005% of the value of each transaction. The elasticity of FX activity
with respect to the rise in dealing costs as a result of the tax is much debated but, if our
characterisation of the FX market is correct, this elasticity would be very high because a
great deal of the purely money-market-oriented trading would be suppressed. It should be
emphasised in this respect that, however low the Tobin tax is set, from the point of view of
the money markets its effect would always be large. The resources used on these markets
are typically turned over with a frequency of once a week or higher; thus a tax of, say, five
basis points levied on each transaction would accumulate over a year to something of the
order of 2·5%, a level which would clearly be prohibitive—it would become uneconomic
to meet short-run liquidity needs from external sources.1
When we turn to the impact of the tax on the financial markets taken as a whole, it is
clear that, as well as a direct effect on the liquidity and the costs of money market
operations themselves, there would also be an indirect effect on the liquidity and costs of
the markets they serve—above all the security markets which give rise to most money
market activity. The desirability of such an effect in the abstract is an open question, but it
is not usually seen as part of the Tobin tax agenda to bring about such an effect on either
the money markets, which are extremely stable, or the securities markets where problems
of stability are surely better addressed directly.
However, our main concern here is not with the general nature of these liquidity effects
but their asymmetry across countries. The key scale factor here is the size of economies not
in terms of GDP, but in terms of their financial systems (see Table 7).
At a glance it can be seen that the financial dominance of the US is an order of magni-
tude greater than its relative strength in production and trade. Historically, the US capital
markets have been bigger and more efficiently organised than their counterparts in other
countries because of the greater reliance on them by the corporate sector and for social
1 It is perhaps for this reason that Tobin himself, in his final statement on the question, argued that
transactions as such should not be taxed, only ‘open positions’ at intervals of a week. This would not interfere
at all with swap-based money-market trades but, on the other hand, it would not leave much of the tax base
targeted by the proponents of the tax since, as has been stressed above, the banks active in the market do not
maintain significant open positions. (‘An idea that gained currency but lost clarity’, Financial Times, 11
September 2001).
Table 7. Capitalisation of major securities markets, end-2000 (nominal value outstanding,
US$bn)
Country of Bond market Bond market Total market
issuance Public sector Private sector Equity market capitalisation
USA 8,539 7,795 15,215 31,549
Japan 4,566 1,814 3,194 9,574
UK ,440 1,020 2,612 4,072
Germany ,750 1,852 1,270 3,872
France ,663 ,719 1,447 2,829
Italy 1,045 ,440 ,768 2,253
Canada ,524 ,273 ,780 1,577
The Netherlands ,163 , 471 ,640 1,274
Others 2,660 2,595 5,134 10,389
Total 19,350 16,979 31,060 67,389
Source: FIBV, BIS.
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provision (pensions, insurance etc.). At present, there is no doubt that these markets have
benefited from the opportunities thrown up by the world-wide trend towards financial
liberalisation and deregulation. Outside participation is now an important contributory
factor to scale: attracted to the US markets by virtue of their depth and range, and by the
low dealing costs, the heavy involvement of foreign institutions in these markets serves in
its turn to promote their scale and liquidity further.
These scale advantages permit the US to adopt an attitude of ‘benign neglect’ towards
external developments, a luxury which is denied to virtually every other country in the
global economy. While any general disturbance to securities markets, from whatever source,
is easier to absorb in the vast dollar-based system, such a disturbance can lead, as has been
seen too often, to catastrophic crises in smaller or less developed financial systems. This
point is certainly not lost on the Europeans, who have now made the integration of EU
capital markets and the achievement of scale effects in the financial sector the overriding
priority of monetary union.
Consider the effects of a Tobin tax in this setting. The imposition of a currency tax
would restrict the FX swap turnover and the short-term international bank lending that
together constitute an important source of external liquidity to domestic monetary
systems. More to the point, however, is that this squeeze on external liquidity will typically
have an economic impact in inverse proportion to the size of the financial system
concerned. Smaller systems, making more extensive use of the FX market for internal
liquidity needs, will be the most affected: it will become significantly more costly to issue
securities, to trade them, and to raise short-run credit, including bank loans, in these
economies because there are few alternative sources of liquidity. At the other extreme,
there will be a minimal impact on the US because its domestic money markets are so
sophisticated and so immense that less use is made of external liquidity in the day-to-day
working of the internal credit market. Even where external credit is used, it will be much
cheaper and easier to mobilise alternative sources. The upshot is that, not only will the US
economy emerge relatively unscathed from a Tobin tax but it would probably even be
strengthened, because one unavoidable consequence of the tax will be to divert borrowers
and lenders around the globe to US capital markets where the costs of issuing and
retrading securities, already low, will fall relative to costs in other markets.
The eurozone financial system would be hard pushed to maintain its position. Although
relatively large in size compared with most other systems, its scale continues to fall short of
that of the US. This, combined with the fact that it remains relatively fragmented in
nature, means that dollars continue to make a major contribution to the liquidity of 
its money markets, especially where transactions cross national frontiers within the zone.
By inhibiting this contribution, the Tobin tax will significantly disrupt money market
functions and thereby retard the process of internal financial integration. This retardation
will inevitably impact on the scale of both short-run and long-run capital markets and thus
reduce Europe’s ability to compete with US finance.
These results throw a different light on the issue of policy autonomy. While it is true
that, in today’s globalised world, loss of autonomy is general, there is nevertheless a
qualitative difference between the position of the US and that of other economies. There
are today no serious external constraints on the exercise of US monetary policy. Central
banks in the other main currency areas have to pay more attention to external develop-
ments but still enjoy a certain measure of discretion. At the other end of the spectrum, 
in the weakest economies, the monetary authorities must establish their priorities and
policies with reference to the dollar. Basically, the size of local financial markets relative to
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those of the US is today the key determinant of how much autonomy remains: the smaller
these markets, the greater the gravitational pull of US markets and the smaller the scope
for independent policy decisions; conversely, the larger the local capital markets, the more
easy it is to resist or offset the impact of US actions, and the greater, therefore, the scope
for discretion—a point which helps explain the sense of urgency behind current efforts to
complete capital market integration in the eurozone.1 Since a Tobin tax would inevitably
strengthen the dollar-based financial system relative to its competitors, it follows that any
increase in policy autonomy from the use of the tax would be certainly accompanied by 
a strong adverse effect on the distribution of this autonomy. The smallest systems would
be worst affected, but other large systems, including the eurozone, would also be badly
hit.
This outcome is surely the exact reverse of that intended by the proponents of the
Tobin tax. Their general intention in seeking to establish some kind of multilateral control
over FX flows is to restore the balance of priorities in favour of industry and trade, and 
to give back to national governments some of the power lost to the financial markets.
However, they could not have chosen a more inappropriate instrument for these purposes.
For in giving a boost to the US financial system relative to the others, the Tobin tax will
only serve to reinforce, not weaken, the domination of finance over industry. And by
accentuating US hegemony over world finance, the tax will work to undermine, not
promote, the policy autonomy of other governments.
5. Conclusion
Although we are opposed to the Tobin tax, our opposition is not based on considerations
of practicality. Despite the manifold technical or political problems standing in its way, we
are assuming, for present purposes, that these can be overcome. Nor is our opposition to
the tax motivated by a lack of sympathy with many of the broader aspirations and
objectives of those various movements which promote it. Far from it. We recognise that
the contemporary globalisation process contains dangers to employment, to economic
stability and to social justice, and that this process, therefore, will need to be brought
under some form of social control and given a new direction.
But the Tobin tax does not represent an instrument of control so much as an act of
vandalism. It is informed by notions about global finance, and about the FX markets in
particular, which are exaggerated or simply inaccurate. Its implementation would bring
about a deep disorganisation of existing financial structures that would not only fail to
achieve, but indeed would work against, the basic objectives of those who support it. Rather
than target financial speculation, the tax’s chief impact would be to suppress precisely those
FX volumes that currently contribute to the liquidity of many domestic financial systems.
Given that these systems already differ greatly in terms of scale and depth, a currency tax
that interferes with an important external source of their liquidity would not increase policy
autonomy so much as exacerbate its unequal distribution.
In the last analysis, the most problematic feature of the Tobin tax is its anachronism. The
idea was born at a time when governments still retained considerable power over national
economies, when the world economy was still essentially an extension of national eco-
nomies, and cross-border flows still concerned primarily current output and foreign direct
investment. That time has gone. Rapid economic, technological and institutional change
1See the Lamfalussy Report, European Commission (2000).
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has resulted in a globalised market which constrains the actions of governments as much
as those of other agencies and which is dominated by financial processes. To control and
redirect this new reality, one has to start by seeing it for what it is, not for what one might
wish it to be.
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relations issues
John Grahl and Paul Teague
Together the macroeconomic and financial attributes of
monetary union are changing the rules governing the European
economy. This paper assesses the consequences of these changes
for employment relations in member states. The analysis
focuses on three matters in particular. First, how labour market
actors are responding to the fact that macroeconomic policies
are not only out of their own control but may therefore fail to
correspond to the needs of particular countries. Second, how
employment relations are adapting to the new microeconomic
challenges released by the move towards deeper financial
integration inside the EU, which has its main impact on the
structures of corporate finance and thus on corporate strategy.
Finally the implications of both patterns of change for the EU
employment policy are assessed to gauge the impact of
monetary union on the European social model.
Introduction
The creation of an economic and monetary union is the most far-reaching act of inte-
gration since the European Union was established in 1958. This is essentially for two
reasons. First, monetary union has radically transformed the macroeconomic regime—
with participant countries losing all autonomy in monetary policy (interest rates and
foreign exchange rates) as well as being subjected to tighter constraints (the Stability
Pact) on their budgetary policies. Secondly, however, the achievement of monetary
union has led to a powerful drive for financial integration which today concerns not
only banks but, in particular, the securities markets—markets for shares and bonds,
which are becoming much more important in company finance in most EU countries.
This second group of changes is particularly topical because the main policy initiative
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involved, the EU’s Financial Services Action Plan, was only launched in 1999 and gath-
ered pace only in the last two years.
Together the macroeconomic and financial attributes of monetary union are chang-
ing the rules governing the economy and business in Europe. Regime transformation
is taking place across the participating countries. The extent and direction of this
change is still unfolding and a matter of hot debate (Dyson, 2002). This paper
addresses one particular aspect to these discussions—the employment relations impli-
cations from deeper monetary and financial integration inside the EU. This is an
important topic that warrants close investigation as it may allow a more informed
assessment of the extent to which European monetary union is compatible with Social
Europe. An ill-defined term, Social Europe is normally associated with the operation
of two big social institutions—comprehensive welfare states and highly organised
systems of employment relations (usually referred to as corporatist). These two insti-
tutions have played a central role in European economic life for the past half-century
and more. To sketch the situation in schematic terms: the economic status of those in
employment was determined by collective bargaining, more or less reinforced by leg-
islation, while the rights and obligations of those not in jobs, such as the retired and
the unemployed, depended on the welfare state. Thus Social Europe represents a form
of economic citizenship as it establishes important rules for the incorporation of people
into the world of work (Grahl and Teague, 1994).
Examining some ways in which monetary union is interacting with employment
relations will shed light on whether or not economic citizenship will change in light
of the EU’s decision to adopt a single currency. The main focus is on employment rela-
tions because, although social protection regimes will certainly be influenced by mon-
etary union, the most rapid and direct effects will be on employment relations as
national economies meet changed macroeconomic constraints and enterprises adapt
to the increased role of organised capital markets.
The paper is organised as follows: firstly, the macroeconomic challenge is exam-
ined—how labour market actors are responding to the fact that macroeconomic poli-
cies are not only out of their own control, but are established on a supranational basis
and may therefore fail to correspond to the needs of particular countries; secondly, we
look at the financial challenge, which has its main impact on the structures of corpo-
rate finance and thus on corporate strategy—how are employment relations adapting
to these microeconomic changes? It will be suggested that although adaptation at 
the macro level has been relatively successful, the deep challenges arising from the
transformation of financial relations are only just beginning to be addressed. Finally
we make some remarks about the implications of both patterns of change for the 
European Social model.
The new macroeconomic regime and national social pacts
The impact of the new macroeconomic regime in the Eurozone countries is essentially
mediated through output markets—markets for goods and services. There are con-
tinuing debates about just how monetary policy works (the discussion of ‘transmis-
sion mechanisms’) but it is generally agreed that employment is primarily affected via
the impact of policy on the demand for the output of the employing enterprise. Tight
constraints in output markets are hardly a novelty in Europe—the general stance of
macroeconomic policy has been restrictive over the last two decades. What is new is
that policy is now largely set on a supranational basis, so that it might not respond to
significant changes in national rates of inflation or unemployment.
In this context, national social pacts are of particular interest because they can adapt
employment terms to specifically national conditions. Table 1 outlines the wage
determination systems in the EU and it shows that almost everywhere multi-tier col-
lective bargaining institutions are in place. Thus the anticipated shift away from 
centralised bargaining institutions heralded a decade ago has not materialised in 
any decisive manner: the generalised trend is for pay awards to be at the very least
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influenced by some type of extra-firm agreement or rule. At the same time, important
institutional variations exist between these national bargaining arrangements. In some
member states, the negotiated deals have economy-wide coverage while in others they
are limited to particular sectors. Some of the agreements are obligatory as they have
legal status while others constitute only guidelines. The scope permitted for trade
unions and employers to conclude additional company-level agreements is another
important source of divergence. Thus the picture that emerges is that, while there is
some institutional diversity to pay setting, there has been no decisive shift towards
labour market flexibility on the British or the United States model. It is also useful to
point out that trade union density—another proxy for institutional continuity—did
not change greatly in most member states during the 1990s. Does this mean that cor-
poratist employment relations have proven more resilient in the new macro economic
regime or that something else, something more complex, is emerging in European
employment relations?
The argument of this paper is that a complex pattern of change is unfolding in Euro-
pean employment relations. In essence, the institutional characteristics associated with
corporatism in the past more or less remain, but the purpose and functioning of these
arrangements have changed. We have continuity of institutions but innovation in sub-
stance. This path of transformation can be detected in the actual content of extra-firm
collective bargaining. Pay systems in Europe currently display three common features.
First, it is accepted virtually everywhere that the rules associated with membership of
the European monetary union club constitute a non-negotiable macro-economic frame-
work for pay determination (Fajertag and Pochet, 2000). Claims for wage increases that
threaten to infringe these rules are strongly resisted. Thus each national wage bargain-
ing system gives top priority to moderate pay bargaining behaviour consistent with
being a full and loyal participant of the single currency club. Second, the theme of com-
petitiveness, particularly in terms of controlling unit labour costs, is dominant in most
of the agreements. Setting pay levels that allow domestic industry to compete inside the
European internal market as well as global markets is the new reféréntial for collective
bargaining negotiations across the EU (Freyssinet and Seifert, 2001).
Third, there appears to be an acceptance that the scope for distributional deals is
small. Although some of the national wage deals contain the conventional quid pro quo
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Table 1: Social pacts and wage bargaining levels
Intersectoral Level Sectoral Level Company Level
Austria XXX
Belgium XX X X
Denmark X XX X
Finland X XX X
France X XXX
Germany X XXX X
Greece X XX X
Ireland XXX X X
Italy X XXX X
Luxembourg XX XX
Netherlands X XXX X
Portugal X XXX X
Spain X XXX X
Sweden XXX X
UK X XXX
Key: X = evident XX = important XXX = dominant.
Source: Compiled from European Industrial Relations Data.
of the ‘social wage’—the situation where increased public expenditure on social pro-
tection or social services is exchanged for pay moderation—these are fairly insub-
stantial trade-offs. If anything, the streamlining of welfare state provision is seen as
an important strand in national social pacts in continental Europe (Ebbinghaus and
Hassel, 2000). In smaller states such as Ireland, the reduction of tax levels, rather than
increases in public expenditure, has been a feature of national agreements. Overall,
equity considerations appear to be a secondary concern in the recent national pay
agreements. Wage moderation has been the main focus of attention.
One interpretation of these developments is that the traditional ‘peace formula’
between employers and employees in Europe has been torn up and that the ‘new’
agreements represent the institutionalisation of an employer-defined, market-driven
employment relations agenda (Streeck, 1999). While this would be an over-statement
there is little doubt that traditional corporatist employment relations, with their
emphasis on the distribution and redistribution of income have been weakened as
member states have sought to comply with the Growth and Stability Pact and the
strong anti-inflationary stance of the ECB—two core features of the Eurozone area.
Three trends are particularly worthy of note. First of all, trends in nominal wages are
consistent with price stability. A big disinflation process has continued in Europe since
the late 1980s with, as a long-term consequence, a huge reduction in inflationary pres-
sures. In the Eurozone area nominal wage increases per employee now move more or
less in parallel with price increases. A by-product of this disinflation process is that
the (absolute) dispersion of nominal wage increases has declined so that there is now
broad convergence on this front.
A second general development, as shown in Figure 1, is that real wage increases
have been lower than productivity increases, leading to a fall in unit labour costs—an
important indicator of competitiveness. Real wage moderation, which often amounts
to real wage devaluation, has prevailed in almost all countries in the Eurozone area.
The most striking examples of this development are Ireland and Finland. Of course,
another way of presenting this development is to point out that labour’s share in
national income has fallen. The third development is that the share of profits in GDP
across the Eurozone area, as shown in Figure 2, has increased during the lifetime of
most of the latest agreements. Levels of profitability make an important contribution
to the overall investment of an economic area and hence to its productivity and growth
potential. Thus one would be hard pressed to sustain the claim that the latest social
pacts have not been good for European business. This is probably the key factor in
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003. The Eurozone and financial integration 399
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
100
102
104
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year
19
91
=1
00 UK
Netherlands
Germany
Eurozone
Figure 1: Trends in Unit Labour Costs
Source: Eurostat
explaining why in virtually all cases employers have complied willingly with social
pacts (Dolvik, 1999).
All in all, although the institutional form of agreements is continuous with the ‘cor-
poratism’ of the past, their content gives heavy emphasis to the adaptation of general
wage levels to given macroeconomic conditions. But if nation-wide agreements con-
tinue to display important advantages in terms of co-ordination, they do not have the
same content as in the past. On the one hand, there is no longer any real possibility
for governments to offer an expansionary macroeconomic policy as the counterpart of
the wage discipline accepted by employees in a social pact. Rather the macroeconomic
pay-off to employees takes the form of a boost to external competitiveness, hence to
net exports and hence to output and employment. Such effects are likely to be strongest
in the smaller member states, which trade a very large proportion of their GDP, and
this in itself is one reason why the many of the most developed examples of such pacts
are to be found in the smaller member states. Thus the social pacts that have emerged
inside the EU during the past decade must be seen as an effort to encourage labour
market behaviour that is consistent with monetary union.
This has taken an explicit form in some member states. For instance, in Belgium, 
a weighted calculation of wage increases in neighbouring countries, particularly
Germany, France and the Netherlands is used to determine the scope for domestic pay
awards. This procedure was first introduced in 1989. In Finland, a number of ‘buffer
funds’ have been added to the centralised collective bargaining system. The operation
of these funds is relatively straightforward: during good economic times government,
employers and trade unions contribute to the funds so that when a business down-
turn arrives employers will not have to pay extra unemployment insurance contribu-
tions which may further reduce the demand for labour. In essence the scheme is about
maintaining equilibrium unemployment in the event of an ‘external’ shock inside
Eurozone. The main point is that monetary union has led to some Europeanisation of
national collective bargaining behaviour and a greater preoccupation with competi-
tiveness by wage negotiators.
Cross-jurisdictional pay bargaining
The single currency has also led to increased efforts to establish greater synchronisa-
tion of pay bargaining across jurisdictions (Sisson and Marginson, 2002). Trade unions
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from Belgium, Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg in the metalworking indus-
tries get together to conclude cross-border agreements on collective bargaining co-
operation. The agreements, known as the Doorn process, seek to prevent national 
bargaining systems being used to bid down collectively agreed pay. More specifically,
the wage setting collaboration encourages the participating unions to pursue wage
claims that amount to exhausting the ‘neutral distribution margin’, which is calculated
as the sum of domestic increases in inflation and productivity. No attempt has been
made to use the process to launch American-style pattern bargaining strategies, which
would involve different national trade unions working in similar industries pushing
for the equalisation of wages across the EU irrespective of differences in productivity
levels. The network is also used by the unions to exchange information on domestic
collective agreements covering training, job redesign and employment security. There
is some disagreement on how fully the national trade unions have complied with the
various agreements in national bargaining rounds, but a consensus exists that the
Doorn process is a significant new departure in Europe-wide collective bargaining
(Schulten and Bispinck, 2001). Discussions are at an advanced stage to allow French,
Austrian, and Swiss unions entry into the group.
Other initiatives of a more limited regional scale have been concluded. Big German
unions orchestrate most of these essentially sub-national cross-border networks, with
IG Metall being the main sponsor of such arrangements (Gollbach and Schulten, 2000).
These mostly involve unions from neighbouring countries attending collective nego-
tiations of German employers and unions to monitor and learn about the agreements
that are being forged and to deepen information exchange. Undoubtedly, there is a
strong measure of self-interest behind these initiatives. Many German unions are
extremely anxious that, in the context of monetary union and EU enlargement, unions
from bordering countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic will enter into
‘national’ coalitions with employers to take advantage of their relatively low social
standards to attract investment from Germany. Presumably the calculation on the part
of German unions is that building cross-border trade union networks may create insti-
tutional hurdles in the way of such a strategy. Additional cross-national trade unions
have emerged in recent times. In August 1998 the Southern Baltic Sea Inter-Regional
Trade Union Council1 was set up involving German, Danish and Swedish unions and
has set itself the challenge of performing like the Doorn group. Established connec-
tions between the Scandinavian trade unions, particularly under the auspices of the
Nordic Council, are being strengthened so that there is greater synchronisation among
national collective demands.
A number of pan European coordination agreements have been signed between
trade unions operating in the same sector. In the chemical industry, unions from
Germany, France and the UK (IG-CPK, IG-BCE, Chimie-Energie-CFDT and GMB)
signed a co-operation agreement in 2000 which involved mutual recognition of trade
union membership, the organisation of a joint training programme and a commitment
to increase the velocity of information exchange (Le Queux and Fajertag, 2001). In the
construction industry, unions from seven countries—Germany, Italy, Poland, Austria,
Switzerland, Netherlands and Belgium—signed in 2000 a ten-point declaration, which
committed those involved to taking some form of solidarity action if any of the par-
ticipating unions were engaged in strike action. Other initiatives designed to intensify
cooperation were included in the declaration.
Efforts at creating EU-wide wage norms by the European Trade Union Confedera-
tion and sector-level European trade union industry federations operating in Brussels
to guide the behaviour of trade union negotiators in national collective bargaining
rounds have been less than successful (Dufresne and Mermet, 2002). In 1999 the ETUC
attempted to establish a norm for national pay awards but had to backtrack on the
proposal as it encountered too much internal opposition. European trade union fed-
erations have adopted framework agreements to influence the direction of national
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1 See http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/print/1998/08/inbrief/DE98008177N.html.
collective bargaining in their respective industries but these have mostly remained
paper tigers (Keller and Bansbach, 2001). Thus there is no formal connection between
EU-level and national-level trade union organisations on the matter of pay determi-
nation. A big difficulty is that national trade unions are still reluctant to transfer
upwards to their European counterparts the necessary authority to allow them to steer
pay determination inside the EU. Furthermore, problems of scale and heterogeneity
may seriously limit the possibilities of centralised Euro-wide wage norms. In the EU
of 15 member states, there are over 120 million people living in disparate circum-
stances, divided by language and culture as well as by ideological, national and reli-
gious traditions. In this situation, it would be very difficult for the EU to establish pay
norms that would be credible at ground level. These problems are only likely to inten-
sify with the imminent process of enlargement.
Technical problems also stand in the way of establishing a European wage norm. In
some countries, the convention is to include some measurement of productivity when
calculating a wage award; in others the convention is to rely more or less on inflation
rates. Even countries that use productivity benchmarks calculate them in different
ways (some use productivity per hour, others productivity per person still others pro-
ductivity by sector). A further obstacle is that some wage agreements take social secu-
rity contributions and a range of other factors into account. In this situation it would
be very difficult to for the EU to establish pay norms that are credible at ground level.
Furthermore, at present, employers would be likely to resist any strong aggregation
of employee interests. Thus little prospect exists of unions regaining at EU level the
influence some of them once enjoyed at national level over the macroeconomic context
of the wage bargain: no macroeconomic counterpart to wage moderation, in the form
of either redistribution or of a commitment to fuller employment is on offer. This state
of affairs strengthens the new macroeconomic regime in the EU—the European Central
Bank and the Stability Pact—because it means that they are not threatened by serious
wage pressure.
Thus monetary union has not encouraged a decisive move towards a Euro-
corporatist system. The biggest change that has occurred has been a certain degree of
Europeanisation of national bargaining. National collective bargaining activity is now
more sensitive to European developments than ever before. So far it has encouraged
collective bargaining activity that is consistent with a single currency in Europe. A
certain amount of cross-jurisdictional ‘focal point’ bargaining coordination has
occurred, involving non-hierarchical, decentralised collaborations between national
trade unions, to synchronise national wage setting across Europe. As a result of this
activity a multitude of new pan European trade union networks are emerging across
the member states. The main motivation behind much of this activity is to ensure that
wage competition does not occur between national employment relations regimes.
Little or no effort has been made to launch American style pattern bargaining which
would involve pay awards cascading from one country to another.
From a trade union point of view, the most optimistic comment that can be made
is that initial assumptions, particularly within the economics profession, that the single
currency would fragment ‘corporatist’ employment relations and pave the way for 
the ‘Americanisation’ of European labour markets have not proved to be justified. As
a result, the special ‘public status’ of organised labour in European politics is still
evident. In this context, the possibility of a new politicisation of European industrial
relations in the future cannot be ruled out. Moreover, the cross-national networks that
are emerging might continue to strengthen and these could give rise to some from of
multi-level European industrial relations regime. However, in light of the current
pattern of institutional development, this regime is unlikely to be a ‘vertical’ and
tightly integrated arrangement, which were characteristics of the classic corporatist
model. Although these possibilities cannot be ruled out, current political and economic
circumstances demand a more modest assessment: the relationship between wage bar-
gaining and monetary union is a less important item on the economic and political
agenda than it was a number of years ago and that it is unlikely that big initiatives
will be launched on this topic in the immediate future. Top of the monetary union
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agenda now is building an institutional architecture to realise and hold together fully
integrated capital markets in the Eurozone area. Important implications arise from this
development for the institutional rules used to incorporate employees into the world
of work. Yet insufficient attention is being paid to this development by the employ-
ment relations academy.
European financial integration, corporate governance and
employment relations
The single currency is accelerating integration of capital markets in the EU. The finan-
cial transformations taking place will have an important impact on employment rela-
tions. Once again it will be argued that the pattern of change is difficult to interpret
but may well be of great significance. The point of departure of most analysis is the
well-established distinction between stakeholder and shareholder models of capital-
ism. The essential difference is that a stakeholder enterprise is a coalition of interests
(including, notably, employee interests) whereas a shareholder enterprise is essentially
the property of its owners, with the interests of employees, customers, suppliers, the
local community and so on being clearly subordinated to profitability objectives. In
financial terms stakeholder capitalism is often related to a bank-based financial system
and to the presence of major ‘insider’ investors closely and permanently linked to the
enterprise; shareholder capitalism on the other hand tends to arise from market-based
financial arrangements, where there are large numbers of ‘outside’ investors, most of
whom need have no close association with, or even knowledge of, the day-to-day life
of the enterprise. The key point is that, when an enterprise finances its long-term
investment with bank credit, the claim held by the bank is not easily marketable: thus
the bank is locked into a long-term relationship with the firm and must attempt to
deal with problems by intervention into the firm’s strategy. An enduring partnership
between firm and bank becomes necessary which often widens to embrace other
parties with influence over performance in the long run, such as the employees.
When, on the other hand, investments are financed by the issue of marketable secu-
rities—shares or corporate bonds—then the holders of these securities can respond to
emerging problems by selling them on organised asset markets: this puts immediate
pressure on the firm by raising the cost of capital and, possibly, by exposing its man-
agement to the threat of a hostile takeover. Thus the management are impelled to
adopt strategies which guarantee that shareholder interests are prioritised at every
moment of time, through continuously high dividend pay-outs and a rising share
price. In the face of this pressure, the interests of other groups, such as employees,
suppliers or local communities may be subordinated to the maximisation of profits.
Japan and Germany come closest to the bank-based system while the UK and USA
are examples of market-based systems.
Both types of financial system have a strong influence on management-employee
interactions inside enterprises (Gospel and Pendleton, 2001). Bank based systems are
generally regarded as more conducive to cooperative employment relations. A fre-
quent characteristic of these systems is that banks hold equity and have seats on the
boards of individual companies. But these shareholdings may not be easily marketable
and hostile takeovers are rare. This does not mean that banks are actively involved in
the short-term operational direction of an organisation on a continuous basis. For the
most part, if a company is doing well banks adopt a hands-off approach. Direct inter-
vention normally only happens when the firm is in financial or commercial trouble or
in need of restructuring. Thus managers typically enjoy a certain latitude to pursue
autonomous action: they are better positioned to develop corporate strategies that not
only meet the needs of shareholders but also other stakeholders. As a result, a corpo-
rate environment emerges that facilitates, if not encourages, cooperative relationships
between managers and employees (Roe, 2003).
Market-based financial systems may be less likely to foster ‘mutual commitment’
manager-employee interactions, largely because organisations are monitored and con-
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trolled on the financial markets with a continuous threat of takeover. In such stock
market economies, all publicly quoted firms are continuously up for auction. The inter-
ests of shareholders are paramount in this system. Other stakeholder interests, those
of employees, supplier companies or consumers, are subordinate to those of share-
holders. Managers may be less able to make strategic decisions that seek to incorpo-
rate the interests of employees. Making credible commitments to employees, which
are a cornerstone of sustainable cooperative employment relations, may thus become
more difficult (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000).
Eurozone and financial transformation
Eurozone is encouraging a series of transformations within European financial
systems that have far reaching implications for investment and credit mechanisms at
member state level (European Commission, 2002). The EU has adopted a programme
of measures that seeks to accelerate this transformation. The core of this programme
is the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), which is meant to sweep away the tech-
nical, regulatory and legal obstacles to a full integration of EU finance, especially secu-
rity markets (markets for company shares, and for government and corporate bonds).
The FSAP is supported by a similar programme in the specific field of risk capital and
by a renewed attempt to adopt a common code for company takeovers in the EU,
which is seen as necessary for an integrated market in company shares because poten-
tial control over companies is an important aspect of the value of corporate securities.
These policies have been launched in the context of on-going changes in European
finance, which can be traced to the internationalisation and deregulation of financial
structures all over the world (Grahl, 2001). One aspect of these changes is disinterme-
diation, which reduces the role of bank credit in the finance of corporations while
increasing the importance of traded shares and corporate bonds. Another aspect of the
same general shift has been the growth of institutional investors (pension funds, unit
trusts, insurance companies and so on) which channel household savings onto the
securities markets. The institutional investors reinforce disintermediation by offering
substitute savings outlets to the banks which have traditionally absorbed the vast bulk
of individual savings in continental countries.
The FSAP is seen by the Commission, the Council and other EU leaderships as 
necessary to strengthen the EU economy relative to that of the US, where disinter-
mediated, security-based finance is highly developed. The legislative programme
associated with the FSAP is extremely complex and elaborate, but it has been given
very high priority by the Commission and member state governments and it is now
clear that most of it will be completed by the target date of 2004. Although all member
states are participating in the FSAP, it is clearly linked to the single currency used by
12 of them because the fact that securities are denominated in a common currency
greatly facilitates the integration of security markets.
The implications of these financial developments for employment relations are
potentially far-reaching because they tend to transform the relations between large
companies and their investors. The new patterns of finance make much more use of
‘outside investors’, that is of resources drawn, via the security markets, from very large
numbers of investors with no particular relationship to the company concerned, whose
shares or debt obligations they treat simply as one component in an ever-changing
portfolio of assets. Although it may be very advantageous for companies to tap these
sources of funds, increased dependence on ‘outside’ finance also brings new con-
straints on company behaviour because companies now have to respond to the
requirements of the financial markets on which shares and corporate bonds are traded.
Profits, dividends and other financial data are continuously scrutinised by portfolio
managers (the reporting of this kind of data in a standardised form is itself one of the
requirements of the new financial model). Holders of shares and bonds, if they do not
have any long-standing relationship to the company concerned, can at any time liq-
uidate their holdings on the financial markets if they perceive its performance as infe-
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rior to that of other companies; the exercise of this sanction tends to deflate share
prices, raising the cost of capital to the company and even exposing its management
to a hostile takeover.
This pattern of financial change is clearly towards the kind of financial structure and
mechanisms which prevail in the US; and indeed the EU has justified the FSAP in
terms of a move towards US practices, which are perceived as more efficient and as
promoting higher rates of investment. Thus, as opposed to the European Central Bank
itself, which impacts on employment relations essentially through the level of demand
for goods and services, the FSAP and the financial changes with which it is associated
impact on corporate strategy and corporate governance. As companies adapt to the
new financial constraints and possibilities, they alter corporate behaviour in ways
which may destabilise employment relations. Three examples can be given of this con-
nection. The first relates to corporate structures. Although ‘outside’ shareholders have
no particular interest in any given company as an industrial entity, they tend to prefer
specialised enterprises, focused on one or a few core activities; pressure is often put
on companies to dispose of subsidiaries in unrelated fields and to outsource inessen-
tial activities if these might complicate managerial tasks without furthering overall
performance. These pressures correspond to shareholder interests, since shareholders
can control the risks of their investments by diversifying their portfolios—by holding
shares in a large range of companies in various industries and countries. Conglomer-
ate companies, with a diversified range of activities, do nothing to reduce shareholder
risk but they may well make the scrutiny of performance and profitability much more
difficult. Employees, on the other hand, confront higher levels of job insecurity if the
company they work for reduces the scope of its activities (Streeck, 2001).
The second connection concerns incentive structures. A key tension in the ‘outside’
investor model is between company management, who might be tempted to pursue
their own interests, and shareholders with no presence in the firm or enduring rela-
tionship to it. In US and British practice, the response to this tension has been to offer
managers very high rewards, geared to financial performance—as measured, for
example, by dividend pay-outs and increases in share prices. On the other hand, share-
holders may seek to reduce rewards for groups of employees who do not possess
strategic influence over corporate performance (Blair, 1999). The third link refers to
employee representation. US corporations today have elaborate systems for commu-
nicating with employees, but these are very much focused on a full use of skills and
productive knowledge. They are not in general intended to involve employees in
strategic decision-making. Over continental Europe, of course, there are systems of
employee representation which go much further than this—in particular the co-
determination structures in Germany. Now, to the extent that the interests of ‘outside’
investors become more important, it can be expected that pressures will develop to
move European firms towards the US model, in which the consultation of employees
is very much focused on their contribution to output and profitability while the strate-
gies of the enterprise are the prerogative of (shareholder-oriented) managers.
In addition to these shifts in the behaviour of individual firms, financial change
involves a deep change in the nature of industrial restructuring. First of all, it inten-
sifies the merger and acquisition process. Whereas ‘inside’ investor systems give 
priority to the strengthening of the competitive position of the enterprise when 
companies are merged or taken over, returns to shareholders—in terms of the market
value of their holdings—is the deciding factor in an economy dominated by security
markets. Secondly, it gives added momentum to hostile takeovers—aimed at the dis-
placement of managements whose performance is judged to be unsatisfactory from
the point of view of shareholders. These are much more frequent in the US and UK
economies than they have traditionally been in continental Europe, where restructur-
ing has often been seen as a form of industrial policy. The Takeover Directive is
intended to reinforce shareholder interests within restructuring exercises (and this 
is the essential reason why it has repeatedly encountered resistance in the European
Parliament). As with outsourcing, the ongoing change in financial mechanisms has
implications for employment security (Barnard and Deakin, 2002).
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Thus financial integration in Europe has significant implications for employment
relations across the member states. This is because integration does not simply aim at
aggregating the existing financial systems in member states; rather it promotes a trans-
formation of financial mechanisms in which the interests of ‘outside’ shareholders,
represented by institutional investors and expressed through the management of their
portfolios and the purchase and sale of holdings on stock markets, are much more
important in the formulation of company strategies (Hopner, 2001).
For three reasons, however, the assessment of these new pressures on European
employment systems is difficult to assess. Firstly, these are for the most part very
recent changes—major shifts in the pattern of corporate finance only date from the late
1990s. Secondly, developments are very uneven across countries: for example, while
there has been a major shift towards stock market finance by French corporations, the
situation in Germany has been much more stable (Goyer, 2002). Finally, the huge
decline in stock market prices since 2000 has tended to make savers extremely cau-
tious in their approach to marketed securities and this has, at least, slowed down the
process of change. Nevertheless, significant shifts in corporate practice can certainly
be detected. Performance assessment systems are being reshaped towards the kind of
accounting and reporting procedures required by the financial markets; disposals and
outsourcing are narrowing the focus of large enterprises; although there has been no
surge in hostile takeovers among European companies, the salience of shareholder pri-
orities in agreed restructuring exercises is on the increase.
Thus financial integration arising in the wake of monetary union adds another
dimension to the employment relations reform taking place almost everywhere in
Europe. In the late nineties, somewhat dazzled by the apparent triumph of the stock
market-based US economy, EU policy-makers sought to implant market-based finan-
cial systems as quickly as possible and with very little concern for their potentially
adverse social consequences. At EU level, the Lamfalussy Report was commissioned
to accelerate the implementation of the FSAP (Lamfalussy, 2000). In Germany, an
important tax reform encouraged the break-up of long-standing relationships between
banks and their industrial customers and a decisive shift towards a stock market-based
financial system. In several countries, pension reforms promoted the accumulation of
financial assets in pension funds, at least partly in order to stimulate market-based
finance.
Today the prolonged stock market collapse of 2000–2002, the bursting of the dot.com
bubble, the revelation of massive corporate malpractice in US companies such as
Enron, and the slowdown in the US economy which is linked to these developments
may be making for a more measured approach to financial change in Europe. Events
such as the Enron collapse highlight the need for corporate governance systems that
reduce the risks employees make in investing their human capital in individual com-
panies and encourage organisations to actually implement (as opposed to simply
espouse) human resource management policies that create a decent working environ-
ment (Kochan, 2002).
At the same time, some social policy initiatives continue to assert a rather different
view of corporate governance and of employee relations than that which is associated
with the US model. Some EU social legislation represents an attempt to reinforce and
generalise the co-operative employment relations found in the traditional ‘stake-
holder’ companies of continental Europe. Although these policies are much less coher-
ent and less forceful than the drive for financial integration which remains the central
reform project of the EU today, they are not simply token gestures. The most signifi-
cant recent move has been the adoption of a European Information and Consultation
Directive. For the best part of 30 years the European Commission has been trying
unsuccessfully to persuade the member states to adopt a Directive on this topic. A host
of technical difficulties arising from divergent corporate law regimes in Europe and
the inability of powerful lobbies to adopt an agreed strategy on the matter have been
the main sources of blockage. In particular, European employers as a whole have been
adamantly opposed to any spread of German co-determination practices to other
countries, while the Germans have refused to abandon them (Streeck, 1997). Finally,
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however, a new Information and Consultation Directive has been adopted that lays
down certain minimum requirements for employee voice mechanisms in the member
states (Sisson, 2002).
The new voting procedures introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty certainly facili-
tated a breakthrough on this matter, but market pressures have also played a role. The
big push towards integrated capital markets has increased pressure for some type of
EU action to create a European model of corporate governance. The new Directive,
which was officially adopted in February 2002, is hardly radical. The legislation estab-
lishes the right of employees to regular, ongoing information and consultation on
matters of concern to them. Such matters include recent or probable developments in
the business situation of the organisation; the structure and probable development of
employment (particularly threats to employment); and changes to work organisation
or in contractual relations.
Most of the other member states have national laws that go further in placing obliga-
tions on employers to consult with employees than those set out in the Directive. Its
biggest impact will be on the UK and Ireland, which have no integrated legislation on
employee voice. Nevertheless, the passage of the Directive may be significant because
it represents partial recognition by the EU that the institutional architecture for the
emerging European financial area must include employee rights. Together with the
European Works Council, the Information and Consultative Directive can be seen as
beginning an attempt to build an employment relations dimension into a future Euro-
pean model of corporate governance. It is true that the Directive gives companies 
enormous scope to design their own customised information and consultation
arrangements with employees and that therefore it bears more on the procedures of
employee voice systems than on their content (Supiot, 2001). However, this inbuilt
flexibility may itself work to ensure that the new regulatory framework is successfully
adopted throughout the EU.
Conclusions
For a long time, many commentators have stressed the cleavage in European con-
struction between the strong, clearly successful, drive for economic integration and
the much more hesitant measures which are found in the sphere of social policy. The
opposition between ‘market-making’ and ‘market-correcting’ policies, is almost as 
old as the European project itself (Scharpf, 1999). There are many reasons for this
dichotomy—among them the historical reality that social policies are deeply embed-
ded in the diverse experiences of specific national cultures and the pressing need felt
today by national governments, confronted by globalisation and a loss of economic
autonomy, to preserve as much freedom of manoeuvre as is possible in their welfare
systems and public services.
In this context, employment policy has a deeply ambivalent status. On the one hand,
the regulation of labour markets and of employment are inseparable from economic
policy in general and therefore have to be included in the core drive towards an ever
more integrated EU economy. On the other, working conditions and the wage deter-
mination process are the central realities around which social models are organised
and there are inevitable spillovers from labour markets into the whole field of social
policy.
How does monetary union affect the balance (or perhaps it would be more accurate
to say, the imbalance) between economic and social Europe? In our view, any answer
to this question must distinguish between the directly monetary and the indirect,
financial, consequences of the single currency. The substitution of a single, Europe-
wide, monetary policy (together with the new constraints on national budgetary poli-
cies expressed in the Stability Pact) for national macroeconomic policies imposes a
challenging new constraint on the working of national labour markets which have
now become the most important sphere in which national adaptation to macroeco-
nomic developments must be pursued. In general, this challenge has led not to a weak-
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ening of Europe’s strongly institutionalised employment systems, but to a reorienta-
tion of labour market and employment institutions to address the need for competi-
tiveness within the monetary union. The outcome has been to further reduce the risk
of inflationary pressures within European labour markets and thus to stabilise the
monetary union, but this has been achieved by limiting the aspirations of employees
and their unions for a more employment-friendly economic environment or for more
active social and redistributive policies to compensate for the moderation of wages.
Here the very strength of national social models seems to work against the constitu-
tion of an effective system of employment relations at the EU level. Thus, as regards
the employment relations dimension of the European social models, the main result
of the new macroeconomic regimes has been to build upon existing national models,
rather than to promote an alternative EU industrial relations framework.
One can detect the possibility of a different, and more ambitious, response to the
same challenge in the efforts of, especially, German trade unions to co-ordinate bar-
gaining across national frontiers and to formulate common positions on a range of
employment issues. At present, this is a secondary development, very much subordi-
nated to the reinforcement of national competitiveness, and only acts as a partial brake
on the latter. However, the logic of market integration itself may tend to reverse this
state of affairs and to promote the development of stronger and more co-ordinated
systems of genuinely European employment relations. Any such development would,
in its turn, release other dynamics—in particular by calling into question the key
national mechanism of adjustment to macroeconomic pressures.
What of the second, indirect, consequence of monetary union, that is the accelerated
integration and transformation of financial systems. Here the challenges to established
employment practices are potentially even more radical because changing patterns of
corporate finance, with an enhanced role for ‘outside’ investors, may tend to subvert
long-standing compromises at the level of the enterprise itself. It is particularly diffi-
cult to interpret the responses to this second challenge because it is so recent but there
are clearly risks to the stability of national employment systems. These risks arise from
the fact that pressures on corporate finance are beginning to result in changes in corpo-
rate strategies and thus in employment relations at the level of the enterprise. These
financial pressures are diffuse, but at the same time pervasive—it is difficult to predict
how particular enterprises will react, but it is clear that virtually all enterprises will
be affected.
In this case the implications for European Social Models are less clear. But in our
view, financial integration might push European employment systems closer to the
threshold at which EU-wide policies and structures are perceived as central to the
effective governance of employment relations. In particular, financial integration may
necessitate a certain harmonisation of corporate governance systems in Europe and
this would mean addressing, at long last, the institutional place of labour within the
enterprise as a European, rather than a national issue.
We emphasise that this threshold has not yet been reached. Neither the tentative
experiments in trans-national trade-unionism which were discussed above nor the
European employment strategy, with its use of soft law in the ‘open’ coordination of
national employment interventions (Mosher and Trubek, 2003), have as yet desta-
bilised the basically national character of employment relations. The same is true for
the very limited and cautious introduction of EU-wide employment law. But each of
these developments might acquire significantly greater substance if there arose a
widely perceived need to reshape enterprise-level employment practice in response to
changing corporate priorities. Thus, in our view, the indirect consequences of mone-
tary union, via its impact on financial systems, may, over time, have a greater impact
on European social models than the direct transformation of macroeconomic condi-
tions which has, so far, absorbed most of the attention of industrial relations 
commentators.
And any such development towards a more highly Europeanised employment
system would necessitate wider changes in the social models, just because social pro-
tection systems and social service provision, at present jealously guarded fields of
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member state autonomy, are so closely tied to employment systems and employment
outcomes. As our final conclusion, we choose not to speculate further on the shape of
future employment relations systems in the EU, but to make a methodological point.
A clear aspect of recent developments is that continuity of established employment
institutions can accompany deep changes in the actual content of employment rela-
tions. Thus it is becoming increasingly difficult to interpret change in purely institu-
tional terms: given the radical changes in economic mechanisms it is increasingly
important to focus on the detailed functioning of relatively stable institutional struc-
tures if one wants to assess the dynamics of European systems.
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John Grahl and Paul Teague
ABSTRACT A drive for financial integration, especially in the field of securities
trading, is a very significant feature of EU policy today. This paper makes a critical
assessment of the central component in the financial integration strategy, the Com-
mission’s Financial Services Action Plan. It is argued that an exceptional degree of
political agreement around the strategy has allowed it to succeed in spite of the for-
midable technical difficulties to which it gave rise. It is suggested, however, that
further reformulations of the strategy will be needed, to cope with the aftermath
of the recent stock market crash and to link the strategy more closely to EU strategies
in the social sphere.
KEY WORDS European integration; financial disintermediation; public policy.
INTRODUCTION
Financial systems play a central role in modern economies. They perform the
crucial function of allocating scarce capital to competing investment alterna-
tives. They monitor the performance of firms to ensure that the capital
employed is being used efficiently. A malfunctioning financial system can
have rapid and grave consequences for the wider economy. Financial relations
can also have broader social effects – for example, they may affect the character
of social compromises within an economic system by determining the amount
that can be borrowed by economic agents and by influencing the behaviour of
economic actors in such fields as wage bargaining.
The European monetary union has led to important changes in European
financial systems. Although most discussion of monetary union focuses on
the creation of a new supranational macroeconomic regime, and on the
related loss of macroeconomic policy autonomy in participating countries,
monetary union has also led to a powerful drive for financial integration
which today concerns not only banks but also securities markets – the
markets for shares and bonds, which are becoming more important to com-
panies in most member states.
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Thus the creation of a well-designed and smoothly functioning financial
system inside the Eurozone has become a key aspect of European construction.
This paper attempts to make a preliminary economic and political assessment of
the drive towards European Union (EU) financial integration. It is argued that
because the financial integration agenda commands wide support among Euro-
pean political e´lites, the integration programme has been able to overcome many
difficulties in that a host of technical problems which initially confronted the
programme have been resolved and some important conflicts of interest have
been dealt with. It is suggested, however, that two key problems continue to
obstruct full financial integration in the EU.
The first of these arises from the stock market crash of 2001/2; this has not
only slowed down financial integration on the ground; it has also called into
question the present structure of financial services by raising problems of
market stability, investor protection and corporate governance which will
need to be addressed both in the US and in the EU. The second potential
problem is a consequence of the spillovers from financial changes to other
aspects of the socio-economic system. There has been insufficient consideration
of how changes in financial mechanisms might impact on employment
relations, for example, or on the balance between market and state provision
in such fields as pensions and health care.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section makes an important con-
textual point about the growing trend towards financial disintermediation. The
following section gives a brief characterization of EU financial policies and
examines the rationale that is put forward for integration in the financial
sphere. Then the EU’s Financial Services Action Plan is discussed. The fifth
section examines some of the technical difficulties that delayed the integration
process. The following sections look at the reformulation of the integration pro-
gramme following the Lamfalussy Report and at fallout from the stock market
crash. The conclusion brings together the arguments of the paper and signals
some issues that may require addressing as a result of deeper financial integration
inside the EU.
THE CONTEXT FOR EU FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
An important contextual point about the character of the global financial system
needs to be made before discussing the drive towards financial integration inside
the EU. The main characteristic of the global finance system that has been emer-
ging over recent decades is disintermediation (Schmidt et al. 1998). In an inter-
mediated financial system strong banks stand between households, which are the
ultimate suppliers of financial resources, and the corporate, public sector or
private agents who make use of them. It is the bank which has a direct liability
towards the savers who are its depositors; claims on the ultimate users of the
funds are not held by these depositors but by the bank itself, whose reputation
and solidity are the basis of confidence in the system. In financial systems where
banks are the main channel for the mobilization of the savings of the public,
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company shares tend not to be actively traded: control of companies tends to be
highly concentrated in the hands of a few ‘inside’ investors with close and long-
lasting connections to the company management. Close coalitions of interest
between these two parties, often extended to employees, suppliers and others,
provide the basis of the ‘stakeholder’ enterprise traditionally found, for
example, in Germany.
In a disintermediated system, borrowers and users of equity capital issue
securities (on primary security markets) which are held directly by the provi-
ders of funds, who therefore assume all the risks involved. Confidence in
the financial structure then rests on the ability of the investors to sell their
claims (in the secondary securities markets where the shares, bonds and other
financial instruments are actively traded); the liquidity and security of the
security markets become the key factors that underpin the financial system
(Mayer and Vines 1993).
Of course, only very wealthy households make substantial direct placements
in the security markets. Most savers purchase securities through institutional
investors, such as investment trusts or pension funds, which are able to aggregate
small individual sums in order to carry out large, diversified, purchases of secu-
rities. But institutional investment is not the same as classical bank intermedia-
tion: the individual saver is directly exposed to the risks of the security market
and is also entitled to the gains which may result from rising security prices.
Financial globalization has not just established increasingly dense and rapid
interactions among existing financial systems, it has also tended to change the
nature of financial systems, away from classical banking activities and towards
the finance of both governments and corporations by the direct sale of securities
to the investing public (Berger et al. 1999). It is this shift in the operation of
financial systems that is known as disintermediation (or, when the role of finan-
cial markets is stressed, securitization). A set of different influences lies behind
this shift. Some of the original forces behind disintermediation can be seen as
contingent. In particular, certain regulatory constraints imposed on the US
banking system in the wake of the Great Depression, such as interest rate ceil-
ings, encouraged borrowers from the 1950s onwards to issue securities directly
to the public, rather than to make use of artificially restricted bank loans. More
pervasively, the major changes in macroeconomic policy which occurred in the
1980s, with tight monetary policy and high interest rates being maintained over
a long period of time to counter inflation, tended to make bank credit relatively
expensive and thus to promote greater use of stock markets and bond markets to
raise funds for both private-sector and public-sector borrowers (ECB 2001).
But the fundamental force behind disintermediation is probably the emer-
gence of the global economy itself, with increasing interactions between econ-
omic agents on a planetary scale. Open securities markets derive much of
their power from their sheer scale – from the fact that they can draw funds
from investors anywhere in the world and place them with any of a host of
potential users according to the risk/return characteristics of the company or
country concerned. And this development is cumulative: the larger the securities
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markets, the easier and cheaper it becomes to trade on these markets and the
more likely they are to develop further. It should be stressed that, as with
other aspects of contemporary finance, the trend to disintermediation is not
homogeneous or uniform. The US financial system has tended to lead the
way, simply because the scale, dynamism and financial sophistication of the
US economy gave it a huge initial advantage as global financial systems
emerged. To a large extent, financial globalization can be understood as the
transformation and internationalization of the US financial system (Grahl
2001). In most of the countries of continental Europe, on the other hand,
changes have been slower and classical bank intermediation still predominates.
THE DIRECTION OF EU FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
On first appearance the discussion in the last section might suggest that deepen-
ing of financial integration inside the EU gives rise to the following conundrum:
should the member states attempt to reconstruct at EU level the bank-based
financial model that can be found in many parts of Europe, or should they
follow the pattern of change mapped out by the global financial markets? In
reality, such a choice does not exist. This is because the various stakeholder
models that have emerged in the member states are completely incompatible
one with another. Each of them is embedded in a specific society, with specific
mechanisms and priorities adapted to national, or even sometimes local, con-
ditions. This social embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) is the main strength of
these models, but it is also their fatal weakness in that it prevents them from
expanding to embrace very wide numbers of outside investors or to undertake
investments on an international scale (Grahl 2001).
The rule of Anglo-American finance, on the other hand, is: anyone can play.
This gives the security-based financial system a global reach and a potential for
cumulative growth which the other systems simply cannot match, in spite of the
fact that they are often more efficient in the detailed, local, deployment of finan-
cial resources. By the 1990s, in consequence, stakeholder financial systems,
centred on bank credit, were already on the retreat everywhere in Europe
(while the Japanese system, unable to deal with the consequences of liberaliza-
tion, was in complete disarray). A coherent European response could only take
the form of an attempt to accelerate and unify the development of Europe-wide
capital markets.
The opportunity to attempt this largely arises from the successful introduc-
tion of the euro in 1999 (Danthine et al. 2001). Savers, investors and borrowers
over an immense and expanding economic zone are now using the same
currency; the risks and costs of foreign exchange transactions have ceased
to inhibit the sale and purchase of securities across national frontiers within
the Eurozone. It therefore becomes possible to envisage a huge, integrated,
security-based financial system, which was simply not possible when insti-
tutional investors had to take particular care not to expose their customers to
big foreign exchange risks.
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Financial integration based on the principle of disintermediation/securitiza-
tion is seen as giving rise to a number of benefits. In the first instance, the same
considerations apply to finance as to integration in other fields. An integrated
financial system can be expected to lead to a more efficient allocation of
capital as financial resources flow to those issuers of securities who offer the
best rates of return, or, more strictly, the best combination of risk and return
characteristics. One aspect of this process is that institutional investors in each
member state should be better able to diversify their portfolios of assets and
in this way reduce the risks which they undertake for a given return. This diver-
sification effect is frequently stressed in official justifications of the financial inte-
gration strategy (European Commission 2002a).
Just as with integration in other spheres, certain complexities arise when we
take into account the fact that existing financial systems are far from being fully
competitive: the customers of existing financial companies are subject to the
market power of these companies, especially if national markets are small and
relatively isolated. The gains from integration will tend to be larger because
of this in that integration will stimulate competition among the providers of
financial services, whether these are institutional investors or the exchanges
and dealing systems that facilitate large-scale trading. This means that inte-
gration can be expected to lead to narrower margins between the interest rates
paid by borrowers and those received by savers. The cost of capital can be
expected to fall in consequence. However, this consideration of market power
does make the distribution of the benefits from integration a highly complex
question. Strategic rivalries will exist among providers of financial services
who will each seek to win advantageous positions on the integrated market.
Just such a process can be observed among the various national stock markets
in Europe, each of which is trying to win a larger share of the increasingly inte-
grated market in equities (Gasper et al. 2003).
Finally, developmental issues can be raised when one takes into account that
efficiency varies a great deal across different national financial systems. Inte-
gration can be expected to eliminate inefficient providers of financial services
to the extent that they are unable to meet the challenge of more advanced com-
petitors. This developmental question has two dimensions. Firstly, within the
EU, integration could be expected to bring about a levelling up process
which would displace the costly and unresponsive financial systems said to pre-
dominate in southern member states and some accession countries, and would
introduce the more modern systems typical of northern European countries
today. But secondly, as between the EU and the US, it was hoped that inte-
gration would endow the EU with the kind of low-cost and fast-moving finan-
cial system found in the States (Giannetti et al. 2002). Since it was thought that
the level of financial development was an important factor in economic devel-
opment in general, this pressure for modernization of European financial
systems became a key element in the actual decision to launch financial inte-
gration, taken at the European Council in 1998 and subsequently promoted
to become a key programme for deeper integration at Lisbon and Stockholm.
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Financial integration was presented as a central feature of the economic modern-
ization of Europe: in the words of the Stockholm summit communique´ finan-
cial integration would make the EU the ‘cheapest and easiest place to do
business in the world’.
THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACTION PLAN
The EU thus adopted a programme of measures designed to promote financial
transformation based on disintermediation/securitization – on the development
of huge integrated capital markets. The core of this programme is the Financial
Services Action Plan (FSAP), which is meant to sweep away the technical, regu-
latory and legal obstacles to a full integration of EU finance, especially security
markets (markets for company shares, and for government and corporate
bonds). The FSAP was supported by a similar programme in the specific field
of risk capital and by a renewed attempt to adopt a common code for
company takeovers in the EU, which was seen as necessary for an integrated
market in company shares because potential control over companies is an
important aspect of the value of corporate securities (Rajan and Zingales 2003).
The legal status of the FSAP gives it exceptional priority. It is seen as a series
of measures to complete the internal market and as thus fully within EU com-
petence and to be determined only by qualified majority voting (QMV). (It is
the Directorate-General for the Internal Market which has responsibility for the
plan.) As argued below, the implications of financial integration are vast and it
would surely have been possible for member state governments to claim that in
certain respects it overstepped the competence of the EU. This did not happen
in general because there was virtual unanimity on the need for the comprehen-
sive modernization it was hoped the plan could bring about (although, as will be
seen, on the issue of takeovers there has been decisive member state resistance).
The FSAP was divided into three broad themes. The first of these was the
integration of wholesale markets for securities: technical and regulatory differ-
ences made it difficult to issue new securities on primary markets across
Europe and to trade existing securities in all EU secondary markets. A pro-
gramme of legislation attempted to remove these barriers by, for example, stan-
dardizing the prospectus which has to accompany a new security issue or by
harmonizing the information and reporting requirements which companies
listed on stock markets have to fulfil.
The most contentious component of this legislation proved to be the
Commission’s proposal for a Takeover Directive. This relates to the market
for company shares because the possibility of a takeover bid increases the
value of shares; since in the past takeovers (especially hostile takeovers, that is
those which are not welcome to the incumbent management of the target
firm) were much easier to bring about in some countries than in others, the
shares of companies based in different member countries could not be regarded
as fully comparable financial assets. Commission proposals were to introduce
a uniform takeover code which would open the way to hostile takeovers
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throughout Europe, making them as easy in the continental countries as they
already were in Britain. In fact, this component of the programme was originally
rejected by the European Parliament (in a dramatic tied vote) because some
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) – the Germans in particular –
were reluctant to expose enterprises to hostile takeovers to the extent that the
Commission wanted. A compromise directive was eventually passed by the
Parliament but the Commission regards this as unsatisfactory, and even as a
‘retrograde step in economic reform’, because it fails to establish the ‘level
playing field’ which was desired. Incumbent managements will be much more
able to defend themselves against hostile bids in some countries than in
others (European Commission 2004: 3, cited in Frangakis 2005).
The second main theme of the FSAP was the integration of retail financial
markets – where investment trusts and other institutional investors compete
for household savings. As pointed out above, this is essentially part of the
same agenda since these investors are the most important buyers of, and
traders in, securities. Typical issues here were the definition of common rules
for the increasing number of retail financial services which are provided via
the internet and the harmonization of rules against fraud in retail finance.
Finally, the third main theme of the FSAP was financial regulation itself. This
has two main dimensions. In retail markets it is necessary to provide a large
measure of consumer protection. Households do not possess the same quantity
or quality of information as the financial enterprises with whom they are
dealing. Households may deal in these markets very infrequently: for
example, individuals may purchase only one pension plan over their lifetimes.
Yet they are parting with cash in return for financial products which are essen-
tially promises of quite distant benefits. In such circumstances the activities of
dishonest and unscrupulous enterprises can undermine public confidence in
the whole savings/investment process. Consumer protection regimes already
existed in all member states – the challenge to the FSAP was to harmonize
them in such a way as to facilitate EU-wide competition among institutional
investors.
In wholesale markets, this problem does not arise to the same extent because
here the sellers of financial claims confront sophisticated and experienced inves-
tors, often financial enterprises, who can be expected to protect their own inter-
ests in a systematic way. On the other hand, the second regulatory theme,
stability, becomes very important. The failure of any large financial actor, or
a collapse in the price of any important financial asset, can disrupt the entire
financial mechanism by compromising the position of other actors or by
sowing distrust about whole groups of assets. Chain reactions can develop
which threaten the financial system as a whole and which can have adverse
effects on the rest of the economy (Boot and Thakor 1997; Boyer et al.
2004). Measures oriented towards stability are of two kinds: prudential
regulation and supervision of financial companies and financial markets,
aimed at preventing such disruptive events, and crisis management to prevent
such failures, when they do occur, from leading to system-wide breakdown or
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to counteract their effects. A key example of the FSAP agenda in this area is the
development of common rules for capital adequacy of financial companies, rules
which are designed to make them less vulnerable to disturbance. Regulatory
integration is an exceedingly complex issue, but in this sphere the FSAP
could take advantage of an on-going process of convergence driven by global
forces: in the field of banking the Bank for International Settlements had for
two decades been involved in the formulation of general supervisory principles;
in the security markets there had been a broad convergence on the kind of pro-
cedures prevalent in the US because this was seen as necessary to attract the big
American institutional investors (Lu¨tz 2002).
DIFFICULTIES IN FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
Thus the FSAP, coupled with the plans for wider technological modernization
to which it was linked, represented an extremely ambitious programme for
economic change in the EU. Yet within a very short time the programme was
in several kinds of difficulty. The failure of the Takeover Directive has been
mentioned above, but this was very much an exception – the main problems
did not result from a general political challenge to the programme, but rather
from its inherent difficulty and complexity.
There were, firstly, many technical problems. With the Single European Act,
the EU seemed to have found a very effective strategy for economic integration:
approximation plus mutual recognition. The first of these procedures ensures a
general correspondence among the member state rules governing some branch
of economic activity; it prepares the way for the second procedure which
abolishes the barriers arising from the existence of different rules at national
level. The general assessment is that this strategy is much speedier and more effi-
cient than the attempts at comprehensive regulatory harmonization which were
often made previously. This approach had even been used successfully in the
sphere of banking with the notion of a single banking passport, acquired
when a bank is licensed in one member state and therefore, by mutual recog-
nition of bank regulatory systems, permitted to operate in all the others.
However, the manifold difficulties which arose with the FSAP seem to pose a
challenge to this established strategy in the case of security trading. A general
reason for this is that very small differences in the nature of a financial instru-
ment or financial transaction (differences in the small print, so to speak) can
have a big effect on the risks involved or on how these risks are divided
between different parties. An important example of these differences concerns
default on financial payments and the related issues of bankruptcy and liquida-
tion. The rules governing breakdowns in relations between borrowers and
lenders are different in each member state. What remedies are available to a
creditor who has not received interest or principal? What are the delays and
the costs in using these remedies? What is the order of priority among creditors,
that is, who, according to law, gets paid first when a company is insolvent? How
easy is it to obtain control of the remaining assets of a defaulting debtor? Such
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‘details’ have a significant effect on the risks, and therefore on the prices, of
financial claims which are, at first sight, very comparable. At the same time
such differences are deeply rooted in national legal systems.
In the early months of the FSAP a complaint frequently heard from represen-
tatives of the financial sector concerned the quality of the legislation involved.
The directives were, usually, going through but effective integration did not
result because of the multiplicity of significant details which the legislation
failed to cover. The sheer dynamism of contemporary financial markets adds
greatly to the complexity of the integration process; these markets are character-
ized by rapid innovation and by the continual introduction of new types of
financial instrument, such as the vast range of financial derivatives, many of
them exceedingly complex (Hartmann et al. 2003).
Much of the devilish detail turned out to concern what is often called the
infrastructure of security trading, an aspect of financial systems which had
hardly been mentioned in the original FSAP. Even when the conditions govern-
ing an actual security transaction – the agreement to buy and sell – have been
approximated, there are a large number of further questions as to how the agree-
ment will be implemented, that is, how the seller will obtain the money and how
the buyer will obtain possession of, or effective control over, the securities.
The first of these issues involves the money market and the payments system.
Security trading today involves holding large sums of money for short periods of
time. Since it is costly to hold large transactions balances, there is a massive re-
cycling system which transfers monetary resources from surplus to deficit agents
active in security markets. The speed, cost and responsiveness of the money
market in which this recycling takes place have an important effect on the func-
tioning of the markets for shares and bonds because it helps to determine the
cost of trading on these markets. A key issue here is collateral: financial
market agents are usually in a position to put up collateral against their borrow-
ing, because when they are short of cash they are correspondingly long on finan-
cial assets. In the United States the ‘repo’ market, in particular, executes
collateralized loans very efficiently and on an immense scale (CEPS 2000).
Cross-border borrowing and lending against collateral in Europe is slower,
more costly and much less developed because there is less agreement on
which types of asset are to be accepted as collateral and on what rights the coun-
terparties to the transaction have when things go wrong (European Commission
2001).
The underdevelopment of payments systems in Europe (the systems which
actually transfer money from one account to another) is another problem in
financial integration. In this case it is the retail sector which is most affected.
Large-scale transfers of money, for example through the European Central
Bank’s TARGET system, seem to be carried out in an efficient way. But the
same did not apply to small-scale cross-border payments by households, which
were horrendously expensive even when only the euro was involved and there
was no foreign exchange transaction. Since such small-scale payments might
often be needed when an individual in one member country buys a financial
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product from an enterprise in another, this in itself was a barrier to financial inte-
gration. In the end, no agreement on the charges for such transactions could be
reached with the big commercial banks and the problem had to be resolved by a
crude but effective piece of legislation, which simply prohibited banks from
charging more for cross-border euro payments than for domestic ones.
The issue of clearing and settlement – the delivery of purchased securities,
either to the purchasers themselves or, more frequently, into the hands of a
recognized custodian against payment from the purchasers – is another con-
dition for the smooth operation of securities markets which is still far from
being met. The basic problem here seems to be the existence of too many clear-
ing enterprises, some of them working only on a national scale, and the conse-
quent absence of the economies of scale which are usually obtained in the
United States in the clearing and settlement of security trades (European Com-
mission 2001). Consolidation is complicated by conflicts of interest since each
enterprise in the clearing and settlement system wants to secure its own survival.
Although there are other technical difficulties in the financial integration
process it is important to see that conflicts of interest also tended to retard
the effective implementation of the FSAP (European Commission 2002b). It
has even been asserted that the situation is analogous to that which once
prevailed in civil aviation: each national authority seeks to maintain its own
‘national carrier’. Since the FSAP necessarily involves co-ordinating the activities
and procedures of national financial regulators, and since these regulators are
understandably concerned to promote the size and the profitability of the
sectors they supervise, there is perhaps a brake on integration arising not just
from the complexity of the process but from the resistance of countries
threatened by important losses from increased financial competition.
Finally, a series of difficulties is associated with the very persistence of distinct
national regulatory systems in the financial sphere. In the process of monetary
union the strategic decision was taken not to construct a unitary system of finan-
cial regulation and supervision but to rely on enhanced co-operation and
co-ordination among continuing national authorities. One justification for
this decision, which at the time concerned, above all, banking, is that national
regulators are closer to, and better informed about, the activities of financial
enterprises in their own countries; they might also be expected to react more
quickly when things go wrong. Another justification was the acknowledged
success of the approximation plus mutual recognition approach in other
spheres. In any case, the same strategy was adopted for security-based finance:
there would be enhanced co-operation among national regulatory authorities
and an attempt to eliminate barriers arising from divergent rules and pro-
cedures. But these regulators would continue their functions and a single over-
arching financial regulator is not envisaged (European Commission 2002b).
One immediate consequence of this strategy is to make integration more
complex, because national regulatory authorities have become, as will be seen,
key actors in the whole process. In the long run other problems might be
anticipated from the integration process itself, should it succeed. Successful
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integration would multiply the number and value of cross-border transactions
and interactions: this could increase the difficulties of co-ordination in all
aspects of regulation – consumer protection in retail markets and both super-
vision and crisis management in wholesale markets. At present, however, this
does not seem to be an imminent danger – the recent dramatic decline in
share prices, for example, does not seem to have triggered serious difficulties
of intra-European co-ordination. These early experiences of the FSAP suggest
that several obstacles stand in the way of the EU in its attempt to build an insti-
tutional architecture to accelerate financial integration between the member
states.
THE LAMFALUSSY REPORT, UNANTICIPATED EVENTS AND
POLICY SHOCKS
The complexities and difficulties of implementing the FSAP led to an early
reconsideration of the strategy for financial integration. In particular, the Com-
mittee of Wise Men, under the chairmanship of Alexandre Lamfalussy, was
established in 2000 to consider the multiple delays and difficulties of the
FSAP. Problems were arising at both European and member state levels of
the legislative process, and were causing not only delays, but also the ‘quality’
problems alluded to above in that it was not always clear whether the Directives
as formulated or their transposition by member states were in fact resulting in
the open and consistently regulated financial markets which are the object of
the exercise. The committee’s report, in the same year (final version in 2001),
reasserted the urgency of financial integration while suggesting a much more
streamlined and expeditious legislative process.
Drastic changes were called for in the legislative and decision-making pro-
cesses associated with EU financial integration. The report recommended that
the established legislative process, involving detailed consideration by both
the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, be used, henceforth,
only for very general enabling Directives. These would do no more than estab-
lish broad frameworks for the detailed legislation which would then follow. This
detailed work was to be the responsibility of the Commission together with a
new committee composed of high-level officials from the relevant ministries
in each country. This latter body would become in a sense the effective legisla-
ture for financial matters and the decisions it reached with the Commission
would be enacted by secondary legislation (on the pattern of, for example, stat-
utory instruments in the UK which are laid before the Westminster Parliament
but usually not debated by it). The transposition of European financial laws into
national legal systems would be supervised by a further committee of regulators
from each member state, which would ensure that the legislative process did
actually result in an equivalent environment for securities transactions across
member states. The regulators’ committee would also provide advisory input
into the programme of detailed legislation. Enforcement of the emerging
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structure of EU rules would become, primarily, the responsibility of the Com-
mission, acting in concert with the regulators.
This reformed legislative process was adopted, essentially in its entirety, by
the Council and, after some negotiations, by the European Parliament. Both
the European Securities Committee (the high-level officials) and the Committee
of European Securities Regulators were put into place very quickly. The pro-
cedural changes have certainly resulted in a much more rapid and effective leg-
islative process. The original programme of legislation was very largely
completed by the target date of 2004 and a raft of supplementary legislative pro-
posals has been added to the agenda, extending it, for example, into the pro-
blems of clearing and settlement discussed above, and into the newly
prominent question of money-laundering. A series of taxation issues, such as
the taxation of pensions provided across borders, has also been introduced
into the FSAP.
The changes to the policy framework introduced by the Lamfalussy Report
are likely to result in the adoption of most of the measures contained in the
FSAP. But this does not mean that effective financial integration – the actual
integration of markets for securities and related services – will be realized.
One reason for this is the huge disruption of equity markets around the
world which has, at least temporarily, dampened the incentives to carry out
cross-border security transactions. As finance has become more expensive to
raise on equity markets, some large enterprises have, at least temporarily,
turned back to the big banks. Retail investors, having burned their fingers
with security-based investments, are more inclined to keep their savings on
deposit with the banks.
THE FALLOUT FROM THE STOCK MARKET CRASH
The stock market crash and its fallout have also exposed deep problems in the
whole shareholder model. Consider a stylized account of a security-based finan-
cial system and compare this with its actual functioning today in a country like
Britain or the US where an essentially market-dominated system is already in
place. Households entrust their savings to institutional investors; the latter
aggregate these savings into large sums which, using their expertise, they place
on security markets, calling upon the dealing and investment analysis services
which are provided on the latter; thus the funds find their way to corporations
which use them to undertake profitable productive activities; it is the flow of
profits thus generated which remunerates both the institutional investors and,
through them, the ultimate savers.
Today, every link in this chain has been weakened by the distrust arising from
multiple malfunctions: the institutional investors have failed to consult the
interests of their customers, missold many financial products, poured billions
of household savings on to obviously overvalued equity markets or into extre-
mely speculative internet shares; dealers on stock markets, more concerned to
swell the volume of transactions than to execute necessary transactions in an
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efficient way, have given out misleading advice; many corporations, inade-
quately controlled by accountants and auditors, have misstated their present
performance and future prospects; the investments undertaken by many large
corporations have either involved ill-judged, speculative, acquisitions at inflated
prices or have added to massive excess capacity in the media, technology and
communications sectors (Blasi et al. 2003).
Thus the crash, together with its fallout on corporate and financial scandals,
economic slowdown and big losses for small savers, has had a direct impact on
the working of the financial mechanism itself. All the indicators of security
market activity are at low levels; companies are not tempted to issue shares
on to depressed stock markets; and many savers, discouraged by capital losses,
are seeking more secure outlets.
The significance of this development should not be underestimated. The
FSAP as a strategy was conceived and initiated at a moment when the US
economy enjoyed enormous prestige, as the consequence of an economic
boom which was clearly extended and reinforced by a continuous and rapid
escalation of share prices (Brenner 2003). Since the EU, and in particular the
major EU economies of France, Germany and Italy, were much less dynamic,
it was difficult in this context to counter the argument for financial moderniz-
ation along American lines and, in any case, this argument seemed to be
endorsed by virtually all political leaderships in the EU. But in the aftermath
of the crash, classical banking, especially when it is relational, that is, when
there is a close, long-standing relationship between the bank and the customer
to whom it lends, now seems more attractive. The renewed emphasis on contin-
uing, stable and well-understood relationships is likely to represent an obstacle
to the rapid expansion and extension of EU financial integration based on the
organizing principles set out in the FSAP. Thus the stock market crash delivered
a policy shock to the new arrangements set out in the Lamfalussy Report to rein-
vigorate efforts at obtaining deep financial integration inside the EU.
The equity market crash is unlikely to hold back, in the long run, the finan-
cial transformation from bank-based to security-based systems. The main trends
involved are not a consequence of the share price bubble of recent years but of
deep-seated changes in economic and financial systems which have continued
over more than two decades. Already many stock markets have staged substan-
tial recoveries from the crash and turnover on some exchanges, such as the
New York Stock Exchange, has reached new highs. But the aftermath of the
crash does make the financial integration project more complex because it is
clear that important reforms to the savings/investment process will be needed
on both sides of the Atlantic and that the Europeans, therefore, can no longer
take American practice as a model in the same rather uncritical way as hereto-
fore. On the other hand, there may be new opportunities for the Europeans – if,
for example, they can find effective ways of increasing investor protection in
European finance without compromising the efficiency of the financial
markets, they might obtain an important competitive advantage against the
US system.
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CONCLUSION
Financial integration is a key component of the economic modernization strat-
egy launched by the EU at Lisbon and reaffirmed at Stockholm. Although the
declared objective of the strategy to create ‘the most dynamic and competitive
economy in the world’ is perhaps overdone, there can be little doubt about
the necessity of this financial aspect of the Lisbon strategy. To put it bluntly,
if the EU does not develop huge, liquid security markets it will simply drive
every investor and issuer on the planet into the North American ones. This
would handicap the EU in two ways: it would disadvantage European corpor-
ations, which would be compelled to raise capital in the US markets, and it
would weaken the monetary union because the effectiveness of European
Central Bank policies depends on the scale and the efficiency of the credit
markets in which it operates. In the face of this imperative, there can be little
scope for sentimentality about the ‘socially embedded’ financial structures
of the past – even if the FSAP were to fail, these structures would not
survive – the question is only whether European or American structures
would replace them.
The financial integration policies launched by the EU are a remarkable
success. In spite of formidable technical difficulties and significant conflicts of
interest among the financial sectors of member states, a very ambitious legisla-
tive programme has been completed which paves the way for a unified capital
market in the EU. The condition for this success was a striking degree of com-
mitment and unanimity among political leaderships at both member state and
EU level, all of whom were persuaded of the need for a coherent European
response to the emergence of global finance. Although the FSAP has proceeded
under the aegis of the Directorate-General for the Internal Market and therefore
by QMV, this could only happen because member states decided that it should;
in the absence of political will there would have been ample scope for challenges
to EU competence over many aspects of the FSAP just because it is such an
ambitious and wide-ranging programme.
The financial integration programme exhibits a further strength, not always
evident in the life of the Union – an ability to change, to recognize and correct
mistakes. At the time of the Lamfalussy Report, major weaknesses in the FSAP
were identified, both as regards legislative procedures and as regards the scope of
the strategy. It proved possible to make timely and effective reforms to both, and
in a manner which was acceptable to the European Parliament in terms of
democratic scrutiny and control. Again, this unusally positive outcome
depended on broad agreement among leaderships at both national and EU
level. The first conclusion of this study, therefore, is that when such agreement
can be secured the EU can act in a very powerful and effective way, in spite of its
much discussed institutional flaws.
Two caveats will be entered against this generally positive conclusion. The
first relates to the disruption of financial systems by the stock market crash of
2001 and 2002. There is no way in which such a contingency could have
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been countered by the financial strategy in advance but, besides delaying actual
integration within European markets, the crash, with its fallout of scandals and
corporate failures, has somewhat altered the terms of the problem. To restore
confidence in market finance, reforms will be needed – to corporate governance,
to investor protection regimes, to accounting and auditing practices and so on,
and such reforms will be needed on both sides of the Atlantic. This perhaps
offers the EU the opportunity to strengthen the international competitiveness
of its financial sector against that of the US, but the price of this opportunity
will be to accept that the US cannot be taken as an economic and financial
model in the same uncritical way as tended to be the case in the 1990s.
The second qualification concerns the social consequences of the strategy. In
spite of its scope and ambition, the financial integration strategy does little to
correct the inherent bias of European construction towards ‘market-creating’
as against ‘market-correcting’ forms of integration. This is not to assert that
alternative lines of economic development are possible: on the contrary the
on-going changes in financial structures are irreversible – the only question is
how Europe responds to them. But the response so far, effective as it has
been, minimizes the possible social impacts of security-based finance and
offers no clear view of the European social models within the new structure
of economic relations. One important social consequence of financial change
concerns employment relations: when enterprises are required to respond to
the needs of the stock market for ‘shareholder value’, what happens to the
status of employees within the enterprise? (See, for the case of Germany,
Streeck and Ho¨pner 2003.) Another example concerns pressure to privatize
certain aspects of social security; although this pressure does not result directly
from financial change, the rapid growth of institutional investors offering
market-based pensions is clearly an important conditioning factor. Although
the revolt against the Takeover Directive in the EU Parliament did not
involve the articulation of a coherent alternative, it did testify to deep anxieties
about the general direction of social change within the emerging financial system.
The main lesson to be drawn from this case study in terms of policy-making
is that the European integration process involves the movement from one
disequilibrium position to another. As Schmitter (2000) has convincingly
argued, the EU defies established political and economic categories such as
federalism, intergovernmentalism and so on. It is a political arrangement that
can destabilize (as opposed to break up) national systems of economic and
social governance, yet it is often not invested with enough authority or
legitimacy to create a fully-fledged European alternative. Thus in many
instances European integration is about managing the disequilibrium effects
that arise from trying to achieve unprecedented levels of political and economic
co-operation between ‘actually existing’ nation-states without the EU having the
capacity in most cases to assign policy competencies authoritatively to particular
tiers of government.
Moreover, because the EU cannot usually build institutional frameworks that
permit strong mutually reinforcing interactions between national and European
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structures, much of its policy-making is gradual, experimental and open-ended
in character. As a result, it is hard to predict in advance the direction, let alone
the outcome, of European integration. Complexity is the byword for
EU–member state interactions. In a sense, the EU is a serial problem-solving
institution, a huge enterprise in unbalanced governance in which sometimes
imaginative solutions and at other times tawdry improvisations are made to
conjoin the ‘European’ and the ‘national’. But much of the time the policy
outcome is provisional and not final. Thus in one sense the progress that has
been made towards deeper financial integration has been remarkable given
the me´lange of different national political positions and economic interests in
the sector. But in successfully guiding the integration process through this
complex policy terrain, the EU has arrived at another: how to reconcile the
direction of EU financial integration with the established institutions of
Social Europe.
Address for correspondence: Paul Teague, School of Management and
Economics, The Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast BT7 1NN, UK. email:
p.teague@qub.ac.uk
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
John Grahl acknowledges support from the European Commission through
contract: HPSE-CT-2002-50027 - FISC.
REFERENCES
Berger, A., Demsetz, R. and Strahan P. (1999) ‘The consolidation of the financial
services industry: causes, consequences and implications for the future’, Journal of
Banking and Finance 23(3): 135–94.
Blasi, J., Kruse, D. and Bernstein, A. (2003) In the Company of Owners: The Truth about
Stock Options, New York: Basics Books.
Boot, W. and Thakor, A. (1997) ‘Financial system architecture’, Review of Financial
Studies 10(3): 693–733.
Boyer, R., Dehove, M. and Plihon, D. (2004) Les Crises Financie`res, Report to the
Conseil d’Analyse E´conomique, Documentation Franc¸aise, Paris.
Brenner, R. (2003) The Boom and the Bubble: The US in the World Economy, London:
Verso.
CEPS (2000) The EU Repo Market, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
Danthine, J.-P., Giavazzi, F. and von Thaadden, E.-L. (2001) ‘The effect of EMU on
financial markets: a first assessment’, in C. Wyplosz (ed.), The Impact of EMU on
Europe and Developing Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 225–68.
ECB (2001) ‘Characteristics of corporate finance in the euro area’, ECB Monthly
Bulletin, February, pp. 37–50.
European Commission (2001) Cross-border Clearing and Settlement Arrangements in the
European Union, Brussels.
European Commission (2002a) ‘EU financial integration’, Directorate-General for
Economic and Financial Affairs, Economic Papers No. 171, European Commission,
Brussels.
1020 Journal of European Public Policy
European Commission (2002b) Financial Services: Meeting the Barcelona Priorities and
Looking Ahead; Seventh Progress Report on the Financial Services Action Plan, Brussels.
European Commission (2004) Financial Services: Turning the Corner, 10th Report,
Brussels.
Frangakis, M. (2005) ‘EU financial market integration policy’, in J. Huffschmid (ed.),
Economic Policy Coordination in Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
forthcoming.
Gasper, V., Hartmann, P. and Sleijpen, O. (eds) (2003) The Transformation of the
European Financial System, Frankfurt: European Central Bank.
Giannetti, M., Guiso, T., Japelli, M., Paduala, M. and Pagano, M. (eds) (2002) Finan-
cial Integration, Corporate Financing and Economic Growth, European Economy,
Economic Papers No. 179, November 2002, Brussels: European Commission.
Grahl, J. (2001) ‘Globalised finance: the challenge to the euro’, New Left Review 8
(March/April): 23–47.
Granovetter, M. (1985) ‘Economic action and social structure: the problem of
embeddedness’, American Journal of Sociology 91(3): 481–510.
Hartmann, P., Maddaloni, A. and Manganelli, S. (2003) ‘The euro area financial
system: structure, integration and policy initiatives’, European Central Bank
Working Paper 230, May, ECB.
Lamfalussy, A. (ed.) (2000) Initial Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation
of European Securities Markets, Brussels: European Commission.
Lu¨tz, S. (2002) Der Staat und die Globalisierung von Finanzma¨rkten: Regulative Politik
in Deutschland, Großbritannien und den USA, Cologne: Campus Verlag.
Mayer, C. and Vines, X. (eds) (1993) Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rajan, R. and Zingales, L. (2003) ‘Banks and markets: the changing character of
European finance’, in V. Gaspar, P. Hartmann and O. Sleijpen (eds), The Trans-
formation of the European Financial System, Frankfurt: European Central Bank,
pp. 123–84.
Schmidt, R., Hackethal, A. and Tyrell, M. (1998) ‘Disintermediation and the role of
banks in Europe: an international comparison’, Journal of Financial Intermediation
8(1): 36–67.
Schmitter, P. (2000) How to Democratize the European Union . . . and Why Bother?,
Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
Streeck, W. and Ho¨pner, M. (eds) (2003) Alle Macht dem Markt? Fallstudien zur
Abwicklung der Deutschland AG, Cologne: Campus Verlag.
Final version accepted for publication 23/3/05
J. Grahl & P. Teague: Problems of financial integration 1021
Chapter 8
Financial markets and
globalisation
128
Financial
markets and
globalisation
John Grahl
John Grahl looks at the internationalisation of
financial relations in the period since the second
world war.
The notion of globalisation refers to social interactions of all kinds. It is often
suggested that territorial states have less power now than in the past over
interactions across frontiers - and that they are therefore constrained to adapt
to external developments more rapidly and more completely. This article, which
accepts that, in spite of many exaggerations, there is a lot of truth in this view,
looks mainly at economic interactions, clearly a key part of globalisation. And
in particular it looks at financial relations, which seem to be central to the
changing relations among national economies.
The nature of finance
Finance means the mobilisation of monetary resources. Since economies today
use money in virtually all transactions, nothing - from a visit to the cinema to the
launch of a huge industrial enterprise, to the invasion of a foreign country - can
take place unless it is financed. Financial relationships, however, are inherently
problematic, in a similar way to employment relationships. There are tensions
between different actors within the transaction, though all want the transaction
to be successful. Thus employers and employees have important interests in
common - they both want the good or service which is being produced to be
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successful - but there are also inherent conflicts between them, as regards
distribution and control (the questions of the way the proceeds of production are
shared between the two parties, and who it is that controls the production process
in which they are both involved). Similar contradictions characterise relations
between the suppliers of finance (‘investors’) and its users (‘issuers’, in the sense
of agents who issue claims such as shares, bonds or other claims against themselves
in return for money). Both parties, in general, want the activity which is being
financed to succeed. But there are inherent conflicts between them as to the
remuneration of the finance (which the investor wants to be high but the issuer
low) and as to control over, and information about, this activity.
Mainstream economics probably underestimates the importance offinancial relations to the workings of the market economy. This isbecause mainstream accounts assume that markets tend to move
quickly and efficiently to equilibrium - that sellers and buyers are generally able
to fulfil their objectives at agreed prices. If the world were like this, then
economies could theoretically function without finance. But if one abandons
the idealised notion of smooth market equilibration, finance becomes a condition
of existence of the market economy itself.
The agents in the actual existing market economy in fact tend to find that,
at the prices which are established in the process of market exchange, it is
impossible to cover necessary purchases from the proceeds of sales, because not
all the sales they want to make can actually be carried out. Thus, only if those
agents with monetary surpluses recycle them to agents with deficits can market
exchange continue - this is the case today over even the shortest conceivable
time period: without continuous and massive recycling of monetary resources
through the financial system the market economy would break down in an hour.
Thus the terms and conditions under which this recycling takes place are central
to all the processes of market exchange and market adjustment. It is financial
pressures on deficit agents which in fact bring about adjustment within market
economies, rather than the magic of price signals which one reads about in
economics textbooks.
Intermediaries and institutions
Because financial relations are inherently problematic, institutions develop
to manage and limit the tensions involved. Specialist intermediaries of all
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kinds - building societies, unit trusts, credit brokers and so on - have emerged
to organise relations between the suppliers and the users of financial
resources. Banks are particularly important financial intermediaries because
the claims they issue against their own borrowing, the deposits of the public,
have the status of money - these claims are accepted as settlement in
transactions of all kinds. Since the stability and efficiency of financial
relations are so critical to the functioning of market economies, complex
systems of financial regulation have been introduced. One central motive
of regulation is investor protection - this is not simply a matter of the
beneficent support of those who commit their money to the financial system;
it is a basic necessity for finance as such, since dishonesty or irresponsibility
on the part of some issuers or intermediaries would otherwise easily
undermine confidence in the whole system and result in financial and
economic paralysis.
A second key motive behind regulation is to avoid financial crises.Financial malfunctions - typically the failure of an important borroweror other issuer to meet their obligations - can easily spread from one
part of the financial system to the rest. This happens both because defaults can
lead to chain reactions - if one debtor fails to repay, the creditor in turn may be
unable to meet their own obligations - and because of the pervasiveness of
mistrust - if one bank collapses or one important company goes bust the investing
public may suspect that other banks and companies may do the same and refuse
to part with their money.
Finally, central intervention into the financial system is also found when
a crisis has broken out, in order to shorten and limit the economic
disorganisation which results. Classically the central bank (a public institution
charged with overseeing the workings of private, commercial, banks) has had
important responsibilities in this respect, acting as a lender of last resort to the
banking system.
International finance
Financial relations within early forms of capitalism are closely tied to the
exchange of goods and services: late payment for goods received amounts to
the finance of customers by suppliers; payment in advance on the other hand
represents the finance of suppliers by customers. However, as capitalist systems
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develop and become more complex, finance becomes more autonomous, in that
monetary resources anywhere in the economy may be mobilised to finance
activities at any other point, without there being any specific exchange
relationship between the issuer and the investor involved. This requires the
development of financial systems within which banks are able to mobilise and
redirect monetary resources, while credit markets and other financial markets
make it possible to compare the different requests for finance and to establish
interest rates and rates of return for different financial investments.
Similar considerations apply to the development of the international
economy. Borrowing and lending are at first closely tied to trade in goods but
subsequently become relatively independent as mechanisms develop to recycle
monetary surpluses between investors and issuers anywhere. Thus sophisticated
and complex credit systems linked to long distance trade had already emerged
by the late middle ages, and by the late nineteenth century the spread of
industrialisation and the comprehensive use of money throughout the economy
had led to what can be seen as a predecessor of today’s global financial system.
The core of financial, as of economic, relations was the Atlantic economy, linking
Western Europe, above all Britain, to the rapidly developing economies of the
United States and other lands of white settlement. Huge financial flows from
the old continent accelerated the growth of the US; this was an era when there
were few if any constraints on the freedom to invest across national frontiers.
By some measures international financial relations were even more dense in
the decades before the First World War than they are today.
T he first half of the twentieth century, however, saw the weakening andfragmentation of international financial and economic relations. War,revolution and the emergence of new states in Europe disrupted trade
and international investment. The growth of labour movements and the
extension of the franchise led states to restrict international economic activity
in order to stabilise internal financial conditions and sustain domestic
employment. Increasingly, governments controlled and restricted access to
foreign currencies. The financial collapse of 1929, spreading from the US around
the world, and the Great Depression which ensued, virtually put an end to
international economic relations on a multilateral basis. The leading economic
powers established relatively closed off trading systems centred on their colonial
possessions or on other subordinated countries. The Second World War and
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the emergence of new communist regimes which rejected established forms of
international exchange were the culmination of this period of international
economic disintegration.
The US and the reconstruction of the world economy
At the end of the Second World War dominant interests in the US were
committed to rebuilding a comprehensive, multilateral, system of international
economic relations. In some respects the US took over the role which had, in
the nineteenth century, been played by Britain as the key promoter of
international trade. Clearly, a country with a large and highly competitive
economy, together with enormous political and military power, is well placed
both to press for a more open international economy and to take advantage of
it. From the late 1940s world trade began to grow very much faster than world
production, as economies, especially those of North America and Western
Europe, re-engaged in multilateral economic relations.
At first, this development was confined to trade in goods and services,while international finance only exhibited a limited development: infact for the first decades following the Second World War, most
international financial flows took place betwen governments (the Marshall Aid
programme is an example), while both private inflows and private outflows of
capital were subject, in most countries, to comprehensive controls. The system
of international monetary and financial relations (the Bretton Woods system)
had actually been designed to minimise external financial pressures on most
states and to permit their governments to intervene effectively in the allocation
of internal financial resources. Comprehensive structures of financial control
were used to limit the range of transactions open to domestic investors and
issuers, partly in reaction to the collapse of unregulated banking and financial
systems after 1929, partly as a consequence of Keynesian views of economic
policy, and partly as an expression of the political importance of full employment.
In the US, for example, there was a fixed maximum interest rate on bank
deposits; in Britain consumer credit was subject to extensive controls which
specified minimum downpayments and maximum payback periods on hire
purchase agreements. Governments were able to impose political priorities on
the working of financial systems by, for example, encouraging housing
construction or exports; not surprisingly, they also made sure that finance for
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the public sector itself was cheap and freely available.
In retrospect, it is easy to see here the emergence of a central contradiction,
which is often discussed today in terms of the notion of globalisation. On the one
hand we have a logic of increasing social and political control over economic and
financial processes - but with systems of control emerging essentially within
individual states. On the other hand there is a process of increasing intenational
economic interdependence, driven by the growth of trade and, subsequently, the
development of multinational enterprises and transnational production systems.
In abstract terms it is also possible to specify the general way in which the
contradiction might be resolved - that is, through the construction of transnational
systems of social control. The actual economic history of the last four decades,
however, corresponds to the opposite of such a process: systems of social control
within countries have been weakened, disorganised and compromised by
international pressures, while no structures or institutions have emerged at an
international level capable of directing or effectively regulating transnational
economic and financial relations. There are indeed significant international
institutions, such as the Bank for International Settlements or the International
Monetary Fund, which impose certain rules on financial practices, but these
institutions, effectively controlled by the most powerful groups in the world
economy, seek only to preserve a minimum of stability within which largely
unregulated financial agents are given maximum scope to pursue private interests.
Could things have been different? Would it have been possible to havecontinued and extended national systems of economic control? Or wouldthis have imposed unacceptable costs in terms of economic
development? Should our emphasis today be on containing and restricting the
growth of globalised financial systems in order to reduce constraints on national
economic interventions? Or is it necessary to accept the rapid expansion of
these systems while seeking, in the long run, to transform the ways in which
they function? The present writer inclines to the latter position. But to inform
such discussion, the actual emergence of the present global financial system
can be looked at.
Offshore markets and the erosion of national regulation
During the postwar period, the rapid expansion of trade, especially among the
richest countries, stimulated the process of private international investment
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and the growth of multinational companies. This was led by US corporations
which enjoyed a clear technological lead over their competitors but which sought
to locate production outside the high-wage US economy. The range and intensity
of the international business of these companies underpinned the emergence
of offshore financial relations, that is of banking systems and financial markets
which connected investors and issuers outside the scope of national regulatory
systems. The first steps in this direction concerned finance in dollars;
subsequently offshore banking and finance developed in all the most important
currencies. The most important location for these activities was London; it was
offshore business which permitted the resurgence of the City after the end of
its historical role in imperial finance.
There were now, therefore, parallel financial systems - alongside the still
tightly regulated systems within states there rapidly grew up a massive,
unregulated international system. To begin with only the largest and most
powerful agents in the international economy had access to the latter; ordinary
companies and households were confined within the national systems. Such an
arrangement could even seem advantageous to the US government: it seemed
to give maximum freedom to the big corporations as they pursued their global
strategies, while preserving the basic framework of control at national level. In
the long run, however, the two systems were incompatible, and in fact the
unregulated offshore systems prevailed as, during the 1980s, the deregulation
of domestic systems removed the barriers between them.
By the 1970s, it had become difficult for the US government to reconcileits domestic and international objectives under the Bretton Woods system,that is to sustain growth and employment at home while also working to
stabilise international payments and exchange rates. The second objective was
thus sacrificed to the first in 1971, when the Nixon administration broke the
link between the dollar and gold and sought to stimulate the domestic economy
by lowering the international value of the dollar. The organised Bretton Woods
system then collapsed and exchange rates between currencies, previously subject
to effective control, were increasingly left to market forces.
This can be seen as a first decisive step towards a free market system in
international finance: national governments now had no international
framework to support their efforts at foreign exchange control, and were
confronted with ever-growing pressures to move financial resources across
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frontiers. In this context it often seemed best to liberalise capital movements
while seeking to avoid exchange rate instability not by controls but by enhancing
the reputation of each national currency for stable purchasing power and thus
by waging war on inflation. In this sense, monetarist policies were a logical
consequence of the collapse of Bretton Woods.
The Volcker shock and public debt
A second decisive step towards an integrated international financial system was
taken in the 1980s. Concerned about the weakness of the dollar in the
increasingly internationalised economy, the American monetary authorities
decided to dramatically raise interest rates - a move known as the Volcker shock
after the name of the then chair of the Federal Reserve - the US central bank.
Other countries were now confronted with an enormous challenge to their
financial arrangements. The dollar gained in strength and investors around the
world rushed to purchase the dollar securities issued by the US government. It
proved extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, for other countries to sustain
low interest rates - and the Keynesian regimes with which they were associated.
Instead, other countries started to open their financial systems and sought to
support their capacity to borrow in internationalised markets by keeping tight
control over budget deficits and by suppressing inflation. This was by no means
only a question of disadvantages: governments which succeeded in establishing
their international credit-worthiness (above all the US but also Japan and West
European countries) found that it was now possible to finance substantial
payments deficits in a way that had not been possible under the Bretton Woods
system. On the other hand, weaker states, including many Latin American
countries, were only able to borrow in foreign currencies and at very high interest
rates: they were caught in a debt trap which persists to this day.
The internationalisation of corporate finance
The wave of financial liberalisation released by the collapse of Bretton Woods
and the Volcker shock essentially removed the barriers which had previously
separated the internationalised offshore financial system from domestic systems.
Financial resources now flowed easily between the two, and the interest rates
and rates of return on external and domestic investments converged. The fact
that government bond markets were now effectively internationalised made it
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possible to use government securities as standards and benchmarks for the
assessment of other financial investments, in particular, the securities issued by
large corporations. The process of integration of stock markets (dealing in
company shares) and corporate bond markets (in which companies borrow)
was accelerated. The integration of corporate finance partly took place through
corporations raising money on foreign stock markets but much more through
the actions of powerful investors who increasingly made use of the opportunities
to lend and invest in other countries. The consequence was that by the turn of
the twentieth century, financial systems around the world, especially those
dealing with governments and large corporations, had become highly integrated.
As this happened the terms and conditions on which these agents could raise
money tended to become standardised, and this in turn started to produce a
certain convergence in their strategies and practices.
Although smaller and weaker agents - such as most households and mostsmall and medium businesses - are not directly linked into this globalfinancial system, they are also deeply affected by it, because the
domestic financial institutions which they use to place their savings and to
finance their expenditures are now operating in an internationalised financial
environment and are subject to the competitive forces involved. Even large
banks and other financial institutions have lost some of the autonomy they
enjoyed in the days when they dominated relatively isolated national systems.
Transformations in financial relations
The process of financial globalisation which has been described is not just a
question of deep interdependence of national financial systems; these systems
have also changed their character as the process has continued. In stylised terms,
the changing nature of financial systems involves the ever-increasing importance
of security markets.
One aspect of the basic tension in all financial relations is the search for
liquidity. In general, investors want to be able to withdraw their money, to
liquidate their positions, whenever they choose. If this can be arranged they
will be much more ready to provide funds. Issuers on the other hand usually
wish to be financed for a long period and not to be required to pay off debts at
short notice. In direct financial relations, where only the investor and the issuer
are involved, it is not usually possible to reconcile these opposing requirements.
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Financial institutions, however, make this possible. They do so in two very
different ways. On the one hand, large banks are able to separate the financial
relation into two distinct operations: the banks borrow from their depositors
and lend to companies and households which need finance; the investor in this
case does not have a claim on the final user of the funds, but on the bank itself;
if the bank is involved in a very large number of financial relationships it will be
able to repay depositors at short notice or even immediately without having to
call in its own loans. In this case it is the strength and reputation of the bank
which guarantees the liquidity of the investment. On the other hand, the need
for liquidity can also be met through security markets. Here the investor retains
a direct claim on the issuer but this claim can be sold to any other investor
ready to purchase it (a security is a marketable financial claim). In this case the
investors rely on the existence of a well organised secondary market bringing
together large numbers of investors, to make it possible to turn their placements
into cash when they choose. The term ‘secondary’ denotes the fact that the
securities being traded are not being sold by the original issuers (who raise funds
on the primary market) but are being passed from one investor to another. There
is much more trading on secondary than on primary markets - securities, shares
or bonds, once issued, are usually bought and sold many times. But the secondary
market makes the primary market possible by underpinning the liquidity of the
claims - the financial assets - involved.
Now, each of these financial structures has advantages and disadvantages.Powerful banks often work to stabilise financial relations; they may actas effective monitors of the users of financial resources because they build
up knowledge of the credit-worthiness of their borrowers. On the other hand,
security markets may have important advantages in terms of scale and scope -
organised security markets bring together very large numbers of investors and
issuers in an arena where their demands for and offers of financial resources
can be compared and competitively assessed. (It is by no means necessary to
accept idealised orthodox views on the efficiency and stability of markets to
perceive these decisive scale effects.) And because it is essentially a process of
extending the scale and scope of financial relationships, the process of financial
globalisation has gone together with a major shift from the first to the second
of these types of financial structure - away from classical bank finance towards
a much greater reliance on stock markets and other organised security markets.
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(It is important to notice that the move away from classical banking operations
is not the same thing as a decline in the importance of the banks - banks today
are very important players in the security-based financial system, in which they
play a key organising role.) To see how this happened, it is necessary to look
once more at the role of the US financial system.
The financial hegemony of the US
In very abstract terms, the emergence of a global financial system can be regarded
as an inevitable aspect of the emergence of an interdependent world economic
system. In more concrete terms, its actual emergence took the form of the
deregulation and internationalisation of the US financial system. Things
happened in this way because of the general economic strength of the US, and
because the size of the US economy led to an emphasis on establishing very
wide financial networks bringing together millions of issuers and investors across
an entire continent.
Although the US, just like European countries, went through a phase inwhich domestic financial relations were closely controlled andrestricted, the liberalisation and deregulation of the US system began
earlier than elsewhere and proceeded at a faster pace. Comprehensive central
control over finance was more difficult than elsewhere because of the size of
the economy and the number of potential financial relationships which had to
be monitored. It was also more costly than elsewhere in terms of the constraints
imposed on both investors and issuers. On the other hand, deregulation offered
very significant advantages in terms of the ability to draw funds from any point
in a huge economy and likewise to place them with any one of a vast number of
users. The early internationalisation of the largest US corporations and banks
meant that financial transformation would be a world-wide, not just a domestic,
process. The key role of the dollar encouraged agents around the world to invest
in and issue securities on the sophisticated and highly organised North American
security markets; this growth was cumulative in that increased scale itself made
these markets more powerful and more attractive to financial actors.
Under American leadership, international institutions were reconfigured so
as to sustain this expansion. Rules were formulated by the Bank for International
Settlements to govern the operation of international banks. Stock markets
around the world were led to reorganise themselves in order to attract
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international investors - as with the ‘big bang’ on the London Stock Exchange.
Such reorganisations were in any case a competitive necessity now that
exchanges had to compete to attract international investors. In the countries
with more developed capitalist economies these changes were more or less
consensual; in much of the non-industrialised or newly industrialising parts of
world financial liberalisation was forced through by the IMF according to the
policies known as the ‘Washington consensus’.
Consequences for European countries
The first direct consequences of financial globalisation are macroeconomic:
currencies are continuously scrutinised by open foreign exchange markets, while
the debt securities used to finance government spending are assessed on
international bond markets. This certainly represents a new set of constraints
on the formulation of macroeconomic policies, but it should also be remembered
that in this system credit-worthy states are able to access international monetary
resources on a very large scale - the continuous current account deficits posted
by Britain over the last ten years show that in practice external constraints on
British economic growth have been relaxed, not tightened, by the emergence
of the global financial system. Provided the British growth process generates
assets which international investors are happy to hold there is no longer any
need to balance current trade transactions over short periods of time. What
does seem to be ruled out, however, is a macroeconomic strategy which relies
on creating specific financial conditions unrelated to those prevailing in the
other major economies - for instance, by maintaining very low rates of interest
or very low rates of return on other financial claims.
As financial globalisation has proceeded, its consequences have ceasedto be essentially macroeconomic, however, and have begun to pervadeeconomic systems as a whole. In the realm of corporate finance there
is a general drive for ‘shareholder value’, that is to make high dividend pay-
outs on shares and to secure increases in share prices. These priorities certainly
have an ideological aspect, but they are fundamentally determined by the
new salience of security markets in the allocation and provision of corporate
finance. They are not a purely financial development but have an impact on
corporate strategy as a whole.
In many European countries (not so much in Britain which has always tended
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towards market-based finance, but, for example, in France and Germany) the
financial systems which developed historically were very different from those of
the US. Security markets were underdeveloped, while companies relied for long-
term finance on closely related ‘inside investors’ with a continuing interest in
their activities. These inside investors might be wealthy families, big banks closely
tied to a specific company or indeed other related companies - suppliers or
customers. The public as a whole did not hold direct claims on companies; rather
they held bank deposits while the banks themselves advanced loans to
companies. The banks, rather than agents on security markets, oversaw the use
of the money advanced to industry, often developing close and continuing ties
with their industrial customers.
This kind of structure was part of the basis of the so-called ‘stakeholder’
enterprise; big companies were to some extent coalitions of interests (managers,
employees, creditors, customers and suppliers, perhaps local communities), in
that each interest group had a certain influence on corporate strategy. The
financial systems involved could be very sophisticated, able to absorb major
disturbances and to reconcile investor and issuer interests over the long term.
Clearly the stakeholder aspects of the systems implied a certain degree of social
and political control over economic life.
T oday these systems seem to be in more or less rapid dissolution, notbecause they were inefficient at the level of the enterprise but becausethey were not capable of the rapid and continuous expansion that was
made possible by organised security markets, or the mobilisation of ‘arms-length’,
outside, investors around the world. ‘Anglo-American’ type financial systems
are winning out not because they arrive at better or more effective financial
decisions in particular cases (there are good reasons to believe that they are
often inferior to the traditional European systems in this respect) but because
they can mobilise staggering amounts of monetary resources and deploy these
resources on an immense scale. Thus European corporations are moving to
shareholder based strategies, centred on stock markets, and in the process are
posing acute problems of social control.
A second important feature of the on-going changes in European countries
concerns household finance. Household savings are less and less held in the
form of bank finance but rather entrusted to institutional investors - pension
funds, investment trusts and insurance companies - which make placements
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on their behalf on the securities markets. This is not the same as classical bank
intermediation: the household is exposed to all the risks of the stock market or
other investment which is made; the liquidity of the investment depends not
on the strength of a bank but on the ability to sell the securities concerned.
In recent years, European governments and the European Union haveabandoned any attempt to preserve their inherited financial structures andhave sought instead to encourage the growth of security markets and market-
based finance, essentially on the American model. This is probably a necessary
response; if the Europeans do not develop their security markets they will simply
drive every investor and every issuer in the world onto the North American
ones. This would tighten constraints on European countries and disdvantage
European companies. But this strategic position is full of social dangers. Two of
the most obvious of these are, firstly, the threat of a deterioration in employment
relations as employers adopt shareholder strategies and, secondly, the barely
disguised intention of many European governments to curtail state provision of
pensions and health care and encourage households to rely increasingly on the
private sector and the institutional investors for the protections previously
supplied on a socialised basis.
Winners and losers from financial globalisation
All markets, unless they are subject to strong forms of social control, are
inequality machines. Markets work by establishing standards and determining
prices; there are always those who cannot meet the standards or pay the prices.
The answer to the question, ‘Who has gained from financial globalisation?’ is,
in general, the strong - those with most resources and with the greatest capacity
to adapt to changing market circumstances. Many third world countries have
been the biggest losers - their elites have taken advantage of open capital markets
to move their wealth abroad, and the new macroeconomic constraints have
devastated their social systems and blocked development. Even the successfully
industrialising countries of East Asia have suffered from massive economic crisis
linked to the process of financial liberalisation. The United States, centre of
the new financial universe, has on the other hand experienced rapid economic
development, although the distribution of income and wealth in the US itself
has become much more unequal.
Beyond these general judgements it is necessary to recognise that the gains
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and losses from financial liberalisation are difficult to assess. One cannot simply
identify one category of agents - for example, lenders - as clear winners. The
era of financial globalisation began, as was pointed out above, with very high
interest rates, and it is clear that some creditors have benefited greatly as a
result; but some debtors have also benefited - the US economy as a whole is
highly indebted but has been able to finance expansion with relatively cheap
external capital. The big intermediaries - banks and institutional investors -
have mostly done extremely well out of the process of financial change, and
have benefited from a continuous flow of financial innovations, some of which
represent real advances in financial practice, some of which are spurious. The
middle classes in Europe and North America have benefited from relatively
high interest rates on their bank deposits but were fleeced in the stock market
bubble at the turn of the new century. Liberalisation in general produces many
winners as well as losers - if it leads to more costly finance, creditors and investors
benefit; if finance is cheaper, which is probably the long-run consequence, debtors
and issuers gain. Like all market processes, the functioning of financial markets
involves acute asymmetries and inequalities.
The logic of global finance
At the risk of both utopianism and fatalism, an attempt will now be made to
separate the actual course and form of contemporary financial transformations
(with all the adverse and indeed frequently disastrous social consequences which
have been mentioned) from the historical meaning of the process. As was
suggested at the start of this article, financial relations are a condition of
existence of the market economy. Today this economy is evolving towards an
integrated world system which will support a myriad of new social and economic
relationships across - and increasingly to the disregard of - state frontiers. Huge
transnational production systems, new communications networks of all kinds,
and vast flows of goods, services and information, testify to what can be seen,
in classical Marxist terms, as a new phase in the socialisation of production.
These developments would be inconceivable without the emergence of an
integrated transnational financial system able to identify monetary resources at
any point in the global economy and transfer them on an immense scale, at
high speed and at low cost towards the activities where they are needed.
The partitioned, virtually closed financial systems of the past could not
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support such a process of global integration, nor would they express pressures
for adaptation in a global context - comparisons of the costs and returns of
financial transactions would express only local circumstances, not global
possibilities.
Of course, the actual emergence of a global economy is characterised by
huge distortions and imbalances. One of the most important of these is the fact
that global systems and networks are overwhelmingly centred on the US, which
has drawn financial resources to sustain its development from around the world
- a huge flow of resources away from poorer counties and towards a rich one.
But, when the logic of global integration is considered, the role of the US is
relatively contingent, in the same way that British industrial leadership was in
the long run contingent to the general process of industrialisation.
The problem of social control
Social control over contemporary financial development poses, in the first
instance, the problem of extending to the international arena the mechanisms
of control which previously developed within states: protection of investors,
prudential supervision, crisis prevention and crisis management all must be
considered today as international issues. Beyond these specifically financial
questions, social control signifies the redistribution of assets and income and
the redirection of resources to match the central contemporary priority of
development.
Such questions should be seen as involving the redirection of the globalfinancial system, however, not its dismantlement. Many policy positionsadopted by critical economists tend towards such dismantlement; there
are calls to reconstruct financial barriers among states, to shrink or even suppress
the role of international security markets, or to preserve the insider-based
investment systems of the past. One striking example is the demand for a Tobin
tax (a tax on foreign exchange transactions) in order to limit the scale of
transnational financial operations. This measure would lead to a profound
disorganisation of many financial systems while reinforcing US financial
dominance by rendering smaller and less developed systems illiquid. The vast
majority of foreign exchange transactions today are not speculative, as is
frequently asserted; rather they are a key mechanism for the recycling on which
the financial system rests.
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Of course, in the short run and in a defensive context, it may be quite justified
to obstruct financial liberalisation in order to emphasise the adverse social
consequences to which it often leads. But the key political challenge posed by
financial developments today is to preserve and deepen international integration
while reasserting, at European and at the world level, the need for social and
political control over economic life.
Given that measures such as the Tobin tax, intended to suppress and restrict
inernational finance, make little sense, what kind of reforms should be proposed?
Three types of measure could work to develop social control over contemporary
financial systems without obstructing international trade and investment. Firstly,
much stronger systems of investor protection are needed in order to make banks,
pension funds and other powerful institutions take full responsibility for the
products and services they sell to households. Finance is not a realm in which it
makes sense to apply the principle caveat emptor (let the buyer beware). For
some products (mortgages, pensions) individual households may only transact
once or twice over a lifetime – there is no way in which they can match the
knowledge and sophistication of the institutions with which they are confronted.
The rule should rather be caveat vendor (the seller is responsible). The institutions
themselves claim that what they call ‘over-regulation’ would stifle ‘innovation’.
But since so many supposed innovations in retail finance are simply scams, some
delay in the introduction of new products and services would be an acceptable
price to pay for greater customer security. Nor would tighter regulation
necessarily hamper the functioning of the financial system; it could lead to
greater confidence in the system and mean that households were much readier
to commit their savings to it.
A second line of reform concerns the working of international financialinstitutions such as the IMF. These have tended to act not as guardiansof the system as a whole but as representatives of the strongest agents
within it. For example, in the international debt crisis they have repeatedly
sacrificed the interests of low-income debtor countries to those of powerful
US and European banks and other creditors. Similarly, enormous pressure
has been placed on low-income countries to open up their financial sectors
to foreign penetration before they were ready to do so. This premature
liberalisation has often led to huge economic and social dislocation. This is
not an argument against liberalisation in the long run – there is an
127
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abundance of cheap financial resources in the high-income countries which
could contribute massively to development around the world. But
institutions clearly biased in favour of Western interests need to give way
to new structures with a broader representation of interests. The Europeans
are well placed to press for such reforms.
T he third, and most important, need is for an efficient redistribution offinancial wealth, both within and especially among countries. In theshort run this means richer countries meeting the development assistance
targets to which they have already, in principle, agreed; in the long run some
kind of international tax structure would be needed. But the target of such a
tax should be the wealth which emerges within the financial system, not the
functioning of that system, which is indispensable to the future development of
the international economy.
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Abstract7
The integration of financial markets is at present a central policy objective of the EU. The actual8
policy priorities of the EU in this context have been to accelerate integration and to reduce transactions9
costs in financial markets. The present paper starts from the view that the minimisation of transactions10
costs is too narrow an objective in the sphere of financial policy. It seeks to specify other objectives,11
which should be pursued in the course of financial integration. These objectives include stability,12
consumer protection and the assertion of the public interest in the financial sector. The paper then13
links the process of financial integration with other problems in European policy: taxation and the14
threat of tax competition, changes in corporate governance and pressures on social protection. It is15
argued that policies for financial integration should be formulated with these connections to other16
policy fields in mind.17
© 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd.18
19
1. Introduction20
The integration of financial markets is at present a central policy objective of the EU.21
The nature of the new financial structures, which are emerging, is conditioned by the22
recent introduction of a single currency and by the wider process of financial globalisation.23
The actual policy priorities of the EU in this context have been to accelerate integra-24
 This paper is based on a chapter contributed to a report to the UEL-NGL group in the European Parliament, and
published in German as “Europa¨ische Finanzma¨rkte: Struktur, Entwicklung, Politik, Probleme und Alternativen.”
The other authors of the report were Jo¨rg Huffschmid (University of Bremen) and Dominique Plihon (University
of Paris-North).
1 1045-2354/$ – see front matter © 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
2 doi:10.1016/j.cpa.2003.01.001
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tion and to reduce transactions costs in financial markets. Such objectives predominate25
in the EU’s financial action plan and in the Lamfalussy Report, which attempted to iden-26
tify obstacles to the action plan and ways to surmount them (Committee of Wise Men,27
2001).28
The present paper starts from the view that the minimisation of transactions costs is too29
narrow an objective in the sphere of financial policy. It seeks to specify other objectives,30
which should be pursued in the course of financial integration. These objectives include31
stability, consumer protection and the assertion of the public interest in the financial sector.32
The paper then links the process of financial integration with other problems in European33
policy: taxation and the threat of tax competition, changes in corporate governance and34
pressures on social protection. It is argued that policies for financial integration should be35
formulated with these connections to other policy fields in mind.36
2. Changes in European ﬁnance37
2.1. Ambiguous developments in the ﬁnancial sphere38
Although there is no doubt that changes are taking place, it may be too early to draw39
strong conclusions about the pattern of financial change in Europe today. There is certainly40
some evidence of a move to financial structures and processes which would be closer to the41
US model than to the traditional practices of the continental European countries (particularly42
as regards disintermediation), but it is difficult to say how far this shift will go. There are43
several reasons for this. Some developments are so recent that it is impossible to say whether44
they represent permanent changes—this is the case, for example, with the recent growth45
of corporate bond issues, which is dominated by the purchase of new mobile telephone46
frequencies. Again, it is likely that some practices adopted during the stock market boom47
of the late 1990s will not survive the downturn in equity prices: even in the US itself, for48
example, it is likely that business start-ups will depend rather more on bank credit and rather49
less on early floatation. It is also true that financial developments in different EU countries50
are somewhat divergent: a rapid move away from traditional bank intermediation in France51
is not matched in Germany.52
2.2. A necessary consolidation53
Thus, policy guidelines have to be developed without making very strong or simplistic54
assumptions about the current pattern of change. However, there can be little doubt that the55
introduction of the euro, together with continuing pressures in global finance, has promoted56
a more rapid integration of EU financial systems. In general, a certain consolidation of EU57
finance seems to be necessary, even though some of the effects of consolidation require to58
be challenged. This is because, in the absence of such consolidation, external pressures on59
European systems are likely to be even more intense and the possibilities for autonomous60
development even more constrained than they are at present. Clearly, one key advantage61
enjoyed by the financial system of the US is its sheer scale, which tends to increase the62
power and scope of dollar-based financial markets even if these are often inefficient in their63
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detailed functioning. A consolidation of European finance could tend to redress the EU’s64
disadvantage in this respect, always on the condition that the consolidation in question does65
not simply take the form of an uncritical internalisation of US procedures and practices66
(Grahl, 2001).67
2.3. The public interest68
The view taken here is that, as with many other spheres of policy, what is needed today is69
consistent promotion of the public interest and of public service, in a context which continues70
to be characterised by the reinforcement of private interests and the pursuit of private71
advantage.1 Although there remains, as has been said, considerable doubt about the direction72
and the speed of financial change, it is clear that both the financial consequences of monetary73
union and certain on-going changes in financial structures – such as disintermediation, the74
increased importance of organised equity markets and the rise of fund-managing enterprises75
– threaten to compromise important general interests at the same time as they widen the76
scope for the pursuit of private interests by, in particular, the strongest and wealthiest agents77
in European economies. The following discussion considers first some important issues78
within the financial sphere itself, and then goes on to examine some of the broader social79
and economic issues related to financial developments.80
3. Stability81
In a world of competitive finance, the stability of financial markets is the responsibility82
of no private agent. Both in theory and, as the recent upheavals in equity markets have83
shown, in practice, there are grave dangers to financial stability in some newly emerging84
financial structures. And it is now clear that such financial instability can have devastating85
consequences for employment and economic development. Yet, the existing monetary con-86
stitution of the EU recognises only price stability as the central objective of ECB policy.87
There are dangers on both sides from the narrowness of the ECB’s mandate: on the one88
hand, insufficient attention might be paid to signs of growing financial fragility, such as89
rapid inflation of asset prices; on the other, the ECB might not react with sufficient speed90
or determination to widespread financial distress and the threat of systemic collapse.291
In the longer term, there can be no full solution to this problem without a fundamental92
reform of the statutes, objectives and practices of the ECB, which would reassert democratic93
control over the common monetary policy and thus permit a wider conception of general94
interests to inform monetary policy decisions. (As is well known, the US central bank itself95
operates with a much wider mandate and under much more effective public scrutiny than96
the ECB; although this has prevented neither the huge speculative bubble of recent years97
1 It is important in this respect that the notion of the general good has been given more recognition in EU policy.
See, in particular, European Commission (2000).
2 Fayolle (2001) presents clear evidence that the policy so far of the ECB has been pro-cyclical: reducing credit
costs in the accelerating stock market boom of 1999 and raising them in the incipient recession of 2001.
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nor its unavoidable collapse, it has at least allowed the US authorities to respond vigorously98
to the subsequent economic downturn.)99
Meanwhile, it is necessary to reinforce the EU’s central capacity to confront issues100
of systemic stability and to undertake active, macro-prudential, measures in response to101
malfunctions in the increasingly integrated European financial sector. Mechanisms for the102
collective supervision of financial actors and markets – such as the European Committee103
on Banking Supervision – should cease to be purely consultative and be accorded actual104
responsibility for system-wide stabilisation. Clear contingency plans are needed to deal105
with possible banking crises—both those which might impact on one member country and106
thus lead to very sharp asymmetries in the effects of common policies, and those which107
might exceed the intervention capacities of individual countries and threaten an EU-wide108
process of contagion. In either situation, confusion as to responsibilities for intervention or109
delay in taking emergency measures could have the most serious consequences.110
3.1. Instability in ﬁnancial markets111
The expansion of organised asset markets means that prudential stabilisation policy112
has today to be concerned not only with possible crises within the banking system, but113
also to consider the potential impact of a collapse of asset prices. Interactions between114
banking and asset market crises can run in both directions—a shortage of bank credit115
can impair the functioning of stock markets, for example, while a collapse in asset prices116
can provoke a wave of bad debts, undermining the balance sheets of the banks. In this117
context, the narrow conception of securities market integration which at present informs the118
Lamfalussy process needs to be widened. The focus of the Lamfalussy agenda is exclusively119
on the transactions costs faced by those private agents who make use of securities markets.120
The stability of these markets should become a key concern in the integration process.121
One way in which this can be done is to take asset market developments into account in122
the formulation of general monetary policy and the level of interest rates; the possibility123
of more targeted measures should also be explored—such as an increase in the capital124
required to support bank loans to asset market operators in the case of an inflation of asset125
values.126
3.2. External dimensions of stability127
There is an important external dimension to the issue of stability. At present, the ECB128
has no real concern with the evolution of global financial relations, even though it represents129
by far the most important financial system outside the US itself. Similarly, the Lamfalussy130
Report almost unquestioningly adopts US practices and standards as the models for reform131
within Europe. However, financial integration may increase Europe’s capacity to define and132
enforce its own objectives in the financial sphere, if these objectives can be embodied in133
common policies. This applies firstly to international monetary relations—a huge lacuna134
in the mandate of the ECB. The need for a reform of international financial institutions in135
order to promote stability has been widely recognised since the East Asian crises. The IMF,136
which takes primary responsibility for the refinance of governments, has no real purchase137
on international financial linkages among private agents, which are today a menacing source138
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of instability.3 The BIS has promulgated rules to lower the risk of international banking139
crises but there are no clear provisions for collective response to a crisis once it has broken140
out.141
The hegemony of US finance makes for major asymmetries—the very scale of the142
dollar-based system tends to reduce the impact of disturbances which have devastating143
consequences within smaller or less developed systems. The EU and the ECB ought to be144
consistent advocates of a more multilateral approach to international financial stability—an145
approach which would emphasise the costs of disruption to smaller and more vulnerable146
economies rather than repeating the demand for ever more liberalisation. Institutional reform147
in this field will, in any case, be slow and difficult. If the ECB is silent, and preoccupied148
only with internal issues, then reform will be almost impossible.149
3.3. Reform of cook committee ratios150
The revision of international capital adequacy ratios which is now being prepared within151
the BIS raises two problems. Essentially, banks are being offered two ways of calculating152
the capital necessary to protect depositors from the risks which the banks assume. The first153
method continues the present practice of applying fixed capital ratios to specific exposures,154
but with the quality of the debtor, rather than simply the debtor’s status, being taken into155
account. This procedure seems relatively acceptable, although it continues the trend towards156
more and more influence for a handful of private credit-rating agencies. It is becoming157
necessary to scrutinise the work of these agencies very closely because they are acquiring158
immense power over the allocation of financial resources.159
However, it is the second proposed method of calculating capital requirements that seems160
more problematic. This would allow the banks themselves to determine the risk of their161
exposures and thus the capital needed to cover these risks. Supervisors would no longer162
examine the banks’ portfolios directly—it would only be the adequacy of their internal163
risk-assessment procedures which was subject to external control.164
Now it is certainly the case that banking supervisors need to examine the internal control165
procedures of banks—the recent example of AIB shows that banks may run huge risks166
of which they are unaware when internal control breaks down. However, if banks them-167
selves are given freedom to assess risks they may tend to reduce the capital they hold to168
dangerously low levels and thus compromise both microeconomic and systemic stability.169
Further, it would be the largest banks which are most able to maintain elaborate internal170
risk-assessment procedures and thus the proposed reform could encourage further concen-171
tration in the banking sector. This is highly undesirable, since there is already an alarming172
tendency towards very high levels of concentration in this sector.173
3.4. European standards of practice174
More generally, EU authorities can promote financial stability by seeking to define high175
standards of practice for corporations raising or investing capital on European securities176
3 See Aglietta and Boissieu (1999).
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markets. The Lamfalussy Report is correct to suggest that EU decision-making has been177
confused and inefficient in the field of financial integration. However, the aim of accelerating178
financial integration must not be allowed to compromise wider objectives such as stability or179
to reduce the integration process to a mere internalisation of US standards and procedures.180
In recent years, the US has taken a unilateral position on financial practices: for example,181
the US has imposed its domestic accounting and reporting procedures on all enterprises182
seeking access to US stock markets; recent scandals make clear that these procedures may183
leave a lot to be desired; the growing scale and liquidity of European capital markets make184
possible a European initiative in this field.185
4. Consumer protection186
There is no good reason to reject the Commission’s view that, in general, micro-prudential187
policies and the detailed supervision of individual financial actors can usefully be assigned188
to the national authorities who are best placed to observe and regulate their activities. But189
the trend towards increasing competition in retail finance carries certain dangers of a general190
decline in consumer protection. The British case is illustrative in this respect because it is191
in Britain that many current financial changes in Europe have gone furthest. One episode of192
particularly unscrupulous behaviour by British pension funds has led to the ad hoc definition193
of a new civil offence: the “mis-selling” of financial products.194
Although detailed regulation of retail finance is best left to national authorities, the EU195
should promulgate general principles to assure that standards converge upwards towards a196
high level of consumer protection. The often very wide information asymmetries between197
powerful financial enterprises and vulnerable households make this a necessary condition198
for an effective and socially responsible financial system. Clear general principles should199
cover both lending – making it impossible for enterprises to recover funds advanced to200
households when it is clear that it was against the interests of the borrowers to assume201
excessive levels of debt – and saving – placing a responsibility on financial companies202
not to market savings schemes or investment products when the companies themselves203
are aware that they are not in the best interests of the customers: the rule in these retail204
markets should be caveat vendor. National authorities should be constrained to adhere to205
such principles in the operation of their supervisory systems.206
4.1. Standardisation of retail ﬁnancial products207
In general, financial globalisation may be increasing competitive pressure on banks208
and other financial institutions. One way in which they are responding to these pressures209
is by increasing product differentiation. This can damage consumer interests when the210
differentiation is more apparent than real, because there is no genuine widening of consumer211
choice and because high marketing costs and excess capacity prevent price reductions. Credit212
cards are a very good example of this process; rather than cutting their usual interest rates,213
card issuers multiply the number of “special offers,” “low introductory interest rates,” and214
so on. The result is that the general level of interest rates remains too high that there are too215
many card issuers and that resource are wasted in huge marketing expenditures.216
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More damaging, perhaps, is the existence of intense product differentiation in medium-217
and long-term retail savings products, which seems to be confirmed in the British case by218
the recent report (Sandler, 2002). The effects are the same: to sustain excess capacity, to219
increase marketing costs, to push up prices.220
Regulators can protect consumers in this kind of situation by imposing a certain standard-221
isation of retail financial products. The aim should be to reinforce genuine price competition222
and to limit the “Chamberlinian” competition where spurious differentiation confuses con-223
sumers and wastes resources. The prevailing approach to retail financial regulation until224
recently has been to permit this unlimited product differentiation and to control only the225
sales process itself. It seems that consumers will pay excessive prices unless there is a226
certain regulation of the products themselves.227
4.2. Distance provision of ﬁnancial services228
The internet is beginning to have an important impact on retail finance and may lead229
in coming years to much larger cross-frontier provision of financial services. Current EU230
policy, with the notion of e-Europe, is to accelerate such developments. However, it is also231
necessary to anticipate the problems that may emerge in the field of consumer protection232
with widespread distance selling of insurance, credit and savings products. To the extent233
that such cross-frontier activity does emerge, there will be new regulatory problems which234
essentially national authorities will be ill equipped to handle. It is difficult to say whether235
the appropriate response would be reinforced co-operation or the creation of some more236
centralised structure. But it is important to address these potential problems today and237
to make it clear that the new technologies will not be permitted to undermine levels of238
consumer protection. In fact, if a strong policy in this field is adopted, it would tend to build239
consumer confidence in new forms of financial service.240
4.3. External trade in ﬁnancial services241
Here again there is a significant external dimension to European policy. The liberalisation242
of trade in services is high on the agenda of the WTO, and in the financial sphere as elsewhere,243
such liberalisation can threaten important general interests in patterns of public provision.244
The EU is the best placed trading bloc to resist the introduction of liberalisation rules245
which compromise consumer protection and to ensure that financial companies entering the246
European market are constrained to observe the highest possible standards. This approach247
would in the long run reinforce European competitiveness in the sector and attract customers248
for European financial services.249
5. Mutuality250
The rapid integration of, and the increasing role of market forces within European251
financial systems have placed increasing pressures on many institutions – such as Ger-252
man Sparkassen and British building societies – which have in the past combined financial253
services to individuals with important public service functions. These include, for example,254
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the provision of savings and credit facilities to households which might otherwise have faced255
financial exclusion;4 support for undertakings with a positive impact on the quality of life256
within local communities; certain redistributive functions or types of collective insurance257
which go beyond what would be achieved by individuals on competitive financial markets.258
These are important public service functions and must not be compromised by the pro-259
cess of European financial consolidation, or by the competition rules which govern this260
consolidation. A network of branches providing financial or banking services, for exam-261
ple, gives rise to important public goods. Banks or other financial companies, which consult262
only their shareholders interests, are likely to close branches in localities with an insufficient263
number of high-income households and this is exactly what has happened in Britain.264
5.1. Demutualisation in Britain265
In Britain, 8 of the 10 largest (mutual) building societies in 1994 were demutualised266
and floated on the stock exchange by 2001, in a move which deprived the sector of some267
two-thirds of its assets. The motive was to realise immediate cash gains by the issue of268
equity. Long-term impacts on standards of customer service have been uniformly adverse269
to the extent that the demutualised mortgage providers have in fact lost market share.5 At the270
same time, demutualisation has resulted in a lower commitment to local communities, and271
has impaired the systematic efforts of the mutual sector to reduce financial exclusion. The272
present British government is now attempting to address financial exclusion in a process273
of negotiation with the big commercial banks, but these efforts have made little progress274
and the previous weakening of the mutual sector has made the task much more difficult.275
In fact, the publicly owned Post Office, although it is currently subject to a privatisation276
policy, offers the most convincing opportunities for effective measures against exclusion.277
5.2. The German case278
In the case of the German Landesbanken and Sparkassen, pressures took a somewhat279
different form since the European Commission played a direct role in the events leading280
to the reforms of 2001, which placed many new constraints on the activities of this sector.281
The issue was the ability of publicly financed banks to challenge commercial banks in282
wholesale markets. According to one study (Smith, 2001), the impact of the reforms “is283
potentially dramatic for German federalism, the social market economy and Germany’s284
overall economic performance.” However, the retail activities of the Sparkassen do not285
seem to have been threatened.286
5.3. Defending the public interest287
A double response to these problems is needed. Firstly, national and local governments288
must be entitled to support, or themselves to provide, retail financial services with a signif-289
icant public service function and must not be prevented from doing so by competition rules290
4 See Kempson and Whyley (1999).
5 For details, see The Case for Building Societies, Building Societies Association, London, 2001.
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which ignore the difference between private and social advantage. A regime, which permits291
and even encourages such intervention, would have the additional benefit of compelling292
profit-seeking financial agents to meet higher standards of consumer service.293
Secondly, the profit-making financial actors should be constrained to respect social objec-294
tives in their commercial activities, for example, to avoid discrimination against lower295
income customers. French enterprises, which close production facilities, are required to296
draw up “social plans” in the interests of their employees. Similar rules should apply, on a297
Europe-wide basis, to the withdrawal of financial services from communities with inade-298
quate alternative provision.299
Once again, it is important that the EU does not concede, in the context of international300
commercial negotiations, the ability of national and local governments to promote the role301
of non-profit and public service agents in the financial sector.302
In fact, the EU does recognise, both in fundamental texts, such as the Treaty of Ams-303
terdam and in the Directives, which install competition regimes for public services, social304
constraints on the behaviour of service providers. At EU level, a minimum set of services305
can be defined as “universal,” that is, as being available at low cost to everybody regardless306
of location, and member states are free to enhance this definition for their own countries.307
In addition, social constraints may be introduced at national level by specifying tasks to be308
carried out by service providers, be they private or public enterprises. However, these limita-309
tions to profit-seeking, competitive behaviour in service markets have so far been introduced310
on an ad hoc basis, sector by sector, and this in itself tends to narrow their impact on market311
processes. There exists no general specification of social responsibility either in finance or312
in production and this works to minimise the social content of the new financial structures313
as a whole: specific questions, such as financial exclusion, may be addressed, but there is314
no attempt to grapple with the overall social consequences of the transformations which are315
under way. A more holistic approach, which would anticipate the general impact of financial316
integration and of such related phenomena as financial disintermediation (the switch from317
bank-based to market-based security finance) on European societies and economies and318
then attempt to steer the whole process in socially desirable directions, is highly desirable319
but, at present, beyond the horizons of EU leaderships.320
6. The taxation of ﬁnancial assets and activities321
Commission spokespersons insist that their strategies for financial integration will lead322
to a more efficient allocation of capital within the EU. It is argued in Grahl et al. (2002,323
Chapter 2) that this claim is inconsistent with wide divergences in the taxation of capital and324
capital revenues. There is certainly a view, among the corporations and wealthy individuals325
who stand to gain, that this problem is best resolved by tax competition, in a process which326
would induce member governments to lower profits tax, for instance, in a scramble to327
attract inward investment. Such a process can already be seen in the general lowering of328
corporation tax rates across the EU.6 Some of the most significant reductions in corporate329
6 For a full analysis of tax competition, see Schratzenstaller (2001).
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taxation have taken place in Germany, and this is particularly worrying because of the scale330
and importance of the German economy.331
This kind of process is a negative-sum game, which can only have immense costs in332
terms of social inequality and the gradual erosion of social expenditures. Thus, financial333
consolidation strategies must be complemented by a process of fiscal convergence con-334
cerning, above all, the taxation of corporate profits. Commission and Council strategies do335
not represent an adequate approach to this problem; the Commission does indeed envisage336
a harmonisation of the corporate tax structures, but not of tax rates, such strategies must337
be interrogated with the greatest diligence as to their implications for the distribution of338
income and for the development of European social models.339
The taxation of individual incomes from financial assets is a less urgent issue in general,340
but it is still necessary, at the very least, for the EU to confront the long-standing question341
of off-shore placements and tax havens—many of the latter being under European flags,342
especially the Union Jack. Recent evidence has emerged of tax avoidance on an astonishing343
scale by the wealthiest individuals resident in Great Britain.7 The key element in these344
avoidance strategies is the use of off-shore tax havens. Companies are making use of the345
same avoidance strategies: “Rupert Murdoch’s media empire has hardly paid any taxes in346
the UK since 1988 . . . Nearly a quarter of the US top 500 companies paid no tax in 1998 . . .347
The use of off-shore tax havens by global corporations is depriving developing countries of348
some US$ 50bn of revenues each year.”8 If this problem is not dealt with, member states349
will be faced with a gradual erosion of their fiscal capacity and of their ability to influence350
the distribution of income.351
Once again there are significant implications for external policy. The Bush administration352
recently rejected the OECD plan for the reporting of off-shore financial revenues. The US353
government, no doubt responding to pressure from some of its most powerful supporters,354
rejected the notion of a “world tax policeman.” The EU has more possibilities to challenge355
this line of US policy, and to insist on a multilateral approach to global economic issues,356
than any other actor on the world stage. It can only negotiate effectively if it stands ready357
to imitate the US and impose unilateral measures on an extraterritorial basis in the event of358
multilateral agreement not being reached.359
It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of an intra-regional and inter-regional initiative360
to restore the ability to tax capital and wealth. If this issue does not become a key priority for361
the European Union then the rest of its integration strategies will lack both social content362
and political legitimacy.363
7. Financial integration and corporate governance364
A further significant implication of current financial developments concerns the nature365
of the European enterprise, in particular of the larger corporations which make most use of366
security markets. The new salience of shareholder interests calls into question the diverse367
arrangements which have developed in member states to give some role to other interests in368
7 Nick Davies, “How the Richest Man in Britain Avoids Tax,” Guardian, 11-04-2002-04-12.
8 Sikka et al. (2002) provide a dramatic account of tax avoidance in Britain.
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the formation of corporate strategy: the interests of workers, customers, suppliers and the369
local community. Current financial developments, encouraged by Commission integration370
strategies, threaten both to multiply inequalities in economic life and to deprive relatively371
weak groups of the limited ability which they sometimes possessed in the past to influence372
corporate decision-making. The German Mitbestimmung model, imitated by several other373
member countries, may be a case in point. These institutions are not about to collapse, but374
shareholder interests are increasingly dominant within them.9375
One clear example of the impact of the shareholder movement on European social mod-376
els concerns job security. Shareholder value doctrines emphasise risk avoidance through377
portfolio diversiﬁcation rather than through diversification at enterprise level; companies378
come under pressure to divest “non-central” branches and to focus on the most profitable379
activities. There may also be pressure to increase financial gearing by taking on debt. The380
logical consequence of such strategies is to increase the risks facing individual enterprises381
and therefore to reduce the job security of employees.10382
Another clear danger from these shareholder pressures is a tendency to increase inequal-383
ities within the enterprise. In an attempt to align company managements more closely with384
shareholder interests very high rewards, linked to profits and share prices, are offered to385
higher management and other key groups while less powerful categories of worker are386
driven closer to the reservation wages which are available on external markets.11387
Trade unions and other social movements within and across the EU need a stronger388
legal framework in which to address such developments. The long-delayed introduction389
of a European company status seems to represent a purely permissive compromise to the390
disputes which have been seen in this area. It does not involve any social constraints on391
corporate governance; several European directives in the field of employment law help392
to establish certain minimum standards in corporate practice, but employment directives393
are not a substitute for clear legal constraints on corporate practice which should be built394
into company law itself. Throughout the implementation of the Lamfalussy agenda, every395
opportunity should be taken to assert the values of the European social models within the396
new structure of regulations.397
7.1. The market in corporate control398
The refusal of the European Parliament to accept the Takeover Directive has a positive399
aspect in this respect. The Commission’s drive for an ultra-liberal regime for mergers and400
9 Consider, for example, the assessment in Jacobi et al. (1998, pp. 190–238): “There is little prospect that the
post-war German industrial relations system will simply collapse or disintegrate, but its foundations are in some
respects being eroded. The system seems to be undergoing a gradual but cumulative change of character; in the new
century, it is likely to be more decentralised, more fragmented, less legalised, less cohesive, and more internally
differentiated. The virtuous circle of stable industrial relations institutions and economic success is no longer the
obvious starting point for students of the German model.”
10 For an account of the impact of the shareholder value drive on British employees, see Froud et al. (2000).
11 A study by Glyn (in press) shows that wage inequality has grown fastest in countries where financial liber-
alisation has gone furthest, such as Britain, the US and New Zealand. Contrary to a widespread misperception,
these increased wage inequalities have not been compensated by reduced inequalities as regards employment
opportunities. If anything, the two types of inequality tend to be cumulative and mutually reinforcing.
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acquisitions was inconsistent with European conceptions of the employee’s role within the401
enterprise. The Commission asserted, in defence of the draft Directive, that “the disposal402
of securities affects only the holders of these securities.” This position is as cynical as it is403
illogical. The declared intention of “protecting minority shareholders” referred, in practice,404
to the shareholders of target enterprises, who constitute the only group which invariably405
gains from acquisitions. Since what is being ceded in a takeover is control over the enterprise,406
all the stakeholders must be concerned employees, related enterprises, the local community,407
and so on. However, the current stalemate is not particularly desirable in that it accords, by408
default, a certain veto power to the managements of target enterprises without specifying409
how that power is to be used or in whose interests.410
What is needed is no less than a European Restructuring Code, which specifies clear411
constraints on all mergers and takeovers. These should include a comprehensive audit of412
the impact of the proposed restructuring on key stakeholders, the duty to inform and con-413
sult with interested parties and minimum measures to compensate affected employees and414
communities. It might be objected that such constraints would inhibit necessary restruc-415
turing but in fact the evidence that merger and acquisition activity generates big economic416
advantages is very flimsy. If institutional shareholders were to focus less on such operations417
and more on the long-term health of their enterprises in consequence of such measures then418
this would be all to the good.419
8. Challenges to social protection420
Across the whole range of social protection and social services, but in particular as421
regards retirement pensions, a shift towards private provision is taking place. Although offi-422
cial accounts of this shift do not recognise the fact, there can be little doubt that it is closely423
connected to the ambition to develop the role of equity markets and of the institutional424
investors which are the most prominent participants on these markets. In fact, the discourse425
which presents capitalisation and individualisation of pension provision as a solution to426
current difficulties in European pension systems is fundamentally incoherent. Making ade-427
quate provision for the needs of the generations who will retire over the coming decades is428
not, in any important sense, a financial problem: it is a problem of resources. A shift from429
public pension systems to dependence on the performance of fund-managing enterprises430
does nothing to resolve this problem, although it does transfer responsibility for it from431
society onto individuals who will often be completely incapable of an effective response.432
A recent study confirms that the privatisation/capitalisation strategies, which are being433
put forward at present, fail to resolve this key issue of resources.12 The study posed the434
question of whether “individuals would, voluntarily, save enough for retirement, when435
‘enough’ was defined in terms of life-time consumption smoothing with an exogenous436
retirement age. The UK and US evidence cast doubt on this. There was also evidence that in437
countries with significant privatisations, many members of the new funded schemes were,438
for one reason or another, not contributing and therefore presumably not accumulating439
pension rights in retirement.”440
12 See Disney (2000) for an assessment of the adequacy of market-based pensions in Britain and the US.
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The distributional consequences of a retreat from public provision hardly need to be441
spelled out; in all countries wealth is much more unequally distributed than is income.442
Pension provision geared to individual wealth accumulation can only increase inequalities.13443
But, even apart from distributional issues, the efficiency of private pension provision444
is open to question. It is extremely difficult for market-based pension systems to protect445
individuals against such contingencies as prolonged ill-health or unemployment, whereas446
public provision can easily do so. (British experience is particularly important in this respect447
because it is in Britain that pensioners are most important on market-based products.)448
The values of the European social models, which have from the start been associated449
with the project of European construction, are inconsistent with the capitalisation and pri-450
vatisation of pensions and other social protection functions which are now being promoted451
in many European countries.452
9. Socially responsible ﬁnance?453
A discourse has developed recently which finds certain possibilities of enhanced social454
control over economic life in the emergence of institutional investors. Two themes tend to455
appear—the notion of “ethical investment” and the idea that the aggregation of interests456
within pension funds might permit the beneficiaries of these funds to exercise influence457
over the conduct and strategies of corporations in which they invest.14458
In abstract terms, such possibilities may exist and it would certainly be valuable to459
explore very thoroughly the conditions under which they might be realised. However, in460
terms of current structures and practices within institutional investment, the actual potential461
for a reassertion of social control by these means is extremely limited. An over-optimistic462
assessment of these strategies could even be dangerous if it diverted attention from other463
strategies of control in the fields of taxation, regulation and legislation.464
The “ethical” investment notion imposes only the loosest and most nebulous constraints465
on investment and investment products with this label are generally marketed on the basis466
that they achieve the same rates of return as standard products. While this is the case, such467
products will reallocate holdings among individual customers of the institutional investors468
but have no influence on the supply of capital to even the most “unethical” corporations.469
There are certainly conditions under which the aggregated power of employees’ pension470
funds could be an important lever of social control. The Meidner plan for workers’ pension471
funds to be built up through contributions of their own equity from Swedish enterprises472
would have represented a real redistribution of economic power if it had been implemented473
in anything like its original form. But today’s institutional investors are operating in a474
competitive environment, characterised by continuing financial liberalisation, in which they475
appeal essentially to individuals as consumers of their products. The situational logic of these476
investors pushes them always to interpret their functions according to purely market criteria,477
to give priority to portfolio management rather than to seek to influence the enterprises in478
13 The recent pension reform in Germany represents a significant move away from public provision. For a critical
account, see Steffens (2000).
14 For the case of pension funds, see Aglietta (1998) and Blackburn (2002).
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which they invest. According to a comprehensive survey of British fund managers, there479
are strong tendencies to conformism and “herding” in the allocation of funds and existing480
incentive structures are leading to a “misalignment of the ultimate investors – the millions of481
consumers and pension fund members – and the agents investing on their behalf.”15 Unless482
and until there are major changes in the legal framework governing institutional investment,483
it will be illusory to think that these “ultimate investors” could use such institutions to control484
or direct the economic environment.485
10. Conclusion486
A consolidation of European financial systems is necessary. External pressures have been487
building up on existing national and local financial mechanisms and a coherent response488
at European level seems to offer the best possibility of redesigning financial systems so as489
to secure an increased autonomy from developments in, above all, the US. However, the490
agenda for financial integration which was ratified at the Stockholm council is profoundly491
inadequate. It amounts to the uncritical internalisation of US procedures and practices,492
divorced from any social project. The consequence of this strategy can only be to exacerbate493
the dangerous alienation of European citizens from the institutions of the EU.494
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This paper suggests an explanation for the heavy trading volume observed on the
US capital markets, the world’s largest. Heterodox economic theory puts much of
this volume down to speculation. Mainstream theory tends to support this thesis,
either directly or indirectly, by giving space to the idea that trading activity is for
the most part exogenous to the functioning of the capital markets. The central
hypothesis of this paper is that the trading volumes observed are an endogenous
feature of the capital markets, because they are to a great extent determined by
the needs of the institutional investors who predominate on these markets. This
endogeneity of trading is posited in connection with the emergence of a new ‘core–
satellite’ paradigm in institutional investment, a development that essentially
manifests the asset-management industry’s transformation from a small industry
serving a few wealthy clients to a mass industry serving large sections of the
population.
Key words: Capital markets, Trading volume, Institutional investors, Core–satellite
paradigm
JEL classifications: G10, G20
1. Introduction
A key characteristic of the ongoing transformations in financial systems is the huge growth
of trading volume in the financial markets. Current developments in the US economy, the
world’s largest, illustrate the point. Money market flows through the US payments systems
are enough to circulate annual US GDP in under three days. As these flows are much too
great to be put into any meaningful relation with GDP or with current incomes and
expenditures, the only possible explanation is that they are needed to support trading
volume in the securities markets. There is abundant direct evidence that growth in these
volumes has been phenomenal. Daily trading in US treasury bonds is now close to $500
billion, enough to turn over the entire outstanding stock of US Treasuries in under ten
days. On the US equity markets, the growth in trading has outstripped the strong growth of
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capitalisation so that average turnover rates (trading volumes divided by capitalisations)
are now close to 100%.
These developments pose a problem of interpretation for contemporary political
economy: while the growth in short-term money market activity can be readily explained
in connection with the massive and continuous turnover of debt and equity instruments on
the securities markets, this latter phenomenon is more intractable. Among heterodox
economists, the prevalent view is that the turnover on capital markets is essentially a matter
of speculation.1 Mainstream analysis of financial developments seems to confirm this view
in that some theoretical approaches (‘efficient markets’ theory or ‘microstructural’ analysis
of security trading) offer no general explanation of the volume of trading, while the one
approach which does so (‘behavioural finance’) offers a psychological account of trading
activity which largely coincides with the heterodox critique of speculation. But how valid is
this critique? At its core is the same logic which leads popular opinion to construe the
volume on the foreign exchange markets as ‘excessive’:2 any trading of financial instru-
ments that is not related in some way to the more fundamental activities of commerce,
production or investment must ipso facto be speculative.3 Now in the case of the FX
markets, this logic was found to be flawed. Although the sheer scale of daily FX turnover
causes it to appear excessive, it becomes clear when FX trades are broken down by
instrument and counter-party that speculation can only play a relatively minor role. On the
contrary, as the present writers have shown in a recent paper,4 the dominance of FX swap
transactions suggests that much of the turnover on the foreign exchange markets is driven
by money market objectives and is completely unrelated to speculation on exchange rates.
The picture as regards the capital markets is bound to be more complicated, because one
cannot, as in the case of the FX markets, identify specific instruments with specific trading
motives. Thus any attempt at explaining capital market volume must inevitably contain
a strong element of conjecture. Nevertheless, enough information can be extracted from
empirical observations of the equity and bond markets to adjudicate between alternative
suggested explanations for trading volume and to judge which are plausible. The
speculation thesis does not fall into this category. Trading activity is in fact concentrated
on a small number of markets and a small number of securities and is carried out by
a relatively small group of agents: none of these regularities can be easily reconciled with
a simple view of security trading as driven by speculation.
This paper seeks to lay down the basis for further exploration and detailed explanation
of this issue. It has five main sections. Section 2 provides data for trading volumes in
the US capital markets and highlights certain trends in these data. Section 3 gives a
brief overview of what can be called ‘market’ perspectives on securities’ trading volume.
Sections 4 and 5 provide an outline of what may be termed ‘institutional’ perspectives
on trading volume. Section 6 provides some policy-relevant considerations. Section 7
concludes.
1 See, for example, Baker (2000), Davidson (2002) and Pollin et al. (2002).
2 It is interesting to note how many papers on capital market trading volume set the scene with
observations on the ‘excessive’ or ‘bloated’ nature of FX daily turnover. Dow and Gorton (1997), Odean
(1999) and Glaser and Weber (2003) are a few examples.
3 The following statement by Davidson (2002) exemplifies this logic: ‘For the most part financial market
activity is speculative and independent of both real investment activity and the rate at which new securities are
being floated since the latter is very small relative to the total number of transactions and the outstanding
stock of existing securities’ (p. 107).
4 Grahl and Lysandrou (2003).
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2. US capital market volume
We shall focus on US security markets, because these easily dominate world capital
markets as regards both equities1 and debt securities.2
2.1 US bond markets
Table 1 shows that there has been rapid growth in daily trading volumes of US Treasuries
and near substitutes such as municipal or Federal agency debt. Trading turnover, that is
the ratio of trading volume to the outstanding stock of debt securities, has been more
stable, although there was a rapid increase in turnover for US Treasuries at the beginning
of the new century.3 Trading in corporate bonds is much less intense, although here also
there has been recent growth, focused on the most liquid issues of the largest issuers. In all
classes of bonds, trading is concentrated on specific issues—for each maturity, the most
recently issued ‘on the run’ instruments are by far the most heavily traded. Finally, this is
an institutional market; virtually all trading involves either institutional investors or
specialist bond dealers with no significant participation by individuals.
2.2 US equity markets
In equity markets, we observe analogous patterns in trading activity. Table 2 shows that
NASDAQ volume is much more volatile than that of the NYSE: NASDAQ attracted
a large number of individual investors during the dot.com bubble, but trading volume has
since fallen off sharply while the NYSE saw a much smaller decline in volume and, in terms
of turnover, has already regained its previous level.4 Although the share of block trading has
recently declined,5 the institutions in fact account for a rising share of total volume
(according to some commentators as much as 80%) because they use many other
Table 1. Average daily trading volume in US debt securities ($billions)
US Treasury
Federal Agency
mortgage backed Federal Agency Municipal Corporate
1992 95.7 17.0 6.1
1994 116.1 30.4 16.0
1996 117.3 38.1 31.1
1998 226.6 70.9 47.6
2000 206.6 69.4 72.8 8.2 9.3
2002 366.4 154.5 81.8 11.3 17.8
2004 497.9 207.4 77.5 16.9 21.2
Source: Bond Association.
1 Market capitalisation on the NYSE in 2003 was $11,329 billion and annual trading $9,691 billion; the
next largest equity market was Tokyo with $2,953 billion capitalisation and $2,109 billion annual trading.
2 In 2004, US debt securities outstanding amounted to $18,647 billion, 44.7% of the world total. Bond
trading in the US is primarily over-the-counter, unlike in Europe, for example, where it is exchange based.
However, the domination of US bond volume over that in other markets can be seen when setting the e26
billion average daily turnover for all European public sector bonds (Federation of European Stock Exchanges,
March 2005) against the $498 billion figure for US treasury bonds, or when setting the e7.8 billion average
daily turnover for all European corporate bonds against the $21.2 billion for US corporate bonds.
3 From an average of 6% in 2000, the daily turnover ratio for US Treasuries rose to 12% in 2004.
4 The turnover ratio dipped to 90% in 2001, but has been close to 100% since then.
5 Block transactions (10,000þ shares) accounted for 37% of reported volume on the NYSE in 2003, down
from the 55% average figure for the 1990s.
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techniques to execute their trades, notably ‘slicing and dicing’ large orders and feeding
them into the market piecemeal.1 Finally, Table 3 shows that it is high-cap stocks that are
most actively traded—the liquidity and relative stability of these issues make them easier to
trade, while issues by newer and smaller corporations have much lower turnovers.
We can summarise recent trading patterns in the US capital markets in the following
way:
(i) There is a trend increase in trading across all security types, but equities are much less
traded than debt securities and, among the latter, private issues much less than public
ones.
(ii) The institutions dominate in all markets, although less in equity than in bond
markets and less on the NASDAQ than on the NYSE.
(iii) Trading is focused on the largest, most standardised and least volatile securities,
whether these be recent Treasury issues in debt markets or large-cap stocks in the
equity markets.
3. ‘Market’ perspectives on trading volume
The question of the scale of capital market trading can be viewed from two alternative
positions: a market-based perspective which focuses on the interrelated activities of all
participants in the financial markets, and an institution-based one, which concentrates
attention on the activities of the large investors. The market approach divides into three
distinct strands, one emphasising the ‘efficiency’ of financial markets—‘the Efficient
Markets Hypothesis (EMH)—and the other two emphasising possible sources of ‘in-
efficiency’, the difference here being that ‘microstructure’ theory (MS) traces inefficiency
to the presence of various objective barriers to the frictionless execution of trades, whereas
‘behavioural finance’ theory (BF) interprets inefficiency in the ‘subjective’ sense of the
Table 2. Average daily trading on NYSE and
NASDAQ ($millions)
NYSE NASDAQ
1994 9,740 5,751
1995 12,234 9,517
1996 15,999 12,999
1997 22,836 17,714
1998 29,040 22,851
1999 35,497 43,484
2000 43,889 80,934
2001 42,296 44,090
2002 40,917 28,458
2003 38,462 26,810
2004 50,348 34,188
Source: NYSE Factbook.
1 See Stoll (2003, p. 6), Madhaven (2002, p. 30) and Schwartz and Wolf (2003, p. 8).
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influence of psychological factors and limits to rationality. All three market approaches
have problems explaining scale.
3.1 Efficient Markets Hypothesis
The problems facing the EMH are very clear. Although the EMH presupposes trading in
that security markets are taken to be liquid and competitive, it finds it difficult to explain
trading because it tends to suggest that a ‘buy-and-hold’ strategy would be optimal for the
representative agent.1 From the assumptions that the representative investor is rational
(investors may make mistakes, but these will be unbiased) and that security prices reflect all
available information, it follows that situations of informational asymmetries (where some
investors have private information) do not provide a sufficient basis for security trading.2 If
one seeks a motive for security trading, it has to be sought in the heterogeneity of endowments
(agents have an exogenous need to trade because of shocks to their wealth or liquidity) or in
the heterogeneity of preferences (agents have differing attitudes to risk).3 The introduction of
‘noise’ traders (whose motives for trading are not information related) may help EMH
theory to explain the occurrence of security trading as such, but not the scale of trading: it
is hardly feasible to attribute the huge trading volumes to changes in the personal
circumstances of investors. As De Bondt and Thaler (1995) put it, the high trade volume
observed in financial markets is ‘perhaps the single most embarrassing fact to the standard
finance paradigm.’(p. 392)
3.2 Microstructure theory
The MS approach to securities markets is not appreciably more successful in explaining
trading volume. MS removes one of the key idealisations of the EMH in that it is no longer
assumed that trading is frictionless; transactions costs are present, their nature and scale
depending upon the specific trading structure of the market concerned. This makes the
role of dealers (market-makers) in facilitating security transactions very important.4 Like
the EMH, the MS approach cannot postulate trade on the basis of informational
Table 3. Distribution of volume in most active stocks on NYSE (%)
Most active
50 issues
Most active
100 issues
Most active
250 issues
1985 24 37 62
1990 24 38 61
1995 23 34 54
2000 29 42 62
2003 31 43 63
Source: NYSE Factbook.
1 Indeed, it has been argued by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) that a completely efficient market might be
an impossible object, because it leaves no incentive for any agent to uncover the information which is assumed
to be costlessly disseminated.
2 See Milgrom and Stokey (1982) for an early statement of the ‘no-trade’ theorem.
3 See Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Milgrom and Stokey (1982), Kyle (1985) or Black (1986). See
Brunnermeier (2001) for an overview of attempts to circumvent the no-trade theorem. For a more recent
summary, see Cochrane (2005).
4 See O’Hara (1995), Madhaven (2000) or Stoll (2003) for a general overview of the microstructure
approach.
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differences alone: no trade would be possible if we simply had a confrontation between
informed traders and uninformed dealers, as the latter would never be prepared to trade. It
must again be assumed that there are market participants who have non-information-
related motives for trading; it is in balancing the trading needs of informed and uninformed
investors that dealers are able to obtain positive returns. To this extent, some trading is
endogenous to the MS approach, even though it must presuppose exogenous trading; in
contrast to EMH theory, volume here has informational value as dealers try to distinguish
informed from uninformed orders to trade and to facilitate price discovery by initiating
trades themselves. However, it is doubtful that one can use this price discovery story to
explain the current scale of equity trading; there appears to be much more trading than can
be accounted for by dealer-initiated volumes, even when these are added to those arising
from endowment or taste shocks.1 Note also that the MS approach runs counter to the
known pattern of equity trading, since it is large-cap stocks, that is, those for which
information problems are minimal, on which transactions are concentrated.
In public debt markets, the problem of private information is less central because the
relevant information is essentially macroeconomic and public. Here, MS theorists tend to
emphasise a different problem for market-makers—that of balancing their security
inventories in the presence of unpredictable order flows.2 Once again, dealers will initiate
trades, this time to reduce the exposures resulting from unbalanced holdings. However, the
same two limitations can be found as in the equity market: on the one hand, a certain
volume of unexplained trading has to be presupposed; on the other, the approach
does not accord well with what is known about the pattern of fixed-income trading,
where transactions are concentrated on Treasuries and near-substitutes which have
the highest degree of transparency and where the share accounted for by inter-dealer
transactions has been falling continuously with improvements in communications and
market organisation.3
3.3 Behavioural finance theory
As opposed to MS’s focus on the objective limitations of the EMH, its idealisation of the
market, behavioural finance addresses its subjective failings, its idealisation of the typical
investor. Isolated and individual departures from full rationality hardly pose a problem for
the EMH; it can be argued, first, that the losses suffered by consistently irrational investors
will lead to their elimination from the market and, second, that the price distortions they
introduce will quickly be corrected by arbitrage. Aggregate failures of rationality, however,
are a different question. It is one of the key insights of behavioural finance that large and
persistent evaluation errors cannot easily be arbitraged away, because there is always the
possibility that security prices will diverge even further from ‘fundamental’ values before
a correction takes place. Some of the trading volume in this context can appear to be self-
generating, as the exploitation of the opportunities for trade occasioned by price deviations
from fundamentals causes further deviations which offer further trading opportunities and
so on.4
1 O’Hara (2001) writes: ‘For all that we have learned, there remain several puzzling issues concerning the
trading process. Foremost is what determines volume’ (p. 3).
2 See Gravelle (2002) for an overview of how the microstructures of equity and bond markets differ.
3 Dealers accounted for approximately 50% of daily trades in US Treasuries in 2004, appreciably down
from the 65% level which was the average in the 1980’s.
4 See Stiglitz (1989), De Long et al. (1989,1990), Shleifer and Summers (1990) and Shleifer (2000) for
statements of this position.
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While there is no doubt that BF theory can contribute to our understanding of what
causes fluctuations in trading volumes at particular periods, its explanations for the trend
growth in trading volume over the longer term invite more scepticism. To see why, we
begin by noting that BF theory identifies two kinds of departure from full rationality. There
are, first, various kinds of heuristic decision processes (the use of rules of thumb and other
mental shortcuts to simplify decisions in complex and uncertain environments) which give
rise to cognitive illusions such as ‘representativeness’ (the tendency to make decisions
based on stereotypes), ‘gambler’s fallacy’ (the mistaken assumption that a trend will
reverse) and ‘overconfidence’ (individuals overestimate the precision of their private
information). There is currently very strong support for the idea that overconfidence can
provide a major explanation for excessive trading and thus for trading volume:1 as Barber
and Odean (2001) put it, ‘overconfident investors believe more strongly in their own
evaluations, and concern themselves less about the beliefs of others. This intensifies
differences of opinion. And differences of opinion cause trading’ (p. 263). This explanation
for trading volume stands close to that put forward in the ‘differences of opinion’ literature,
which posits a strong correlation between trading volume and the degree to which investors
differ in their prior beliefs or in the way that they interpret public information.2 Once again,
the highly focused nature of actual trading seems to work against these views as a central
explanation of trading volumes; heterogeneity of opinions would presumably make for
a greater dispersion of trading across securities carrying different characteristics and yet
trading is concentrated on a few types which exhibit many common characteristics.
The same criticism can be applied to a more recent explanation for trading volume that
also lies firmly in the heuristics branch of BF theory: the ‘trading rule’ explanation.3
Central to this approach is the same assumption that individuals use rules as mental
shortcuts to reduce complexity, although the rules in question have a more formal
character in that they involve a fixed and clearly specified link between security selection
and the publicly observable characteristics of securities (for example, the price/earnings
ratio which indicates whether a specific equity is a ‘value’ or a ‘growth’ stock). Investors
following a particular rule or ‘style’ rebalance their portfolios in accordance with changes in
the characteristics of individual securities. As with the overconfidence and differences in
opinion literature, trading volume here is predicated on the heterogeneity of investors, the
difference being that heterogeneity pertains not to beliefs as such but to trading rules. But
again the observed pattern of trading in the capital markets goes against this explanation.
Recall that we are dealing with daily trading volume, much of which is concentrated on
a few agents and on a few securities: while there has been a proliferation of trading rules
among the investor community, and while security characteristics do change over time, the
scale of daily volume and its concentrated nature are orders of magnitude above that which
1 De Bondt and Thaler (1995): ‘the key behavioural factor needed to understand the trading puzzle is
overconfidence’(p. 393); Shiller (2000): ‘Overconfidence, however generated, appears to be a fundamental
factor promoting the high volume of trade we observe in speculative markets. Without such overconfidence,
one would think that there would be little trading in financial markets’ (p. 23); Shefrin (2000): ‘There are two
main implications of investor overconfidence. The first is that investors take bad bets because they fail to
realize that they are at an informational disadvantage. The second is that they trade more frequently than is
prudent, which leads to excessive trading volume’ (p. 300); Barber and Odean (2001): ‘ We believe that there
is a simple and powerful explanation for high levels of trading on financial markets: overconfidence’(p. 261);
Statman et al. (2004): ‘The proposition that investors are overconfident about their valuation and trading
skills can explain high observed trading volume’ (p. 1).
2 See Varian (1989), Harris and Raviv (1993) or Kandel and Pearson (1995).
3 See Barberis and Shleifer (2003) or Nagel (2004) for statements of this position.
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can be accounted for by the range of trading rule heterogeneity or by the pace of change in
security characteristics.
The second kind of departure from full rationality, prospect theory, relates to biases
stemming from an inability to cope fully with problems of uncertainty. Examples are
‘mental accounting’, which leads to an inappropriate separation of various decisions, and
‘regret aversion’, a psychological reaction to realised losses which adds to the financial
penalty involved. In certain cases, these ‘framing effects’ can lead to herding behaviour
with implications for trading volumes. Herding of this kind might come closer to the
observed patterns of trading on equity markets in that it might tend to focus on ‘respected
companies’. There may well be, in these behavioural effects, an important contribution to
our understanding of fluctuations in trading activity.1 However, there would be major
empirical difficulties in any attempt to account for the trend growth of trading volumes in
these terms.
To summarise, in the analysis of security markets, all three approaches are valuable, with
MS and behavioural finance complementing, at a more concrete level, the powerful but
very abstract account offered by the efficient market hypothesis. But none of the three gives
a clear explanation of the known facts about security market trading. The difficulties are
clearest in the case of EMH, where the paradox of an active market based on a general
tendency to buy and hold is well known. But the microstructure and behavioural
approaches also have difficulties—they can explain some fraction of transactions only by
taking the rest as given; they do not usually match the known pattern of security trades,
with its focus on high-cap equities and on-the-run Treasuries; they either have to assume
a high degree of heterogeneity among investors, or they fail to specify clearly who are the
counterparties to a given type of trade. Above all, however, none of the three approaches is
sufficiently dynamic to address the strong trend growth in security market trading which is
a key empirical characteristic of the phenomenon.
4. ‘Institutional’ perspectives on trading volume: churning and hedge funds
The past two decades have witnessed strong growth in the role of institutional investors in
the US financial markets. The major contributory factors to this growth include the
increase in the financial wealth of US households,2 the increase in the proportion of
household wealth held in securities as opposed to bank deposits,3 and the increase in the
proportion of household assets that are externally managed.4 In quantitative terms, there is
no doubt that the rapid increase in US security market turnover can be associated with the
rise of institutional investors. Over 50% of equity is now held by the institutions,5 although,
as noted earlier, a much larger share of equity trading can be attributed to them. In the
fixed-income markets, moreover, securities are almost exclusively in the hands of the
institutions who are also responsible for virtually all of the trading.
1 See Shleifer (2000) or Brunnermeier (2001) for a discussion of herding behaviour and its impact on
trading volume.
2 The net financial wealth/GDP ratio for households in 2004 was 2.22% compared with 1.99% in 1970.
3 In 2004, institutional investors held 73% and banks held 27% of all intermediated claims; this compares
with a 50:50 ratio in 1980.
4 In 2004, institutional investors had 42% of all household assets under management as compared with
22% in 1970 and 32% in 1990.
5 The Conference Board (2002) reported that institutional equity assets as a percentage of total
outstanding equity rose from 37.2% in 1980 to 55.8% by year-end 2001.
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In the light of these developments, it may seem surprising that, in the theoretical
approaches to trading volume reviewed above, little attention is paid to the distinction
between individual and institutional investors. The efficient markets hypothesis refers, in
the abstract, to a representative rational investor whose motives and procedures are not
affected by the indirect nature of the holdings concerned. Analysts of micro-market
structure have to take the scale of trades into account, but they focus on the distinction
between informed and uninformed investors rather than on the motives for individual and
institutional trades. As for behavioural finance, many of its practitioners seem to assume
that the cognitive biases and psychological effects which this approach emphasises are
applicable in the same way and to the same extent to both individual investors and the
agents employed by institutions.
Some commentators have attempted to link trading volumes to the rise of the
institutions by focusing on principal-agent problems that are specific to the delegated
fund management process.1 This choice of the agency theory paradigm as the broad
framework for discussions on institutional trading explains why the characteristic feature of
these discussions is the notion of security market churning; that is, trading by fund
managers which is, in one way or another, excessive in relation to the interests of their
clients. The churning story can be approached from other perspectives, but agency theory
brings an added dimension to the link between institutional trading and trading volume
when it makes the claim that turnover is high because contractual problems not only give
scope to the propensity for churning (which may be motivated by fund managers’ attempts
to boost fees, reputation or career prospects) but also may directly encourage churning as
a second-best solution to these problems.2
Although the phenomena adduced to support the churning notion are certainly real,3 it
is unlikely that it can account for a substantial part of daily trading volume. Churning
signifies managerial discretion for trading, and while contractual problems may encourage
or give room to such discretion there are today even more powerful counteracting forces at
work. Chief among these is the increased use by institutional investors of market
benchmarks for setting the terms of investment mandates and assessing fund manager
performance.4 It can be argued that passively managed funds (where discretion over
security selection is virtually eliminated) still represent the minority part of all in-
stitutionally managed assets in the US, but with the continuing trend towards the tiering
and narrowing of mandates, now characterised by tight constraints on allowable deviations
from a given market benchmark, the scope for managerial discretion is also reduced for
active mandates.5 If there is a connection between delegated asset management and
1 See Dow and Gorton (1997) or Dasgupta and Prat (2003).
2 Dow and Gorton (1997) argue that, because employers of portfolio managers find it difficult to
distinguish ‘actively doing nothing’ (in the sense that managers cannot uncover any mispriced securities) from
‘simply doing nothing’, and thus do not write contracts that allow a reward for not trading, managers are
induced to trade actively so as not to appear incompetent or to be shirking.
3 Walter (2003) gives a comprehensive overview of the subject.
4 See Bernstein (2003) for a discussion of the increasing popularity of benchmarking as an element in
performance measurement and the implication this has for managerial discretion.
5 A recent Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (2003) report on institutional asset management
states: ‘More recently, the dividing line between active and passive mandates has tended to become
increasingly blurred. Contractual and regulatory constraints, for example, when used together with limits on
tracking error, can eat significantly into the asset manager’s room for manoeuvre, potentially converting
active funds into quasi-passive funds’ (p. 15) Tracking error, defined as the standard deviation of excess
returns over a sample period (typically a year), is a measure of the divergence of a portfolio’s return from that
of a selected benchmark.
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trading volume, it has to be explained in terms of the constraints binding on portfolio
managers rather than in terms of voluntary behaviour.
Another explanation for equity trading volume that tends to be advanced in connection
with institutional investors emphasises the role of hedge funds. Subject to much lighter
regulatory and investment management constraints than are institutionally managed
funds, hedge funds have been well positioned to take advantage of the progressive
reductions in brokers’ commissions and other transaction costs and, moreover, they have
had the motive to do so, as many of their strategies involve vast numbers of transactions
which aim to make small gains on average.1 Taken in conjunction with the observation that
in recent years (and particularly since the end of the bull market in US stocks in 2000)
institutional investors have increased their use of hedge funds to help boost overall returns,
these points have induced some commentators to see hedge funds as providing an
important clue to the trading volume puzzle. We are sceptical. Despite their recent growth
in the US, the proportion of institutional assets assigned to them still remains extremely
small.2 Even allowing for the fact that some hedge funds have extremely high rates of
turnover of shares, it is unlikely they account for anything like the 50% of daily trading
volume on the New York Stock Exchange as has been suggested; more likely is the
maximum figure of 20% quoted in recent testimony to the US Securities and Exchange
Commission.3 A further reason for our scepticism is that it is difficult to reconcile the
heavily concentrated structure of equity trading with the sheer diversity of hedge fund
investment strategies. These strategies, which include macro, long/short, distressed debt,
convertible arbitrage, multi-strategy, market neutral and event driven, presumably involve
substantial differences not only in the techniques used but also in the types of securities
traded. Since 63% of the daily trading volume on the NYSE in 2003 consisted of trades in
just 250 securities, it would seem to follow that hedge funds can only account for
a minority, if not insubstantial, proportion of this volume.
When all is said, the hedge fund theory of trading volume can be seen as an example of
the market-based perspectives reviewed above. The churning theory is also more to be
identified with, than differentiated from, these perspectives. While it makes the case that
the increase in delegated asset management provides an important clue to understanding
the increase in trading volume, its portrayal of institutional trading as largely dysfunctional
places it on a par with those views that ascribe trading volume to various structural
inefficiencies or pathological disorders. In our view, the strong correlation between the
trend growth in trading volume and the trend growth in delegated investment manage-
ment, coupled with the apparent inexorability of these trends, point to the likelihood that
1 The fact that hedge funds avoid stamp duty in the UK has been cited as another reason for their
important contribution to trading volume; this argument, however, does not apply to the US as there is no
stamp duty here.
2 Pensions & Investments reports a figure of just $38.2 billion for 2004. The total amount of assets managed
by US hedge funds at the beginning of 2004 on behalf of all institutions and wealthy individuals was in the
region of $820 billion (FT, 23 March 2005), a sum that is roughly equivalent to just 10% of institutional tax
exempt assets.
3 Owing to the lack of transparency of hedge funds, it has been extremely difficult to reach agreement on
their precise contribution to trading volume. The Economist (February 2005) reports that hedge funds ‘can
account for more than half the daily volume on the New York Stock Exchange’ (p. 60). The Financial Services
Authority (April 2005) puts the figure at between a third and a half (p. 13). US sources tend to go for a lower
ratio. Thus Black (2004) gives a figure of 25%. Paul Roye (October, 2004), the former Director of Investment
Management at the SEC, stated in his testimony to the SEC that ‘ hedge funds are responsible for up to 20
per cent of equity trading volume’ on the NYSE.
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institutional trading practices and heavy daily volume are now symptomatic of the routine
operation of an advanced economy. This issue is explored in the next section.
5. ‘Institutional’ perspectives on trading volume: the ‘core–satellite’
paradigm and portfolio rebalancing
All the accounts of security markets considered so far have two key elements in common.
First, trading is largely exogenous; it is inessential to the various theories which are
advanced. Second, such explanations of trading as are given stress the heterogeneity of
investors with respect to the individual security concerned, whether this heterogeneity
relates to information or investor requirements. These elements are most clearly seen in the
efficient markets approach where trading is basically presupposed: liquid markets in
securities must exist in order for investors to hold securities, but typical investor strategies
do not involve much trade. But the other theories also display the same two features.
Market structure theories can explain some trading (on the part of dealers) but only
because they presuppose the rest—the exogenous trading requirements of the other
investors. Here, heterogeneity of information as to the expected returns on a specific
security motivate the trading strategies of market actors. The behavioural approach, on the
other hand, appeals to the heterogeneity of investor motives, for example, the different
biases inherent in investor styles to account for some trading, while again assuming that
exogenous factors (for example, the wealth and liquidity shocks which are assumed to give
rise to noise trading) are sufficient to constitute liquid markets. Finally, prevalent accounts
of trading by institutional investors, with their emphasis on portfolio churning or on the use
of hedge funds, again display the same two elements. Trading may result from
heterogeneous assessments, whether objectively or subjectively based, by the various
institutions, or it may represent a malfunction on their part, a failure of the institutions as
agents to represent the true interests of their principals, and thus a feature which is not
intrinsic to the market.
All the above accounts raise a central empirical difficulty in that they correspond neither
to the huge scale of security trading nor to its skewed structure which is heavily concentrated
on just those securities where there is least scope for differences in assessment or for
idiosyncratic judgements. On the contrary, the data suggest that the bulk of security
trading is endogenous to the markets in the sense of being an essential activity of the
institutions as major participants and is characterised by homogeneity in that the exchange
of a security rests more often on an equivalent valuation by buyer and seller than on
divergence of their opinions. This is not to deny that some trading is clearly based on such
divergences and on exogenous forces—but the greater part of security trading cannot be
understood in those terms. While all the established accounts of security turnover rule out
the possibility that trading volume is largely endogenous, our argument is that it can be
given scope and credibility by directing attention to the newly emerging ‘core–satellite’
paradigm in institutional fund management1.
The core–satellite paradigm essentially represents the fund management industry’s
response to the new problems and responsibilities it faces as it makes the transition from
a small industry catering to the needs of a few wealthy clients to a mass industry serving the
1 Because the core–satellite paradigm is relatively recent (although fully established among US and UK
institutional investors, it is only now making its appearance in continental Europe (Amenc et al., 2003, p. 19))
discussions of this paradigm are still confined to industry practitioners (see the BIS survey, 2003) and have yet
to filter through into the academic literature.
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requirements of broad sections of the population. The basic function of delegated fund
management remains the same: unlike banks which provide a maturity transformation
giving depositors an asset of guaranteed immediate value, institutional investors provide
their customers with long-run positions without such a guarantee but with the basic
rationale of exploiting opportunities of size and expertise so that individual clients obtain
a better return subject to given levels of risk than would otherwise be possible. However,
with the popularisation of fund management, and with the intensification of competition
that inevitably accompanies such popularisation, institutional investors have come
under far greater pressure to show that the returns on investment management are
commensurate with the risks taken and that fees are commensurate with the results
delivered. The advantage of a core–satellite approach is that it enables them to cope with
these pressures in a disciplined and cost-effective way. In elaborating on this point, and
drawing out its implications for trading volume, we look, first, at equity funds, and second,
at bond funds.
5.1 Institutional equity funds
One of the most striking developments in the US equity markets over the past two decades
is the rise in the proportion of institutional assets that are tied to various market indices.1 In
an important sense, this trend vindicates both the EMH and its offshoot the Capital Asset
Pricing Model: the latter because the rise in indexation brings actual investor practice into
accordance with the central theory of asset evaluation, which can only be made fully
operational through the portfolio diversification that large institutions can achieve; the
former because the rise in indexation bears testimony to institutional investors’ acceptance
of the view that capital markets are sufficiently efficient as to make it difficult for most fund
managers to outperform them consistently over the longer term. However, the very process
by which institutional investors have sought to give systematic practical application to the
insights of theory also creates certain difficulties that impede its full application.2 To
illustrate, we can look at the major domestic equity strategies of the top US money
managers as documented in Table 4.
The data in Table 4 confirm the new core–satellite structure in US institutional equity
fund management, where the ‘core’ consists of portfolios benchmarked against a given
market index, and the ‘satellite’ portfolios consist of particular subsets of the market
selected either according to a given specialisation strategy (the two most prominent being
the ‘growth’ and ‘value’ investment strategies)3 or by simply attempting to identify
undervalued securities. As is also clear from the data, the core–satellite structure preserves
the passive/active dichotomy but in a way that brings these traditionally opposed
investment strategies closer together. Thus in both the core and satellite strategies, we
find a continuum stretching from passively managed portfolios that stay very close to their
relevant benchmarks to more actively managed portfolios that give some scope for
discretion. Figure 1 helps to illustrate the point that it is through the twofold division of
individual portfolio managers into ‘core’ versus ‘satellite’ and ‘passive’ versus ‘active’, that
fund management firms can keep tight control over return–risk correlations, on the one
hand, and managerial cost and performance correlations, on the other. Core-passive and
1 Pensions & Investments (2004) reports that the amount of indexed institutional tax exempt assets rose
from approximately $400 billion in 1994 to approximately $1.75 trillion in 2003.
2 These difficulties seem to be closely related to those identified by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
3 Money managers also further subdivide core and style portfolios into capitalisation boxes (large cap,
mid-cap and small cap). For purposes of simplicity, we have abstracted from this subdivision.
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Table 4. Equity strategies of the top 25 US money managers (sums in $millions)a
Strategy
Manager Core-passive
Enhanced
index Core-active Value-passive Value-active Growth-passive Growth-active Total
1 State Street Global Advisors 206,279 12,111 960 182 1,050 56 220,638
2 Barclays Global Investors 262,592 64,447 13,993 2,691 10,172 353,895
3 Fidelity Investments 16,966 16,356 143,819 27,265 66,974 271,380
4 Northern Trust Global 85,779 3,822 2,322 8,999 2,026 8,174 1,218 112,340
5 Mellon Financial Corporation 60,963 1,985 16,385 1,863 14,605 507 956 97,264
6 TIAA-CREF 7,428 62,059 24,624 11,003 105,114
7 PIMCO 22,174 22,174
8 Vanguard Group 83,351 238 1,975 664 2,418 1,248 89,894
9 Legg Mason 2,643 13,605 23,869 142 40,259
10 Alliance Capital 14,777 2,531 1,838 723 30,228 200 37,650 87,947
11 Capital Research
12 Prudential Financial 11,905 2,211 2,158 3,296 14,808 34,378
13 Capital Guardian 25,701 1,602 182 27,485
14 Evergreen Investments 6,350 1,375 4,319 1,282 13,326
15 Banc One Investment 3,457 4,194 3,723 4,800 16,174
16 INVESCO 955 2,964 16,948 1,152 5,486 27,505
17 J.P.Morgan Fleming 11,225 7,372 1,111 348 20,056
18 Blackrock 1,837 625 171 2,633
19 Morgan Stanley Investment 1,914 3,627 5,541
20 Dodge&Cox 46,052 46,052
21 Wellington Management 5,887 15,579 1,318 3,182 25,966
22 ING 717 5,173 5,752 619 2,919 15,180
23 Franklin Templeton 9,367 3,954 8,861 22,182
24 T.Rowe Price 3,245 5,230 6,575 1,900 7,125 24,075
25 Principal Global Investors 6,726 3,166 2,068 1,506 13,466
Total 771,490 218,800 299,258 27,735 179,676 24,421 173,544 1,694,924
aSums refer to institutional tax exempt equity assets. The top 25 money managers of the 803 profiled by Pensions & Investments in 2004 had approximately $3 trillion
of institutional tax exempt assets (equities and bonds) under their management, just over a third of the total of $8.98 trillion
Source: Pensions&Investments.
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style-passive portfolios represent low-risk and low-cost strategies for gaining broad market
and sub-market exposures, respectively. Funds placed in portfolios that deviate from their
benchmarks represent attempts to attain yields above the average while incurring extra
risks and managerial costs. However, the imposition on managers of very precise limits of
allowable tracking error manifests the new forensic approach to risk management, as
additional levels of risk are closely monitored and precisely measured, unit for unit, against
any corresponding additions in yield. Similarly, as regards managerial cost control, the use
of benchmarks against which individual performance is measured enables fund manage-
ment firms to distinguish ordinary beta-factory and style portfolio managers from genuine
bargain hunters and alpha creators, thereby enabling cost and performance to be more
closely aligned.
It is by following this same twofold categorisation of management strategies as ‘core’
versus ‘satellite’ and ‘passive’ versus ‘active’ that we can begin to see clearly the
implications of this approach for the scale and structure of equity trading volume. Trading
in connection with the maintenance of satellite portfolios can indeed be characterised by
the twin elements of ‘exogeneity’ (trading is not essential but reflects rather the search for
alpha) and ‘heterogeneity’ (traders expecting ‘growth’ stocks to outperform ‘value’ stocks
sell the latter to, and buy the former from, traders who expect the reverse). But the volume
of funds placed in satellite portfolios is much lower than that placed in core-passive
portfolios, and these are associated with an entirely different approach to trade. It is not
trading so much as the avoidance of trading that is a key objective of these portfolios: apart
from the trades required to construct them, and to alter their composition as and when
there are changes to the index taken as a benchmark, no further trades are required.
Indeed, a key implication of the capitalisation-weighted indices serving as benchmarks is
that, in the absence of changes to the index, fully replicated portfolios are essentially self-
balancing and thus cheap to manage. The question that arises of course is why, given the
cost advantages of a purely passive strategy, are not all core portfolios run in this way? The
answer lies in the gap between theory and practice.
In theory, the optimum solution to maximising return for a given level of risk is to
maintain a portfolio that duplicates the entire range of equities in the market. In practice,
institutional investors find it too complex and too expensive to construct and maintain such
a portfolio. They attempt rather to replicate the behaviour of the whole market with a much
smaller sample of stocks. The most popular benchmark used for this purpose is the
S&P500.1 However, while replicating a narrow market index such as the S&P500 resolves
one set of problems, it gives rise to another. Heavy concentration on placements closely
Increasing use of Information 
 
Strategy
Portfolio Passive Active 
Core Beta Factories Bargain Hunters 
Increasing
Specialisation
Satellite Style Portfolios Alpha Traders 
Fig. 1. The core–satellite approach to asset management.
1 Assets benchmarked against the S&P 500 totalled $1,431.8 billion in 2004. For a comprehensive
overview of US equity index benchmark usage, see Smith and Lert (2004).
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representative of the market tends to lower the yields of the securities selected by such
a strategy and thus to create opportunities for the use of research and information to seek
some gains either by accepting limited departures from the benchmark index in the search
for higher yields or by the use of specialisation strategies.1 It is clear from Table 4 that even
the largest fund managers find it too costly to hold their entire funds in core-passive
portfolios and diversify their strategies to seek some informational gain. But where the
larger fund managers can exploit their scale economy advantages and hold the bulk of their
funds in passive portfolios, the smaller managers have to apply a lighter touch to indexation
and concentrate more on bargain hunting. This is confirmed in Table 4 by the strong
negative correlation between the volume of the funds under management and the ratio
of actively managed funds to the passive component: the larger the fund, the larger
the proportion of assets held in more passive portfolios and vice versa.
Trading may not be essential when portfolios fully replicate a market index, but it
certainly becomes so as soon as limited departures from an index are accepted. Even for
those core-passive strategies that allow for the smallest of deviations from full replication,
trading is endogenous to portfolio maintenance. The same applies to a greater extent for
enhanced index and core-active strategies. Managers following these strategies hold the
principal components of a given index but vary the weights from those in the index to make
space for the inclusion in portfolios of close, but cheaper, substitute securities to represent
particular sectors. Any deviation of these sample values from the values of the sectors on
the whole market requires a rebalancing exercise to replicate the changed market situation.
If rebalancing is not undertaken, the fund managers in question are speculating in the sense
of hoping for exceptionally favourable outcomes from the particular stocks that are held. It
might be argued that, in accepting departures from the index, these managers are already
speculating. This is not the case if by speculation we mean the exercise of discretion on the
part of investors in an attempt to outperform the market by generating above-average
returns. Not only do managers of enhanced index and core-active portfolios have very
limited discretion, but such discretion as they do have is aimed at enhancing yield, not by
beating the market, but by holding the market in a reduced cost form. What would amount
to speculation in the usual sense of the term would be the failure to rebalance enhanced
index and core-active portfolios continually, thereby allowing their reward–risk structures
to stray too far from the index which is being tracked.
Given the allocation of a substantial proportion of funds to core portfolios that track
indexes with varying degrees of tracking error, and given that these portfolios have to be
continually rebalanced to stay within tracking error limits, there is a case for saying that the
rebalancing thesis provides a good explanation for the rise in daily trading volume observed
on the equity markets. However, what really strengthens the case in favour of this thesis is
that it can explain the homogeneous nature of much of this volume. To see this, let us go back
to the argument that even the slightest deviation of sample values from the values of the
sectors on the whole market necessitates a rebalancing exercise. This rebalancing can take
one of two forms: trade the existing sample securities for alternative securities whose
characteristics more closely represent particular sectors or keep the existing sample
securities but again vary the weights of the principal components to compensate for their
changed characteristics. The latter strategy is by far the more cost-effective, because
smaller cap securities, although cheaper to hold are more costly to trade on account of their
relative illiquidity, while the largest cap securities, although more costly to hold are cheaper
1 See BIS (2003, pp. 19–20).
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to trade on account their superior liquidity.1 The homogeneity of trading essentially comes
down to this fact that it is the liquidity of large cap securities that institutional investors
value identically. Heterogeneity of interests may form the basis of trades, even while these
are characterised by homogeneity, in so far as different sampling strategies are followed;
although fully indexed portfolios are identical,2 less than fully indexed portfolios are
obviously different, in that choice is exercised over the nature and degree of variation from
full indexation. The important point, however, is that whatever other securities are held in
enhanced index and core-active portfolios, it is the principal components of the index that
are being traded in order to control the costs of tracking the index.3
The above discussion points to what has to be the major stumbling block standing in the
path of all other theories of equity trading volume. These do not explain the scale and
structure of this volume, because they do not allow for the endogeneity and homogeneity of
trades, and the reason for this is because they all start from the premise that trading is a key
objective of investment strategy: investors trade because they want to trade, and they want to
trade in order to take advantage of some opportunity or other. The rebalancing thesis
advanced here turns this logic on its head, in that it argues that a substantial proportion of
trades actually form part of an investment strategy that has the avoidance of trading as
a central objective. To say that investors trade because, in some sense, they do not want to
trade may seem illogical, but this paradox is not a reflection of irrational or inconsistent
behaviour so much as the result of the collective and entirely rational behaviour of
institutional investors. It is logical for them to try to track the market, while driving trading
costs towards zero, by holding a given index. However, the practical problems associated
with a purely passive, ‘no-trade’, investment strategy, compel institutional investors to
supplement their core strategies to include enhanced index and active portfolios which
then entail both continual rebalancing and the continual effort to keep the cost of this
rebalancing down. In our view, the heavy concentration of NYSE trades on the most liquid
and public of stocks, on those stocks, in other words, which yield the least possible
informational advantage, is a clear indicator of the ‘endogeneity’ of trading, the fact that
trading is not itself a strategic aim so much as an unavoidable aspect of a strategy that has
an entirely different aim.
5.2 Institutional bond funds
Even more than in the case of equity trading, transactions in the bond market have to be
related to institutional behaviour. Data on bond turnover show that levels are very high but
relatively stable, since the rapid growth rates of both overall capitalisation and trading have
been approximately equal in recent decades. Given that there is no ongoing transition to
institutional dominance, as for equities, but rather a complete dominance of the
institutions, this pattern corresponds to the general position taken here that security
trading is largely an institutional phenomenon. This said, there are important aspects of
this trading that can only be properly understood with reference to the fact that the bond
portfolios of institutional investors are also increasingly organised in a core–satellite
structure. Table 5 confirms this development.
1 The fact that institutional investors have to trade shares in above-average size blocks also explains why
trades tend to be concentrated on those securities which have the deepest markets and where, in consequence,
the price impact of trades is lowest.
2 Assuming that the same index is chosen as the benchmark.
3 This represents the reverse, upside, effect of the growth in the demand for large cap securities that
correlates closely with the rise of indexation strategies; while making large cap stocks more costly to hold, this
growth in demand also makes them, by increasing their liquidity, cheaper to trade.
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Table 5. Bond strategies of the top 25 US money managers (sums in $millions)a
Strategy
Manager Core-passive Enhanced index Core-active Stable value Market timing Sector rotation Other Total
1 State Street Global Advisors 41,148 17,013 6,149 10,865 41,148 116,324
2 Barclays Global Investors 53,471 5,300 58,773
3 Fidelity Investments 3,779 7,221 4,078 39,319 5,503 59,900
4 Northern Trust Global 25,295 699 9,073 35,067
5 Mellon Financial Corporation 21,562 10,029 96,698 128,289
6 TIAA-CREF 4,566 380 2,658 18,009 25,613
7 PIMCO 1,019 155,957 11,032 29,763 197,778
8 Vanguard Group 13,675 21,354 24,062 819 59,918
9 Legg Mason 811 66,287 4,284 11,651 8 83,041
10 Alliance Capital 884 1,056 1,505 6,313 12,931 22,689
11 Capital Research
12 Prudential Financial 4,518 6,844 14,046 8,128 29,189 62,737
13 Capital Guardian 2,685 239 530 3,467
14 Evergreen Investments 17,436 37,138 54,588
15 Banc One Investment 42,685 42,700
16 INVESCO 531 5,502 39,937 6,887 52,873
17 J.P.Morgan Fleming 35,344 6,151 41,512
18 Blackrock 6,799 51,125 14,849 22,093 94,884
19 Morgan Stanley Investment 24,026 1,083 5,749 30,877
20 Dodge&Cox 34,914 34,934
21 Wellington Management 16,872 1,878 18,771
22 ING 361 5,233 3,796 6,997 6,718 23,127
23 Franklin Templeton 6,081 1,312 7,416
24 T.Rowe Price 15 1,630 3,055 10,255 14,979
25 Principal Global Investors 4,648 13,115 1,120 18,908
Total 165,239 51,870 521,662 201,227 1,702 148,486 198,702 1,288,888
aSums refer to institutional tax exempt bond assets.
Source: Pensions & Investments.
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As with equity portfolios, US fund management firms are being driven by competitive
forces to divide portfolio managers into two distinct groups, a ‘core’ group of low cost/low
risk managers who are charged with matching average market returns by tracking a broad
bond index, and a ‘satellite’ group of higher cost/higher risk managers who are given a little
more licence to try and generate above-average returns. In the case of bonds, this means
exploiting interest rate predictions as regard changes in their level (‘market timing’) or
structure (‘active duration’) or in the risk premiums attached to corporate debt instru-
ments (‘sector rotation’). As with equities again, satellite portfolios account only for a small
fraction of institutional holdings. When core bond portfolios are examined, however, an
important difference with equity portfolios emerges: core-passive strategies, those which
most closely approach full indexation are less common and core-active strategies, where
some attempt to use information is involved, are more so. The key reason why core-passive
strategies are relatively less prominent in institutional bond investment is that there are
immense practical difficulties surrounding bond indexation.
For a start, there is a vast universe of debt instruments1 which means that even the
broadest of bond indices come nothing like as close as the equity indices in representing the
full opportunity set. Further, not only are the components of the major bond indices
changed more frequently than those in equity indices (owing to redemptions, new issues
and so on), but the indices include many securities that are either not available or available
at huge cost, which means that full replication of these indices is practically impossible. In
this situation, although indices are widely used as benchmarks, only a few, very large and
conservative institutions, actually attempt anything like index replication, typically through
stratified sampling. Rather, limited departures from benchmark performance are traded off
against attempts to reduce costs and increase yields. Finally, it can be noted that even if full
replication of bond indices were possible in practice this may still not be desirable as it
would restrict the ability of managers to adjust the risk structures of bond portfolios in
accordance with changes in macroeconomic conditions and monetary policy. Since
publicly available information is a major determinant of bond prices, it is hardly possible
for fund managers to abstain completely from information seeking.
The distinctive features of debt securities help shape the precise form taken by the core–
satellite approach in institutional bond management, and they similarly influence the
particular pattern of bond transactions. These transactions, for example, are affected by
the fact that the characteristics of a bond change with the mere passage of time, in a way
that equities characteristics do not, as redemption approaches and coupon payments are
made. Transactions are also affected by the fact that bonds give rise to pre-determined cash
flows which makes them particularly valuable for investment strategies where risk
avoidance and value conservation motives prevail. However, mutatis mutandis, the
structures of institutional trading in equities and bonds are very similar. As with equity
funds, the ‘satellite’ bond portfolios are characterised both by exogeneity of trading
(trading is not essential to the maintenance of these portfolios but rather reflects the
attempt to generate ‘alpha’) and by heterogeneity of judgements over the securities traded.
But as with the bulk of equity funds, the ‘core’ bond portfolios are on the contrary
characterised by endogeneity of trading activity and by homogeneity with respect to security
evaluation.
1 Approximately 180,000 issues are currently available in the US with different maturities, call features,
coupon structures and credit protections as opposed to some 15,000 equity issues.
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For core portfolios which track an index with varying degrees of permissible tracking
error, trading is endogenous in that constant rebalancing is necessary to keep these
portfolios in line with their mandates. As in the case of equities, this endogeneity of core
portfolios helps to explain the heavy daily volume in bond trading. However, there is
a further consideration that also explains why this volume is orders of magnitude above that
in the equity markets. Because systemic risk, linked to general changes in interest rates, is
so important in bond markets, the main rebalancing operations are linked to interest rate
exposures. The classical form of rebalancing, still predominant as a trading motive, is
‘immunisation’. Except in very unusual cases, bond portfolio managers are unable to
match exactly the time pattern of their assets and that of their liabilities, that is, of their
payments to customers. Coupon and redemption payments which arrive ‘too soon’ are
subject to reinvestment risk, that is to a decline in interest rates; on the other hand, bonds
with later pay-offs will have to be sold before maturity in order to meet liabilities which
means they are subject to ‘market risk’, that is, the risk of a rise in interest rates which will
depress their value. Thus a standard rebalancing strategy is to control the ‘duration’ of
a bond portfolio so as to offset reinvestment and market exposures.
The large volumes of trading that arise, as a matter of routine, out of the rebalancing
operations necessary for index tracking or for immunisation purposes may give the
impression that the bond markets are characterised by widespread speculation, but the
opposite is in fact the case. If a portfolio replicating the risk structure of a more
comprehensive portfolio (through stratification or some other optimisation procedure) is
not continually rebalanced in line with changing market conditions, then the manager is
speculating, calculating that a different risk structure is more advantageous. The same
logic applies to a manager following an immunisation strategy. The manager has to
respond to every change in the level of interest rates; for example, a general rise in rates
requires the replacement of near-term by more distant cash flows. If this is not done, the
manager is adopting a speculative position, relying on an ability to reinvest approaching
coupon and redemption payments on better terms. Changes in term structure will involve
more complex, but equally necessary, rebalancing operations. The upshot is that core bond
portfolios, those which actually predominate, are constantly rebalanced precisely in order
to avoid speculative exposure to the main risks in the debt securities market. As with equity
portfolios, it is not security trading but a failure to undertake rebalancing trades which
would amount to speculation.
If the endogeneity of security trading by institutional investors is just as clear in debt
markets as in equity markets, so also is this true of homogeneity. Heterogeneity of motives
must of course be presupposed as the basis for trading. The buyers and sellers of a given
debt security have differences which relate to their portfolios, to the time structure of
liabilities and to the levels of risk which are acceptable. However, what does not differ is the
assessment of the traded security by the buyers and sellers concerned. Just as equity
portfolios are rebalanced, wherever this is possible, by buying and selling the most liquid,
high-cap stocks, so bond portfolio adjustments are also concentrated on the most liquid
debt securities, above all Treasuries. Even when, for yield motives, other bonds are held, it
tends to be Treasuries and near substitutes which are traded in order to control exposures
and track benchmark indices.1 The specific characteristics of debt securities reinforce
1 US Treasuries are extremely attractive to institutional investors because of their greater homogeneity as
compared with corporate securities (they are completely free of default risk, have no call features etc.) and
because they are issued in very large volumes, at regular intervals and across a range of maturities See Dupont
and Sack (1999) and Joint Economic Committee (2001).
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concentration in yet another way. For each bond issue, the fraction which is actively traded
tends to decline over time as maturity approaches; thus, even trading in Treasury securities
is concentrated on ‘on-the-run’ issues.1
To summarise this section: the ‘macro’ data on US security markets suggest that
transactions characterised by endogeneity and homogeneity dominate those characterised
by exogeneity and heterogeneity; at the same time, the ‘micro’ data profiling the top US
money managers suggest that the organisation of institutional investors into core–satellite
structures corresponds to this pattern. It is straightforward to relate ‘satellite’ portfolios to
trading activity which is exogenous and based on heterogeneity of security evaluations. The
correspondence between ‘core’ portfolios and the endogeneity and homogeneity of trades
is less straightforward, in that such portfolios are tied to market indices, and indexation
in theory signifies minimal trading. However, the practical problems associated with
indexation, particularly acute in the case of bonds, mean that a substantial proportion of
‘core’ funds are allocated to portfolios which track but do not fully replicate the indices
chosen as benchmarks. The need for the constant rebalancing of these portfolios is, we
contend, a major factor behind the current levels of daily trading volume, and the attempts
by fund managers to contain the costs of rebalancing can provide a major explanation for
the concentrated structure of trading. The final point is that the emergence of the core–
satellite paradigm reflects the fund management industry’s response to the new pressures
and responsibilities that accompany its increasing popularisation. It follows that any
evaluation of current financial market trends for policy purposes must depend on how this
expansion in institutional fund management is interpreted. The next section briefly
discusses this question.
6. Policy implications of institutional trading
The steep rise in capital market trading volume in recent decades has inevitably led to an
ongoing and very intense debate over its likely impact. Where some commentators see the
rise in this volume as necessary to the stable and efficient functioning of the wider
economy, others see in this rise a source of greater systemic instability.2 Intense as it is, this
debate is nevertheless one-sided in that, while the effects of liquid capital markets are
discussed, the question of whether these markets are indeed liquid is not. On the contrary,
because of the tendency to identify rising capital market trading volume with rising capital
market liquidity, this liquidity is generally treated as a fact to be taken as given rather
than as an issue to be explored. This position links strongly with the failure to draw
a fundamental distinction between the trading motives of institutional investors, on the one
hand, and those of individual investors, on the other.
A completely different take on the liquidity of the capital markets is necessitated as soon
as the distinction between institutional and individual investors is taken seriously. From
the point of view of the individual investor, this liquidity is certainly a fact; but from
the perspective of the institutional investor, things are completely different. Since core
portfolios presuppose necessary and continual trading for the reasons given above, the
sheer size of these portfolios means that this trading comes up against the liquidity
1 Dupont and Sack (1999) report that in recent years more than half of reported interdealer broker trading
in Treasuries took place in on-the-run securities, even though off-the-run issues outnumbered on-the-run
issues more than twenty to one (p. 795).
2 For brief surveys of the debate on the effects of liquid capital markets, see Honohan (2003) or O’Hara
(2004).
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constraints in the capital markets. From a historical perspective, trading volume appears
high, but the past can often be a poor guide to the present where rapid economic and
institutional change is involved, and the US fund management industry is a case in point.
In contrast to the past, this is now a mass industry serving large sections of the US
population, which means that, no matter how vast may be the trading taking place on the
US security markets, from the point of view of the largest institutional investors these
markets are characterised by a chronic lack of liquidity.
The concentration of institutional trading on the most standardised and liquid
securities, which offer institutions the possibility of minimal price disturbance when trades
are executed, is one particular manifestation of attempts to overcome the shortage of
liquidity. Other manifestations are to be found in the host of reorganisations in trading
methods and market structure to cater to the needs of the institutions. These are especially
pronounced in the equity markets, where individual investors still have a significant
presence.1 To limit the price impact of their trades and to avoid ‘pilfering’ by fast-moving
small investors who try to anticipate their portfolio alterations, the big funds ‘slice and dice’
their trading orders. They attempt to match their trades against those of other institutions
in ‘upstairs’ markets before committing them to the trading floors of the exchanges. They
establish parallel, purely institutional trading networks—‘crossing systems’—to bypass the
public markets. They resort as much as is possible to the use of derivatives in order to
rebalance their portfolios without costly exchanges of the underlying securities. In the case
of bond markets, which have always been the preserve of the institutions, the attempts by
the latter to overcome liquidity constraints manifest not only in the restructuring of these
markets but also in the parallel growth of the short-run money and repo markets. The
constant rebalancing of institutional bond portfolios creates huge needs for short-run
transactions balances; only the rapid and low-cost recycling of monetary surpluses permits
these massive operations to take place.2
The above argument suggests that any policy initiatives aimed at reducing capital market
liquidity, such as taxing security transactions,3 would have a severe impact on the large
investment institutions. In the current debate on such initiatives, attention is focused
chiefly on the effects of controlling financial market liquidity on the manufacturing and
other non-financial sectors of the economy, with opinion divided as to whether these effects
are, on balance, positive or negative. There can be no such ambiguity, however, as regards
the detrimental impact of such policy measures on the institutional investors. If fund
managers currently find it difficult to execute rebalancing trades smoothly or cost
efficiently, the introduction of liquidity curbing measures would render that task virtually
impossible. This serious disruption to the ability of fund managers to fulfil their function
1 For general overviews of how institutional investors attempt to overcome the liquidity constraints of
current market structures, see Economides and Schwartz (1995), Davis and Steil (2001), Schwartz and Steil
(2002) and Schwartz and Wolf (2003).
2 An anonymous referee has pointed out, first, that increasing turnover is to a substantial extent
attributable to the declining costs of trading stocks and bonds (the increased use of computerised trades being
a key factor here) and, second, that it is the fact that transaction costs are negatively related to the size of
companies which explains why turnover is positively related to size. These propositions are correct. However,
causality runs in both directions: on the one hand, reduced transaction costs for the large institutions help
them to trade more frequently than individual investors; on the other hand, given that they have to trade more
frequently because this is essential for portfolio maintenance, it is the institutional investors who lead the drive
to introduce new technologies, instruments and organisational arrangements aimed at lowering trading costs.
3 Those who have suggested taxing security transactions include Stiglitz (1989), Summers and Summers
(1989), Baker (2000) and Pollin et al (2002). See Haberler and Kirilenko (2003) for an overview of the
positions for and against securities transactions taxes.
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would have wider ramifications. Given that the rise of the institutional investors, providing
mass access to the security markets on standardised terms, is inseparable from the linked
processes of disintermediation and securitisation which are transforming financial
systems based on inside investors and bank credit into market-based systems, it follows
that policies for reducing capital market liquidity would strike at the very core of this
systemic transformation. To those who construe this transformation to be more the
result of historically contingent factors than a logically necessary counterpart to other
wider changes in the modern economy, this outcome may be desirable. Our position is
different.
While it is clearly the case that some of the forces behind the shift towards a market-
based financial system were historically contingent,1 the shift is also an expression of the
persistent advantages of that system, in terms of cost and scale, as against one based on
classical bank intermediation. These advantages seem to be cumulative in that the growth
of security markets to which they give rise enhances the scale effects which are a key source
of that growth itself. The institutional investors are the central actors in this dynamic
process, because they are well placed to exploit the growth of security markets to obtain
levels of diversification which are otherwise impossible thereby magnifying the risk-return
advantages of security-based systems vis-a`-vis classical bank-based investment. But other
financial actors are also driving the process forward; not only issuers and investors, whose
defection originally put pressure on the banks as depository institutions, but also the banks
themselves, which are increasingly oriented towards security-market activities of all kinds.
The point of this argument is not that there is no room for policy initiatives aimed at
improving the efficiency or stability of the financial system. The point, rather, is that
liquidity reducing policies should not be among these initiatives. The very high levels of
security trading observed are an endogenous aspect of contemporary security markets
because this trading is an inescapable necessity for the institutions which are the main
players on these markets. Only if it were thought possible to reverse the whole historical
process of financial change and restore the primacy of ‘relational’ bank-based finance
would such a strategy make economic sense. If, on the other hand, the rapid growth
of trading is seen as a necessary feature of current financial developments, then such
a response might seem inadequate to the challenge which is posed in that it merely
disorganises rather than improves the working of financial mechanisms.
7. Conclusion
This paper has made an attempt to characterise one of the most prominent, but least
understood, phenomena of the modern economy: the massive scale of trading on financial
markets. In the heterodox tradition, many commentators tend to see, in the huge scale of
contemporary financial transactions, the ‘whirlpool of speculation’ denounced by Keynes
in his General Theory, an unhealthy development which subordinates the long-term needs
of the productive system to the pursuit of short-term capital gains. Mainstream theory
tends to support this view, either directly by endorsing the speculation thesis or, as is more
generally the case, indirectly by giving space to the idea that trading activity is for the most
part exogenous to the functioning of the financial markets. These incorrect and very
misleading assessments arise out of a failure to draw a fundamental distinction between
1 For example, the attempt to circumvent certain aspects of US banking regulation, such as the interest-
rate ceilings imposed by Regulation Q, lay behind moves to disintermediation in the 1950s and 1960s.
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individual and institutional investors or, if such a distinction is made, to differentiate
historically the role currently played by the institutions in the financial system from that
played by them in the past.
The central hypothesis of this paper is that the large trading volumes observed are an
intrinsic and necessary feature of the contemporary financial landscape, because they are
to a great extent determined by the inescapable needs of the institutional investors which
now predominate on the capital markets. This endogeneity of trading is inextricably linked
to the emergence of a core–satellite paradigm in institutional investment, a development
that essentially represents nothing other than the fund management industry’s response to
the increased pressures on it as it takes centre stage in the functioning of a market-based
system of finance. It follows from this whole line of reasoning that proposals to curtail
capital market liquidity in the hope of reigning in speculative activity or dysfunctional
churning would, on the contrary, disrupt the operation of the financial system, thus
holding out the prospect that more problems are created than are resolved.
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Chapter 13
Global finance after the
credit crisis
The text here is a late draft of the paper later published as “Global
Finance after the Credit Crisis” Journal der Entwicklungspolitik (Vi-
enna), 2009.
Introduction
The vast financial disturbances which broke out in 2007, leading to unprece-
dented state intervention to rescue financial systems in 2008, surely necessitate
a reconsideration of the role and prospects of the global financial system which
has developed over the last decades. That system is widely recognised to be
both a central component of the global economy as a whole and a key driving
force in its emergence and transformation. For example, only the enormous
financial recycling operation linked to China’s export surplus has permitted the
exceptional growth of the Chinese economy.
The continuing crisis of major banks, other large financial corporations and cap-
ital markets clearly impairs core functions of the financial system. Both political
reactions to the crisis and the reactions of market participants themselves are
bound to enforce major changes in the system. These are difficult to foresee —
the present essay only sketches some possible lines of development.
The next section looks at certain features of the crisis and suggests that it
represents not simply another financial crisis but a crisis of finance itself. The
following section argues that neither financial globalisation nor the increasing
importance of financial markets are likely to be interrupted by the crisis; rather
will both market actors and regulators have to grapple with the introduction
of specific public goods, without which both the stability and the efficiency of
226
the global financial system will be permanently at risk. The concluding section
speculates on the possible long-run consequences of the crisis.
A Crisis of Finance
The liberalisation of finance, from the 1970s onwards, in most advanced econo-
mies, together with the removal or attenuation of many regulatory restrictions
and controls, led to a chronic destabilisation of finance from the beginning of the
1980s onwards. From the start the main victims of crises were in the developing
world. Indeed, the most serious such episode, in 1982, was the outbreak of a
crisis of third world indebtedness which, aggravated by harsh and misguided
policies at the IMF, had grave and long-lasting effects across much of Africa
and Latin America.
It is not yet clear whether the financial turbulence which broke out in 2007 will
have such devastating social consequences. However, to a much greater extent
than previous crises, it calls into question the global financial system as such.
There are several reasons for this.
Scale
Firstly, where several of the previous crises were centred on peripheral or emerg-
ing markets, or on the high-technology sector of developed economies, the latest
crisis is clearly centred on the financial sectors of the United States and West-
ern Europe. Moreover, most of the problematic financial claims relate to the
finance of US real estate — this is by far the biggest financial market in the
world. Outstanding household mortgage debt, on its own, is much larger than
either government or corporate debt (and the latter also includes large amounts
of mortgage debt).1 The understandable interest of many researchers in corpo-
rate finance and in international financial transactions should not obscure the
sheer scale of North American real estate finance.
Of course, to begin with, only a small fraction of these real estate claims were
called into question — the subprime mortgages which, repackaged and resold,
became the collateralised debt obligations at the centre of the subsequent tur-
moil. But more and more mortgages were affected, partly by the contagion
of doubt among similar assets, partly by the fall in real estate prices which
undermined previously adequate collateral.
Leverage undoubtedly contributed to the enormous profits of major banks dur-
ing the bubble. The “big five” British banks, for example, declared profits of
37 billion in 2006 — the year before the crisis broke out. This sum represented
nearly 13% of all corporate profits in the UK and nearly 4% of total UK GDP.
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The sheer scale of the crisis was then multiplied by the same leverage mecha-
nisms which had expanded and intensified the subprime bubble. Losses relative
to the own capital of the banks and hedge funds concerned were multiplied be-
cause so much borrowed money had been used to obtain increased subprime
exposure.
This effect in turn was aggravated by the break-down of tactics widely used by
the banks to avoid capital adequacy regulations. Most of the dubious mortgage-
backed assets had been moved off the balance sheets of the banks themselves
into various “conduits” or “Special Investment Vehicles” (SIVs). This meant
that the banks themselves did not have to raise capital to match the risks
involved. Most of the SIVs, however, were funded by short-term borrowing
which became difficult or impossible to roll over as the quality of their assets
was called into question and alarm spread through the credit markets. Thus
banks had to take the mortgage-based assets back onto their balance sheets
and ensure that enough risk-adjusted capital was in place to meet regulatory
requirements. These risks, of course, were growing at the same time. The
ratings agencies, which had initially given astonishingly high credit-worthiness
ratings to sub-prime-based and similar assets, now rapidly downgraded them,
increasing the capital needed.2
The move to highly leveraged positions had been very general and had affected
other sectors besides residential mortgages. Thus the rapid expansion of both
hedge funds and private equity investment in Europe towards the end of the
bubble period was part of the same general attempt to increase the yield on
financial assets by assuming more debt. Hedge funds and private equity are two
very different types of investment vehicle — but they do have in common the
use of very high gearing and this accounts for the simultaneous expansion in the
years up to 2006 (in the European Parliament), 2007). In the subsequent crisis,
many of these positions also had to be unwound because the assets were losing
value and the credit by which they were funded was drying up.
For all these reasons, the credit crisis involved losses on an unprecedented scale.
The main factor involved, however, seems to have been the very general move
to highly leveraged positions.3 This in turn reflected a general reluctance to
accept what would otherwise have been much lower rates of return on financial
assets than had been the case over the previous twenty-five years.
When an individual bank takes a more leveraged position, it increases its own
exposure to systemic risk, but that risk as such does not necessarily increase.
However, when the sector as whole does so, the risk of system-wide disturbance
is bound to grow. Central banks and other regulatory authorities around the
world seem to have been aware that this was happening but were reluctant to
respond by higher interest rates or tightened regulatory constraints because of
the wish to extend the macroeconomic upturn. The consequence was a system
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breakdown on such a scale as to constitute a very serious threat to production
and employment.
The deregulatory Zeitgeist was also a factor: the banks and other financial cor-
porations have been powerful forces behind the continuing drive to dismantle
many forms of social control over economic life. One consequence of such lob-
bying was the promulgation of new, and much less restrictive, capital adequacy
standards for international banks (Basel II) at just the time when the bubble
burst. Regulators had been repeatedly warned that Basel II would aggravate the
cycle by requiring banks to raise additional capital in economic downturns, that
it gave far too much scope to banks to disguise the risks of their positions and
that it did not impose sufficient transparency on bank accounting practices. The
neglect of these prescient criticisms means that Basel II will almost certainly be
rapidly superseded by new, more rigorous, regulatory arrangements.
Impairment of the Banks
Secondly, the crisis struck at the central actors of the global financial system —
the banks. It has been a central feature of financial globalisation that classical
bank intermediation has to some extent been displaced by the growth of security
markets. This never meant, however, that the banks were less important as
financial actors — on the contrary they have played a leading role in the security
markets — as market-makers, market analysts and fund managers as well as in
their more established functions of underwriting security issues and financing
security trading (Plihon et al., 2006).
A necessary condition for the banks to play this key role has been the glob-
alisation of interbank relations. In fact the money markets of the advanced
economies, largely dominated by inter-bank credit flows, are the most com-
pletely globalised component of international finance and the major interna-
tional banks which are active lenders and borrowers across currency zones could
be regarded as the core of the global system.4
The banks concerned, which it is plausible to take as those linked to the CHIPS
payment system, have undergone a ferocious concentration process bringing
down their number from 142 in 1985 to 46 today.5 The crisis has accelerated
this process because even among these giants there are banks which have been
badly affected by the credit crunch and the associated write-downs of assets and
which are looking for safety in a merger.
These giants have the closest interconnections, supported by the deployment
of extremely powerful information and communication technologies. Together
they form a coherent system at the core of global finance. The fact that they
use different currencies has disguised these close interdependencies from some
commentators, but in fact the huge amounts of currency traded on foreign ex-
change markets represent, much more than “casino” speculation, a vast interna-
tional interbank credit market. (The frequent misinterpretation of FX trading
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as essentially currency speculation is discussed in Grahl and Lysandrou (2003).)
The growth of security trading around the world is completely dependent on
the functioning of these interbank markets because this is how the banks are
able to finance security trading.
The impairment of this system through the crisis was never the “paralysis”
sometimes evoked in the press, because that would have meant a catastrophic
breakdown of the entire economy. At the start, problems were confined to un-
secured term interbank credit and what happened was a rise in the risk and
liquidity spreads in the interest rates concerned, rather than a cessation of lend-
ing. Most interbank lending is against collateral and these markets continued
to function more or less normally.
However, as bank balance sheets continued to deteriorate, problems of illiquidity
were combined with a growing threat of insolvency. (See the commentaries by
Willem Buiter on the Financial Times website.) The failure of the investment
bank, Lehman Brothers, seems to have concentrated minds and tensions spread
to interbank relations as a whole while the banks perceived as most vulnerable
suffered runs on their credit which they could no longer roll over at any interest
rate.6
In general, financial crises tend to be more or less severe according to whether
or not risks are concentrated in the banking system (Boyer et al., 2004). Such
a concentration was certainly the case here, with an IMF estimate that, out
of some $1.4 trillion of losses and write-downs through the crisis to October
2008, the banks had incurred at least some $725 billion and possibly as much as
$820 billion (IMF, 2008, p9). In principle, a fraction of the losses by banks and
other agents were insured either through “monoline bond insurance companies”
or the use of credit default swaps, but the authorities, by buying many of the
most dubious assets, tried hard to avoid too much stress being placed on these
insurance systems for fear of another wave of failures and asset price falls.
Interbank credit represents an enormous economy of monetary resources, with a
relatively restricted aggregate deposit base supporting a vast and rapidly grow-
ing amount of financial transactions. By the same token its collapse would be the
equivalent of an immense monetary deflation. By the autumn of 2008, however,
only unprecedented and coordinated interventions by governments prevented
such a collapse. Many of the giant banking corporations at the centre of global
finance were now subjected to political tutelage.
Loss of Control
A third novel feature of the crisis was the loss of control by central banks.
Macroeconomic textbooks usually assert that monetary policy is implemented
through the central bank’s control over short-term interest rates. By the summer
of 2007 this truism was being re-examined as it became clear that the interest
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rates charged to households and businesses had become detached from the offi-
cial rates set by central banks. As the latter were eased in response to financial
distress and weakening economic activity, the former remained stubbornly high.
It is here that interest rates on unsecured term interbank lending become highly
significant because these rates such as LIBOR or EURIBOR (London or Euro
interbank offered rate, respectively) are the benchmarks used to set interest
rates on a very large amount of private lending. The banks were not prepared
to reduce the rates at which they lent to their customers in step with reductions
in central bank target rates.
In fact, central banks are relatively small players in credit markets. (For exam-
ple, the Bank of England in 2007 had assets totalling 39 billion, although this
grew in the crisis to 73 billion in 2008; compare Barclays — one of the “big five”
British commercial banks, with assets of 1.3 trillion in 2007.) They typically
target directly only one very short-run interest rate, that in unsecured overnight
interbank lending, and rely on substitution among the different credit markets
to influence the general level of short-run rates in the economy as a whole. Im-
plicitly, this depended on the strength and stability of the big commercial banks
as well as their confidence in one another. Given those conditions, the commer-
cial banking sector as a whole came close to being part of the state in that it
could borrow on approximately the same terms as could central government.
The impairment of the big banks put an end to this situation. A huge spread
opened up between one-month and three month interbank interest rates and
those in the overnight markets still, more or less, under central bank control. (It
is interesting that this happened at virtually the same time and to approximately
the same extent in dollar, euro and sterling money markets, testifying to the
close, global, integration of the financial sectors concerned. That the Japanese
banking sector escaped the credit crisis with relatively limited damage seems
to be due to the severity and persistence of the Japanese banking crisis from
the late eighties onwards.) These spreads correspond to the liquidity and risk
premia exacted by the banks’ creditors. (For a detailed analysis, IMF, 2008,
chapter 2). At the same time, the interest rates on lending to the government
went very low indeed as wealth-holders sought a safe haven. (Late in October
2008, the annual yield on three month US Treasury Bills was below 1% while
the corresponding rate in Germany was 1.75%.)
These gaps persisted, and even widened, in spite of big moves by the central
banks to re-establish control. They started lending much greater sums to the
banks, for longer periods and accepting a much wider range of assets as collat-
eral. Thus a central tool of macroeconomic policy has itself been impaired by the
crisis. In a deteriorating macroeconomic climate, where interest rate reductions
for household and business borrowers would normally be a key policy response,
this situation eventually provoked quite radical proposals. Suggestions include
channelling all interbank lending through the central bank or expanding the
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scope and scale of central bank lending in other ways. In any case it seems
likely that central bank balance sheets will grow substantially relative to those
of commercial banks and other financial corporations, leading perhaps to a per-
manent shift in the balance between public and private power in the financial
sector.7
Such a development would to some extent at least reverse the monetarist re-
assignment of macroeconomic functions which began in the 1980s. The sole
goal of monetary policy was to be price stability, rather than either financial
stability or support for general macroeconomic policies. The minimalist central
bank — with a very limited balance sheet — is to some extent a consequence of
the approach to monetary policy adopted at that time. To that extent, central
banks may be recovering some of their previous functions, although in a very
different context.
Reform, not Fragmentation
The argument so far has merely been to characterise the credit crisis as being, in
at least three important respects, different from and more severe than previous
crises: the combination of the scale of the disturbances, the impairment of the
large banks at the centre of global finance and the weakened control of central
banks suggests that this is not simply a financial crisis, but a crisis of finance,
calling into question the both structure and the functioning of the financial
system.
It is much more difficult to go beyond these descriptions to assess the possible
nature and direction of future changes to this system. Any such assessment has
also to consider the new political situation. The financial de´bacle is the biggest
blow ever suffered by neoliberal ideology and the biggest ever setback for the
neoliberal project.8 Thus a much wider range of economic strategies are now
becoming politically possible than in the recent past where neoliberalism has
dominated and this makes future developments even more uncertain.
However, some implications of the crisis already seem relatively clear. Firstly,
the financial sector, and especially major banks, are likely to be subjected to
much closer, more intrusive and more comprehensive regulation. Some obvious
examples can be given. (It has to be acknowledged that some regulatory issues
raise technical difficulties beyond the expertise of the writer. For a recent ac-
count, responding to the first phases of the crisis, Davies and Green (2008).)
Reforms to bank accounting will be used to control off-balance sheet assets and
liabilities and to reassert capital requirements over the entirety of a banks’ po-
sitions. The conflicts of interest which have clearly distorted the work of the
ratings agencies will be addressed. There will be a push for more complete and
up-to-date reporting of the positions taken by banks and hedge funds. Some
reforms also seem likely to reduce the immense incomes enjoyed by those at the
232
head of financial corporations. Many of the parameters of regulation are likely
to become cyclically variable to avoid the exacerbation of cyclical upswings and
downswings by existing regulatory structures.
Secondly, it seems already clear that the crisis has not called into question but
rather reinforced the global character of the financial system. One aspect of this
is the serious attempts that were made, in spite of a some initial disarray, to
coordinate the official responses to the crisis. Central banks, firstly, organised
a series of simultaneous monetary policy changes and other coordinated inter-
ventions; central bank literature shows that, although little action was taken
during the subprime bubble, there was a growing concern with stability issues
and intense communication and debate among central banks about them. (For
an account of arrangements in Europe see ECB (2006).)
Serious government intervention began in the autumn of 2008 with the res-
cue package proposed by US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and eventually
adopted by the Congress and a rescue package, including the provision of new
capital for the banks from the government, in Britain. Coordination of such
policy interventions seems to have begun almost at once, both within the EU
and among the G7 group of the largest economies. There were clearly dangers
of spillover effects from some types of intervention, such as the Irish govern-
ment’s guarantee of bank liabilities, and some clashes, notably between Britain
and Iceland, but in general the international nature of the crisis and the need
for an international response seem to have been recognised early (Iceland’s ap-
peal for credit from the Russian Federation is an interesting illustration of the
geo-political shifts which may be accelerated by the crisis). Reference to global
forces might also, of course, be an attempt to evade responsibility by national
political leaders, but on the whole the political language used seems to be jus-
tified by economic and financial events.
The responses to crisis in the private sector also seem to have reinforced the
global character of the system. Protectionist tactics were hardly to be expected
from the big banking corporations who surely place a very high value on their
freedom of action, but there were some indications that the banks were mobil-
ising international resources to meet the crisis. The intervention of sovereign
wealth funds to supply new capital to Western banks went very badly for the
former, who came in too early, bought bank equity too dear and suffered huge
losses in consequence (Demarolle and Johanet, 2008). Nevertheless, these ac-
tions may foreshadow larger shifts in the ownership and control of the global
financial system in the future.
It was mentioned above that the globalisation of finance has been marked by a
substantial change in the structure of finance, away from classical bank inter-
mediation and towards a much bigger role for organised security markets — for
both company shares and, especially, bonds. Does the “securitization” fiasco
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mean the end of this trend? The view taken here is that such an outcome is ex-
tremely unlikely. A security is a marketable claim. It is necessary to distinguish
between the legal and economic interpretations of this definition. The whole
range of “toxic” assets arising from the subprime bubble had the legal form of
marketability but they often lacked its economic content — the markets for such
paper were thin and inadequate even towards the end of the bubble when the
absurd AA and AAA ratings had not yet been exposed. (For just this reason
these assets had yields well in excess of what could normally be expected from
high-grade paper.) It was pointed out above that much of the risks involved
stayed with the banks — this in itself indicates that formal securitization did
not really correspond to the creation of a functioning market.
To function in effective way, asset markets require a certain standardisation.
The possibility or otherwise of such standardisation determines whether the
widespread recognition of the asset which is needed for tradability exists. The
key advantages of traditional “relationship” banking over the public issue of
securities arises where credits or investments are too specific to permit a wide
market to develop. As Michel Aglietta (2008) points out, when such standard-
isation is not possible, securitization destroys information. The thin, fragile
markets for subprime-based collateralised debt obligations destroyed it on an
enormous scale, with potential buyers knowing less and less about the nature
of the claims being offered.
Similar considerations apply to the huge growth of financial derivatives. Those
which have given rise to most difficulties are OTC (over-the-counter) instru-
ments rather than the much smaller total of standardised, exchange-traded
derivatives where big defaults are unlikely because changing prices are rapidly
reflected in payments by counterparties with deficit positions. In the case of
both asset-based obligations and OTC derivatives, the danger was a confusion
between types of claim. Those which are highly specific or which depend on de-
tailed knowledge of a particular agent should stay with or close to the original
creditor because information will be destroyed by secondary trading; those which
are effectively standardised can be safely traded on secondary markets. What
is to be avoided is a confusion whereby claims are moved off banks’ balance
sheets without being effectively distributed across liquid secondary markets.
Regulation should perhaps encourage a certain standardisation of claims; this
is often said to discourage innovation but, in both retail and wholesale financial
markets, it is now clear that many supposed innovations are either exercises
in spurious product-differentiation or, quite simply, scams. A somewhat slower
pace of financial innovation is perhaps desirable.
The broad trend from classical bank intermediation to security markets is not
yet fully understood. On one view, the main reason for it is regulatory —
the imposition of risk-adjusted capital requirements on the banks. However, it
is also possible to interpret the shift in terms of economic development — as
supporting financial relations among a very large number of agents and on a
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very great scale. Thus the clear lead of the US in the development of security
markets could reflect the fact that, even before the era of global finance, this
was a vast economic system spread over a huge area (Grahl, 2001; Lysandrou,
2005).
Thus, although one can be certain that much tighter controls will be put on
bank activities, both the global character of financial systems and the increased
role of security markets seem likely to survive the crisis, and indeed may even
be advanced by it.
Two Conjectures
The predictions made in the previous section are already somewhat tentative.
At the time of writing the end of the crisis is not yet in sight and there is no
possibility of any definitive assessment of its course and consequences. Instead
of attempting to reach clear conclusions, two possible lines of development will
be sketched in this last section — both of them speculations but with a certain
rationale.
Firstly, there now seems to be a real possibility that the world economy is en-
tering a period of cheap capital and low rates of return. Since the Volcker shock
of 1979 (the drastic change in US monetary policy with very high interest rates)
the potential abundance of investible funds has been prevented from driving
down target rates of return in industry and commerce. During the 1980s, very
tight monetary policies and a general search for liquidity by potential investors
kept interest rates at very high levels. Real (that is, inflation adjusted) rates
were driven higher by the fact that disinflation ran ahead of monetary policy
relaxation. In the 1990s, rates on government debt came down markedly, but
the very high rates of return sought by investors in the equity markets prevented
this from lowering the cost of risk-bearing capital. These unsustainable conven-
tions as to rates of return were shaken by the dot.com crash when it turned out
that in many cases high reported shareholder returns were illusory. Then in the
subprime bubble banks used massive leverage in an ultimately futile attempt to
raise the return on their capital.
One lesson of these episodes is that a sustainable convention, among investors,
of a general rate of return has something of the character of a public good.
The authorities might in the future use their analytical and research resources
to diffuse realistic expectations as to yields; they will certainly try to police
the use of leverage by major financial corporations. One result could be a
general decline in yields and interest rates, not simply on government debt, but
also on industrial investments and consumer credit. If this happened the social
consequences, particularly in labour markets, could be dramatic. The persistent
deterioration in the relative bargaining position of employees has been caused to
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a considerable extent by the high rates of return which were routinely pursued on
industrial assets. It is impossible to predict how such a change in the balance
of power in the labour market would be expressed — a revival of traditional
trade unionism seems rather unlikely. But a reassertion of employee interests
in some form would most certainly be encouraged by cheap capital. One of the
main forces pressing down on the confidence and the ambitions of the popular
classes would be weakened.
The second conjecture is even more speculative. At present the global financial
system is being rescued by governments and at public expense. This is bound
to lead to reforms — the way the system works will change. It is at least
conceivable, however, that change will go further than this — that there will be
a challenge to the finalities of the system, to its goals and the priorities among
them. To envisage such a development is certainly to take a sanguine view of
the global economy and global financial relations. But, whether or not such a
transformation is feasible, it is most certainly necessary. The key priorities of
development in the poorest countries and of environmental protection cannot
plausibly be asserted in economic life unless they shape the financial constraints
on households and businesses. Only if the global financial system becomes the
bearer of these objectives do they have the slightest possibility of realisation.
This is a long way from the speculation and excess which has disfigured Western
financial centres in recent years. But it is to be hoped that the end of that world
may make another possible.
Notes
1At end 2007, household mortgage debt in the US stood at $10.5 trillion; corporate debt
was $6.3 trillion; government (Federal, State and local) $7.3 trillion; claims on foreign debtors
$1.9 trillion. Federal Reserve (2008) p8.
2For the disastrous role played by credit rating agencies in the assessment of sub-prime
mortgages and the collateralised debt obligations based on them see, IMF (2008) chapter 2,
box 2.2, “When is a AAA not a AAA?”
3It should be noted that, contrary to the declarations of the European Commission (D.-G.
Internal Market press release, 27th February 2008) and some political leaders in Europe, the
drive for high leverage was even more marked in Europe than in the US itself. Daniel Gros
and Stefano Micosi report that, “the dozen largest European banks have now on average an
overall leverage ratio (shareholder equity to total assets) of 35, compared to less than 20 for
the largest US banks.” These economists recognise that the leverage numbers reported to
regulators are much lower, but they explain this by the “massive in-house investment banking
operations of European banks” which “are not subject to any regulatory capital requirement.”
They give the following figures for the leverage ratios of European banks as of 30th June 2008:
UBS, 46.9; ING 48.8; Barclays, 61.3; Cre´dit Agricole, 40.4, Deutsche (2007) 52.5. (Gros &
Micosi, www.voxeu.org).
4Globalised money markets require huge amounts of collateralised foreign currency trading:
the key instrument involved, the FX swap, accounted for the first time for more than half
of all FX trading in 2007, some $1.7 trillion per day (out of a total of $3.2 trillion). Dollar
trades against the euro, the yen, sterling, Swiss francs, Australian and Canadian dollars and
Swedish krona made up two thirds of all FX trading, again relating it to the activities of
Western financial centres. Data from BIS (2007)
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5This concentration was until recently dominated by mergers between banks in the same
currency zone and this may have disguised the increasingly global nature of the system as a
whole. The recently announced Commerzbank, Dresdner Bank continues this pattern, but the
crisis has also seen a number of large international mergers and takeovers such as Mitsubishi’s
stake in Morgan Stanley.
6The account in the text is based on the supposition that the monetary flows through
wholesale payment systems can be taken as a reasonable proxy for interbank lending (it is
difficult to imagine what else these enormous flows can represent). For example, the flow of
funds through the ECB’s inter-bank payment system, TARGET, continued to grow through-
out 2007 (from 2.19 trillion euro per day in January to 2.69 trillion in December). However,
in 2008 actual falls are recorded from 2.76 trillion in January to 2.32 in August — the first
such contraction in the system’s history. Flows through the New York-based CHIPS system,
however, which handles dollar payments among 46 of the very biggest international banks,
continued to grow at annual rates of 12.1% in 2007 and 9.6% in the first half of 2008.
7In Ireland, for example, the government issued a blanket guarantee of all bank borrowing,
which comes close to moving, at least temporarily, the banking system as a whole into the
public sphere Of course this measure, which has several precedents in, for example, Italy in the
1930s or Sweden in the early 1990s was taken to rescue the banks rather than to re-establish
central control over interest rates, which are set by the ECB. But similar measures are being
proposed to secure a general decline in market interest rates to combat recession.
8The neoliberal project is understood here as a political strategy which uses the intensi-
fication of certain market processes to roll back many of the gains achieved by the workers’
movement and other social movements in the first seventy years of the twentieth century. It
is important to add that this definition excludes the use of the term, “neoliberalism” to cover
all important developments in contemporary capitalism. In particular, the emergence of a
global financial system is not seen basically as a consequence of neoliberalism, but rather as a
necessary and functional aspect of globalisation in general, which is itself perceived as a new
stage in the socialisation of production.
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Chapter 14
The official case for
financial integration
The references cited in the text can be found in a list of all references from items
14–18 on page 326.
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6.  The official case for financial 
integration
Thorsten Block and John Grahl
6.1  INTRODUCTION
This chapter looks at some of the studies of financial integration spon-
sored by the European Commission. It is argued that most of the claims 
they put forward on the benefits of financial integration are, to say the 
least, exaggerated.
The plan of the chapter is as follows: there is firstly a brief characterization 
of the general position of the Commission on markets and integration; then a 
look at the viewpoint taken by European leaderships on financial integration 
in particular; next there is a discussion of market liberalization in general; 
this discussion is then related to the financial sphere; there is then a criti-
cal assessment of three economic studies which make the case for financial 
market integration. It is not denied that a certain consolidation of European 
financial systems may be necessary as a response to the ongoing process of 
financial globalization; this latter argument for integration, however, which 
is developed throughout this book, depends on market integration being 
combined with effective measures for social control over the financial sphere. 
It is concluded that the use of technically sophisticated but in fact quite unre-
alistic studies to suggest that major economic gains can be achieved without 
such control amounts to a distortion of democratic debate.
6.2  THE COSTS OF ‘NON-EUROPE’
It is well known that, in recent decades, the integration strategy adopted 
by the leadership of the EU has been strongly biased towards ‘market cre-
ation’ rather than ‘market correction’ (see Scharpf, 1999). For this reason, 
EU policies have tended to reinforce neoliberalism, in the sense of a politi-
cal project which deliberately intensifies certain market pressures in order 
to block, or even reverse, forms of collective action and state intervention 
which were seen as threatening by dominant interest groups.
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In some respects, however, decision makers in the Commission and the 
Council of Ministers have been more royalist than the king. Even those 
who are most committed to the market economy normally recognize that 
some markets do not exist simply because there is no need for them. The 
Commission on the other hand tends to regard the absence of any Europe-
wide market as being necessarily the consequence of damaging ‘barriers’ 
which must be levelled to avoid ‘the costs of non-Europe’.
This was the title given to the Cecchini Report, a series of studies com-
missioned by the EU in the late 1980s and purporting to show that the 
liberalization strategy launched by the Single European Act would lead 
to massive economic benefits. These, it is generally acknowledged, never 
materialized.1
However, the almost routine falsification of such claims never holds 
the Commission back from the next assault on ‘non-Europe’ or from the 
extravagant promises which are made to justify it.
6.3  THE GENERAL CASE FOR LIBERALIZATION
The standard argument for trade liberalization is that the removal of bar-
riers or the reduction of tariffs will increase the scope for advantageous 
exchange: a country which imports more of the commodity concerned 
will do so because it is cheaper for it to import than to produce at home; 
a country which exports more will likewise find that the returns from so 
doing are higher than from using the same commodity at home. This 
standard case is sometimes referred to as the theory of comparative advan-
tage but in fact it is no different from the usual argument for specializa-
tion: the case for free trade is simply the case for market exchange.
This case is subject to the usual caveats on markets. Three important 
qualifications of the case for free trade are:
it is subject to the full use of resources; a country which reduces  ●
its home production of a product in favour of imports obtains no 
advantage from so doing unless and until the resources no longer 
used in that industry are redeployed more effectively;
there must be no adverse developmental effects, as when specializing  ●
in a low productivity industry prevents a country from moving into 
more advantageous specialisms at a later date, or when a country, 
by importing a sophisticated product, makes it difficult for domestic 
firms to acquire expertise in its production;
adverse distributional effects from trade liberalization must be  ●
avoided – an example might be when wealthy consumers benefit 
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from imported luxury goods while low-income producers suffer 
losses; to ensure that free trade is advantageous in such a case, the 
winners from liberalization must compensate the losers.
Many studies of trade liberalization neglect these important qualifi-
cations or assume them away. Even when such assumptions are made, 
however, standard studies usually indicate that the gains from liberaliza-
tion are small, and this is especially the case in the EU.
There are two reasons for this. The first, which applies very generally, is 
that in market economies there are usually many substitutes for any given 
good or service; it may be damaging to suppress market interactions as a 
whole, but if only a single market is suppressed the impact on welfare is 
likely to be small. If one can’t get apples, one eats pears; if one can’t go by 
train, one takes a bus and so on. Thus GATT studies of substantial tariff 
reductions rarely showed very large benefits, even when very optimistic 
assumptions were made.2
The second reason relates specifically to the EU. This is already an 
extremely liberalized economic bloc, far more so than any other trading 
bloc, and the barriers to free exchange among member state are already 
very low. In particular, the Single European Act and further Treaties 
since enshrine the ‘four freedoms’, the right of all persons, corporations 
and other organizations legally present in the EU to move goods, serv-
ices, capital and labour across member state borders. These are effective 
rights, upheld not simply by the European Court of Justice but also within 
national judicial systems. If, therefore, barriers between member states 
prevent a corporation from making money, it has an effective remedy, 
even against the government of its home country. This unique legal struc-
ture has led to a very high degree of integration. In spite of endless com-
plaints from the Commission about ‘non-Europe’ it is probably already 
the case that in those areas where cross-border transactions are limited this 
is because there would not be much advantage in increasing them.
6.4  THE NEW INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY
In the last two decades a further rationale for trade liberalization has been 
developed on the basis of the linked phenomena of imperfect competition 
and scale economies. The two phenomena are linked because in a competi-
tive industry enterprises can achieve the optimum level of output; where 
competition is limited, however, and enterprises have significant influence 
over prices, there may be unexploited economies of scale – countries may 
be too small to achieve the optimum scale of output.3
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In a situation characterized by unexploited scale economies and imper-
fect competition, the gains from free trade may be much larger than in 
the standard argument because, firstly, trade may increase the level of 
competition and align prices more closely on costs and, more important, 
the creation of a larger market may permit the scale of production to 
increase and thus drive down costs. (Note that the same caveats as to 
full employment and so on apply as in the standard case.) However, the 
case becomes much more complex because the way the gains from trade 
are divided between the countries involved is now much more complex. 
The existence of monopoly revenues means that countries which special-
ize in the activities concerned may profit at the expense of their trade 
partners.4
It was this line of reasoning which was used or abused in the Cecchini 
Report to promise the huge gains mentioned above. The difficulty was that 
in most of the sectors where big scale economies are to be found, usually 
manufacturing sectors, the level of European integration was already very 
high prior to the Single European Act.
6.5  FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION
Mutatis mutandis, the same kind of argument for free trade applies to the 
financial sector as to the rest of the economy. The standard case for finan-
cial liberalization is that it would lead to a better allocation of capital by 
inducing flows of capital from countries where interest rates and yields on 
financial assets are low, to countries where they are high. This kind of rea-
soning is hardly pertinent to the situation in the EU, however. Individuals 
and enterprises in EU countries have the legal right to invest in assets 
or to issue liabilities in any member state they choose; in principle, they 
have had this right since the Treaty of Rome, fifty years ago. In practice, 
some member states restricted access to foreign exchange into the 1980s, 
but these restrictions were removed between 1990 and 1992. There are no 
pools of excess capital trapped in individual member states nor are there 
member states suffering capital shortage. Fifteen member states, account-
ing for well over half EU output and employment, belong to a monetary 
union within which there are no longer any exchange rate risks attached to 
international finance.
Of course, just as with trade in goods and services, there may be 
situations where local solutions are superior to international ones. Some 
types of risky investment are difficult to assess without local knowledge 
– this may be the case not only for countries but also for regions, cities 
and smaller communities. Only the Commission, however, would find 
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anything inefficient as such in the use of local knowledge to make a local 
investment rather than a cross-border one.5
In fact, contemporary financial systems are often marked by a hierarchi-
cal structure which combines an integrated, centralized allocation of stand-
ardized financial claims (bank deposits, government bonds, the shares of 
big multinational corporations) with decentralization of many decisions 
requiring local knowledge, such as investment in small  businesses – the 
branch networks of efficient commercial banks may function in this way, 
as may also networks of independent local banks.
In any case it is impossible to claim that levelling barriers to capital 
movement would produce major benefits simply by evening out the supply 
of and the demand for capital across member states. The official case for 
financial integration is much more analogous with the ‘new international 
trade theory’ – it rests not on allocative efficiency but on competition and 
technical change.
All the caveats and qualifications to liberalization mentioned above 
continue to apply but now with a crucial addition – the problem of mac-
roeconomic stability. Much more than the liberalization of exchange of 
goods and services, capital market liberalization can lead to acute prob-
lems in the foreign exchange market and the banking system (see also 
Chapters 7 and 14).
6.6  COMPETITION, EFFICIENCY AND FINANCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION
Thus the rationale put forward for the financial integration programmes 
in the EU has less to do with the allocation of capital than with the 
 transformation of financial systems. The argument is made that regula-
tory barriers and differences in financial practice have allowed inefficient 
financial systems to survive. The integration process is seen as transform-
ing the weaker and less efficient financial systems and bringing them up to 
the standards in those Northern European countries which are regarded 
as the most advanced.
One objection to this view is that the measures proposed – regulatory 
harmonization and so on – might simply be too weak to produce the 
postulated effects. In other sectors – manufacturing for example – there 
remain very large differences in productivity across member states after 
more than five decades of integration; it seems doubtful that much more 
rapid change can be obtained in the financial sector.
A second objection can be derived directly from the new international 
trade theory. The ‘transformation’ of the weaker financial systems may 
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take the negative form of penetration by foreign financial enterprises, a 
centralization of financial activities in the stronger countries and a high 
level of dependence on external financial markets. In such a case, there 
might still be some growth of productivity in the domestic financial sector, 
but this sector would remain small and the main benefits from integration 
would accrue to the stronger countries.
This is not a hypothetical pattern of events: it is an accurate account 
of what has already happened in those member states which used to be 
in the Soviet bloc.6 Their banking systems have been taken over by West 
European banks and their security markets seem likely to go the same way 
and become mere branch offices of the big Western markets. This would 
represent ‘modernization’ of a kind and many services might be provided 
in a more efficient way after the old domestic financial enterprises have 
been closed, but this kind of dependence will not contribute to economic 
development, since it confirms the exclusion of the country concerned 
from the most complex and profitable activities in the financial sector. 
As will be seen below, there is a considerable body of evidence linking 
financial development to economic development in general. There is no 
evidence, however, that mere financial openness has similar effects – in fact 
several researchers report the contrary.
6.7  FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, FINANCIAL 
INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
The academic literature on the finance–growth link has so far mainly 
focused on the role that financial development, rather than financial 
integration, plays in the process of economic growth. In this literature, 
financial instruments, markets and institutions may arise to mitigate the 
effects of information asymmetries and transaction costs. By ameliorating 
market frictions, financial arrangements alter agents’ incentives and con-
straints, thus influencing savings rates, investment decisions, technologi-
cal innovation, and consequently long-run economic growth. In a recent 
survey of the role of finance in growth Levine (2005) identifies, inter alia (i) 
the generation of ex ante information about possible investments and the 
allocation of capital; (ii) the monitoring of investments and the reinforce-
ment of corporate governance after funds have been provided; and (iii) 
the facilitation of the trading, diversification, and management of risk as 
important functions performed by the financial system and as mechanisms 
whereby finance can promote general economic development.7
Now, a key part of the Commission’s case for the FSAP and other 
financial integration strategies is to suggest that financial integration and 
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financial development are the same thing. The Commission’s Economic 
and Financial Committee (EFC) in its report on financial integration nicely 
summarized the argument (European Commission, 2002, p. 10):
 ‘Financial integration 5 a more efficient financial market.’
More precisely, increased competition among financial service provid-
ers will compress the margins levied by intermediaries and thus lead to a 
lower cost of capital for borrowers and higher rates of return for investors. 
A larger internal market allows financial service providers to exploit econ-
omies of scale and scope, and increases the liquidity and depth of capital 
markets which also drives down the cost of capital. A more efficient finan-
cial market thus translates directly into better economic performance.
A pervasive weakness in the studies to which the Commission appeals 
is that they all tend to make this very dubious assumption that integration 
and development are identical. In so doing they beg one of the key ques-
tions raised by the financial integration strategy.
6.8  IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE AND THE LISBON 
STRATEGY
The financial transformations discussed so far relate to differences in 
the efficiency of Europe’s own financial systems, to the gaps in financial 
development between North-West Europe on the one hand and Southern, 
Central and Eastern Europe on the other. In this context the main prob-
lems with the integration strategy are firstly that it may take very much 
longer to change systems than policy-makers suggest and secondly that 
integration may not lead to widespread financial development but to an 
increased dependency of the weaker systems on the stronger ones.
However, by the late 1990s a very different concept of financial trans-
formation had come to dominate the thinking of EU leaderships – a 
concept based on the US financial system. The rapid growth of the US 
during the 1990s was perceived as resulting from its successful transition 
to a ‘knowledge-based economy’.8 The Lisbon Strategy, adopted in 2000, 
was essentially an attempt to replicate US success, based on the adop-
tion of certain features of the US economic model, notably its financial 
system.
What was at stake now was no longer the level of financial development 
in Europe; by most indicators the financial systems of France, Germany 
and the US are roughly equivalent in their levels of development. Rather, 
European leaderships decided to promote a change in the nature of the 
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financial system and to enhance the role of stock markets. It was thought 
that stock markets in the US were making a massive contribution to 
economic growth and to the knowledge-based economy, especially in the 
support of innovative new enterprises in high technology sectors.
It will be remembered that the year 2000 saw the peak of a stock market 
bubble, well described in the expression of Alan Greenspan, head of the 
US central bank, as due to ‘irrational exuberance’.9 There can be little 
doubt that EU leaderships were affected by the same euphoria.
Now, there has been a great deal of discussion and debate in recent 
years about different types of financial system, but it can be emphasized 
that comparisons are extremely difficult. A Commission economist ends 
his survey of the issue with a simple statement: ‘Evidence that market-
based systems are constantly superior to bank-based financial systems 
does not exist.’ (Thiel, 2001, p. 45).
One of the many difficulties in making such an assessment is to decide 
on the appropriate criteria. Several commentators (for example, Dore, 
2000) suggest that the financial systems traditionally found in continen-
tal Europe, with powerful inside investors and a heavy reliance on bank 
credit, may achieve a very precise and efficient matching of the interests 
of investors to those of the users of funds. On the other hand, this micro 
advantage may be associated with weakness on a larger scale – it is 
often thought that the immense security markets which have developed 
on an international scale are more effective in bringing about major 
 reallocations of capital from region to region or sector to sector (Grahl, 
2001).
There are also of course very important social questions, explored 
throughout this book, relating to these patterns of financial development.
None of these points implies that the attempt to build big integrated 
security markets in Europe was an irrational policy. The general shift from 
financial systems based on bank credit and powerful ‘inside’ investors to 
systems making much more use of security markets may prove to be irre-
versible. In that case, a failure to build big, open, liquid security markets 
in Europe would simply drive every investor and every issuer on the planet 
into the North American markets. This outcome might deprive Europe of 
influence over financial developments and of highly remunerative financial 
business.
Thus it is most certainly not claimed here that the financial integra-
tion strategy was irrational. But it is asserted that the benefits of inte-
gration were grossly exaggerated and that the potential problems of 
financial transformation, in both the social and the economic sphere, were 
understated.
This assertion can be supported by an examination of some of the 
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most influential studies used by the Commission to justify its financial 
strategy.
6.9  THE LONDON ECONOMICS STUDY
The procedure adopted by London Economics (2002), in a study commis-
sioned by the European Commission, is as follows:
A relationship is estimated linking trading costs in equity markets to  ●
the size of the markets (measured by capitalization, that is the value, 
at prevailing prices, of the shares issued by corporations which are 
traded on the given market). As one would expect, trading costs are 
lower in bigger markets.
This relationship is used to estimate the reduction in trading costs  ●
which would come about with complete integration, that is if all 
the equity markets in Europe were replaced by a single, aggregated, 
market.
A relationship is then estimated between trading costs and the cost  ●
of capital to corporations – the latter being measured by the returns 
received by shareholders. It is found that the cost of capital is lower 
when trading costs are lower; this is to be expected because many 
investors prefer to hold securities which are easy to trade and they 
are therefore willing to accept slightly lower returns on more trad-
able shares.
This second relationship is used to estimate how much the cost of  ●
capital would fall in consequence of the total integration postulated 
above.
This reduction in capital costs is plugged into a complex macr- ●
oeconomic model, to see how much investment, and consequently 
 production, would rise in the event of full financial integration.
The methods used in this study are open to the following objections:
The capitalisation data used to predict future trading costs in  ●
Europe come from the period 2000–2001, that is the high point of 
the stock market bubble. If later figures were used the effect would 
be much less.
An implausible degree of integration is predicted which would mean  ●
a downward convergence in dealing costs for shares all over Europe. 
It is not clear how competition among different stock markets could 
be combined with such a high degree of integration.
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In any case not all share trading is necessarily desirable – over- ●
liquid markets can lead to volatility; if corporations then focus on 
short-run changes in their share price, their strategies may become 
distorted.
The link between the postulated fall in capital costs and investment  ●
may be exaggerated. The London Economics model involves an 
unusually large response of investment to a small reduction in the 
cost of capital; in other models this parameter is much lower.
The London Economics study, like the Cecchini studies in the past, 
illustrates one of the pitfalls of buying research on the market, which is 
that the buyers may get what they want. The existence of independent 
research institutes, committed to the critical study of public policy, may be 
threatened by the commercialization of research.
6.10  THE GYLLENHAMMER REPORT
A report to the European Financial Services Round Table (Heinemann 
and Jopp, 2002, known as the Gyllenhammar Report) contains another 
extravagant estimate of the benefits of financial integration. This is derived 
quite uncritically from a previous study by De Gregorio (1999) which 
found a large effect of financial integration on growth.
However, De Gregorio’s study does not estimate a direct relationship 
between financial integration and economic growth – in fact he fails to find 
any such relationship. Like many other researchers he does find a positive 
association between financial development and growth and he also finds an 
association between financial openness and financial development and he 
then puts these two associations together, even though he has no empirical 
justification for so doing, to deduce a relationship between openness and 
growth.10
The Gyllenhammar Report then makes an estimate of the growth 
impact of financial integration in Europe. This is done by assuming that 
an arbitrary (but supposedly ‘plausible’) increase in integration will take 
place and then using De Gregorio’s estimates of the impact on financial 
development and then onto economic growth. This gives the enormous 
figure of a € 42 billion annual bonus for the EU economy. A further dif-
ficulty of this procedure is that the De Gregorio study included many 
developing countries, where financial development, starting from a very 
primitive financial system, is likely to have a big impact. There is no reason 
to believe that the further expansion of Europe’s much more developed 
systems would lead to outcomes on the same scale.11
M1803 - GRAHL TEXT.indd   146 30/3/09   14:37:49
GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:11683 - EE - GRAHL:M1803 - GRAHL TEXT
 The official case for financial integration  147
GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:11683 - EE - GRAHL:M1803 - GRAHL TEXT
6.11  A SECTORAL STUDY
Another study, commissioned by the EU and frequently used to support 
current strategies for financial integration, is that of Giannetti et al. (2002). 
This uses an approach pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998) who 
explored the effect of financial development on growth, sector by sector, 
on the basis that companies in different sectors had different needs for 
external finance. In the Giannetti study it is again the case that the empiri-
cal estimates refer to the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth, not to financial integration as such.
To simulate the effect of financial integration, these authors assume that 
it translates into development. They have identified the US as having the 
most developed financial system; they assume that EU integration meas-
ures suffice to raise all member countries to the same level. On this basis, 
impressive gains result – the growth rate in many countries increases by 
over 1 per cent per year!
Gains of this magnitude arise as countries with less developed financial 
systems are assumed to converge rapidly on the highest standards. The 
authors recognize that in practice integration may well take the form of 
penetration of foreign banks and financial corporations and that this 
would skew the distribution of benefits towards the financial sectors of the 
stronger economies. However, they argue that such a development would 
still be desirable because households and non-financial companies in the 
weaker economies would still gain from better and cheaper financial serv-
ices. This proposition, however, is simply stated, not demonstrated.
A second simulation attempts to measure the potential impact of legal and 
regulatory harmonization on economic growth. For this, numerical indica-
tors have to be found for such intangibles as the ‘rule of law’ or ‘creditor 
rights’. In fact the most important such variable turns out to be ‘accounting 
standards’. These are specified as: Sweden, 84; UK, 78; Finland, 77; France, 
69; Netherlands, 64; Spain, 64; Germany, 62; Denmark, 62; Italy, 62; 
Belgium 61; Greece, 55; Austria 54; Portugal, 36; Ireland and Luxembourg, 
no data. It is doubtful whether such numbers signify anything more than a 
typical vote in the Eurovision song contest; they are obviously exposed to 
many challenges. Accounting standards in the US are put at 71, that is as 
superior to those in France, Germany and the Netherlands, but in the wake 
of recent revelations in the US that figure may seem a little high.
In any case an association is found between these indicators and finan-
cial development and this permits a simulation in which ‘integration’ is 
assumed to raise these institutional factors to the highest level in Europe 
(thus, in the case of accounting standards, to Sweden’s 84). The benefits 
from so doing are again massive – but this is only to say that a completely 
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successful modernization of Europe’s financial systems would produce 
large benefits.12 So also would, for example, a convergence of industrial 
productivity throughout the EU on the existing levels in France and 
Germany. What remains to be shown is how specific policy moves, such 
as those in the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), will have concrete 
effects on the functioning of European financial systems.
6.12  CONCLUSION
The economic studies used by the Commission to support its case for 
financial integration are very sophisticated in technical terms – they deploy 
state-of-the-art modelling techniques and statistical procedures. But their 
strength in technical terms does not in itself justify their extremely opti-
mistic conclusions which rest, in every case, on heroic assumptions – for 
example, when it is assumed, without any empirical evidence at all, that 
the limited harmonization and liberalization measures in the FSAP could 
miraculously bring about full financial integration and a level of financial 
efficiency equal to that in Germany or the US13.
Indeed, the very technical sophistication of these studies becomes dan-
gerous in such circumstances, since it may seem to endow their conclusions 
with a scientific status they do not, in fact, possess. Public discussion and 
scrutiny of EU policies are not furthered, but are in fact distorted, by such 
procedures.
The European Commission frequently resorts to the purchase of tech-
nically sophisticated but basically tendentious studies from commercial 
research organizations who seem to know very well what their paymaster 
wants to hear. Over time, this practice can only serve to further undermine 
public confidence in, and public respect for, the European project.
NOTES
 1. This was officially recognized. The Cecchini report in 1988 had projected that the ‘single 
market’ would add 4.5 per cent to the GDP of the 12-nation EU, adding 1.8 million 
jobs. Four years later, the EU released a report on the impact of the single market 
and it estimated that the GDP of the now 15-nation EU was 1.1 to 1.5 per cent higher 
than it would have been without the removal of market barriers and that a net 300,000 
to 900,000 new jobs were created (European Commission, 1996). These much more 
modest claims themselves are open to question. The Cecchini Report itself is a massive 
multi-volume work; its key arguments can be found in Emerson et al. (1988). 
 2. This argument, although it is based on the strength of the market economy, is often 
embarrassing to neoliberals, who want to argue that every single control or regulation 
is a costly impairment of free exchange. 
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 3. For the new international trade theory see Krugman and Obstfeld (2007).
 4. Thus, this kind of situation may justify industrial policies designed to change a country’ 
pattern of specialization.
 5. Even in a perfectly integrated market local financial services might still play an impor-
tant role in providing finance to small-scale borrowers. Small business lending involves 
the production of soft information that cannot be easily collected by loan officers 
external to the local community. This type of information is also not easily shared with 
outsiders. This implies that in specific segments of the credit market integration would 
be less relevant (Guiso et al., 2002).
 6. Thus by 2004, foreign banks accounted for almost all banking assets in the ex-Soviet 
transition economies of the EU: 92 per cent in the Czech Republic; 98 per cent in 
Estonia; 77 per cent in Hungary; 58 per cent in Latvia; 93 per cent in Lithuania; 68 per 
cent in Poland; and 97 per cent in Slovakia. See Allen, et al. (2005).
 7. These studies adopt an orthodox view of finance, as facilitating transactions over time. 
From the heterodox position discussed in the introduction, the role of finance may be 
even more important in that financial mechanisms are needed to handle the huge imbal-
ances and disequilibria which arise in the course of economic development. 
 8. EU leaders persistently refuse to acknowledge that the higher employment levels and 
more rapid economic growth achieved in the US are due to a more expansionary macr-
oeconomic regime.
 9. Greenspan had actually used this term some years earlier, but had then retreated some-
what from his critical view of behaviour in the stock market.
10. In fact, the correlations found by De Gregorio suggest the following: that financial 
development is associated with economic growth, to the extent that it is indigenous 
financial development and not simply induced by the entry of foreign financial corporations 
following capital market liberalization. 
11. The report makes no use of the study by Neimke et al. (2002) even though this study 
was specially commissioned for it. Neimke actually defines integration as the penetra-
tion of foreign banks and suggests that countries where penetration is high display more 
rapid gains in economic efficiency. The statistical basis of these claims is weak, however, 
because there are only 13 observations, and the estimated relationship is a poor fit to the 
data. It is probably because of these statistical weaknesses that Gyllenhammar does not 
cite the study.
12. Sweden also has a highly concentrated banking sector and very concentrated family-
based ownership structure of firms. This fact obviously influences the role of good 
information availability for the functioning of the stock market in comparison, for 
example, with the United States.
13. Thus the Commission (2003a) is hardly justified in characterizing such assumptions as 
‘conservative’.
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5.  Lisbon, finance and the European 
social model
John Grahl
5.1  INTRODUCTION
The European Commission’s (2000a) contribution to the Lisbon Council 
opened with a self-congratulatory account of economic progress in the 
EU. The ‘best economic conditions for a generation’ were signalled in 
terms of disinflation, the stabilization of public finance and lower inter-
est rates. However, weaknesses, ‘in spite of this positive outlook’, were 
acknowledged in growth and employment, especially in comparison 
with the US. The expression, ‘in spite of’ might be considered tenden-
tious in that the severe monetary and fiscal stabilization measures of 
the 1990s are regarded by many as, at least, the proximate cause of slow 
growth and high unemployment. But the relative lack of employment 
and output dynamism in the EU was traced not to any macroeconomic 
circumstances but to inadequate technological progress. The ‘knowledge 
economy’, centred on information and communication technologies 
(ICT) and the Internet, was seen as the sphere in which Europe needed 
to catch up.
Transformed financial relations were to be a key linkage in the catch-up 
strategy. Within a ‘sound macro-economic environment’, policies for social 
inclusion, investment in human capital, integrated research policies and so 
on were to promote a surge in innovation, while finance was essential to 
the successful introduction of innovation into the economic system. ‘An 
integrated capital market and a dynamic financial services industry’ would 
translate these more fertile and entrepreneurial conditions into success on 
EU and global markets by widening financial options for enterprises and 
driving down the cost of capital (Figure 5.1). Specific dimensions of this 
financial component in the strategy ran as follows:
The relatively low capitalization of EU equity markets and their  ●
fragmentation were to be overcome by integration and the removal 
of administrative and legal obstacles.
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The removal of portfolio restrictions on pension funds; if these  ●
funds in other member states were to reach the level achieved in 
the Netherlands, five trillion euro could be placed on EU capital 
markets.
These were the main considerations which made the already established 
financial integration policies (the general Financial Services Action Plan 
INTEGRATING POLICY TO CREATE A DYNAMIC,
INCLUSIVE EUROPEAN ECONOMY
SOUND MACRO-ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Contributing Policy Areas
People
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Source: European Commission (2000a, p. 10)
Figure 5.1  Finance and the Lisbon strategy
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and the Risk Capital Action Plan) into indispensable components of the 
agenda.
As regards the first issue, the scale of security markets, a judgement was 
implied that the bank-based systems of many EU countries were inferior 
to the more equity-based US system in terms of both the general cost of 
capital and the finance of innovative start-ups. This judgement might well 
be questioned because, although there is a lot of evidence that financial 
deepening is necessary to economic development, the evidence on the 
importance of particular financial structures is much weaker.
The subsequent European Council (2000) completely endorsed these 
Commission proposals, adding the famously ambitious goal for the 
coming decade ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.’ The only significant dif-
ference from the Commission document was a particularly heavy empha-
sis on the role of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as bearers of the 
innovations leading to the knowledge economy. The financial paragraph 
began:
Efficient and transparent financial markets foster growth and employment by 
better allocation of capital and reducing its cost. They therefore play an essen-
tial role in fuelling new ideas, supporting entrepreneurial culture and promoting 
access to and use of new technologies. It is essential to exploit the potential of 
the euro to push forward the integration of EU financial markets. Furthermore, 
efficient risk capital markets play a major role in innovative high-growth SMEs 
and the creation of new and sustainable jobs.
There followed a repetition of the need for rapid implementation of the 
Financial Services and Risk Capital Action Plans.
5.2  THE SOCIAL POLICY AGENDA
The Commission (2000b) developed its view of the social policy content 
of Lisbon a few months later in its Social Policy Agenda. It is interesting 
that the introduction to this document put forward two motives for social 
policy: social cohesion and ‘fairness’. In the tradition of Rawls (1971), 
fairness is a term which can be given a clear meaning and as an objective 
it might imply a very ambitious policy indeed. However, this was the only 
such reference in the document, which subsequently spoke only of ‘cohe-
sion’.1 But social policy was not only seen as serving social objectives; we 
also find the claim that social policy is to be seen as a productive factor. 
Thus it was asserted that the economic, social and employment strategies 
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reinforced each other through a virtuous cycle (in fact, in Figure 5.2, two 
such cycles – clockwise and anticlockwise).
One key concern was the anticipated difficulty in paying for social 
expenditures – especially pensions and age-related health care – in 
European countries. Another was that social protection regimes were 
not sufficiently supportive of employment. The social strategy as defined 
in this document in fact included employment policy (essentially the 
European Employment Strategy, EES) as its main content, on the grounds 
that ‘raising the employment rate will underpin the sustainability of the 
financing of social protection systems’ and that employment was the main 
route to social inclusion.
The EES as such is discussed below. Apart from a restatement of the 
Luxembourg process and its employment objectives, the Social Policy 
Agenda did recognize that other social policies were necessary because 
fuller employment could not in itself resolve such problems as poverty 
(Figure 5.3).
Thus, besides reiterating the Luxembourg employment targets, the 
Social Policy Agenda specified two further objectives:
●  Quality of social policy implies a high level of social protection, good social 
services available to all people in Europe, real opportunities for all, and the 
guarantee of fundamental and social rights. Good employment and social 
Social policy
Economic policy Employment policy
Full employment/Quality of workCompetitiveness/Dynamism
The policy mixes to be established to create a virtuous circle of economic and social 
progress should reflect the interdependence of these policies and aim to maximize their 
mutual positive reinforcement.
Social quality/Social cohesion
Source: European Commission (2000b, p. 6).
Figure 5.2  Social policy and the Lisbon strategy
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policies are needed to underpin productivity and to facilitate the adaptation 
to change. They also will play an essential role towards the full transition to 
the knowledge-based economy.
●  Quality in industrial relations is determined by the capacity to build consen-
sus on both diagnosis and ways and means to take forward the adaptation 
and modernisation agenda.
   This also includes coping successfully with industrial change and corporate 
restructuring. (European Commission, 2000a, pp. 13–14)
The gloss on the first of these objectives moved to a generally more 
defensive specification but with a very surprising exception. Improving 
the quality of social policy included: firstly, ‘modernising’ and ‘improv-
ing’ social protection (it being added that, in practice, this means ‘making 
work pay’, ‘making pensions safe and pension systems sustainable’); sec-
ondly, ‘preventing and eradicating poverty’; thirdly, promoting ‘full par-
ticipation of women in economic, scientific, social, political and civic life 
as a key component of democracy’ (again the benefits of such participation 
for production are emphazised); finally, the ‘development and respect of 
fundamental social rights’ with emphasis falling on tackling discrimina-
tion and xenophobia.
We have here important objectives to counter discrimination but which, 
in themselves, are market-conformable. Few large enterprises today, for 
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Figure 5.3  Poverty and employment in the EU
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example, are without equal opportunities policies. The specification of 
‘safe pensions’ and ‘sustainable pension systems’ conspicuously failed to 
add ‘better pensions’. The notion of ‘making work pay’ is, of course, a clas-
sical EU ambiguity – which might and probably does connote completely 
opposed labour market interventions at one and the same time, that is, 
both higher minimum wages and reduced support for the unemployed.
The most far-reaching of the social objectives was therefore most cer-
tainly the second on the list – the ‘eradication of poverty’. This wholly 
laudable target, which together with the near simultaneous commitment 
to ‘full employment’ gave the EU a surprisingly ambitious social policy, 
will be examined below.
The second objective, of ‘quality in industrial relations’ reminds us that 
the ‘Cologne Process’, involving improved employment relations was, in 
principle at least, part of the overall agenda, but the development of this 
theme was very sketchy. The Commission limited themselves to a call 
for ‘social dialogue at all levels (to) contribute in an effective way to the 
challenges identified. To promote competitiveness and solidarity and the 
balance between flexibility and security.’ But this early allusion to the holy 
grail of ‘flexicurity’ was not translated into any concrete policy orienta-
tions besides the ever-present need for ‘dialogue”.2
5.3  CONSISTENCY: THE SAPIR REPORT
Almost from the launch of the Lisbon agenda both its main components 
and the strategy as a whole were subject to repeated review. Many spe-
cific anxieties lay behind these repeated reassessments, but the failure to 
close the gap in GDP growth between EU and US was always part of the 
picture.
The Sapir Report (Sapir, 2003), was an early attempt to address this 
core problem of slower growth. The report had the merit of emphasizing 
the possible inconsistencies of the agenda – indeed it offered a typology of 
such inconsistencies, which might impair:
1. coherence at the level of instruments and objectives,
2. coherence at the level of decision-makers and jurisdictions, and
3. coherence over time for a given decision-maker and/or jurisdiction.
In general, however, the resolution of inconsistencies was to be sought 
by a strong emphasis on growth, since this was a necessary condition for 
the achievement of all the other objectives of the strategy. Growth might 
raise certain problems of cohesion (especially among regions) but the 
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main notion was that a rising tide floats all ships. And growth was to be 
pursued essentially by way of structural reforms and further liberalization. 
(The Report began to problematize the EU’s macroeconomic framework, 
but in the limited terms that have since become standard: the Growth 
and Stability Pact might indeed represent an obstacle to expansion, but 
if this was so it was because member state budgets had failed to build up 
sufficient surpluses during the boom to allow for fiscal relaxation in the 
downturn.)
According to the report, the European Social Model (ESM) was in deep 
trouble. In what was soon to become the new orthodoxy, both techno-
logical change and the rise of the Chinese economy were seen as lower-
ing the relative demand for unqualified labour. In these circumstances, 
labour market regulation and social protection which raised the price 
of such labour would only generate unemployment and destabilize the 
public finances. Population ageing exacerbated these problems. It should 
be remarked, however, that the empirical support for these explanations 
of widening labour market inequalities is fragile. Glyn (2001) reported 
that increasing wage inequalities were by no means a simple question of 
declining fortunes for the less qualified – they pervaded the entire dis-
tribution and were in fact more marked among highly qualified workers 
than between them and the unskilled. At the same time, the high risks of 
unemployment faced by workers with low bargaining power were not a 
European phenomenon: although general rates of unemployment were 
often lower in the US than in the EU, the concentration of unemployment 
on the less skilled was just as marked across the Atlantic.
In considering finance, the Sapir Report stressed the issue of risk 
capital. Between 1995 and 2000 the growth of labour productivity in the 
US outstripped that in the EU for the first time since the second world 
war, ‘an extraordinary performance for a country at the leading edge of 
the production possibility frontier’. The previous catch-up in European 
productivity levels had been to a great extent based on imitation; in the 
1990s, however, innovation became much more important. Among the 
conditions of research investment is ‘good access to risk capital by new 
start-up firms’. Thus the lack of risk capital had become a serious obstacle 
to European growth (Figure 5.4). The report gave the following details:
In 1999, total US expenditure on R&D at 2.6% of GDP was over a third higher 
than that of the EU. Nearly all of the difference can be attributed to a sub-
stantially higher investment in R&D by business (1.8% against 1.2%). Within 
the EU, the low level of business R&D reflects a general north–south divide. 
Finland and Sweden have both overall and business-financed R&D expen-
ditures exceeding those of the US, while Germany is not far behind. At the 
M1803 - GRAHL TEXT.indd   121 30/3/09   14:37:46
122 Global finance and social Europe
GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:11683 - EE - GRAHL:M1803 - GRAHL TEXT GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:11683 - EE - GRAHL:M1803 - GRAHL TEXT
other extreme, all EU Mediterranean countries have low overall and business-
financed levels of R&D. Nor are trends in R&D expenditure favourable to 
Europe. The US increased its lead in R&D expenditure by €95 billion between 
1996 and 2000, of which €20 billion was publicly financed. Between 1991 and 
2000, public research budgets in Europe declined from 0.91% to 0.73% of GDP. 
(Sapir, 2003, p. 34)
The Sapir Report also gave a strong endorsement of the FSAP, while 
insisting that the integrated capital markets which should emerge be 
lightly regulated.
Given the crucial role of financial integration for growth, completing the Single 
Market for financial services is crucial. A number of specific proposals currently 
in the pipeline address issues identified in this Report. For example, credit 
markets and the financial system for innovation are the subject of the Risk 
Capital Action Plan and Financial Services Action Plans. We support the accel-
erated implementation of both these actions rather than bringing forward new 
recommendations in these areas. An effective regulatory system for financial 
services, such as that proposed by the Lamfalussy Report on securities markets, 
represents a requirement for the efficient functioning of the financial system. 
In general, the regulatory process needs to become much closer to, and more 
aware of, market developments in service sectors and utilities. Possibilities for 
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Figure 5.4  R&D Finance by Source, 1999, as percentage of GDP
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self-regulation as a partial or complete substitute for statutory regulation need 
also to be explored. (Sapit Report, 2003, p. 130).
In its general orientation, the Sapir Report, having given detailed con-
sideration to possible inconsistencies in the Lisbon agenda and to trade-
offs among the various Lisbon targets, came down decisively in favour of 
growth: ‘there is a need to give higher priority to growth, because it is the 
means to achieve the economic, social and environmental objectives of the 
enlarged Union. Growth is also crucial to help the Union fulfil its political 
objectives’ (Sapir, 2003, p. 124). And the way to achieve that growth was 
essentially to learn from US experience:
The main reason for disappointing growth in the EU is quite clear. During 
the past decades, the economy has been confronted by a series of long-lasting 
shocks – the information technology revolution, German re-unification, the 
opening up to the new market economies of central and eastern Europe, globali-
sation – which called for new organisational forms of production. The situation 
demanded less vertically integrated firms, greater mobility within and across 
firms, greater flexibility of labour markets, greater reliance on market finance 
and higher investment in both R&D and higher education. In other words, this 
required massive change in economic institutions and organisations, which has 
not yet occurred on a large scale in Europe. (Sapir, 2003, p. 123)
As will be seen below, the Sapir report could be taken as forecasting 
the actual evolution of the Lisbon strategy towards an essentially eco-
nomic programme in the tradition of EU since its inception. Other targets 
were to be made possible by achieving growth, while growth itself would 
follow from market-oriented integration. It was suggested therefore that 
some temporary sacrifice of other priorities, such as ‘cohesion’, would in 
the longer term be rewarded by more abundant resources to sustain the 
ESM. An appeal was made in this context to the experience of the post-
war decades, when high growth rates went together with social progress. 
But, since the report also recognized that the nature of the growth process 
had changed and since it advocated economic policies very different from 
those of the trente glorieuses, it is not clear that such a comparison was 
relevant.
5.4  REASSESSING THE SOCIAL AGENDA
The Social Agenda was revisited by a group of experts (European 
Commission, 2004b). Following the Barcelona Council, the group defined 
the ESM thus: ‘The European social model is based on good economic 
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performance, a high level of social protection and education and social 
dialogue.’ It was recognized that ‘since the creation of the European 
Communities, social policy has always been lagging behind economic 
policy’ and it was added that ‘it is probably one of the major achievements 
of the Lisbon Strategy to try to put them on an equal footing’. This seems 
an optimistic judgement both because the constitutional structure of the 
EU privileges the economic and because the social content of the post-
Lisbon epoch is still to be demonstrated.3 The group endorsed the view 
that ‘the social model functions as a productive factor’:
Three key compromises can be detected within the social model: between the 
state and the market; between labour and capital, requiring concerted action 
and a role for nationwide agreements; and between the welfare state and indi-
vidual responsibility.
 In the 1960s, the conditions were excellent, with strong economic growth and 
low inflation. There is also a high level of training of the labour force. As a con-
sequence, there was confidence in public affairs as well as in individual rights. 
Law and collective bargaining fulfilled a key role, the latter one through a truly 
credible commitment between employers’ and workers’ representatives. The 
strength of the European Social Model was determined by the way in which 
competitiveness, solidarity and mutual trust interacted.
 However, since the 1970s this model has become less effective. This is due 
to the fact that the appropriate conditions are not met anymore. The balance 
between economic efficiency and social progress has to be adapted to take 
account of changing economic environment and social context. European 
Commission, 2004b, (pp. 27–8)
Three challenges to the ESM were specified: enlargement, population 
ageing and globalization. These were said to necessitate a certain modifi-
cation of the Lisbon agenda in the following ways:
To put more emphasis on the employment possibilities of the service  ●
sector as a whole, rather than on the potential of the ICTs;
To address demographic issues by longer working lifetimes (the  ●
target of five more years was adopted by the Barcelona Council 
in 2002), immigration and natalist measures (‘to allow European 
couples to have the number of children they desire’) centring on 
improved child-care facilities, parental leave and so on;
Certain reforms to the Stability and Growth Pact, so that the con- ●
straints involved relate more to long-term conditions and less to 
short-run fluctuations in budgetary positions.
As regards social protection, the group called for this to be financed 
increasingly out of social income as a whole, rather than labour income; 
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it called for strengthened social dialogue at all levels; and it asserted 
that since globalization threatens certain groups in the developed world, 
“social inclusion must be developed as a policy in itself”.
Of specific relevance to financial issues is the position that the group 
adopted on pensions. As a general framework, it suggested a new inter-
generational pact which would address both pension problems and 
those of young people (insecurity, adverse distributional developments). 
This proposal was subsequently adopted, at least in principle, by the 
Commission, although it is still unclear what the content of such a pact 
would be. Besides the risks traditionally covered by European social pro-
tection regimes, the report identified new risks, resulting from globaliza-
tion, and necessitating ‘new securities’ which include lifelong learning and 
‘capital ownership’. Although the latter point was not fully developed, it 
relates in part to funded market pension schemes. The report argues that 
the expansion of such schemes is necessary to preserve European owner-
ship of European enterprises:
Recent developments have proved the great vulnerability of companies whose 
capital is owned by Anglo-Saxon pension funds or hedge funds. If the EU wants 
to keep control of the economic centres of decision of its companies, it has to 
develop European pension funds as well as capital ownership by the workers 
themselves, which has already developed recently in many Member States in a 
very rapid and successful way. (European Commission, 2004b, p. 29)
This tied the social agenda very closely to financial integration and its 
consequences. The rapid growth of institutional investors became a way of 
limiting external ownership and at the same time of providing a new, asset-
based, security for workers. The linkage calls for at least two comments. 
On the one hand, the transition from ‘insider’ to ‘outsider’ investment 
systems, together with privatizations financed by stock market flotations, 
has been so far the basis for a new heightened penetration of US pension 
funds into the ownership of European companies, for instance in France. 
On the other, if a ‘new security’ is to be based on the individual possession 
of financial assets, what needs to be said about the distribution of such 
assets among the insecure?
After this report, the Commission itself published a brief review of 
the Social Agenda in February 2005. For the most part this dealt with 
employment issues, and the expansion of employment was still seen as 
the main weapon against ‘exclusion’. The issue of poverty was handled in 
a more cursory fashion – there was to be a ‘European year of combating 
poverty and exclusion’ in 2010. An attempt would be made to focus such 
EU-level instruments as did exist (above all the European Social Fund) 
on the priorities of the agenda, but in general the Union could only 
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deploy the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in the field of social 
policy, that is, it could only encourage, not determine, certain lines of 
policy because member states retained control in this field. Here, the aim 
was to stimulate improvements in the minimum income programmes of 
the member states, which was certainly the only logical approach within 
the existing constitutional and budgetary constraints, but it is extremely 
difficult to assess progress in counteracting poverty because few data 
are available since the launch of the Lisbon agenda. The Commission 
(2005b) noted that, ‘at the start of the decade, the number of citizens of 
the enlarged EU who were at risk of poverty and persistent poverty was 
very high: 15% and 9% respectively’. (These data seem to refer to the 
15 member states at the time – such data as are available suggest that 
the corresponding levels in many new member states are rather higher.) 
The document did make the judgement that ‘many people are still in 
considerable difficulties and are obtaining neither employment nor the 
national minimum income protection’. In view of this, ‘from 2005, the 
Commission will begin consultations on the reasons why the existing 
schemes are not effective enough’.
It should be noted in this context that, while the employment com-
ponent of the Social Agenda was closely linked to the Lisbon growth 
objectives, this was not as true of the anti-poverty component since 
the measure of poverty applied is relative, some 60 per cent of median 
income. (This use of the median is perhaps significant – it means that 
measured poverty rates are not sensitive to widening inequalities in the 
upper half of the income distribution, such as might follow from higher 
rewards for highly qualified workers or for successful entrepreneurs.) The 
Commission vehemently denied that the goal of poverty eradication had 
been ditched, but, as yet, it is impossible to see what effect that goal has 
had on social outcomes.
5.5  THE KOK REPORT
The High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok (2004) was clearly responding 
to what was, by the time of its convocation, something of a crisis in the 
Lisbon agenda.
After a recapitulation of the original Lisbon programme, the High 
Level Group acknowledged that it had been framed in the climate of 
‘irrational exuberance’ which had characterized stock markets around the 
time of its formulation: ‘The Lisbon strategy is sometimes criticised for 
being a creature of the heady optimism of the late 1990s about the then 
trendy knowledge economy, neglecting the importance of the traditional 
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industrial strengths of the European economy......... this is a fair criti-
cism’ (Kok, 2004, p. 9 with the omission of a quite unnecessary qualifying 
clause).
But things had gone wrong. Like most other commentators, the Group 
emphasised the failure to meet growth and employment targets, but they 
also mentioned failure to meet environmental objectives. To some extent 
these problems resulted from contingencies – the US downturn and so on 
– but the main factor had been ‘a lack of commitment and political will’, 
compounded by ‘incoherence and inconsistency, both between partici-
pants and between policies’ (Kok, 2004, p. 39–40). Neither the OMC nor 
the Community Method has been working properly.
Were European macroeconomic policies in any way responsible for 
the failure of Lisbon? The Kok report asserted several times the need for 
‘a wider macroeconomic framework as supportive as possible of growth, 
demand and employment’ and in this sense endorsed the planned revisions 
to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The perhaps Aesopian reference 
to macroeconomic issues repeated that the problem was that insufficient 
surpluses were built up in periods of high economic activity; however, it is 
difficult to see which period could have been meant because the 1990s were 
not a period of boom but were in fact dominated by the struggle to meet 
the Maastricht criteria.
Lisbon, however, remained indispensable because of the deep and 
manifold challenges faced by the EU and the ESM. The Group insisted 
that ‘The Lisbon strategy is not an attempt to become a copy-cat of the 
US – far from it; Lisbon is about achieving Europe’s vision of what it 
wants to be.’ However, the US remained the key external reference and 
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Figure 5.5  European productivity relative to the US
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provided the metric of success and failure, for example in terms of labour 
productivity (Figure 5.5).
Although, as with most recent assessments of Lisbon, the original 
agenda was seen as too complicated, the Group insisted that its revision 
should maintain the scope of the original version, including its social and 
environmental dimensions. Thus five priority areas were specified:
Innovation and the knowledge society ●
The internal market (including financial markets) ●
The right climate for business (including risk capital) ●
An inclusive labour market ●
Sustainable development ●
It will be shown below that in practice the revised agenda was rather 
narrower than this but it can be noted already that the Group, although 
they listed the ‘eradication of poverty’ (together with the application of 
the OMC to social protection) as a component of the original agenda, 
did not address in their recommendations this most striking and ambi-
tious goal of the Lisbon enterprise. This silence might be taken to imply 
that the goal was seen as unrealistic or the social agenda as too crowded. 
The Group repeated, very reasonably, that higher levels of employment 
would work to reduce poverty; their main recommendation on ‘inclu-
sion’ was to reinforce the European Employment Strategy. But apart 
from labour market policy the only proposals in the ‘social’ sphere con-
cerned ‘life-long learning’ and ‘active ageing’ – policies aimed, respec-
tively, at improving employment outcomes and at containing pension 
costs.
On financial services, the Kok Group repeated that ‘dynamic and 
highly competitive financial markets . . . are an essential driver of growth 
in all other sectors of the economy and must be a cornerstone of efforts 
to boost the EU’s economic performance.’ (Kok, 2004, p. 26). This led 
to an endorsement of the FSAP, of its extension to integrate clearing 
and settlement systems and of a further drive for integration in the field 
of retail finance. The report was, of course, a stimulus to policy discus-
sion rather than an academic treatise but the expression ‘essential driver 
of growth’ might require both some qualification and some evidential 
support.
On risk capital, the Group repeated the standard analysis that there 
is ‘insufficient mobilisation of capital’ to sustain entrepreneurial activ-
ity, but added that ‘investors in Europe should be more encouraged to 
commit to long-term involvement in start-ups’. This view marked a certain 
distance from the US model where it is, on the contrary, not long-term 
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commitment but the prospect of early exit via an IPO which is often seen 
as an indispensable incentive.
The Group went on to endorse the general process of financial integra-
tion, but again with a slight change in emphasis:
Equity markets and funds remain fragmented and below their critical size. As 
a consequence, the risk run by funds and private investors is unnecessarily 
increased as exit strategies are blocked. This in turn leads to lower investments 
and to Europe missing out on many opportunities. Therefore, the whole chain 
of creating worthwhile opportunities and assuring investment in them needs 
to be reinforced, linking funds, companies, industry and universities. (Kok, 
2004, p. 30)
The suggestion here seems to be that financial integration would lead 
to more liquid markets and, because this would permit dealing on a larger 
scale, to bigger institutional investors better able to diversify risks and 
rebalance portfolios. Thus we see the benefits of the FSAP and the RCAP 
defined, in a very realistic way, in terms of scale benefits rather than in 
terms of more intense competition or enhanced allocative efficiency. (Note 
that the reference to ‘exit’ in the second quotation sits somewhat uneasily 
with the ‘long-term involvement’ of the previous one.) But the new stress 
on the innovation ‘chain’ as a whole and on communications among all 
the actors seemed to reduce the usual emphasis on finance and financial 
markets.
In a further shift, one subsequently endorsed by Commission President 
Barroso, the public sector and public finance appeared as key supporters 
of start-ups and innovations: ‘Financial and public institutions offering 
different financing instruments supporting a specific policy objective, such 
as privileged loans, grants or subsidies, could cooperate better to make it 
easier for companies to locate the appropriate funding and to make use 
of the opportunities offered.’ (Kok, 2004, p 30). (If, per impossible, these 
public participations gave rise to ownership rights, this would represent 
a somewhat surprising ideological departure; see Holland (1972) on ‘the 
state as entrepreneur’.
Overall, the Kok Group went farther than other commentators in the 
attempt to rescue the Lisbon agenda as a strategy combining employment 
and growth objectives with ambitious ecological and social targets. They 
endorsed the intention ‘to embed Europe’s commitment to social cohesion 
and the environment in the core of the growth and jobs generation process 
so they are part of Europe’s competitive advantage’ (Kok, 2004, p. 16).
But their analysis went along with a general drift towards seeing growth 
and employment as the means to these other ends: these are the ‘key 
priorities’.
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5.6 THE PRODUCTIVITY GAP
What is the exact nature of the emerging productivity gap between the EU 
and the US? The aggregate data often referred to in the Lisbon literature 
are illustrated in Figure 5.6, from the Kok report.
A study by O’Mahoney and van Ark (2003) permits an accurate dis-
aggregation of the productivity gap. In country terms, three quarters 
of the productivity slowdown in the EU can be attributed to two coun-
tries: Germany and Italy, ‘with Germany about twice as important as 
Italy’. Thus what is often presented as a Europe-wide problem is in fact 
dominated by events in this single member state, which might therefore be 
accorded a priority position in analysis.
In terms of sectors, the study used three interrelated classifications: in 
terms of technology, labour force skills and innovation. Results are sum-
marized as follows:
— US productivity growth acceleration, EU unchanged or declining. Industries 
that are ICT producing manufacturers or intensive users of ICT, employ gradu-
ates or lower intermediate skilled labour, and where innovations arise through 
specialized suppliers, supplier based innovation and are provided through 
demands of clients.
— EU productivity growth relatively high, little or no US acceleration. Industries 
that are ICT-producing services, employ highly skilled craftsmen (higher inter-
mediate skilled labour) and/or where innovations are largely process changes 
arising from in-house R&D.
1966 1971 1976 1981
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Annual percent change
Source: Kok (2004, p. 16)
Figure 5.6  Productivity per hour in the Us and the EU
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— Relatively low and declining productivity growth in both the US and EU. 
Industries that neither produce nor intensively use ICT and employ mostly 
unskilled labour (pp. 12–13).
Of course, a sectoral analysis of the productivity gap is not the same 
thing as a sectoral explanation. There may be, and most probably are, 
economy-wide factors in the EU or in the US which have played a part 
in the differential performance of various sectors. But the phenomenon 
under study does seem to relate to a very specific aspect of technological 
development and technology diffusion over a relatively short period of 
time. The time period may even be too short to justify strong policy con-
clusions, but to the extent that it does we are confronted essentially with 
an investment problem and responses might be sought in a close analysis 
of the determinants of ICT investment.4
Connections between these investment issues and the broad themes of 
European employment policy are complex. There are certainly educa-
tion and training issues, but the pertinence of ‘flexibility’ in the sense of 
atypical contracts is questionable. A recent sectoral study of productivity 
growth and employment factors finds no connection whatsoever – the 
high-performance sectors tend to employ full-time, prime-age male 
workers on permanent contracts and could therefore be said to be as far 
away from the ‘flexible’ labour market as it is possible to go (Anderson 
et al., 2006).
In any case, the productivity gap, as the core phenomenon behind 
much of Lisbon’s economic prescriptions, does not seem to admit of a 
detailed analysis which would support the key themes that were adopted. 
In general, the drastic slowdown of the US economy in 2008 also calls 
into question the supposed structural superiority of the American model, 
while the massive disturbances in financial relations at the same time must 
qualify, in particular, the enthusiasm for US financial practices which 
inspired the Lisbon agenda.
5.7 BRITAIN AND THE INCLUSION INDICATORS
A simple point should be made about the various indicators of social 
exclusion developed in the context of Lisbon. This is that the UK (often 
accompanied by Ireland) displays particularly bad performance across 
virtually all the measures available (see Table 5.1).
The general picture is that Britain (and Ireland) exhibit inequalities and 
levels of social disadvantage similar to those of Spain and Portugal, in 
spite of significantly higher levels of income, and that these two countries 
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therefore represent somewhat retrograde social systems among those of 
Northern Europe. This pattern occurs in spite of relatively low unemploy-
ment rates, which might be thought to be a counteracting influence.
In most discussions of financial reforms, on the other hand, Britain 
(with Ireland, which was historically a subordinated region of the British 
economy) is seen as a pioneer – approaching much more closely the US 
structures and practices which provide the model for the financial integra-
tion programmes than do other member states. This is hardly a  coincidence 
– it is the actual functioning of the market mechanisms celebrated as the 
economic dimension of Lisbon which generates the ‘exclusions’, that is to 
say, the inequalities which are recorded in the Lisbon indicators.
It must be added that the New Labour government in Britain made 
strenuous efforts to square this circle, essentially by major programmes of 
tax credits aimed at children and low-paid workers. It is perhaps a little 
Table 5.1  Social indicators for Britain and other EU countries
Indicator EU-15 
Average
United 
Kingdom
Notes
Percentage of population at  
risk of poverty 2001
15 17 UK level exceeded by 
Ireland, Spain, Italy, 
Greece, Portugal
Percentage of children at risk  
of poverty 2001
19 24 UK level exceeded by 
Ireland, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal
Percentage of 65+ population  
at risk of poverty 2001
19 24 Higher figures only in 
Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain, Belgium
Income quintile ratio S80/S20  
2001
4.4 4.9 Exceeded by Greece, 
Spain, Portugal
Gini coefficient 2001 n.a. 31.0 Exceeded by Portugal, 
Spain, Greece
Percentage of children in  
jobless households 2003
9.8 17.0 UK highest in EU-15
Long-term unemployment  
rate 2002
3.0 1.1 UK bettered only by 
Sweden, Austria, 
Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, 
Denmark
Early school leavers not in 
education or training (%) 2003
18.1 16.7 Figures higher only in 
Portugal, Spain, Italy
Source: European Commission (2003c)
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early to judge the success or otherwise of these programmes, but recent 
data suggest that, together with rising employment, they may have helped 
to stabilize the percentage of the population falling below the usual EU 
poverty threshold (60 per cent of median income) (see Figure 5.7).
However, to the extent that wealth becomes a factor of increasing 
importance in social and economic outcomes, the trend in Britain seems to 
be adverse (see Table 5.2).
Notice the continued deterioration under New Labour. As wealth 
inequalities are translated into socio-economic inequalities of all kinds the 
New Labour tax credit programmes may be running hard to stand still.
5.8  THE MOVE TO A NARROWER AGENDA
Commission President José Manuel Barroso (2005) offered a condensed 
account of the New Lisbon agenda. Firstly, the general failures of the 
Below 60 per cent of median income
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1  Contemporary household disposable income before deduction of housing OCED 
equivalisation scale.
2  Data for 1994/95 for Great Britain only.
Source: Office for National Statistics (UK), Social Trends, 2008
Figure 5.7:  Poverty indicators for Britain
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first five years were acknowledged in a reasonably frank way. As the 
Kok report indicated, Europe had, if anything, moved further away from 
becoming ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy 
in the world’ in that it now confronted not only a continuing gap vis-à-vis 
the US but also the dramatic transformations in India and China. The 
main problem, however, was in implementation:
While many of the fundamental conditions are in place for a European renais-
sance, there has simply not been enough delivery at European and national 
level. This is not just a question of difficult economic conditions since Lisbon 
was launched, it also results from a policy agenda which has become over-
loaded, failing co-ordination and sometimes conflicting priorities (Barroso, 
2005, p. 5).
Yet the programme remained valid. ‘We need a dynamic economy to 
fuel our wider social and environmental ambitions.’ Failure to resurrect 
the strategy would involve ‘the costs of non-Europe’ which ‘have been 
substantiated through a large volume of academic evidence.’ (It was added 
immediately, and very correctly, that ‘one can argue with the figures.’) 
(Barroso, 2005, p.6).
The rebirth of Lisbon was sought through a sharper focus on central 
objectives, essentially on jobs and growth, and the strategy was given an 
alternative name, ‘Partnership for Growth and Jobs’ .Political obstacles 
were to be overcome by mobilizing ‘support for change’. ‘Everyone . . . and 
at every level must be involved in delivering these reforms’. (Barroso, 2005, 
p.7). Procedures and reporting had to be streamlined. One measure that 
was taken was to simplify the policy guidelines issued by the Commission. 
These now cover several years, and the economic policy and employment 
policy guidelines have been compressed into a single document, although 
the latter move may only serve to further subordinate employment stand-
ards to economic imperatives.
Thus, the core economic and employment objectives were given complete 
Table 5.2  Wealth inequalities in Britain
Distribution of wealth in UK (%)
1975 1986 1991 1996 2001
Most wealthy 1% 21 18 17 20 23
Most wealthy 25% 71 73 71 74 75
Most wealthy 50% 92 90 92 93 95
Source: Office for National Statistics, Social Trends, 2003168
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priority. For example, completion of the internal market again moved 
centre stage. The ambition of the revised social agenda, to use the Open 
Method of Coordination to promote minimum income systems, although 
not repudiated, was absent from this document; the ‘modernization’ of 
social protection seemed only to signify improved employment incentives 
and pension schemes which encourage a longer working life. In this way, 
broader social (and environmental) objectives were in practice subordinated 
to the traditional economic programmes of the EU, with the reassurance 
that economic success would permit these wider objectives to be reached. 
One might question both the assumptions on which this reassurance rested: 
firstly, the assumption that the proposed economic reforms would indeed 
lead to more growth and employment; and secondly, the assumption that 
economic policies of the kind envisaged would be compatible with the 
values and outcomes required for the European Social Model.
In fact, economic performance in the EU improved a little after the 
midpoint of the Lisbon strategy in 2005, but it is by no means clear that 
this was due to the Lisbon measures. The report prepared by Iain Begg 
(2007) for the European Parliament, although generally sympathetic to 
the Lisbon agenda in its revised form, finds no link between the Lisbon 
measures and the limited economic upturn and warns of a serious imbal-
ance among the EU economies, with German employment recovering via 
increased exports which put pressure on its neighbours.
On the specific issue of finance, however, the long reconsideration of 
Lisbon does seem to have led to a certain demotion. This can be seen in 
two fields. The optimism of Lisbon (and of the early FSAP) that the emer-
gence of big European institutional investors would provide a solution to 
pension problems seems to have been silently abandoned. The key measure 
now is to extend working life with, as supporting policies, the promotion 
of both immigration and fertility. This shift has at least the merit of 
making declared policies somewhat more logical. The ‘modernization’ of 
pension systems is still called for, but, to the extent that the ambiguities 
of EU language can be penetrated, this term seems increasingly to refer to 
parametric changes to existing systems rather than to a rapid privatization 
of provision (see Chapters 9 and 13). Of course, it remains the case that 
serious reductions in public provision would in themselves drive people 
towards market-based pensions, but the latter are no longer painted in 
such rosy hues as in the past.
Secondly, there was a similar switch in emphasis as regards risk capital. 
The Lisbon target of much higher R&D spending (3 per cent of GDP) was 
repeated, but rather less was said about the organizational forms of risk 
capital. Instead we have a somewhat ironic reorientation as regards state 
aid policy. At the Stockholm Council, this was still anathema: ‘State aid in 
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the European Union still accounts for more than 1% of GDP. This must 
be further reduced and the system made more transparent” (European 
Commission 2000c – presumably the figure given excludes agriculture). 
Now it became clear that state aid was to have a new and more positive 
role in support of R&D and innovation, especially in the SMEs. The 
Barroso document asserted that, ‘starting later this year, Member States, 
regional and other public actors will have more scope to support research 
and innovation, particularly by the EU’s small and medium-sized busi-
nesses’ (2005, p.9). Revisions to the code of conduct governing macroeco-
nomic policy seem to support this new approach in that they suggest a 
slight relaxation of budgetary rules to encourage this type of expenditure. 
Like the implicit move in pension policy, this shift on R&D cannot be 
faulted on logical grounds, but it testifies to a certain disappointment with 
the promise of financial reform as such to dynamize the EU economy.
NOTES
1. The term ‘social cohesion’ suggests an absence of conflict, which may not be compatible 
with, for example, a strong movement for a fairer distribution of income or wealth. The 
other term in standard use in the EU, ‘social exclusion’, is also problematic. Originally, it 
had a precise meaning in the context of Bismarckian social protection systems based on 
labour market participation. Someone without an adequate record of such participation 
could find themselves excluded from the social protection regime. In other contexts, the 
term seems to be a euphemism for ‘disadvantage’ or ‘poverty’. 
2. Subsequent development of the ‘flexicurity’ theme permits a more precise interpretation 
of its meaning to the European Commission. On the one hand the ‘security’ referred to is 
employment, not job security. This is a dubious switch because someone who loses their 
job and then finds another often suffers substantial reductions in pay and conditions. On 
the other hand, the broad recognition of problems with the standard ‘flexibility’ agenda, 
that is with the multiplication of ‘atypical’ employment contracts – such as part-time 
and temporary contracts, ‘zero hours’ contracts, the use of agency labour, putative ‘self-
employment’ is now used to justify not enhanced protections for the workers concerned 
but rather a general weakening of standard labour contracts. This kind of reasoning is 
also being used to support a decisive turn in EU employment policy towards deregula-
tion. For the new official position see the Green Paper on ‘Modernising’ European 
Labour Law (European Commission, 2006c). For a critique, see Keune and Jepsen 
(2007). 
3. Most commentators are of the view that this imbalance persists. For example, see 
Scharpf (1999).
4. It is interesting that O’Mahony and van Ark suggest (2003, p. 11) that the European 
slowdown is partly related to “moderation in wage growth. . ...during the second half of 
the 1990s” which may have discouraged the rapid substitution of capital equipment for 
labour. On this issue see also Kleinknecht (1998).
5. Because of problems in data collection, this table has been dropped from subsequent 
editions of Social Trends.
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9.  Financial markets and social 
security
John Grahl
9.1  INTRODUCTION
The increasing salience of financial markets and the rapid growth in many 
countries of institutional investors channelling household savings onto 
these markets have been pointed out in earlier chapters. These develop-
ments form the background to a political project to transfer responsibility 
for important welfare functions from the state to the market. The two 
most important examples are probably health care and retirement pen-
sions. In both cases, throughout Europe, provision today is very largely 
a public function. But there is a strong drive to limit or reduce public 
responsibility both for health care and for pensions, and to make house-
holds, using private insurance companies and privately managed pension 
funds, take over a large part of the responsibility. The argument for this 
kind of change is one aspect of a general assault on public services and 
social security which tries to call many public goods and social services 
into question and to privatize broad areas of the public sector.
The present chapter concentrates on the pensions issue. It makes a 
critical assessment of the moves towards market-based provision in the 
European Union and of the arguments on which these moves are based. 
It is suggested that these arguments fail in three key respects: firstly, they 
are conceptually incoherent in that they do not address the resource issues 
involved; secondly, they fail to recognize the efficiency of public provi-
sion and the inefficiency of most private provision in the field of pensions; 
thirdly, they promote changes which must aggravate social inequalities 
and divert resources away from those pensioners most in need.
9.2  THE CASE FOR MARKET PENSIONS
A very significant document in the present debate was a report from the 
World Bank (1994), which has been very influential in policy debates. The 
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argument was that ageing populations would make the present reliance 
of most Western countries on public ‘pay-as-you-go’ (PAYGO) systems 
unsustainable. The ratio of inactive pensioners to the employed popula-
tion whose contributions provided their pensions was going to deterio-
rate. The recommended solution was to move responsibility away from 
the state towards the market: funded pensions, based on the marketable 
assets accumulated by households through the institutional investors, 
would compensate for the predicted inadequacy of public provision in the 
future.
The entire argument rests on a massive petitio principii: that the accumu-
lation of marketable financial claims will produce resources which cannot 
be mobilized through existing public PAYGO pension schemes. As has 
been frequently pointed out, a financial claim (on the state, on an enter-
prise or, usually via a financial intermediary, on households) and a public 
pension entitlement are two logically equivalent devices for transferring 
current output to the holder of the claim: neither of them as such generates 
the output in question.
The proponents of pension privatisation thus have to suggest that, 
in some way, the accumulation of claims in private pension funds will 
promote the availability of real resources from which tomorrow’s more 
numerous pensions can be paid. Two arguments are made to support such 
a suggestion, both equally specious.
Firstly, it is argued that the current savings made today by people 
contributing to funded pensions will raise the rate of investment and thus 
render the economy more productive in the future. In fact it is impossible 
to establish any positive relationship between the role of private funded 
pensions and the level of savings in an economy. Two countries which 
depend to a very great extent on market-based pensions, Britain and 
the US, have notoriously low, sometimes negative, rates of household 
savings (together with serious problems of indebtedness for many house-
holds) while in Germany, for example, where pensions are still largely 
provided through a public PAYGO scheme, household savings are very 
high – indeed in recent years perhaps too high in that private consumption 
expenditures have been so low as to restrict employment in the domestic 
economy.
Of course, the management of savings and investment is a key concern 
of macroeconomic policy and it may at times be important to stimulate 
household savings (indeed it would be desirable to do so in Britain to 
limit the importation of consumer goods and to contain problems of over-
indebtedness for low-income consumers). However, there is no evidence 
whatsoever that the promotion of market-based pensions acts as such a 
stimulus. In fact, the tax breaks used to encourage people to take out such 
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schemes, although they are very expensive and a serious burden on public 
budgets, seem to have the principal effect of merely diverting the savings 
stream of high-income households from one channel to another.
The second argument from ‘demographic crisis’ to the need for market-
based pensions simply depends on the notion that there are clear limits to 
public spending on pensions. It is not clear what these limits would be: no 
evidence exists that higher social security contributions to cover higher 
numbers of pensioners would be a disincentive either to employment or 
to savings. From the point of view of the neoliberal project there is, or 
should be, a maximum level of public spending which it is imperative not 
to transgress. In reality it is normal, when the proportion of older people 
in the population rises, to increase the proportion of GDP which goes to 
older people.1
9.3  DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS AND MORAL PANIC
It has been pointed out that an increase in the proportion of older people 
in the population raises a question of resources, not a question of finan-
cial techniques. But this resource question has been grossly exagger-
ated. Between the present and 2050, the time horizon in many studies of 
population ageing, there is enormous scope firstly for a big reduction in 
unemployment, which would substantially improve the balance between 
contributions and payments in public systems, and for economic develop-
ment, which would provide additional income out of which the increased 
needs of an older population could be met.
According to EU data, on present policies public pension expenditure 
will increase by more than 5 per cent of GDP between now and 2050 in 
the following countries: Belgium (5.1 per cent) the Czech Republic (5.6 per 
cent), Cyprus (12.1 per cent), Luxembourg (7.4 per cent), Hungary (9.9 
per cent), the Netherlands (7.6 per cent), Portugal (9.7 per cent), Spain (7.1 
per cent), and Slovenia (8.3 per cent) (see Table 9.1).
In the cases of Cyprus and Spain, actual levels of expenditure are well 
below the EU average and most of what will be taking place is simply a 
movement towards European norms. Luxembourg has such a small and 
wealthy population that there cannot be any reason for concern. In the 
Netherlands, the public sector provides a universal flat rate pension at 
some 70 per cent of the minimum wage (a pension based on years of resi-
dence rather than employment). This is a very successful strategy against 
poverty in old age and there is a political will to maintain the scheme even 
though its costs will rise with demographic change. On the other hand, the 
Netherlands already has bigger private pension funds than any country in 
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Europe except Switzerland (in 2001, pension fund assets amounted to 105 
per cent of GDP in the Netherlands as against 66 per cent in the UK and 
63 per cent in the US, according to OECD 2005b, p. 24) and so it is dif-
ficult to see what a further development of market-based funded pensions 
could contribute. Portugal does seem to be one case where ageing will 
give rise to tight constraints. The Portuguese situation is marked by very 
high degrees of inequality both among pensioners and for the population 
as a whole; increased spending per head of the older population will be 
 neces sary to relieve poverty.
Table 9.1  Predicted pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP
Country Public pensions, gross as % of GDP Change 
2004– 
30
Change 
2030– 
50
Change 
2004– 
502004 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050
BE 10.4 10.4 11.0 12.1 13.4 14.7 15.7 15.5 4.3 0.8 5.1
CZ  8.5  8.2  8.2  8.4  8.9  9.6 12.2 14.0 1.1 4.5 5.6
DK  9.5 10.1 10.8 11.3 12.0 12.8 13.5 12.8 3.3 0.0 3.3
DE 11.4 10.5 10.5 11.0 11.6 12.3 12.8 13.1 0.9 0.8 1.7
EE  6.7  6.8  6.0  5.4  5.1  4.7 4.4 4.2 −1.9 −0.5 −2.5
GR
ES  8.6  8.9  8.8  9.3 10.4 11.8 15.2 15.7 3.3 3.9 7.1
FR 12.8 12.9 13.2 13.7 14.0 14.3 15.0 14.8 1.5 0.5 2.0
IE  4.7  5.2  5.9  6.5  7.2  7.9 9.3 11.1 3.1 3.2 6.4
IT 14.2 14.0 13.8 14.0 14.4 15.0 15.9 14.7 0.8 −0.4 0.4
CY  6.9  8.0  8.8  9.9 10.8 12.2 15.0 19.8 5.3 7.6 12.9
LV  6.8  4.9  4.6  4.9  5.3  5.6 5.9 5.6 −1.2 −0.1 −1.2
LT  6.7  6.6  6.6  7.0  7.6  7.9 8.2 8.6 1.2 0.7 1.8
LU 10.0  9.8 10.9 11.9 13.7 15.0 17.0 17.4 5.0 2.4 7.4
HU 10.4 11.1 11.6 12.5 13.0 13.5 16.0 17.1 3.1 3.7 6.7
MT  7.7  7.6  8.3  9.0  9.7 10.7 11.7 11.2 2.9 0.6 3.5
AT 13.4 12.8 12.7 12.8 13.5 14.0 13.47 12.2 0.6 −1.7 −1.2
PL 13.9 11.3  9.8  9.7  9.5  9.2 8.6 8.0 −4.7 −1.2 −5.9
PT 11.1 11.9 12.6 14.1 15.0 16.0 18.8 20.8 4.9 4.8 9.7
SI 11.0 11.1 11.6 12.3 13.3 14.4 16.8 18.3 3.4 3.9 7.3
SK  7.2  6.7  6.6  7.0  7.3  7.7 8.2 9.0 0.5 1.3 1.8
FI 10.7 11.2 12.0 12.9 13.5 14.0 13.8 13.7 3.3 −0.3 3.1
SE 10.6 10.1 10.3 10.4 10.7 11.1 11.6 11.2 0.4 0.2 0.6
UK  6.6  6.6  6.7  6.9  7.3  7.9 8.4 8.6 1.3 0.7 2.0
EU-151 10.6 10.4 10.5 10.8 11.4 12.1 12.9 12.9 1.5 0.8 2.3
EU-10.9  9.8  9.2  9.5  9.7  9.8 10.6 11.1 −1.0 1.3 0.3
EU-121 11.5 11.3 11.4 11.8 12.5 13.2 14.2 14.1 1.6 0.9 2.6
EU-251 10.6 10.3 10.4 10.7 11.3 11.9 12.8 12.8 1.3 0.8 2.2
Note: 1 Excluding Greece.
Source: European Commission (2006b)
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In general, however, it is clear that there is no emergency. Relatively 
small increases in public spending on pensions as a fraction of GDP are 
required, on average from 11.0 per cent to 14.6 per cent over more than 
forty years; there is no reason, apart from neoliberal ideology, why these 
increases cannot be made.
9.4  ADMINISTRATION COSTS
There are big economies of scale in pension provision, whether or not this 
provision involves funding.2 Governmental schemes, involving the whole 
employed population and not allowing individuals to opt out, tend to 
have the lowest costs per euro of pension finally delivered. Occupational 
schemes, organized on a sectoral basis or by very large employers, have 
significantly higher costs; schemes sold by institutional investors directly 
to individuals have the highest costs, and these costs are the higher, the 
wider is the choice of schemes open to the individual.
From the point of view of an individual customer, the costs of a funded 
occupational pension scheme can be divided into: accumulation costs (the 
difference between the returns on the securities underlying the scheme 
and the returns credited to the individual’s account); alteration costs 
(which must often be met when the individual’s circumstances change – 
for example, a change of employer); and annuitization costs which occur 
when the individual retires and has to turn the funds accumulated in their 
account into a regular payment (Herbertsson and Orszag, 2001).
The alteration costs are often very high, representing a distribu-
tion away from contributors who change their occupation or employer 
towards those in more stable circumstances. Although this has been an 
embarrassing problem for the advocates of ‘flexible’ labour markets, 
their preferred solution, to replace occupational by ‘personal’ pensions 
chosen by the individual, fails because of the very high marketing costs of 
the latter. From the point of view of the institutional investor as pension 
provider, costs can be divided into: acquisition costs (costs of acquiring 
new business, essentially marketing costs); administration costs (costs 
of administering individual accounts); and asset management costs as 
such (portfolio purchase and alteration). It is the first two of these which 
dominate the supplier’s costs, with ‘acquisition’ or marketing costs being 
particularly onerous for ‘personal’ schemes.
A typical personal pension in the UK absorbed 40 per cent of the 
individual’s contributions (Murthi et al, 1999, cited by Herbertsson and 
Orszag, 2001).3 It is for this reason that most of the personal pensions mar-
keted in the UK in the 1980s were later declared to have been mis-sold and 
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the institutional investors who were responsible were made to compensate 
their customers.
9.5  WEALTH INEQUALITIES
There are three broad principles according to which pension income can 
be distributed. There can be, firstly, distribution according to citizenship 
or, in practice, residence. This is the most egalitarian approach, and the 
most developed example is perhaps the basic component of the public 
pension in Denmark. Although at present only relatively limited schemes, 
of course in the public sector, function in this way, there are strong argu-
ments for a move in this direction to reduce inequalities and simplify the 
working of social security systems.
The second distributional principle, which has been predominant in 
continental European countries up to the present, is earnings-related. 
Pensions calculated in this way depend on wages while in work (and 
often on years of employment). These systems aim to maintain the broad 
pattern of wage distribution among the employed population into retire-
ment. They are obviously considerably less egalitarian than flat-rate pen-
sions and may tend to perpetuate the injustices of working life into the 
years of retirement, in particular as regards women’s pensions. For this 
reason earnings-related systems can be modified in favour of lower earners 
or to take child care and care of the elderly into account as well as employ-
ment records. Most such systems work on a public sector PAYGO basis, 
which facilitates this redistributional objective, but many pre-funded 
occupational schemes also correspond essentially to the ‘earnings-related’ 
principle, especially where they are ‘defined benefit’ schemes, that is where 
they guarantee a certain pension in function of years of contribution; the 
guarantee is usually expressed as a fraction of earnings in employment.
The third possible principle characterizes ‘personal’ pensions but also, 
to an increasing extent, other private-sector pensions, such as the defined 
contribution schemes operated by many employers. This is simply to 
pay pensions in function of the accumulation achieved by the individual, 
that is, in accordance with their wealth. This is a radically inegalitarian 
approach since, in all countries, the distribution of wealth is extremely 
unequal, much more so than the distribution of earnings. One’s ability to 
acquire wealth depends on how much wealth one already has and on the 
amount of savings one can devote to further accumulation – those with 
high incomes can save many times more than those with average incomes 
while, for the lowest income groups, saving may be practically impossible 
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and no wealth at all can be accumulated. This is certainly the case today as 
regards market-based pensions.
All studies of wealth distribution testify to massive inequalities. For 
example, a very recent study (Sierminska et al., 2006) attempts to produce 
comparable measures for seven countries (see Table 9.2).
The data in Table 9.2 specifically exclude pension entitlements, but this 
only reinforces the point. Even social-democratic Sweden is characterized 
by extreme inequality in the distribution of wealth. In Europe, especially 
in Scandinavia, these inequalities are mitigated by pension entitlements 
based on residence, on earnings and, for those without resources, on 
need. To the extent, however, that market-based pensions displace public 
PAYGO schemes while collective provision gives way to purely individual 
responsibility, pensions will become a simple corollary of personal wealth 
– inadequate except for a privileged minority.4
9.6  RISK AND THE MOVE TO DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION
The social security systems which were built up over the twentieth century 
are not only effective systems for the redistribution of income. Quite apart 
from their redistributive aspects they are extremely efficient systems for 
insurance against risk. Many of the risks which can be routinely covered 
by public social security systems are either impossible or very expensive 
to insure via financial markets (Barr, 2001). This is true, for example, for 
Table 9.2  Distribution of wealth in selected countries (c. 2000)
Share of  
wealth of  
richest 1%
Share of  
wealth of  
richest 10%
Percentage of  
households with zero/
negative net worth
Canada 15% 53% 20%
Finland 13% 45% 15%
Germany 14% 54% 19%
Italy 11% 42%  3%
Sweden 18% 58% 27%
UK 10% 45% 11%
US 29% 67% 17%
Source: (Sierminska et al., 2006) Luxembourg Wealth Study
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such risks as unemployment, chronic sickness or the need for intensive 
care in old age. Information problems, non-diversifiable risks, externali-
ties and other difficulties frequently obstruct market-based approaches to 
many of the risks which confront people in their everyday lives.5
Market-based pensions, pre-funded from the accumulation of securi-
ties, are subject to two main risks. Firstly, there is the danger that the 
pension provider – whether an employer sponsoring a pension scheme 
for their workers, or an institutional investor selling pension schemes to 
 individuals – might become insolvent: there have been numerous recent 
cases in Britain and the US. It is interesting that the response of the 
authorities has been to intervene and to regulate, in Britain for example 
by compelling providers to contribute to a state-run system to refinance 
insolvent pension schemes.
The second risk is that the assets accumulated in the fund will prove 
inadequate to pay the pensions required, either because the net return on 
the investments is too low, or because very low interest rates make it costly 
to turn an accumulated pension account into a regular (‘annuitized’) 
pension. In principle this risk can be insured against on the market – 
insurance companies in particular may offer long-term savings plans with 
a guaranteed pay-out. These tend, however, to be very expensive so that 
most individuals buying pension products opt for ‘defined contribution’ 
rather than ‘defined benefit’ schemes, meaning that it is the contributions 
rather than the final pension pay-out which is fixed.
Until recently, however, private pensions with a somewhat more collec-
tive character – those organized on a sectoral basis or by large employers 
– tended to be on a defined benefit basis, where members of the scheme 
were guaranteed a certain pension, usually in function of their earnings at 
work. Thus the risk that pension funds’ assets would not cover liabilities 
was assumed by the sponsor of the fund, whether an employer or an insti-
tutional investor. This corresponded to a situation where occupational 
pensions were essentially perceived as deferred wages – as arising from the 
employment contract (often subject to collective bargaining).
In recent years there has been a wholesale flight from ‘defined benefit’ 
pension provision. Particularly in the US and in Britain, where employer-
provided pensions were of great significance, employers began to close 
defined benefit pension schemes and replace them with defined contribu-
tion schemes. The employees concerned usually lost out in two ways: 
firstly, they had henceforth to carry all the risks of the security markets 
in which their pension funds were invested; secondly, they usually faced 
a straightforward decline in provision since employers cut back their pay-
ments into the new funds.
This was essentially equivalent to a cut in wages – the rewards offered 
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to employees were reduced. Clearly these moves by employers were made 
possible by a decline in the strength of organized labour. At the same time, 
however, the widespread refusal by employers to accept pension fund 
risks demonstrated how important the risks were that could not simply 
be diversified away across security markets; to the extent that diversifica-
tion can eliminate risk any sizeable pension portfolio can do so. But, after 
diversification, systemic risk (that affecting all securities) remains, and 
it is clear that this risk was substantial. To cope with systemic risk is a 
public function since only governments are in a position to defend pension 
 entitlements in the face of a generalized decline in investment returns.
9.7  EU PENSION POLICY AND THE 
OCCUPATIONAL PENSION DIRECTIVE
Although EU leaders were clearly dazzled by the rapid rise of equity prices 
(especially for high-tech stocks) when the Lisbon agenda was being defined 
in 2000, it has not been possible for them to promote pre-funded pensions, 
based on the security markets and delivered by the institutional investors, 
as a plausible response to pension problems in the EU. The difficulties with 
such an approach were too great: even if a switch to pre-funded pensions 
were brought about, no resources would thereby become available to meet 
future pension needs; the costs of market-based pensions might well be 
prohibitive, especially for low-income groups; reliance on such pensions 
would clearly have extremely adverse distributional consequences, incom-
patible with the European Social Models; and the risks involved for those 
with limited resources were obviously excessive.
Nevertheless some significant moves have been made in that direction. 
In Germany the Schröder government introduced a market-based, funded 
element into the state system, but this remains predominantly a PAYGO 
scheme. A very small funded element has recently been introduced into 
the Swedish scheme. In Britain, where many pensions are very inadequate, 
a new funded scheme, based on employers’ and employees’ contributions 
is planned. Originally this was to be operated by a new central agency 
but pressure from the institutional investors prevented this. However, the 
most important reform in Britain was the recent decision to strengthen the 
basic state pension by linking it to the growth of incomes, not just the rise 
in prices.
In practice, the main reforms taking place are parametric changes within 
public PAYGO systems rather than moves away from these systems. The 
key parameters here are: the age at which pensions become payable (or the 
number of years of labour market participation required for eligibility); the 
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contribution rates levied on employers and employees; the level of pension 
subsidy from general taxation (or the level of pension surplus appropri-
ated by the government); and the generosity or otherwise of pension 
provision. It is very important that the parametric changes which are used 
do in fact improve the position of the disadvantaged pensioners. This is 
not in general the case for increases in the age at which pensions become 
payable except perhaps in some southern European countries where the 
age of retirement has been very low for specific occupational groups. This 
is firstly because the life expectancy of the poor is often much lower than 
that of the rich and so even this apparently technical adjustment may 
aggravate social injustice. Secondly, the activity rates of older workers, 
especially the lower paid and more disadvantaged ones, are very low and if 
their pensions are delayed many of them will be unemployed or compelled 
to remain in very poor jobs. An important ‘parametric’ resource which is 
insufficiently used would be to reduce the tax breaks given to high-income 
groups with private pension schemes.
Thus, although many EU leaders might well have desired a thorough-
going market approach, they realized that this was impractical. They 
did try to develop a European pensions market in the Directive on 
Occupational Pensions which was adopted in 2003. However, it was never 
very likely that this market would grow rapidly to any significant scale. At 
the same time therefore the European Commission developed a somewhat 
different approach, which might be regarded as a surrogate form of pre-
funding. The main emphasis today is less on replacing public by private 
provision, but rather more on ‘strengthening’ the public finances so that 
higher rates of public expenditure in the future can be accommodated 
without a big increase in tax revenues. To this end, member state govern-
ments are urged to run budget surpluses, so that it will be easier to run 
deficits to cover the future peak in age-related spending. The Commission 
(2006b) now writes:
The Stockholm European Council outlined a three-pronged strategy to tackle 
the budgetary implications of ageing populations:
– Member States should reduce public debt levels at a faster pace;
– Member States should undertake comprehensive labour market reforms, 
including tax and benefit systems, in order to achieve higher employment rates, 
in particular among older workers and women;
– Member States should undertake appropriate reforms of pension systems in 
order to contain pressures on public finances, to place pension systems on a 
sound financial footing and ensure a fair intergenerational balance.
This approach has at least the merit of recognizing that pension provi-
sion is and must remain essentially a public responsibility. It has, however, 
several demerits.
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Firstly, public finance objectives are laid down with no consideration 
of their macroeconomic consequences. Any large or rapid tightening of 
budgetary policy is likely to have a negative effect on employment and 
thus undermine the attempt to increase the ratio of the active to the 
inactive population. Secondly, the dogmatic repetition of the demand 
for ‘comprehensive labour market reforms’ ignores the tendency of these 
‘flexibility’ measures to increase inequalities. As has been suggested 
throughout the present discussion, the real problem of pensions in Europe 
is basically one of inequality rather than demographics: pensioners in 
general are not a disadvantaged group, but there are very many poor 
pensioners. Measures designed to increase employment by imposing 
lower wages and economic insecurity on the most vulnerable sections of 
the workforce will make this situation worse. Thirdly, to the extent that 
there is a demographic problem, it is quite logical to finance the associated 
expenditures in part by government deficits and thus avoid a sharp fluc-
tuation in the total tax burden. Only if a problem continuing over a very 
long period were anticipated would it be necessary to make a fundamental 
shift in the budgetary stance, and even then, it would be desirable to make 
the shift gradually.
9.8  PENSIONS IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES
In many of the new member states of the EU, previously within the Soviet 
sphere, there have been rapid and dramatic changes in the pension system 
in recent years. In the Baltic states, in Hungary, Poland and the Slovak 
Republic very similar market-oriented reforms have been implemented. 
These involve adding to the existing public PAYGO systems, a second 
mandatory scheme, which is to be fully funded and to operate on a defined 
contribution basis.6 The population which is compulsorily insured in this 
way usually consists of all members of the workforce below a certain age; 
since older workers have no hope of accumulating significant entitlements 
they are not required to make contributions.
So far, there are numerous restrictions on the institutions which manage 
the funds collected by these schemes – their fund management has not 
yet been opened up to external penetration although this is certainly in 
the logic of the Occupational Pension Directive. The fact that these new 
member states retain, for the time being, their own currencies makes it 
possible for their governments to restrict investment in foreign assets to 
30 per cent of the total value of the funds. Initially at least, these pension 
funds have invested very heavily in the bonds issued by their own govern-
ments – which calls their rationale into question: if the assets accumulated 
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are merely claims on the government why not simply record claims (also 
on the government) within a PAYGO system? The administrative costs of 
the second option would be much lower.7 It is far too soon to evaluate the 
performance of these new funded schemes, which will not mature and start 
to pay out significant numbers of pensions for several decades. However, 
it is possible to point to characteristics of these societies which lead to spe-
cific problems for their pension systems.
The structures inherited from the state socialist era, although far from 
adequate, scored rather high in terms of both coverage and distribution: 
EU indicators for income equality among pensioners, for replacement 
ratios and for poverty ‘risks’ among pensioners have rather favourable 
values in these countries. These data, however, must be interpreted in light 
of the low levels of income of the population and the drastic disruption of 
economic and social life during the 1990s.8
Financial problems for social security systems in these countries are 
very immediate. Although the population is certainly ageing in some of 
them, the real constraint on their social security systems arises from low 
employment rates, especially among workers aged over 55 (see Table 9.3). 
These low rates, in turn, reflect the massive process of deindustrialisation 
which followed the collapse of the centrally planned economy and the 
virtual impossibility of reintegrating all those who lost their jobs at that 
time.
In these circumstances, the move to ‘funded’ provision, a long time into 
the future, reflects less a response to long-run demographic problems than 
an inability to respond to current pressures with systems which historically 
depended on high levels of employment.
The nearly uniform imposition of radical, market-oriented change by 
Table 9.3  Employment rate in selected new member states (ex-soviet 
bloc)
Employment rate (%) 55–64 years
Czech Republic 43
Estonia 52
Hungary 31
Latvia 48
Lithuania 47
Poland 26
Slovak Republic 27
EU25 41
Source: European Commission (2006b), Technical Annexe p. 33
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most of these countries perhaps indicates weaknesses in civil society. The 
representation of domestic interest groups is weak; the influence of foreign 
agencies and their ‘experts’ is more powerful and direct than it would be 
in Western Europe.
The Czech Republic represents an interesting contrast to the other 
post-Soviet economies. Its institutional development has clearly been 
more influenced than that of Poland, for example, by social-democratic 
experience in Western Europe, and its pension system has been rede-
signed more along Western European lines than according to the blue-
prints of the neoliberal advisors whose handiwork is seen across most of 
the other new member states. Currently the Czech Republic has one of 
the most effective pension systems in the EU: over 65s at risk of poverty 
number only 4 per cent; the incomes of over 65s are 83 per cent of those 
of younger people; and the distribution of pensioner incomes is both 
more equal than among the Czech population at large and more equal 
than in most other EU countries. This is not a cheap system – it requires 
contributions of 28 per cent of payroll – and this has been made possible 
by an overall economic performance somewhat better than that in other 
new member states.
9.9  A QUESTIONABLE ‘MODERNIZATION’
Many statements of the EU’s Lisbon Agenda call for a modernization of 
the European Social Model. It is impossible to object to modernization in 
the abstract, but in concrete terms one central meaning of the moderniza-
tion is usually a shift from public to market-based pension provision. This 
would not in reality be a modernization of the European social models 
but an abandonment of one of their defining goals, the security of the 
European populations in their old age.
It is noteworthy that in the member state where reliance on market pro-
vision has gone furthest, the UK, the functioning of the pension system is, 
by the EU’s own reckoning, very weak (see Chapter 10). It is irresponsible, 
given such results, to promote pension strategies which, in effect, take the 
UK as a model.
Change in the direction which is advocated by many European leader-
ships would do nothing to provide more resources for the retired; it would 
aggravate social inequalities; and it would undermine the economic security 
of European populations. To the extent that such policies are motivated by 
a desire to expand the role of security markets in contemporary economic 
life, they display a confusion of ends and means and a misunderstanding of 
the role that market finance can play in economic development.
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NOTES
1. The dimensions of the ‘ageing’ problem are frequently expressed in terms of a ‘depend-
ency ratio’, that is the ratio of the retired to the employed population. The underlying 
notion here is some kind of labour theory of value according to which the entire social 
product would accrue to employees. In fact the share of wages in GDP has been falling 
for two decades in most EU countries and is now around 60 per cent, with around 40 
representing various forms of property income. Obviously this last is in potential an 
important source of revenue for governments. It must also be recognized that the eco-
nomically non-active population includes children as well as retired people. The ratio of 
the active to the non-active population as a whole is much more stable than the ratio of 
the active population to the retired. 
2. It is also true, of course, that PAYGO schemes are cheaper to administer than pre-
funded ones, because they do not have to bear the costs of asset management. 
3. The Labour administration elected in 1997 attempted to reduce these costs by promoting 
‘cheap and cheerful’ standardized pension schemes, known as ‘stakeholder’ pensions. 
They have been successful neither with the public, to whom they offer minimal benefits, 
nor with the institutional investors, who cannot make much profit out of them.
4. No argument will be made against the accumulation of market-based pensions by 
the wealthy, as a supplement to public schemes. And the role of market-based savings 
schemes will tend to expand as societies become richer. However, it is neither necessary 
nor just to subsidize such accumulation out of public funds.
5. Shiller (2003) argues that innovation and technical change in securities markets may 
make them able to handle more of the risks of ordinary life. But it is significant that many 
of his examples of successful innovation in covering risks relate in fact to public systems 
of social insurance, not to the financial markets.
6. The Lithuanian funded scheme is in principle voluntary, but once someone has joined it 
they cannot leave.
7. No custody costs, very few regulatory or legal costs, no transactions costs, and so on.
8. In Poland, the incomes of people above 65 years are higher (113 per cent) than those of 
younger people – this is a unique situation in Europe but it relates to widespread poverty 
among the younger population. 
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10.  Finance and the household
John Grahl
10.1  INTRODUCTION
Most discussion of regulation in the financial sector identifies two broad 
motives: stability and consumer protection.1 The issue of financial stability 
is dealt with in Chapter 7 above and again in chapter 14; thus the present 
chapter concerns only consumer protection.2 It should be noted, however, 
that sometimes the actual regulatory measures which might be adopted 
on grounds of stability coincide with those taken to protect the consumer 
of financial services; for example, measures to maintain confidence in the 
banking system can serve both purposes.
Information Asymmetries
Much of the mainstream literature on regulation runs in terms of infor-
mation asymmetries between the suppliers and the users of financial 
services. The basic notion is that retail consumers, whether individuals, 
households or small businesses, have much less information about the 
efficiency, quality and honesty of specific financial service providers than 
do the providers themselves. If then consumers are unable to discriminate 
between good and bad services, they may simply distrust all suppliers 
rather than choosing the best. This limits the market for the service in 
question; indeed it may, in the limit, prevent any transactions at all. 
Honest and efficient suppliers are penalized by the activities of dishonest 
and inefficient ones.
Among the factors leading to information asymmetries is the fact that 
households may transact much less frequently than the financial compa-
nies with which they are dealing – for example, someone may only ever 
need to arrange one or two mortgages – and this means they are bound to 
lack the detailed knowledge which will be available to a financial company 
specialized in the provision of mortgages. The same may well apply to a 
pension or a long-term savings plan.3
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Market Power
Market power may be a further motive for consumer protection measures. 
Some financial sectors are highly concentrated and this can lead to the 
exploitation of consumers. And effective market power may result also 
from information problems when consumers are unaware of the full range 
of suppliers of a particular product.4
Social Inequalities
Both information asymmetries and market power can result in market 
failure. In terms of mainstream economic analysis they may justify 
 regulation or other forms of intervention to increase the efficiency of the 
market economy.
However, these narrowly economic motives are not in practice the 
only reasons for regulation to protect consumers – broad considera-
tions of social justice and equality are also at work. Banks, insurance 
companies and other financial institutions are often among the richest 
and most powerful structures in contemporary society and those who 
own and control them among the richest and most powerful individuals. 
Limits on the ability of these institutions to profit at the expense of ordi-
nary people and, especially, of the most vulnerable, are therefore seen as 
necessary in terms of social justice and the legitimacy of the economic 
system.
Market Regulation versus Public Provision
The view taken throughout this book is that many household needs are 
better met through public than through market provision. This is, for 
example, the case for most health insurance. It is also true for most pension 
needs – the public sector can provide pensions at lower cost, with greater 
security and in a much fairer way than can the private sector (see Chapter 
9). For example, actual pensions outcomes are much less satisfactory in 
Britain, where there has recently been a substantial move away from state 
provision, than in France or Germany where the state continues to play a 
larger role.5 Thus the arguments below for stronger regulation of market 
finance are not meant to imply that even well regulated financial markets 
are superior to state provision – on the contrary.
However, even where the state retains a major role in such fields as 
pension provision, the market demand for financial services is likely to 
grow as a result of rising levels of income and the increasing complexity 
of economic relations. And where private sector provision is extensive it is 
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important that it works as well as possible, even though more public provi-
sion might be desirable.
10.2  METHODS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
As for financial regulation in general, consumer protection systems exhibit 
a great deal of diversity across Europe, as a consequence of differences 
in needs and in types of provision. In recent years, however, regulatory 
systems have tended to converge to a certain extent. One trend has been 
a move to cross-sectoral regulatory institutions and away from sector-
specific institutions; this might be seen as a response to the increased 
ability of financial companies to enter different sectors – as when British 
banks became big players in the mortgage market. A second trend has 
been a move to more formal rules and procedures; this can be related to 
the increased openness of some financial activities to competitive entry so 
that the population of enterprises supplying a given service might be less 
stable and less susceptible to informal controls.
Both trends can be seen as moving towards the US model of a domi-
nant single regulator in the financial sphere – the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC). In fact, there has been some pressure from the US 
to converge on this model, at least as far as security markets were con-
cerned, in order to avoid a competitive disadvantage for US security 
markets (Lütz, 2002). However that may be, unitary regulators have been 
introduced in Germany, for example, by bringing banking, insurance and 
security trading regulators under one roof (Fröhlich and Huffschmid, 
2004, chapter II, section 1.1), and in Britain where legislation in 2000 
replaced a series of sectoral regulators by the unitary Financial Services 
Authority.
In retail sectors, regulatory change has tended to involve more precise 
rules governing the description and marketing of financial products (as 
with the introduction of statutory ‘cooling-off periods’ during which a 
customer might cancel a financial agreement without penalty) and the 
treatment of customer complaints, with a widespread use of ombuds-
men to reduce the cost of disputes. But this kind of formalization has 
tended to focus on procedures rather than on the substantive nature of the 
financial services which are being sold to the public. The prevalent view 
has been that substantive restrictions are an obstacle to competition and 
innovation and a number of such restrictions have been removed – most 
importantly restrictions on the portfolios of institutional investors such 
as limits to their placements in certain assets or abroad. Thus stricter 
control over procedures has accompanied some substantive liberalization 
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and deregulation. Once again, US practice has often been influential – for 
example in relaxing specific controls over many of the portfolios managed 
by institutional investors and substituting some version of the ‘prudent 
man’ approach used in the US which simply requires that portfolio deci-
sions are reasonable given the interests of the consumer.
10.3  THE FAILURE OF INTEGRATION IN THE 
RETAIL SPHERE
The Commission itself has had to acknowledge that the Financial Services 
Action Plan has not yet brought about much integration in retail finance. 
Retail markets for banking services, institutional investment, consumption 
and housing credit and so on are characterized by considerable national 
variations; branch networks, representing huge investments, are still very 
important in some of these markets and constitute barriers to the entry of 
suppliers from other countries. The local knowledge which domestic sup-
pliers possess about customers, about their requirements and preferences 
and about the risks in extending credit to households and small businesses 
may be very important and may also represent obstacles to market pen-
etration by foreign financial enterprises. 
Thus a Commission report in 2004 finds the highest level of integration 
among financial institutions themselves, considerable integration in the 
provision of financial services to non-financial companies, but very little in 
the retail sphere: some convergence in prices is claimed and the emergence 
of some new transnational infrastructures (mostly, one expects, in the pro-
vision of payment services) but virtually no cross-border establishments 
by providers of retail services (Frangakis, 2005).
These obstacles to direct market entry mean that financial companies 
wishing to penetrate retail markets in other European countries may 
often seek to do so by mergers and acquisitions, by purchasing exist-
ing companies. Here again, however, less integration is observed than 
might have been expected – there are in fact fewer cross-border mergers 
in retail finance than in most other sectors of the economy, a fact which 
the Commission deplores and which it brought to the attention of the 
ECOFIN council in 2004.6
A final factor depressing international markets for retail finance may be 
the recent crises on the stock market and in the banking system and the 
associated corporate and financial scandals. Many retail investors were 
inveigled into schemes promising big returns from international place-
ments and may now feel inclined to distrust similar adventures.
However, there may also be some long-run tendencies towards greater 
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integration: the introduction of the euro must itself facilitate cross-border 
transactions, and the growing use of the Internet may give rise to new 
forms of service provision which are less tied to specific countries or 
localities (for this reason the Commission takes a great deal of interest in 
e-commerce). There are also, at least in principle, benefits from further 
international portfolio diversification7 which can be expected to improve 
the risk/return characteristics of the investment products offered to house-
holds provided that external investors are not systematically disadvan-
taged by their lack of knowledge or of influence.8
The point here is that these are long-run tendencies which may lead to 
greater integration if countervailing forces do not prove to be stronger. 
The voluntarism of the EU, which sees integration as the outcome of leg-
islative and administrative commitment has, as so often in the past, clearly 
shown its limits in the field of retail finance.
10.4  INTEGRATION OF MORTGAGE MARKETS
In 2007, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for the Internal 
Market, which has been responsible for some of the most extreme free 
market projects launched by the EU, started to push for a full integration 
of European mortgage markets (European Commission, 2007b). This is a 
particularly fatuous proposal. It is based on the usual one-sided and exag-
gerated estimate of the benefits of integration. In fact, since the financial 
corporations which make home loans already have full access to wholesale 
credit markets in each other’s countries, there is no great need to integrate 
the retail side of the market. The Commission claims that integration 
would widen the range of mortgage products available to consumers but 
such widening might well work to the disadvantage of consumers because 
it could make for spurious product differentiation and render price com-
parisons more difficult.
At the same time, integration of mortgage markets would require a 
convergence of regulatory systems and in practice this would mean a level-
ling down of standards. Regulation in housing markets, developed over 
generations in response to the specific social priorities of different member 
states, would be crudely levelled downwards to permit the interpenetra-
tion of markets by the biggest corporate players.
As usual with the D-G for the Internal Market, a simplistic view of US 
practices inspires ill-thought-out proposals for Europe. Until recently, 
American mortgage markets were strongly influenced by big quasi-official 
institutions (‘Freddie Mac’ and ‘Fannie Mae’) which allocated mortgage 
credit with a concern for stability in housing finance and with the social 
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objective of facilitating access to property ownership for middle-income 
groups. Naturally no suggestion of similar strong institutions to influence 
European markets comes from the Commission. Rather, the Commission 
admires the recent deregulation of US housing finance and proposes to 
imitate it.
But this deregulated mortgage market, with an unrestricted secondary 
market in mortgages and mortgage-backed securities was a major factor in 
the ‘sub-prime’ financial crisis which has led to the disruption of banking 
and credit markets around the world. In the housing sector itself, the spe-
cific consequences of the crisis include drastic declines in house prices, a 
collapse of house-building and the subjection of thousands of low-income 
households to the distress of repossession. In the UK, which has one of 
the most deregulated mortgage markets, many of the same phenomena 
can be seen.
The Commission had rapidly to change its tune on these stability issues. 
In the expert report which was used to prepare the way for the launch of 
the mortgage market integration drive (European Commission, 2006d, 
p. 9) it was argued that a strong secondary market in mortgages would 
necessarily contribute to stability by spreading risk. By the end of 2007 
it had to be acknowledged, in the White Paper itself, that things were 
not as simple and that the secondary market in mortgages could involve 
problems in monitoring debtors. The White Paper recognizes that the fact 
that
many of the rules which restrict the offering of certain products on a cross-
border basis have been designed to protect consumers and/or preserve financial 
stability. The problems which occurred recently on the US sub-prime market 
serve as useful reminders of the importance of not taking undue risks with these 
crucial public policy objectives (European Commission, 2007b, p. 4).
In practice, however, close and detailed regulation of secondary markets 
would block the move to market integration since it would deter many 
financial corporations from moving into other member states.
10.5  THE FIN-USE CRITIQUE
It is a sign of the distortion of political processes in the EU that it was 
only when the FSAP was virtually finished that any systematic attempt 
was made to consult with the retail users of financial services (households 
and small businesses) as to the validity of the strategy. One aspect of this 
belated integration of consumers was the creation of FIN-NET. This 
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establishes communications among the various member state systems 
for dealing with customer complaints and if possible resolving disputes 
between providers and consumers without court action.9 The objective is 
to encourage cross-border transactions by making it easier for dissatis-
fied customers to complain and to seek compensation. The premise of 
the system is what is usually called ‘home country control’, that is, each 
financial institution is regulated in the country in which it is based and 
this regulation is recognized as valid in each member state in which it 
operates.
The second aspect of consultation with consumers, the establishment of 
FIN-USE, a forum of experts representing user interests called exactly this 
premise into question. What is needed, claimed these experts is ‘user home 
country control’, that is a general requirement of a financial institution 
operating in another country to meet all the regulatory requirements of 
that country (FIN-USE Forum, 2004). These requirements are not arbi-
trary but reflect specific user needs, rooted in history, culture and social 
norms. Such a view leads the users to come close to seeing the FSAP as a 
whole as a case of regulatory capture, as a series of policies whose essence 
is to promote the interests of the powerful suppliers of financial services. 
The four reports on which FIN-USE was asked to comment are seen in 
virtually these terms, as representing compromises between suppliers and 
regulators to the detriment of users:
It is a common feature of the four reports that they fail to discuss the possibility 
that the creation of pan-European markets in financial services could have neg-
ative effects on some users. Yet it is well-known that economic integration has 
winners and losers even if the overall impact is positive. FIN-USE is concerned 
that no thought seems to be given to compensating the ‘losers’ (p. 4).
FIN-USE is of the opinion that these [national] laws, developed over many 
years and reflective of the diverse cultures that make up the EU, should not be 
lightly dismissed. Instead, an empirical case must be made for why the potential 
benefits of a bigger market outweigh the costs of doing away with existing con-
sumer protection laws (p. 5).
From this position a comprehensive critique of the FSAP is developed. 
This may leave intact the case for integrating wholesale markets where 
powerful and knowledgeable actors confront each other, but it completely 
undermines, on both social and economic grounds, the basic thrust of the 
FSAP towards regime competition, self-regulation of finance by the finan-
cial companies themselves, and the removal of strict rules in the interests 
of market integration. The box (10.1) of counter-examples offered by 
FIN-USE is worth reproducing as a whole.
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10.6  SYSTEM-WIDE PROBLEMS
One point made strongly by FIN-USE is that the massive failures of the 
US financial system from the dotcom bubble and consequent stock market 
collapse through such corporate scandals as Worldcom and Enron and 
BOX 10.1  BENEFITS OF STRICT PROTECTION 
LAWS
In order to prevent the sale of ‘false’ or unnecessary insurance 
– sometimes combined or ‘packed’ with legitimate insurance 
products – consumer protection legislation and case law often 
guarantees that insurance must provide coverage of risks that 
the target group actually faces. These same laws specify ‘cooling 
off’ periods (i.e., periods during which the purchase of insurance 
products can be cancelled without penalty) and set maxima for 
the length of time that buyers must pay insurance premiums.
● In payment systems, some countries have created a right 
to a basic bank account for all citizens (including over-
indebted individuals and those with very low income). In 
addition, some countries have placed restrictions on the 
ability of service providers to terminate payment services. 
These laws presumably reflect a societal belief that access 
to financial services should not depend only on the ability of 
suppliers to profit from service provision.
● In securities markets, an increasing body of national law 
concerns the allocation of risk in particular investment vehi-
cles. The idea is that adequate advice, informed by the indi-
vidual financial situation of the investor, must be provided.
● Laws against excessive pricing (including, for example, 
usorious interest rates, excessive fees for unwanted serv-
ices and excessive penalties for exiting long-term con-
tracts), predatory lending, fraudulent investments have a 
long history especially on the continent.
● Laws that protect the elderly against fraudulent investment 
products.
Source: FIN-USE Forum (2004)
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the revelation of widespread fraud and malpractice by institutional inves-
tors, financial advisers and security dealers, have not elicited any adequate 
response from the Commission. It has imitated the US government in 
calling for more effective auditing and financial reporting by enterprises 
but has not called into question either the overall working of the finan-
cial system or the direction of change towards a wider role for security 
markets.
However, there is a lot of evidence to indicate that financial problems 
today are indeed system-wide, and cannot be reduced to the misconduct 
of individuals or to localized malfunctions. The security-based financial 
system can be viewed as a series of links, connecting the households which 
are the ultimate suppliers of financial resources with the corporations 
which are major users of these resources. Households, often through the 
activities of advisers or other agents, supply savings to insurance compa-
nies and other institutional investors who, in turn, place these funds on 
secondary financial markets. A host of agents – analysts, credit ratings 
agencies, stock traders and fund managers, clearance and settlement 
agencies – are involved in their so doing. Through the interconnection 
of secondary and primary markets, the valuations established on the 
secondary markets control the allocation of capital among the corpora-
tions in general. A continuous flow of accurate information to the security 
markets is one necessary condition for these valuations to be meaning-
ful and another host of agents, inside and outside the corporations, are 
involved in acquiring and transmitting this information – such as financial 
managers, auditors and accountants. The distributed profits of the corpo-
rations then return via the institutional investors to repay and reward the 
households as providers of funds. The structures of corporate governance, 
such as boards of directors and management incentive systems, have, as 
at least one of their functions, the alignment of corporate behaviour with 
investor interests.
Now, every link in these complex chains has been called into ques-
tion by the recent development of financial systems. The institutional 
investors have sold inappropriate savings products to households, often 
using unscrupulous sales forces whose commissions push up the costs of 
the products and lower the returns to customers. The same institutional 
investors have often carried out transactions on security markets which 
are contrary to the interests of their customers – firstly by failing to make 
the best possible assessments of the securities they are trading and then 
by incurring excessive transactions costs which have benefited a range 
of security market professionals – in both cases to the detriment of their 
customers. The corporations which were supposed to function in the 
interests of investors have rather been guided by the priorities of their top 
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managements who have creamed off an ever-growing share of company 
revenues. The professionals – outside directors, accountants, auditors and 
the rest – who were supposed to control management have failed to do so 
and have instead been induced by easy money to give free rein to excessive 
managerial rewards and to the deception of investors.
These considerations apply in general not just to households as inves-
tors but also to the other main interactions between households and the 
financial system, where households are borrowers or users of the payments 
infrastructure. According to free market doctrines the interests of the 
households should predominate; in reality their interests are often subor-
dinated to those of the enterprises which supply financial services.
The main response to the scandals and crises of recent years, both by 
the US authorities and the European Commission, has been to call for 
more transparency, for fuller and more accurate flows of information. In 
general, this proposal is justified, although a move to very frequent report-
ing periods may not be an advantage if it encourages a preoccupation with 
short-run variations in company performance.
More fundamental flaws in the financial structure have to be acknowl-
edged. Firstly, there are many grounds to question the power and auton-
omy of the modern corporation. Those who promote the drive to enhance 
the economic role of security markets take it for granted that the markets 
in which an enterprise functions, together with minimal legal safeguards, 
constitute an adequate system of social control. Many corporations them-
selves are starting to recognize the implausibility of such claims, as the 
increasing discussion of ‘corporate social responsibility’ makes clear. But 
the rhetorical tribute paid to social responsibility does not alter the pro-
found gaps in the social control of large businesses, endowed with legal 
personality; when the maximization of investor returns becomes the only 
legitimate objective for corporate leaderships then they are sanctioned to 
disregard or circumvent every social constraint without being effectively 
subordinated even to the interests of shareholders.
In fact, it has been realized since the 1930s that the emergence of giant 
corporations brings about a separation of ownership and control which 
compromises the position of outside investors. (The classic thesis of Berle 
and Means, the separation of ownership and control, has recently been 
re-examined and updated by several writers; see in particular, Aglietta and 
Rebérioux, 2005). Some wish to see in the growth of institutional inves-
tors a strong countervailing force to that of corporate leaderships, but the 
actual functioning of these financial institutions is, perhaps necessarily, 
centred on the security markets and on the construction and maintenance 
of portfolios rather than on the monitoring and control of individual 
corporations. Although pension funds, investment trusts and insurance 
M1803 - GRAHL TEXT.indd   210 30/3/09   14:37:54
GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:11683 - EE - GRAHL:M1803 - GRAHL TEXT
 Finance and the household  211
GRAHAMS IMAC:Users:Graham:Public:GRAHAM'S IMAC JOBS:11683 - EE - GRAHL:M1803 - GRAHL TEXT
companies will certainly press for transparency from the corporations in 
which they invest, they are not in a position to exercise close and continu-
ous supervision of the corporations – indeed they would be reluctant to 
develop close relations with any specific company because this would 
compromise their ability to trade the securities concerned.
The problematic role of the corporation, then, is one deep factor deter-
mining the malfunctions of the financial system. A second is the intrinsic 
susceptibility of security markets to cumulative waves of rising or falling 
prices, related to imitative behaviour among the traders active on these 
markets. Once again, the fact that, today, institutional investors play a 
very big role on these markets does not change the basic nature of the diffi-
culty – indeed, the competition among institutional investors may promote 
imitative behaviour as each of them tries to avoid being left behind by the 
portfolio shifts of the others. These speculative swings on security markets 
cannot be eliminated simply by improving information flows if the division 
of the market into individual actors with separate interests is maintained. 
It is the emergence of certain common views of future developments which 
can limit these waves of pessimism and optimism, but such shared opin-
ions emerge from a discursive process with a political and social content 
– which has to be regarded as a public good.10
Thus, the problems of retail finance should not be seen as limited fail-
ures of a financial structure which is fundamentally sound; rather, these 
problems result from basic weaknesses in the corporation as an institution 
and in the functioning of the securities markets.
10.7  THE BRITISH CASE
To present the problems of retail finance in a more concrete manner, it is 
useful to examine some of the many failures in the British system. Britain 
is a lot closer to the market-dominated financial structures which are 
found in the US than are other European countries. The British case can 
therefore be taken to represent the kind of financial system which the EU’s 
financial integration strategy is trying to bring about by its promotion 
of the role of security markets. There is a lot of evidence that the British 
system serves the interests of households very badly.
Households as Savers
This negative view of the British system has been reinforced by a number 
of authoritative reports into various aspects of retail finance. The Myners 
(2001) review of institutional investment, although very much written 
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from the point of view of the financial sector itself, identified serious ‘dis-
tortions’ in the activities of pension funds, including a tendency to ‘herd’ 
in their investment decisions. The critical relationship between fund man-
agers and the brokers who dealt on their behalf in the stock market was 
opaque, so that there was a tendency for transactions costs to be excessive. 
The review identified even more serious failings with the individual savings 
products sold by insurance companies (in Britain, most of these are what 
is known as ‘with profits’ schemes). The fierce competition in this sector 
was all about marketing the products and had little or no impact on the net 
returns received by savers.
The Sandler report (2002) examined the products of the insurance compa-
nies in more detail and also considered the functioning of investment com-
panies. The role of so-called ‘Independent Financial Advisers’ was looked 
at in more detail. These enterprises are not in any true sense independent 
– they derive their income not in the form of fees from those they advise but 
as commissions from the institutional investors whose products they sell. 
Governments have repeatedly retreated from radical reform of the IFAs 
because the necessary reform – to eliminate the IFAs’ interest in distorting 
consumer choice by forbidding them to accept commissions, or at least to 
make this interest clear to the consumer by strict disclosure requirements – 
would put much of the parasitic IFA structure out of business. Sandler com-
ments that ‘the focus of competition for providers is on winning distribution 
rather than on providing simple, good value products to the end consumer.’ 
The latest attempt at reform, in 2005, changed the rules governing the range 
of products to be distributed but again shied away from tackling the deep 
conflict of interest which prevents IFAs giving impartial advice.
British commentators often refer to a ‘savings gap’, meaning by this 
that many households are not acquiring sufficient assets for a decent 
retirement. There are various measures of the ‘gap’; Sandler refers to an 
estimate that personal savings are 20 per cent below the required level. 
In fact the whole notion of a savings gap is tendentious because it rules 
out reinforced public provision as the best way to improve pensions and 
because it neglects the fact that many pensioners are very well off so that 
the distribution of income among pensioners is just as important an issue 
as the total amount of income going to pensions. Nevertheless, those who 
accept the notion of a gap just because they wish to exclude redistribution 
and public provision face the difficulty that public distrust of the financial 
sector is such as to discourage many people from increasing their savings. 
It was this perspective which informed the enquiry of the Treasury Select 
Committee (2004) of the House of Commons. The Select Committee 
endorses and strengthens the Sandler critique of commission-driven sales 
in the retail financial sector. It emphasizes that the information failures in 
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the sector include a failure to give consumers an accurate account of the 
risks of many products. The overall judgement is harsh:
Presently, many areas of the long-term savings industry are struggling to offer 
returns that can realistically be expected to be much better than those available 
from a good deposit account, especially when allowance is made for the risks 
involved in most forms of long-term savings. This suggests that one of the main 
priorities for the long-term savings industry is to work out how it can deliver 
competitive returns to the saver. This is likely to require both the development 
of lower cost distribution mechanisms and a much greater emphasis on invest-
ment performance and asset allocation.
 Nevertheless
 the industry currently fails to engage in serious dialogue on a regular basis 
with consumer bodies and other interested parties on issues such as pension 
reform, access for the less affluent or, indeed, general consumer confidence. 
This may well partly explain why the industry in recent years has seemed to 
limp from crisis to crisis (p. 69).
Households as Borrowers
British households as investors, then, are not well served. In many ways 
their treatment as borrowers, as users of finance, is even more alarming. 
Long-term borrowing for house purchase does not in itself raise particular 
difficulties, although the provision of mortgages in Britain was for a long 
time linked to the sale of certain savings products (‘endowments’) which 
were subject to all the problems referred to above. Mortgage endowments 
were eventually treated as a case of mass ‘mis-selling’, and the financial 
sector is still involved in the slow and often reluctant compensation of 
some of the victims.
However, it is the provision of shorter-term credit, to support consump-
tion expenditures, where the most serious problems arise. Two illustra-
tions can be given. Banks and other providers of unsecured loans often 
try to sell to the borrower at the same time an insurance policy known as 
‘payment protection insurance’. These policies are supplied to banks and 
other lenders by insurance companies and then sold on, at the same time 
as a loan is agreed, to households at horrific mark-ups. Further, they are 
often sold to people to whom they are valueless – for example, the self-
employed who are not covered against unemployment. Even when the 
policy is of some value, it clearly benefits the lender as well as, or even 
more than, the borrower because it greatly reduces the chances of default; 
it is in particular less sophisticated customers, and those most in need of 
credit, who are persuaded to purchase these over-priced and deceptive 
products. Although the FSA (2005) has been trying to limit the scale of 
abuse, lenders make enormous sums from payment protection which is 
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said to account for 10 per cent of the profits of major commercial banks. 
A report from the Office of Fair Trading (2006) recently concludes that, in 
the market for payment protection, some £5.5billion annually, ‘consumer 
detriment appears to be a significant fraction of the total market value’. 
The matter has been referred to the Competition Commission (2008), 
whose first report begins by estimating ‘that the 12 largest distributors of 
PPI made profits in excess of the cost of capital of £1.4 billion in 2006, on 
their combined Gross Written Premium (GWP) of £3.5 billion.’ This is 
attributed to inadequate competition, although it is as much a question of 
simple dishonesty as of market power.
In a similar way, other malfunctions in the provision of credit to house-
holds affect above all those on inadequate incomes or facing economic inse-
curity. Many British households are in debt difficulties, as is signalled by the 
rapidly rising number of personal bankruptcies. ‘Some 8% of individuals 
have monthly repayments on unsecured borrowing in excess of 25% of their 
income.’ Yet financial corporations market all forms of consumer credit in 
the most ferocious way. ‘County court judgements against personal debtors 
in the first half of 2005 rose by 15% to 290,643.’ Between September and 
November of 2005, credit card issuers sent over 100 million unsolicited 
offers of credit cards to British households (Credit Action, 2006).
As in much of the financial sector, competition is focused on marketing 
and product discrimination rather than price, so that competition does 
not effectively reduce the cost of credit to households. The Treasury Select 
Committee, which issued a damning report on credit cards in 2003, noted 
certain improvements in industry practice in 2005, but added: ‘The indus-
try as a whole has further to go if the goal is to be achieved of ensuring that 
customers can understand clearly what they are being charged for in their 
use of their credit cards and, for some, avoid arriving almost unknowingly 
at a point where they have built up dangerous levels of personal debts.’ 
(Treasury Select Committee, 2005).
The poorest and most vulnerable individuals tend not to deal with 
established banks or financial corporations but become the prey of loan 
sharks and ‘doorstep’ lenders. Here, three-digit interest rates are the rule 
rather than the exception: the Housing Corporation (2005) reports that
financially excluded families with no access to affordable credit will have to 
borrow money from doorstep lenders at rates of up to 600%. For those forced 
to turn to illegal loan sharks, the prospects are even worse. In July 2005, a 
loan shark in Birmingham was convicted having charged interest rates of up 
to 8,000%.
There are no adequate systems or structures in Britain to protect the 
poor from this ruthless exploitation.
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Households and the Payments System
In an economy which makes less and less use of cash, individuals without 
access to the payments system face immense difficulties in their daily lives. 
For most of the population, the necessary transactions services are pro-
vided in the form of current accounts with commercial banks. Households 
in general are not well served by the banks. The Cruikshank (2000) report, 
commissioned by the then British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon 
Brown, told what is now a familiar story of overpriced products and poor 
services. One can take as typical the judgement on money transmission:
Money transmission services are supplied in the UK through a series of 
unregulated networks, mostly controlled by the same few large banks who in 
turn dominate the markets for services to SMEs and personal customers. This 
market structure results in the creation of artificial barriers to entry, high costs 
to retailers for accepting credit and debit cards, charges for cash withdrawals up 
to six times their cost, and a cumbersome and inflexible payment system that is 
only slowly adapting to the demands of e-commerce.’
All other aspects of Bank services are criticized in similar term – the 
commercial banks meanwhile make profits which dwarf those of most 
other enterprises.
Once again the worst difficulties are faced by the weakest and most 
vulnerable. In some other European countries, notably France, individu-
als have the right to a basic bank account which permits them to receive 
wages or social security benefits, to make a certain number of electronic 
payments free of charge and also to make a certain number of free cash 
withdrawals each month. In Britain, however, reluctance to constrain the 
activities of the financial corporations means that no such right has been 
established. The Treasury (HM Treasury, 2004) report on the issue begins 
by recognizing that
One in twelve households in the UK lacks access to a bank account of any kind. 
For them the costs of transactions as simple as cashing cheques or paying bills 
are high, and services such as hiring videos and contract mobile telephones are 
unavailable. Whilst lacking a bank account has costs in itself, the implications 
of financial exclusion can be much broader. Families can be locked in a cycle of 
poverty and exclusion, or turn to high cost credit or even illegal lenders, result-
ing in greater financial strain and unmanageable debt.
In Britain the term, ‘exclusion’ is used too much, a weasel word for 
poverty. People with decent jobs, homes and incomes will often be able to 
include themselves in social life. Nevertheless, in the context of payments 
services it is valid to speak of exclusion, in a concrete sense.
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The critique of British retail finance is of general significance because 
the whole thrust of the EU’s financial strategy is towards exactly this 
kind of system: British finance is characterized by powerful financial cor-
porations, by huge security markets, by the prevalence of ‘arm’s-length’, 
market-based corporate finance over the socially embedded investors 
often found in continental Europe. The regulatory constraints on British 
financial companies are minimal in order to give as much scope as pos-
sible to market forces. It is just such a system, on a Europe-wide basis, 
that is aimed at by the FSAP and the Lisbon agenda in general, while EU 
competition rules for the service sector threaten to undermine existing 
structures of social control and intervention at member state level. But the 
most elementary examination of the retail finance in Britain, drawing on 
documents from the most orthodox establishment sources can show that 
the financial model which is aimed at by the EU may have a very negative 
impact on the welfare of the households which make use of it.
10.8  DISMANTLING SOCIAL CONTROL
At the retail, as at the wholesale level, financial services are increasingly 
important and an essential aspect of contemporary economic life. Many 
retail services work well for many people much of the time. But when 
they fail to do so, as happens sometimes for most consumers and very 
frequently for the poorest and most vulnerable, the results are distress-
ing and in complete conflict with the values of the European social 
models.
In this sphere as in others, the European social models require effective 
systems of social control. Yet the main tendency in recent decades has 
been to dismantle such systems. This process has many aspects, only some 
of which have been discussed here.
Established barriers between particular sectors of retail finance have  ●
been removed in order to stimulate competition; in any case, techno-
logical change was making it difficult to maintain these barriers.
Public sector provision has been reduced, both to control public  ●
spending and as part of the broad privatization drive. Particularly 
important here has been a general reduction, across Europe, in the 
provision of financial services through post offices. These services 
were often used most by low-income groups. There have been 
threats also to the public sector banks (Sparkassen) in Germany, 
whose position has been challenged as contrary to European 
 competition rules.
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Along with the reduction in public provision there has also been a  ●
move away from non-profit provision – the role of cooperative and 
mutual financial institutions has been reduced, again often in order 
to enforce competition rules. There is evidence, however, that the 
transformation of mutuals into profit-making corporations, for 
example in the case of British building societies, has worked against 
the interests of consumers.
There has been a switch in regulation away from the substantive  ●
control of financial services and products to a focus on procedures 
– on information disclosure, for example, or marketing practices. 
It has been argued, to justify this switch, that substantive controls 
block innovation. In practice, however, many innovations are spuri-
ous – a question of marketing rather than genuinely new services 
and the abolition of controls on pricing and quality standards may 
have damaged consumers –especially low-income consumers.
Growing international trade in retail financial services and the  ●
increasing use of the Internet to sell and deliver financial services, 
although both trends are slower than is sometimes thought, raise a 
whole series of new problems for effective social control.
In principle, the EU is very well placed to act as a vector of renewed 
social control, through its transnational reach and its ability to prom-
ulgate and police high minimum standards in service provision. There 
are some signs that EU institutions are becoming more aware of these 
responsibilities.11 But to discharge them in an adequate way will require 
a shift away from the current insistence on market-led integration as the 
overriding priority of EU policy in retail finance.
NOTES
 1. See Goodhart et al. (1998) chapter 1, ‘The rationale for regulation’.
 2. The term ‘consumer protection’ is used here to emphasise that the household, whether 
it is saving, borrowing or using other financial services, stands in a relation to the 
company providing the service which is analogous to that of a retail customer to a cor-
poration providing consumer goods or services. Much of what follows, however, also 
applies to small businesses as users of financial services since the imbalances in power 
and information between small businesses and financial corporations can be as great as 
for households. The term ‘investor protection’ is also often used in the literature when 
the service involves the use of household savings.
 3. Thus, detailed protection regulation is usually thought to be less necessary in wholesale 
financial markets where all participants can be assumed to be experts and to have a 
good understanding of the product and services which are traded. But note that even in 
wholesale markets, investors are not always as informed as they should be.
 4. For example, many British people were unaware that they were entitled to use certain 
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pension savings to buy an annuity from any supplier and simply bought it from the 
company providing the pension savings plan. Regulation was used to try to ensure that 
companies made customers aware of the ‘market option’.
 5. If the poverty threshold is set at 50 per cent of median income, then the percentage of 
old (over 65 years) people in poverty is as follows: France, 7.8; Germany, 9.8; Sweden, 
7.7; United Kingdom, 20.9, United States, 24.7 (Wu, 2005).
 6. See European Commission (2005c), annex I, section IV). The Commission seemed to 
suspect that member state competition regimes were being used as protective devices to 
block cross-border mergers, although it offered no evidence of this. Some conceivable 
types of integration do not take place because there is little or no need for them but it 
is always difficult for the Commission, usually so committed to market principles, to 
understand this elementary aspect of market economics.
 7. Davis and Steil (2001, p. 33) give the following figures for the percentage of pension fund 
portfolios held in foreign assets: United Kingdom, 18; United States, 11; Germany, 7; 
Japan, 18; Canada, 15; France, 5; Italy, 0. There would appear to be considerable scope 
for more diversification to take advantage of the variation in the macroeconomic cycle 
across countries as well as of differences in economic structure and thus in exposure to 
economic risks.
 8. Such disadvantages, however, have certainly marked many of the first steps towards the 
internationalization of asset management: when it becomes difficult to find a domestic 
purchaser for a dubious asset then attempts are made to find a sufficiently naive for-
eigner. The external adventures of Britain’s Midland Bank and Abbey National, the 
huge foreign losses of the Credit Lyonnais, the problems met by Deutsche Bank in its 
drive for global supremacy all supply chastening illustrations.
 9. It is rather difficult to assess the value of the FIN-NET system. It is reported that some 
400 consumer complaints were dealt with in its first year of operation (2002) but no full 
evaluation seems as yet to be available. 
10. Both the sub-prime crisis and the preceding dotcom bubble and collapse were condi-
tioned by the attempt of wealth-holders – individuals but also and especially banks 
and other financial corporations – to obtain rates of returm which simply could not be 
delivered on a continuing basis by the economy. Establishing more realistic conven-
tions regarding the yield on investments is a key condition for more efficient financial 
markets, but such conventions cannot be produced by market processes themselves. 
11. Besides the FIN-USE network, referred to above, one can mention the recent study, by 
the European Economic and Social Committee (2007), of the social consequences of 
recent financial developments, although there were clearly divisions within the commit-
tee on the need for stronger measures of social control. However, recent developments 
in EU policy have been rather negative in this respect. The influence of financial service 
users on policy formulation seems to have been attenuated. 
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11.  The impact of financial change on 
European employment relations
John Grahl
11.1  ECONOMIC AND IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS 
AND STANDARDS
In attempting to assess the impact of financial change on employment 
relations in Europe, it is necessary to recognize that this change has more 
than one dimension: clearly there are both economic and ideological 
aspects to the new salience of security markets and shareholders. Also 
of great importance is the issue of standards of practice where economic 
and ideological forces are combined.
Finance and Corporate Behaviour
The direct economic aspects are related to the constraints and opportuni-
ties in the financial environment of an enterprise. From the late 1950s, 
many mainstream economists thought that financial mechanisms would 
have little or no impact on corporate behaviour or corporate strategies. 
This was the implication of the Miller–Modigliani theorem which states 
that the value of an investment (and by extension, of an enterprise as an 
assembly of investment projects) is unaffected by the way in which it is 
financed.1 Were this the case, changes in the system of corporate finance 
would have no economic impact on employment relations.
However, the Miller–Modigliani theorem depends on the absence of 
asymmetric information. Information may be incomplete without being 
asymmetric so that investments involve risks but, by assumption, both the 
suppliers and users of finance assess these risks in the same way. When this 
assumption is not made, that is, when it is recognized that the enterprise 
as a user of funds will probably have more information than the suppliers 
of finance, the result no longer holds. Financial institutions and financial 
practices can now affect the value of potential investments, and thus cor-
porate behaviour, by their impact on the information flows from the enter-
prise to its creditors and investors.2 The theme of asymmetric information 
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permeates finance theory today and supports the view that changing struc-
tures of corporate finance might well alter corporate strategies, including 
approaches to employment relations.
The Shareholder Ideology
But ideological aspects must also be recognised. The increased scale and 
importance of equity markets, in particular, is not simply an economic 
development: the notion of shareholder value provides one view of the 
meaning and purpose of the modern corporation, a view that has been 
widely propagated in recent years. It is not, however, the only such view 
– at the same time a different, even to some extent opposed, corporate ide-
ology has developed, that of ‘corporate social responsibility’. Both types 
of thinking can be related to the separation of ownership from managerial 
control in the giant modern enterprise: shareholder value denies the separa-
tion by suggesting that the proprietors (the ‘principals’) are still essentially 
in control through the management (their ‘agents’); on the other hand, 
corporate social responsibility acknowledges that managerial autonomy is 
a reality but claims that it is exercised in socially legitimate ways.
Codes of Practice
However, it is also necessary to see the ways in which financial change 
combines economic pressures with the development of norms of conduct. 
Both equity and bond markets today depend on the standardization of 
the financial claims which are traded on them and this standardization of 
securities implies the imposition of common standards of practice among 
the firms which issue these securities. This is true immediately of the essen-
tial flows of information from a corporation back to the markets on which 
it is financed, that is the requirements on reporting corporate performance 
and on the accounting conventions to be used when doing so. But the 
standards of practice linked to these markets go beyond information flows 
in this narrow sense to embrace corporate governance as a whole: the way 
decision making in the firm is organized and the forms of accountability 
which are established. One aspect of the increased salience of security 
markets and dispersed ownership of equity is that formal codes of govern-
ance tend to become more important; when there are a only a few large 
investors closely tied to the company, it is less important to codify proce-
dures in this way because the allocation of responsibilities can be directly 
apprehended by those involved.
Thus a comparative study of European corporate governance codes 
finds that they have proliferated in recent years, the majority (25 out of 35) 
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having been issued since 1997, and that there are strong trends towards 
convergence in the practices and structures which are recommended in 
individual countries and, increasingly, on an international basis.3 Even 
though the legal position of shareholders is very different across member 
states, this convergence of norms signals the increased weight of the capital 
markets in corporate life because it establishes benchmarks of practice 
which make it easier to relate company performance to the measures of 
risk and return used by dispersed investors.
11.2  SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE 
STRATEGIES
Managerial Predation
In reality, shareholders have generally failed to impose their priorities 
on corporate managements. Brenner (2003b) documents this for the 
central case of a market-based financial system, the US. In 1992, the Chief 
Executive Officers of US corporations owned about 2 per cent of their 
outstanding equity; by 2002 this had become 12 per cent, perhaps the 
biggest expropriation of wealth in human history, and essentially at the 
shareholders’ expense.
A necessary condition of this vast failure of market-based control 
was consistent and dramatic overvaluation of companies on the equity 
markets. Michael Jensen, one of the leading academic advocates of share-
holder value, now accepts that things went badly wrong and points to 
overvaluation as one of the key factors.4
However, in the aftermath of the world-wide stock market crash of 
2000 and 2001 and with institutional investors attempting to rehabilitate 
themselves among their customers, equity markets may regain some of 
their disciplinary role. Just as important is the wide range of issues over 
which corporate leaderships themselves endorse a shareholder orientation 
of their strategies, a process of internalization of norms which, in Europe, 
has tended to run ahead of actual changes in financial constraints although 
these also have been accelerating.
Thus in his survey of changes in European corporate organization, 
Streeck (2001) observes that:
In recent years, European large firms have come under pressure to extend 
similar attention to shareholders, especially minority shareholders, as Anglo-
American firms; this is reflected in the debate on ‘shareholder value’ . . . 
as well as in ongoing changes in European regimes of corporate govern-
ance. Anglo-American arm’s-length financial relations mediated through a 
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developed capital market are increasingly beginning to invade and replace 
traditional European systems of national insider finance. In the process, the 
behaviour of Continental-European companies is changing as they find them-
selves forced to address many of the issues emphasized by the standard cor-
porate governance literature: e.g., how to ensure that minority shareholders 
are given reliable information; how to prevent ‘insider trading’ at the expense 
of outsiders; and how to hold management accountable to the interests of 
minority investors.
(It is pointed out that this reorientation does not stem from immediate 
financial pressures as most large European corporations could rely upon 
internally generated funds to meet most of their investment needs.)5
What strategies would a shareholder orientation suggest? As far as 
employment relations are concerned the general answer is straightforward: 
a relegation of the interests of labour, in so far as these are in conflict with 
profitability. In the abstract, there might be issues on which shareholders 
and employees could find common ground as against corporate manage-
ments; both groups might have an interest in making management more 
accountable, in limiting managerial predation and in extracting more 
information about the activities and plans of the management.6 However, 
in practice, decision-making power in the company usually remains with 
senior management, and strategies continue to reflect the interests of these 
elites. Shareholder interests, as interpreted by the managerial leadership, 
seem likely to sharpen antagonisms between employees and employers in 
so far as they imply pressure for higher profits.
If we look at how more specific aspects of corporate strategy might, 
under shareholder pressure, impact on employees then there are several 
examples, all of which seem to be adverse to employee interests. Firstly, 
there might be pressure to curtail investment and to distribute a higher 
fraction of profits to shareholders; the retention of earnings inside the firm 
and the adoption of investment projects aimed at growth more than profit-
ability are classical sources of friction between management and dispersed 
shareholders; employees would normally favour more investment at the 
price of lower dividends.
A related example concerns company structure. On grounds of trans-
parency dispersed shareholders dislike conglomerate companies; they 
prefer to control risks by diversifying their portfolios rather than by diver-
sification of activities at the level of the individual enterprise. This prefer-
ence may become more marked as institutional investors come to the fore 
because they, unlike all but the wealthiest individual investors, can carry 
out effective portfolio diversification and therefore have little interest in 
reducing the risks carried by single companies for a given expected rate 
of return.7 This investor preference, however, directly increases the job 
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insecurity of the employees by reducing the scope for redeployment within 
the firm.
On similar grounds, shareholders might press for the outsourcing of 
any activities which are not central to the production and sales strategies 
of the corporation. In this case, the transparency of company performance 
may not be the only motive: investors may also wish to dispose of assets 
which have lower rates of return than the targets they try to set for the 
enterprise.
Associated with such targets are various performance metrics, such as 
‘economic value added’ which are intended to correspond to the share-
holders’ interests. These differ from each other in some respects but tend 
to have in common that they focus on profitability while seeking to limit 
managerial discretion in reporting performance. They tend therefore to 
emphasize cash flows as an indicator of the resources which might become 
available to shareholders. The result may be a general pressure to reduce 
expenses which could impact adversely on working conditions. From the 
point of view of shareholder value, the very notion of ‘retained earnings’ 
is suspect. Everything, in this perspective, belongs to the shareholders and 
must be distributed to them unless retention serves their interests.
Mergers and Restructuring
A key aspect of the shareholder value movement is its approach to 
company restructuring, mergers and so on. On the one hand, mergers 
often present an opportunity for the extraction of large amounts of cash 
from the corporate sector; on the other, they are typically seen, from a 
shareholder point of view, as a means of bringing inefficient or spendthrift 
managements to account. The productive logic of many mergers, however, 
is unclear while employee interests tend to be relegated to the extent that 
financial motives are determinant. Clearly there may be occasions when 
a merger or takeover rescues jobs in an enterprise which would otherwise 
fail. However, the reverse is even more frequent – the restructuring is the 
occasion for job-shedding and wage-cutting.
Even when European elites were rushing to embrace virtually every 
aspect of the US shareholder model, there remained considerable reticence 
on the question of takeovers. The Commission officials responsible for the 
internal market had no doubts – their aim was to facilitate hostile takeovers 
by outlawing most of the measures by which an incumbent management 
might fight off an unwelcome bid. From their point of view the interests of 
the (dispersed) shareholders of the target firm should be paramount. The 
Takeover Directive was seen as central to financial integration: the key 
consideration was that shares issued anywhere in Europe should have the 
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same characteristics, including the same possibility of being purchased in 
the course of a takeover.
However, in July 2001 the European Parliament, in a dramatic tied 
vote, rejected the Commission’s proposals for a Takeover Directive. A 
very diluted version was passed by the EP in December 2003, but this did 
not establish the ‘level playing field’ desired by the Commission because 
the legal framework for (especially hostile) takeover bids remained very 
different in different member states. The outcome was not particularly 
logical in that no clear or agreed view emerged as to the reasons which 
would justify blocking a takeover; in that sense, the compromise Directive 
reflected the uneasy conscience of the EP. However, the extreme view of 
the Commission, that the only thing that mattered was the right of the 
holders of shares to dispose of them as they pleased, was certainly rejected 
and behind this rejection lay a concern for the social implications of 
restructuring.8
Incentives and Inequalities
Finally, it can be pointed out that the shareholder value drive is associ-
ated with sharply unequal rewards within the corporation. The activities 
of both management and employees are interpreted in a ‘principal–agent’ 
framework according to which the principals (the shareholders) have the 
problem of constraining their agents (corporate managements in the first 
instance) to subordinate their own interests to those on whose behalf they 
are supposed to be working. The solution proposed was to reward corpo-
rate leaderships in function of the returns they generated for shareholders 
in dividend payouts or rising share prices. In practice this led simply to an 
enormous inflation of rewards for corporate leaders, with no correspond-
ing benefits to the so-called principals.9
At the same time, the focus on shareholder interests means that there 
will be an attempt to compress the incomes of those employees whose 
performance is most easily monitored or who are most easily subjected 
to market disciplines.10 The outcome is a widening of income inequalities 
within the corporation. In contrast, where corporate strategy relates to a 
coalition of stakeholder interests, these inequalities will be smaller.
Corporate Bonds
It should be added that, in quantitative terms, the bond market is much 
more important in corporate finance in Europe than is the equity market. 
Further, there are clear signs of a recent increase in its importance. Banks 
and other financial institutions have always made considerable use of the 
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bond market, but now non-financial corporations appear to be doing 
so. The big expansion of these issues around the turn of the century was 
linked to the auction of third generation mobile phone frequencies, and 
the subsequent decline in issues suggested that the corporate bond market 
might return to the levels of the mid-1990s. This does not appear to be the 
case, however, and the new, much higher level of activity seems to have 
been established (Figure 11.1).
However, the greater prominence of bond markets does not have the 
same implications for the corporation as an increased dependence on 
equity markets. Bondholders resemble shareholders in that they both 
require ‘transparency’ and a full flow of information to the security 
markets. But there the resemblance ends. To the holders of bonds and 
other fixed-income securities, the value of their holdings depends on the 
extent to which risk can be reduced. For this reason they prefer corporate 
issuers to possess wide margins of safety, in terms of both revenues and 
assets. The first of these reduces the probability of default on debt service, 
1990 1995 2000 2005
0
50
100
150
Financial corporations other than MFIs (dotted line)
Non-nancial corporations (solid line)
Note: Gross Issues, all maturities, all currencies (by sector of the issuer; EUR billions; 
transactions during the month; nominal values) January 1990 to January 2006.
Source: ECB securities issues statistics
Figure 11.1  Debt securities issued by euro area residents
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the second reduces the probability of loss following default. In both cases 
shareholder interests are opposed to those of the bondholders because 
the former are seeking to reduce asset holdings and direct all revenue 
flows not needed for profitable investments back to themselves. Thus the 
switch of many large European corporations away from bank loans and 
towards the bond market does not seem likely to have major implications 
for  corporate strategy.
11.3  THE SHAREHOLDER DRIVE IN GERMANY
The impact of the shareholder movement in Germany is of particular 
interest because Germany is often seen as the most important example of a 
form of financial organization which puts much less emphasis on security 
markets than does the US, since the typical large corporation has tended 
to rely for equity capital on a small number of ‘inside’ investors with close 
links to and expert knowledge of its activities. To the extent that the wider 
public has contributed to corporate finance, it has been indirectly, through 
the banks, which have been by far the biggest suppliers of credit to the 
corporate sector.
The German financial system was, until recently, regarded as particu-
larly efficient in view of the rapid development and strong competitiveness 
of the German economy over several decades. However, like other fea-
tures of the German system, it has been called into question in the context 
of the slow growth and high unemployment rates seen in Germany since 
the early 1990s.
It is important to recognize that employment relations in Germany are 
also under enormous pressure for reasons other than financial change. 
Since the 1980s neoliberal projects have sought to lower labour standards, 
to encourage more inequalities in the distribution of income and to com-
press both direct labour costs and the social wage. The specific rationale 
for this project has sometimes changed; what began as, above all, a strat-
egy against inflation is continued as a strategy to promote low-cost service 
employment and to respond to the supposed challenges of globalization. 
Most recently a series of reforms to the social security system has drasti-
cally reduced indemnities for the long-run unemployed and tightened 
up eligibility criteria with a view to promoting low-paid and part-time 
employment as well as self-employment by the unemployed.
Thus the shareholder value drive takes its place among an array of forces 
working to destabilize German employment relations and to intensify both 
administrative and market constraints on workers. Nevertheless, it may be 
possible to link certain developments more closely to financial change.
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Recent Changes in Financial Structures in Germany
Compared with other continental economies, in particular that of France, 
patterns of corporate finance were relatively stable in Germany until very 
recently. Ownership of the larger enterprises was highly concentrated and 
often involved either a single dominant investor or a small group with 
effective control. There was an extensive network of cross-holdings among 
the larger enterprises, with the big banks in particular holding substan-
tial stakes in industrial companies. This structure, sometimes known as 
Deutschland AG or ‘Germany Incorporated’, was seen as the support for 
close linkages among the biggest firms. The general public held relatively 
few shares and participated in the finance of industry indirectly, through 
the banks. The stock market was relatively undeveloped in terms of both 
the number of firms listed on it and its overall capitalization. Foreign 
ownership was very limited except for a few foreign, mostly American, 
companies which had established a presence in Germany.
This situation now seems to be changing fast, especially as concerns the 
very biggest firms. The structure of industrial cross-holdings is now con-
siderably attenuated, as is the role of the banks as a shareholder in other 
companies. The German Monopoly Commission reports that whereas in 
1996 the six biggest private sector banks held stakes in 75 of the largest 100 
companies, by 2004 this had been reduced to 30. Over the same period the 
total number of cross-holdings among the 100 largest companies fell from 
51 to 28 and the number of enterprises (including the banks) possessing 
such stakes from 39 to 17 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2006). These develop-
ments have been analysed by Streeck and Höpner (2003) as the dissolution 
of Deutschland AG, in a process which is redefining German corporate 
interests and transforming corporate practice.
There is only a slow decline in the role of bank finance in the German 
economy. However, financial change in Germany is reflected less by quan-
titative change in the financial activities of the banks as in a change in their 
role. The banks themselves are increasingly active in fund management 
and now tend to regard their shareholdings in other German companies as 
essentially portfolios of securities rather than as the support for industrial 
collaborations.
Stock market data are hard to interpret because the stock market crash 
of 2001–2002 was particularly severe in Germany. Capitalization fell from 
$1432 billion at the end of 1999 to $686 billion at the end of 2002. Since 
then, however, it has grown at an accelerating rate to reach $2105 billion 
2007. The number of companies quoted on the Deutsche Börse on the 
other hand has not recovered its peak of 983 in 2001 but has grown fast 
from a low of 764 in 2005 to reach 866 in 2007.11
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These changes appear to be less rapid among smaller companies, where 
cross-holdings remain common and foreign ownership is growing less 
rapidly.
The stock market crash of 2001–2002 and in particular the failure of the 
Neue Markt, a secondary stock market specializing in innovative companies 
and start-ups, may also have delayed the pace of change in German finance. 
However, there has been a shared determination among business and politi-
cal elites in Germany to reorient the corporate sector towards market-based 
finance. A most important step in this direction was a tax reform by the 
Schröder government which allowed banks and other companies to sell off 
their accumulated holdings of shares free of capital gains tax.
Shareholder Orientation in Germany
Although these changes in financial practice are often very recent, the 
orientation of German companies has shifted rapidly. For example, Lane 
(2003) writes that
the German system of corporate governance . . . is in the process of converging 
towards the Anglo-American system and . . . this has fundamentally affected 
the way strategic decisions are made in firms. Large, internationally oriented 
companies are particularly affected. But the notion of shareholder value and 
its many behavioural effects are gradually spreading also to other parts of 
the economy. Consequently, the distinctive logic, which had underpinned the 
German variety of capitalism during most of the post-war period, is eroding. 
This transformation is affecting also labour and industrial relations in negative 
ways.
Lane sees the sources of this reorientation not only in international 
capital markets (potential access to which may affect corporate behaviour 
Table 11.1  Distribution of German financial system liabilities (in 
per cent), by type of financial institution
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Banking  
 Sector
76.9 77.1 76.0 75.4 75.4 74.8 72.9 72.1 69.9 70.4 71.3 72.9
Insurance  
 sector
18.2 18.0 18.3 18.6 18.3 18.1 18.8 18.6 18.9 18.2 17.8 16.9
Other  
  financial 
services
 4.9  4.9  5.7  6.0  6.2  7.0  8.3  9.3 11.2 11.4 10.8 10.2
Source: Vitols (2003).
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even though actual financial practice is relatively stable) but also in the 
pressures of product market competition and
new cultural and/or ideological orientations. . .the reference is to the concept 
of shareholder value and associated motivations, cognitions and scenarios for 
action. These have been widely propagated by consultancy firms which often 
are of Anglo-American origin. They also have been absorbed through partici-
pation in new programmes of management education, particularly the MBA, 
and, last, during extended spells of direct exposure to Anglo-American business 
environments when managing German subsidiaries in these two countries. The 
management practice of measuring performance through application of precise 
financial indicators, fundamental to the concept of shareholder value, has 
become widely adopted by and legitimate among higher German managers.
This transformation in corporate behaviour, then, involves both specific 
changes in company ownership and corporate finance and a more general 
reorientation towards the global economy. Factors at work include the 
increasing autonomy of large enterprises in all countries with respect to 
national regulatory regimes and their increasing use of financial market 
conditions as a reference point. But ideological influences have also been 
important.
11.4  CAPITAL MARKETS AND SHAREHOLDER 
POWER
For a balanced assessment of contemporary financial change it is nec-
essary to distinguish the expanding role of internationalized security 
markets from the ideology of shareholder value. The first of these is an 
essentially economic development which adapts financial relations to the 
internationalization of production and exchange. Until now, in fact, it is 
more obvious in European bond markets than equity markets, although 
the internationalisation of debt markets makes the internationalization of 
equity markets feasible, because the pricing of equities relates them to the 
return on a very low-risk security such as a government bond.
The problems arising from these developments are discussed through-
out this book. They include the intrinsic instability of deregulated equity 
markets, the tendency of all markets not subject to effective social control 
to generate inequalities and the weight of established interests (those of 
powerful financial actors in Europe and, especially, the US) in the design 
and construction of the new international market regimes.
In principle, these problems of regulation and control are best addressed 
at a European level. However, at present EU leaderships remain wedded 
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to simple market-based integration, divorced from any social project 
and threatening to undermine existing forms of social control in member 
states, without building European structures to replace them.12 In these 
circumstances, it can be important to defend social objectives at member 
state level, even if this retards the development of certain international 
economic relations.
However, it should be remembered that there is nothing sacred about 
the financial status quo ante in Europe. It is true that the ‘inside’ inves-
tors who control the big corporations have been constrained, in different 
ways in different countries and regions, to recognize the validity of other 
interests, including those of the employees. However, these groups still 
constituted privileged elites which sought to defend their own concen-
trated economic power. Indeed, it is often established industrial elites who 
are leading the drive towards an internationalized economic and financial 
system, partly at least because these developments can free them from the 
social compromises of the past.13
In the German case, for example, the structure of interlocking owner-
ship and control which characterized large-scale industry in Germany 
(and, as has been seen, continues to do so) was not seen as desirable by the 
trade unions because it meant that, in any conflict, they were confronted 
not by separate employers but by a closely integrated grouping mobilized 
to defend the collective interests of big capital. Thus the social advances 
made within the ‘stakeholder model’ of German capitalism should not be 
identified with that model itself which is open to many objections.
On the other hand, the ideology of ‘shareholder value’ cannot be vali-
dated by the new salience of equity markets at an international level, even 
though some financial developments lent a certain plausibility to some of 
the claims which it makes. This ideology seeks to deny that large corpora-
tions today represent concentrations of unaccountable power, by claiming 
that the interests of shareholders remain predominant, actually or poten-
tially, in corporate decision making.
The empirical falsification of the shareholder story (most obvious in 
the predation of corporate leaderships and related scandals) has been 
referred to above. The logical weaknesses of the shareholder value posi-
tion have been well expressed by Aglietta and Rebérioux (2005). Dispersed 
shareholders have, in reality, traded in the possibility of corporate control 
against the liquidity of their holdings. Their own interests mean that they 
value the ability to exit from their investment more highly than a decisive 
voice in corporate strategy. Indeed, were a shareholder to develop a privi-
leged, ‘insider’, position in a corporation, the very knowledge so acquired 
would become an obstacle to dealing in the shares concerned as it would 
give rise to an information asymmetry with other investors.
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Contrary to a fashionable view, the recent rise of the institutional 
investors does nothing to mitigate the divorce of ownership and control. 
Essentially, it intensifies it because the institutions are even more focused 
on portfolio liquidity and market trading than are individual investors (for 
a survey, see Grahl and Lysandrou, 2006). These investors will certainly 
exercise significant influence on aspects of corporate governance which 
might affect their ability to trade equity. But they have no ambition to 
control the companies concerned and will avoid any relationship to a cor-
poration which might give them the status of insiders because this would 
inhibit their trading.14
11.5  SHAREHOLDERS AND CAPITAL MARKETS
It may be necessary to distinguish more clearly than is often done between 
the following trends. On the one hand is the broad rise of security markets, 
including equity markets, to become much more important aspects of the 
corporate environment than in the past. This is true especially, but by no 
means only, in countries such as Germany where they were previously of 
very limited importance. On the other hand are the specific claims and 
ambitions which are articulated in terms of shareholder interests. The first 
shift seems to be systemic and irreversible, a function of the changing global 
economy and the new financial linkages which sustain it. The second only 
coincides with the first in some respects, that is in terms of those share-
holder interests which can be met through market pressure on the issuing 
enterprise, while the nostalgic view, which would restore  shareholders 
to the status of sovereign proprietors, will eventually fade because of its 
irrealism (Aglietta and Rebérioux, 2005). But even though the shareholder 
doctrine may prove to be a simplistic and idealized account of the new role 
of financial markets, this will not free large corporations from the much 
tighter constraints which capital markets exercise today.
NOTES
 1. According to the theorem, the balance between equity and debt in the finance of an 
investment makes no difference to its value because it is always open to the credi-
tors and shareholders to reallocate risks among themselves if they see an advantage 
in so doing. Miller and Modigliani give as an analogy a dairy farm: the value of its 
milk is not affected by whether it is sold as whole milk or separated into cream and 
skim. 
 2. One example of this kind of reasoning is the argument that the dominance of a few large 
‘inside’ investors in German corporations has made it easier to transmit information 
to them and thus to finance corporate expansion. On the other hand, it is sometimes 
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 suggested that it is more difficult to finance business start-ups in Germany than in the 
US because of the absence of a venture capital system. 
 3. ‘Notwithstanding legal differences among EU Member States, the trends toward con-
vergence in corporate governance practices in EU Member States appear to be both 
more numerous and more powerful than any trends toward differentiation. In this 
regard, the codes – together with market pressures – appear to serve as a converging 
force, by focusing attention and discussion on governance issues, articulating best prac-
tice recommendations and encouraging companies to adopt them.’ (Weil, Gotshal and 
Manges, LLP, 2002, p. 3).
4. See Jensen (2004): ‘When a firm’s equity becomes substantially overvalued it sets in 
motion a set of organizational forces that are extremely difficult to manage, forces 
that almost inevitably lead to destruction of part or all of the core value of the firm.’ 
He adds that ‘equity-based compensation cannot solve the problem because it makes 
the problem worse, not better.’ See also Jensen and Murphy (2004). Jensen now often 
appeals to ethical forces (‘integrity’) as the basis for a solution to problems of corporate 
control but it is hard to see how a world of corporate rivalry, enormous individual 
enrichment and a focus on profit maximization could be consistent with high ethical 
standards.
 5. Note, however, that the statistics of equity issues need to be handled with care. The fact 
that net issues of equity are low over the economy as a whole does not mean that the 
equity market is unimportant to individual corporations. If some companies are retir-
ing equity (often in the context of mergers and acquisitions) while others are issuing new 
shares then the stock market can be an important financial constraint on the companies 
concerned even though the corporate sector in aggregate is not drawing new funds 
from the household sector. Over the period January 1999 to January 2006, net issues of 
shares by non-financial corporations in the eurozone amounted to € 367.5 billion; gross 
issues over the same period were € 623.9 billion. It is the latter figure which indicates the 
importance of the stock market to the finance of individual corporations.
 6. On this question see Jackson (2005) and Rehder (2003), both of whom argue, cor-
rectly, that of the three groups, managers, employees and shareholders, any two might 
combine against the third (note as well that only under certain conditions will these 
groups themselves be able to aggregate the interests of the individuals who compose 
them). Jackson calls these possibilities ‘class coalitions’ (workers against managers and 
shareholders); ‘insider–outsider coalitions’ (workers and managers against sharehold-
ers); and ‘transparency coalitions’ (workers and shareholders against management). 
Insider–outsider or ‘productivist coalitions’ – have often been observed and are par-
ticularly probable at division-level in multi-divisional companies when divisions are 
competing for investment. But alliances between shareholders and employees are oppo-
sitional in nature – they cannot make corporate decisions but must aim to constrain the 
decisions taken by senior management.
 7. Most of the customers of the institutional investors are extremely risk-averse, but would 
still tend to endorse the diversification strategies of the latter, to the extent that they are 
effective.
 8. See also Chapter 4 above. The position of the Commission no longer corresponded to 
the situation in the US, usually taken as the model for financial reform. Although the 
US Supreme Court had in 1982 struck down state legislation to restrict hostile takeo-
vers, concern over the consequences of a wave of very ruthless takeovers in the 1980s 
led it to change its position and, in 1987, to endorse a restrictive statute in Indiana. 
‘State legislators were not concerned that stock ownership was changing hands, rather, 
it was the aftermath that was disturbing. In many cases, the goal of acquirers was not 
to simply control the stock, but to control the assets. In these instances, bidders would 
acquire controlling interest in a target company and then profit from the large-scale liq-
uidation of assets or the corporate restructurings that resulted in plant closings, layoffs, 
or out-of-state relocations. Takeovers motivated by such objectives were believed to 
threaten jobs, tax revenues, existing interdependent business relationships, community 
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stability, and corporate contributions to socially responsible causes. . . . As of March 
1992, over 40 states had passed or strengthened statutes regulating hostile takeovers.’ 
Mallette and Spagnola (1994).
 9. Thus in the largest 350 US corporations, the shareholder drive carried CEO compen-
sation from 50 times the average wage of employees in 1982 to 525 times the average 
wage in 2000. The collapse of the stock market bubble brought this down to a mere 281 
times average wages in 2002 (the mean CEO compensation standing then at $7,400,000 
(Erturk et al., 2005).
10. Thus the same era which saw the explosion of CEO rewards in the US was also marked 
by a slow decline in real wages for most workers.
11. Data from the World Federation of Exchanges.
12. The most obvious recent example of this approach is the notorious Bolkestein Directive, 
which sought directly to undermine and even to suppress a wide range of regulatory 
measures at member state level. See Dräger and Wagenknecht (2005).
13. The Swedish economy is a good example of this process. Swedish corporations are the 
most multinational in Europe, at least in part because of their desire to free themselves 
from the constraints imposed upon their activities in Sweden itself. 
14. Today it is usually a legal requirement that trades must not be made on privileged 
information; but it is also an economic necessity. Institutional investors are able to 
trade with each other on a routine basis only because they can plausibly claim not to be 
trading on private information.
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Appendix A
References for items 14 - 18
This is the reference list from Grahl (ed) Global Finance and Social Europe, and
it includes all the references for items 14 - 18 as well as some others on the same
theme which might be of interest.
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